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Concerned by the threat that psychology seemed to pose to Christian belief, Rufus 
Jones wrote Social Law in the Spiritual World in 1904 to show how this new science 
would actually lead to a deeper understanding of God. In particular, Jones, an 
American Quaker, discussed the relationship between humans and God in terms of 
the Quaker concept of the Inner Light. He argued that the traditional dualistic 
formulation, which saw the Inner Light as distinct from human nature, was 
psychologically flawed and that instead it should be understood as describing an 
inherent relationship between God and humans.  
Jones returned to the ideas in Social Law throughout his life, invariably generating 
controversy. Liberal Quakers endorsed his use of psychology, and his novel 
formulation of the Inner Light became axiomatic. Many Evangelical Quakers, 
however, worried that he was promoting humanism and marginalizing the need for 
Christ. He has thus been feted for revitalizing Quakerism on the one hand while 
being accused of making this Quakerism Christless on the other. In spite of his 
enduring legacy, however, his key ideas have received little critical attention. 
This thesis identifies the multiple strands of thought that are apparent in Social Law, 
assesses Jones’ attempts to synthesize them, and explains why his ideas have met 
with such varied reactions. I conclude that Jones’ new formulation of the Inner Light 
draws on the idealism of Josiah Royce, the psychology of William James and the 
social imperative of the Social Gospel movement. Furthermore, I propose five 
reasons why Jones’ synthesis provoked criticism. First, although Jones self-identified 
as a Christian, his theism draws on the ‘Absolute’ of Royce and the ‘more’ of James 
so is actually multivalent. Second, he used psychology to argue that humans and 
God were related through the subconscious, a strategy that carried with it an 
implicit universalism. Third, Jones had an experiential approach to Christian 
doctrine, which meant that his formulation of the Inner Light explained his own 
experience of God, but not that of someone who had no sense of God’s presence. 
Fourth, his deliberate avoidance of theological concepts meant that he did not have 
the theological tools to address the points at which he diverged from traditional 
Christian doctrine, for example concerning how the Creator and creation could be 
distinct. Finally, his informal prose meant that he was particularly vulnerable to 
being quoted out of context and therefore of being misinterpreted.  
My thesis starts with Jones’ accounts of his childhood experiences of God and a 
brief overview of the relevant aspects of the thought of James and Royce. I then 
analyse how he wove this thought together with Christian ideas about God, Christ 
and human nature, and with Quaker ideas about the Inner Light and mysticism.  
Finally, I assess the wide range of reactions to his ideas that are apparent both in 
unpublished archival letters and in the secondary literature. 
It is hoped that this critical evaluation of an important Quaker thinker, who is little 
known outside Quakerism, will be of use both to those interested in the historical 
interaction between Christianity and psychology and to those seeking to 









In the early 20th century, many Christians were concerned about the questions that 
the new science of psychology was asking about the nature of the soul and religious 
experience. The American Quaker Rufus Jones, however, was convinced that 
psychology, far from being a threat to Christian belief, would provide new insights 
into the nature of God and the relationship between God and humans. His 1904 
book, Social Law in the Spiritual World, was an attempt to share this conviction with 
the general public. The book focused on what Quakers refer to as the Inner Light, or 
‘that of God in everyone’. Whereas Quakers had traditionally understood the Inner 
Light as a divine spark implanted in humans (like a divine candle in a human 
lantern), Jones insisted that this view did not fit with the new discoveries of 
psychology. Instead, the Inner Light was both human and divine. 
Jones returned to the ideas in Social Law again and again throughout his life, 
invariably generating controversy. While some Quakers endorsed his use of 
psychology and his ideas about the Inner Light, others worried that he had too 
optimistic a view of human nature and that Jesus was no longer needed to reconcile 
humans and God. Thus, although Jones has been called one of the most influential 
Quakers in the history of the movement, not everyone approves of his legacy.  
In spite of his influence, Jones’ ideas have not been critically assessed. My thesis 
identifies the multiple strands of thought that are apparent in Social Law, assesses 
Jones’ attempts to weave them together, and explains why his ideas have met with 
such varied reactions. I conclude that Jones draws on the Harvard philosopher 
Josiah Royce, who argued that God is the ultimate consciousness, and on the 
Harvard psychologist William James, who believed that humans are related to a 
‘more’ through the subconscious. I propose that the ideas in Social Law provoked 
criticism partly because Royce’s and James’ ideas differed from traditional Christian 
ideas about God, and partly because Jones’ informal style meant that he was often 
misinterpreted.  
I start by considering Jones’ accounts of his childhood experiences of God and giving 
a brief overview of the relevant aspects of the thought of James and Royce. I then 
analyse how he wove this thought together with Christian ideas about God, Christ 
and human nature, and with Quaker ideas about the Inner Light and mysticism.  
Finally, I assess the wide range of reactions to his ideas that are apparent both in 
archival letters and in published comments on his work. 
It is hoped that this critical evaluation of an important Quaker thinker, who is little 
known outside Quakerism, will be of use both to those interested in the historical 
interaction between Christianity and psychology and to those seeking to 
understand why British Quakerism has shifted from a Christian movement to one 
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It is manifestly impossible to crowd our religious dogmas and our sacred traditions 
into some compartment impervious to thought or to have them unaffected by the 
present day studies on the nature of the inner life.1 
 
‘There are few crises’, observed Rufus Jones in Social Law in the Spiritual World, ‘to 
compare with that which appears when the simple, childhood religion, imbibed at 
mother’s knee and absorbed from early home and church environment, comes into 
collision with a scientific, solidly reasoned system which explains the universe.’2 
Jones’ own childhood religion was Quakerism, characterized by daily times of family 
silence on a farm in rural Maine, by twice-weekly, two-hour, largely silent meetings 
for worship, and by an unshakeable conviction that God dwelt within and directly 
guided him and his fellow Quakers.3 It was a religion rooted in Christianity and 
brought to life by its emphasis on a felt experience of God that Jones later described 
as mystical. The scientific, solidly reasoned system that he was reminiscing about 
was Darwin’s theory of evolution. At the time of Social Law, however, it was the 
discoveries and theories arising from the new science of psychology that were 
causing consternation. Would this new science explain away the soul, religious 
experience, free will, and even God, as some were suggesting? Jones assured his 
 
1 R. M. Jones, Social Law in the Spiritual World (London: Headley Brothers, 1904), 14. 
2 Jones, Social Law, 9–10. 
3 I have used the common terms ‘Quakerism’ and Quakers to refer to the Religious Society of Friends 
and its members throughout. See Section 1.1.1. 
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readers that it would not, and sought to convert the potential crisis into an 
opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of God.  
Social Law in the Spiritual World was Jones’ first attempt to grasp this opportunity, 
but his success in averting a crisis was ambiguous if judged by the diverse 
interpretations of and reactions to the book. In spite of his aim of defending 
Christianity, for example, Jones has often been accused of ushering in a Christless 
form of Quakerism.4 The book’s audacious central tenet, that God is an inherent 
part of human nature, was initially ignored, subsequently became axiomatic for 
Liberal Quakers, but has regularly been criticized by Evangelical Quakers.5 And, 
although the historian of religion Michael Hedstrom described the book as a 
ground-breaking publication that made mysticism middlebrow, an elderly Jones 
deemed it a work of his youth ‘with some crude things in it’.6  
The diversity apparent in these reactions had its genesis in the theological, 
philosophical, religious and scientific upheavals that were either unsettling or 
inspiring many Christians at the beginning of the 20th century. For Jones, the ideas 
that were particularly significant were those he encountered at Harvard University, 
where he undertook a year of postgraduate study in 1900/01. In theology, higher 
criticism and the increasing authority awarded to science were challenging 
traditional biblical interpretations and demarcating fracture lines between Liberal 
and Evangelical Christians. In philosophy, the Harvard idealist Josiah Royce was 
attempting to show how individuals were related to ultimate consciousness, or the 
‘Absolute’. In religion, mysticism was proving an irresistible attraction for many 
while raising fundamental questions about religious experience, and Francis 
 
4 G. Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism? Rufus Jones and the person and work of Christ’, 
Quaker Religious Thought, 116 (2011): 37–53 
5 For references see my Chapter 9. 
6 See M. S. Hedstrom, ‘Rufus Jones and mysticism for the masses’, Cross Currents, 54 (2003): 31–44 
and the Introduction in M.S. Hedstrom, The Rise of Liberal Religion (Oxford: OUP, 2013). Jones’ 
opinion on Social Law is from a letter to Ernest Hocking, 13 June 1937, Haverford College Rufus Jones 
Special Collection (hereafter HC), Box 58.  
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Peabody, the Harvard proponent of the Social Gospel movement, was stressing the 
importance of social reform. And in psychology, William James, again of Harvard, 
had published his seminal work Principles of Psychology in 1890, and twelve years 
later was proposing in Varieties of Religious Experience that all individuals were 
related to a ‘more’ through the subconscious.7 All these developments 
characterized what Jones termed the ‘modern world’.8 Social Law acknowledges 
both James and Royce in the Introduction,9 and can, I will propose, be seen as an 
attempted synthesis of their ideas with various aspects of Christianity and 
Quakerism.  
The book’s content therefore makes it an interesting subject of study in and of 
itself, covering as it does an often-neglected but vibrant expression of Christianity 
and its historical relationship to developments in idealism and psychology. Beyond 
this, though, the significance of the book lies in the effect it had on Quakerism. The 
human–divine relationship that is the central theme of Social Law is cast in terms of 
the ‘Inner Light’, a concept that lies at the heart of Quakerism. Jones argued that 
the traditional, dualistic understanding of the Inner Light, as something Divine 
implanted in human nature, was psychologically flawed. Rather, the Inner Light was 
both human and divine. In essence, the main objections to this idea, which have 
occurred in various guises throughout the last century, have been that it divinized 
humans, promoted humanism, underestimated sin and marginalized the need for 
Christ. These objections were raised more stridently in America, where 
evangelicalism exerted a stronger influence on Quakerism, than in Britain (see 
Section 1.1). Today, British Quakers hold a wide range of beliefs, both theistic and 
non-theistic. Although this pluralism has been fostered by many factors, both 
 
7 W. James, The Principles of Psychology (Vols 1 and 2) (Digireads, [1890] 2010); W. James, Varieties 
of Religious Experience (London: Penguin, [1902] 1985), 511. 
8 See, for example, Jones, Social Law, 171. 
9 Jones, Social Law, 21. 
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theological and cultural,10 it is, I will suggest, a natural corollary of the non-dualistic, 
psychologically informed formulation of the Inner Light in Social Law.  
In view of the importance of its ideas, it is perhaps surprising that the book has not 
been studied in more detail, an omission recently noted by Michael Hedstrom, who 
declared Social Law to be ‘an important and understudied book’.11 Within 
Quakerism and the Quaker scholarly community, where Jones’ impact is most 
apparent, one reason for this neglect may be the traditional wariness that Quakers 
exhibit towards theology.12 Thus, although the importance of Jones’ concept of the 
Inner Light is often acknowledged, there has been scant assessment of whether his 
arguments are robust, of how his ideas were influenced by psychology, and of the 
overall coherence of his thought. Outside Quakerism, it is notable that a number of 
scholars who were questioned in the late 1950s about Jones, by PhD candidate 
James Moore, viewed him as an engaging writer who spoke from deep experience 
but who did not have a particularly distinctive position. John Baillie of New College, 
Edinburgh, for example, saw Jones as a mystic but theologically merely as a 
representative member of the liberal movement of the early 20th century.13  While 
in one sense Baillie is correct, I suggest that the intervening years may have opened 
up a new angle on Jones’ contribution, namely the way he combined science and 
religion. The academic study of the relationship between science and religion did 
not emerge until the mid-1960s, as exemplified by Ian Barbour’s seminal work 
Issues in Science and Religion, 14 so it is unlikely that Baillie and his fellow 
interviewees would have identified this aspect of Jones’ thought, especially if they 
had not read Social Law. It is Jones’ handling of this relationship, however, in which 
 
10 For example the emphasis on intellectual tolerance - see M. Davie, British Quaker Theology since 
1895 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1997), 268. 
11 M. Hedstrom, ‘The Quakerization of everything’, Quaker Religious Thought, 122 (2014): 38. 
12 See e.g. J. Dudiak & L. Rediehs, ‘Quakers, philosophy and truth’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker 
Studies, eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 507–519. 
13 J. F. Moore, ‘The ethical thought of Rufus Matthew Jones, with special references to Biblical 
influences’ (PhD thesis, Boston University, 1960), 297–323. 
14 I. Barbour, I. Issues in Science and Religion (London: SCM, 1966). 
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we see Scripture, experience and psychology jostling for authority, that makes 
Social Law intriguing and that is partly responsible for its novel representation of 
the Inner Light. Furthermore, this relationship is of particular interest from a 
historical perspective because psychology was not an established edifice but a 
young discipline seeking to resolve tensions between the scientific respectability 
afforded by the laboratory and its early dalliance with psychic phenomena.  
My aim in this thesis is thus to explore how Jones tried to synthesize Quakerism 
with ‘modern thought’, especially with regard to his views on the Inner Light and 
mysticism, to discover why and how he diverged from the Quaker tradition and the 
core of Christian conviction (terms I discuss in Section 1.2.1), and to determine 
whether both his detractors and his supporters have interpreted him correctly. I do 
this by undertaking a close reading of Social Law in historical context and by 
referring both to archival letters to and from Jones and to published reactions to 
the book. This enables me to identify the ideas of James and Royce buried in the 
text, to determine how Jones engaged with these ideas, and to assess whether 
Jones’ early readers and later commentators present an accurate picture of his 
thought.  
Note that my aim is narrower than that of the other significant work in this area, 
Martin Davie’s British Quaker Theology since 1895, published in 1997. Davie traces 
the development of British Liberal Quakerism from the seminal Manchester 
Conference of 1895 to 1980.15 He offers a broad perspective, drawing on the 
thought of many Quakers over nearly a century, whereas my work is focused on a 
particular book, looking in detail at the ideas therein and at the varied reactions of 
lay readers and academics.  
 
15 Davie, British Quaker Theology.  
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I start by describing Jones’ Quaker practice and beliefs (Chapter 2) and providing a 
brief summary of the thought of James and Royce (Chapter 3). I then look at how 
Jones blended his Quaker beliefs with ideas from James and Royce in regard to God 
(Chapter 4), human nature (Chapter 5) and Christ (Chapter 6). Having gained some 
insight into Jones’ views in these key areas, I move on to discuss how they found 
expression in his reformulation of the human–divine relationship, or the Inner Light 
(Chapter 7), and how this concept found practical expression in his interpretation of 
mysticism (Chapter 8). Finally, I discuss whether both advocates and critics of Jones 
have interpreted him accurately (Chapter 9). 
I conclude that Jones’ understanding of mysticism as first set out in Social Law is his 
grand synthesis of pertinent aspects of Quakerism, modern thought and Christian 
liberal theology. It encompasses the Quaker emphasis on an experiential 
relationship with God, the Inner Light and the importance of social action, ideas 
from Royce’s idealism and James’ psychology, and the social imperative of the 
Social Gospel movement. I further suggest that although Jones hoped that his use of 
modern thought would make Christianity and Quakerism credible, he ended up with 
a theory of the Inner Light (and therefore a form of Quakerism) that was not, in 
fact, unequivocally Christian.  
I identify five reasons for this ambiguity and incipient Quaker pluralism.  
(1) The loving Father of Christianity is not straightforwardly identical to the 
‘more’ of James or the ‘Absolute’ of Royce. Jones treated them as if they were 
equivalent, but the fact that they are not and that he used ideas about the ‘more’ 
and ‘Absolute’ in relation to the Inner Light means that his formulation of this 
fundamental Quaker concept holds equally well outside a Christian framework. I 
term this factor his multivalent theism.  
(2) Jones’ determination to make Christianity consistent with psychology meant 
that he proposed that humans and God were inherently related through the 
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subconscious. One consequence of this was that the need for and the uniqueness of 
Christ were brought into question. I term this factor his reliance on psychology.  
(3) Jones, in keeping with the Quaker tradition, had an experiential approach to 
Christianity, and this means that at times what he seems to be defending is not so 
much Christian doctrine as his own experience of God. He had a strong sense of 
God’s presence and love, for example, and an (arguably) concomitant neglect of 
doctrines related to a separation from God, for example regarding sin and the 
atonement. I term this factor his experiential basis.  
(4) Jones’ deliberate avoidance of theological concepts meant that he did not 
have the tools to address important theological issues, in particular those related to 
the differentiation between humans, Christ and God. This means, for example, that 
he can be interpreted as divinizing human nature. I term this factor his theological 
naivety.  
(5) Finally, the fact that Jones was attempting to synthesize complex ideas and 
present them simply for lay people meant that he was vulnerable to being 
misinterpreted. I term this factor his informal style. 
My hope is that this thesis will make a contribution in two areas of research. The 
first is the history of Liberal Quakerism. Jones’ thought has had a profound 
influence on the development of this strand of Quakerism, which is more dominant 
in Britain than in America, so a critical analysis of his ideas may cast light on some of 
the issues being discussed regarding the diversity of belief among today’s British 
‘post-Christian’ Quakers.16 The second is the historical dialogue between psychology 
and Christianity. Jones was attempting to defend aspects of Christian belief and 
practice using psychology at a particularly interesting time for this emerging 
discipline. While some psychologists (notably James) were exploring psychic 
phenomena and were not averse to metaphysical speculation, others were 
exhibiting what has been termed ‘physics envy’ and were attempting to present 
 
16 See, for example, H. Rowlands (ed.) God, Words and Us (London: Quaker Books, 2017). 
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psychology as a science and thereby gain kudos and authority. Jones, interestingly, 
drew from both sides of the divide, combining James’ metaphysical speculation with 
general appeals to the authority of ‘psychology’ or ‘science’. 
In the remainder of this chapter I first provide a brief introduction to Quakerism, a 
short biography of Rufus Jones and an overview of Social Law. I then describe my 
methodology, detail some critical considerations, and provide a short literature 
review. Finally, I give a chapter-by-chapter outline of the thesis. 
 
1.1 An introduction to Quakerism, Rufus Jones and Social Law 
The Quaker environment into which Jones was born undoubtedly determined his 
life’s trajectory, so I start by commenting on some of the historical factors that 
shaped that environment. I then outline how Jones in turn influenced Quakerism.  
1.1.1 Quakerism circa 1900 
The movement now known officially as the Religious Society of Friends was 
established by George Fox during the turmoil of the English civil wars.17 Further 
information is provided throughout the thesis, but for now I note merely that the 
movement’s most distinctive feature was the belief that all people could hear and 
know God by virtue of having ‘that of God’ within them, with this point of contact 
often referred to as the Inward or Inner Light and being associated with Christ. 
 
17 Members initially referred to themselves as ‘Friends of Truth’ of ‘Children of the Light’, with the 
term Religious Society of Friends coming into use in the early 19th century (P. Dandelion, An 
Introduction to Quakerism (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 29). There are various theories for the origin of 
the term Quakerism. One is Fox’s claim that the term was first used by Justice Bennett of Derby 
when Fox told him to ‘tremble at the word of God’ during his trial for blasphemy (J. Punshon, 
Portrait in Grey: A Short History of the Quakers (London: Quaker Home Service, 1984), 51), but 
another is that the members of this fledgling movement quaked under the emotional strain of trying 
to discern whether or not to offer vocal ministry. For an account of a manifestation of quaking as 
late as the 1960s, see Quaker Faith and Practice, 4th edn (London: Yearly Meeting of the Religious 




Meetings were characterized by a communal silence in which anyone who felt that 
God was speaking to them could share their message, by offering ‘vocal ministry’. 
The possibility of hearing God directly raised questions about the relative authority 
of Scripture and the Inner Light, and the different answers given lie behind most of 
the historical schisms within Quakerism (see Chapter 7 and Appendix A). Jones grew 
up in a so-called ‘Gurneyite’ community, named after Joseph John Gurney (1788–
1847), an Oxford-educated, wealthy English banker who had visited North America 
between 1837 and 1840 to great acclaim.18 Gurney emphasized the importance of 
the Bible, studying it in its original languages and working with William Wilberforce 
under the auspices of the British and Foreign Bible Society.19 Gurneyite Quakers 
thus tended to attribute authority to Scripture, a position that their detractors 
claimed broke faith with the traditional Quaker attribution of authority to the Inner 
Light.20  
By the 1860s, two strands were becoming apparent within Gurneyite Quakerism. 
The differences between them are best illustrated by reference to two very 
different books published in the late 1890s by two Gurneyite Quakers.21 The first, 
written by Richard H. Thomas, was the novel Penelve about members of a Quaker 
community in rural Pennsylvania. These Quakers had abandoned plain dress but 
avoided being slaves to fashion, read the Bible but did not fear critical study, and 
worshipped in silence but were active in peace, temperance and other reform 
causes. They were confident that their lives were part of God’s plan to establish his 
kingdom on earth. The second, written by Seth G. Rees, was The Ideal Pentecostal 
Church. The ideal church encouraged ‘holy ghost revivals’, conviction and 
 
18 Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 197. 
19 H. R. Macy, ‘Quakers and Scripture’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, eds S. W. Angell & 
P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 193. 
20 See e.g. L. L. Wilson, ‘Conservative Friends, 1845–2010’ in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, 
eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 126–140. 
21 T. D. Hamm, The Transformation of American Quakerism: Orthodox Friends, 1800–1907 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 144. 
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conversion, but eschewed evolution, higher criticism and social reform. Its sole 
purpose was to save sinners before the imminent return of Christ. The two streams 
encapsulated by these books became known respectively as the renewal/modernist 
movement, which was world-accepting and believed that humanity would prepare 
the rule of the saints, and the revival/holiness movement, which believed that it 
was Christ who would initiate this rule.22  
As we will see in Chapter 2, Jones’ upbringing undoubtedly prepared him for his 
eventual alignment with the renewal/modernist movement. And this in turn made 
him sympathetic to the British ‘modernist/liberal’ movement that came to 
prominence at the Manchester Conference of 1895 (see Section 1.2.1). The story 
starts, though, on a farm in rural Maine. 
1.1.2 Rufus Jones: The man, his life and his legacy 
Jones was born in 1863 into a Quaker community in South China, where family daily 
Bible readings and times of silence formed the backdrop of a physically demanding 
farming life.23 After attending Quaker schools, he enrolled at Haverford College, a 
small but respected Quaker institution of higher education just outside Philadelphia, 
where he studied history, philosophy and religion. Following graduation, he spent a 
year travelling in Europe, and on his return to America in 1887 spent the next six 
years teaching at Quaker schools. In 1893 he returned to Haverford, where he 
taught psychology, philosophy and Christian history for the rest of his career, 
remaining a prominent figure on campus well after his retirement. He loved the job, 
reflecting that ‘I have always felt that I was at my best in a classroom, and there is 
no question that I am happiest when I am teaching a class of youth.’24 1893 also saw 
him taking on editorship of the liberal Quaker journal The Friends Review, which he 
 
22 For a further discussion and summary of differences, see P. Dandelion, The Quakers: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 30. 
23 The following biographical information is taken mainly from E. Vining, Friend of Life: The Biography 
of Rufus M. Jones (Forgotten Books, [1958] 2012). 
24 R.M. Jones, The Trail of Life in the Middle Years (New York: MacMillan, 1934), 211. 
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merged in the following year with the evangelical The Christian Worker to form The 
American Friend, partly in an attempt to promote unity between these two strands 
of Quakerism.25 His attempts to create unity also involved travelling across America 
(10,000 miles a year), a physical challenge made that much more difficult because 
Jones’ undiagnosed allergy to horses meant that journeys from train stations by 
horse and cart often left him breathless to the extent that he recalled that ‘it often 
seemed as though each breath would be the last one I could draw’.26 He was also 
much in demand as a speaker world-wide and was a prolific writer, averaging about 
a book a year for 50 years in addition to churning out numerous articles and 
editorials.27 As Walters notes, it was ‘a regimen that would have killed a different 
man’.28 
After America joined the First World War in 1917, Jones was instrumental in setting 
up the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), an organization that he chaired 
on and off until 1944 and that in 1947 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize jointly 
with the British Friends Service Council for relief work in connection with the two 
World Wars. Just prior to retirement, he was also involved in the layman’s foreign 
mission, travelling widely in Asia, and, controversially, advocating learning from 
other religions.29 Still active in his mid-70s, in 1938 he led a delegation of Quakers to 
Germany to plead the cause of the Jews to the Gestapo. He died in 1948, in bed 
convalescing after a series of heart attacks. True to form, he had spent the morning 
working – correcting the proofs for his latest book and finishing a speech he was 
 
25 For a fuller discussion of the factors behind the merger, see D. Alten, ‘Rufus Jones and the 
American Friend: A quest for unity’, Quaker History 74 (1985): 41–48 
26 Jones, Middle Years, 174.  
27 Jones was invited to speak at over 100 institutions of higher education, ranging from Oxford and 
Cambridge to the University of Shanghai, and maintained a 25-year association with Harvard, as 
detailed in D. Hinshaw, Rufus Jones, Master Quaker (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1951), 264–
266. For Jones’s publications, see C. Bernet, Rufus Jones (1863–1948) (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009). 
28 K. Walters, Rufus Jones Essential Writings (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2001), 22. 
29 See S. W. Angell, ‘Rufus Jones and the Laymen’s Foreign Missions Inquiry: How a Quaker helped to 
shape modern ecumenical Christianity’, Quaker Theology 3 (2000): 167–209. 
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due to deliver a few days later.30 A timeline of the main events in his life is given in 
Appendix B. 
Jones’ extraordinary productivity was accomplished against a background of ill 
health. At various points in his life he suffered from severe asthma, sore eyes, 
insomnia, rheumatism, back problems that made it difficult to stand, a ‘defective’ 
digestive system later associated with a collapsed intestine, and dental problems, 
exacerbated by a bad dentist, that seemed to cause secondary ailments (Jones once 
commented wryly that ‘Satan has often had to bear the blame for deeply hidden 
pains and mysterious assaults which should have been charged up to the account of 
a blundering dentist.’).31 He reflected, though, that these problems did not hinder 
him unduly: ‘I cannot see, as I look back over the pain-charts, that these thorns in 
the flesh have hampered my work or limited my range in any serious degree.’32 In 
fact, he concluded that not to know ‘the ministry of pain’ would have resulted in a 
‘loss of capacity for genuine sympathy’.33 
Furthermore, the time at which he wrote Social Law was marked by a tragic 
succession of bereavements. Jones lost his first wife Sallie Coutant in 1899 to 
tuberculosis, his fiancée Ellen Wood in 1900 to typhoid, and his 11-year-old son 
Lowell in 1903 to diphtheria. (He later married Elizabeth Bartram Cadbury in 1902, 
and the couple had a daughter, Mary Hoxie, in 1904.) In 1905, his close friend and 
fellow reformer John Wilhelm Rowntree died shortly after arriving in America to see 
Jones. Just a year before, Jones had written a heartfelt dedication to Rowntree in 
Social Law, a ‘Dear friend over the sea with whom I have had a new revelation of 
the riches of human fellowship and the still deeper joy of fellowship with our Divine 
Companion’. Here again, though, loss seemed to enrich rather than diminish Jones. 
 
30 Hinshaw, Master Quaker, 3. 
31 Jones gives an account of some of his health issues in Middle Years, Chapter XI. The comment 
about dentists is on p. 175. 
32 Jones, Middle Years, 178. 
33 Jones, Middle Years, 177. 
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Shortly after Lowell’s death he could write that ‘The greatest service of the loved 
object is that it trains and prepares us for wider, more universal love.’34Jones 
overcame physical and emotional personal challenges, then, and in fact saw them 
as opportunities for spiritual growth. 
Personal reminiscences about Jones are unfailingly glowing, to the extent that it is 
difficult to gain a balanced picture of his character. His biographers describe him as 
having a gift for friendship with people from all walks in life and as having a 
seemingly endless supply of amusing anecdotes (many of them about Maine 
farmers).35 He is generally acknowledged to have been a captivating speaker. The 
American pastor and radio-broadcaster Harry Emerson Fosdick recalled that Jones 
‘was natural, genuine, direct, human. He spoke from experience to experience. He 
possessed the spiritual vitality he pled for, and he shared it.’36 He was also a natural 
leader, as evident from childhood when he led the local band of farmboys ‘in an 
amazing list of things which to say the least were not saintly’.37 In later life, his 
vision and ability to inspire others proved invaluable to the AFSC. Clarence Pickett, a 
colleague on the AFSC, wrote ‘At first sometimes his proposals seemed incredible 
and impossible, but I have never known anyone who lived to see as large a 
proportion of his dreams fulfilled.’38  
At various points in his memoirs Jones describes his struggles to ‘be good’,39 but in 
maturity there is a sense that, essentially, Rufus Jones liked Rufus Jones. He starts A 
Small Town Boy, for example, by proclaiming that his early experiences made him 
the kind of person he was ‘glad to be’.40 And he was certainly not reticent about 
sharing his thoughts: a former student recalled that Jones offered vocal ministry so 
 
34 R.M. Jones, Practical Christianity (Memphis: General Books, [1905] 2012), 36. 
35 See e.g. Hinshaw, Master Quaker, 3–8; Vining, Friend of Life, 282. 
36 H. E. Fosdick (ed), Rufus Jones Speaks to our Time (New York: Macmillan, 1961), xii. 
37 R. M. Jones, A Small-Town Boy (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 33. 
38 Hinshaw, Master Quaker, 5. 
39 See e.g. Jones, Finding the Trail, 104, 116, 122.  
40 Jones, Small-Town Boy¸ viii. 
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regularly that students used to run a sweepstake on the time he would first rise to 
speak.41 This self-confidence and self-esteem were, however, of the sort that 
encouraged rather than belittled others. One friend enthused that ‘to meet him was 
to feel set up for the day because he always made one confident that the best was 
yet to come’,42 and in a letter he encouraged his fiancée Elizabeth Bartram not to be 
hampered by humility, advising that she needed rather courage, confidence and 
heart-boldness.43  
The breadth of Jones’ legacy reflects his multifaceted life. One could point to his 
contributions to the AFSC, and to his work in bridging the gaps between various 
strands in Quakerism, for example. He has also been held partly responsible for the 
Quaker acceptance of psychology: in 1943, the first Friends Conference on Religion 
and Psychology declared the positive interaction between Quakers and psychology 
to be the joint legacy of William James and Rufus Jones.44 Beyond Quakerism, the 
historian of religion Leigh Schmidt discusses Jones in the wider context of American 
spirituality, enthusing that ‘his highly spiritualized version of the Society of Friends 
(indeed, of Christianity across the board) was sweepingly influential. Almost single-
handedly, he transformed his small denomination into a great purveyor of 
devotional wisdom for aspirants from various religious backgrounds.’45 It is thus 
understandable that the Quaker scholar Wilmer Cooper should fete Jones as one of 
the most influential Quakers in the 350-year history of the movement.46 The aspects 
 
41 Stephen Cary, a former student of Jones, being interviewed in the DVD ‘Rufus Jones: A Luminous 
Life’ (Philadelphia: Share Vision Productions, 2008), at 19:34 mins. 
42 Hinshaw, Master Quaker, 5. 
43 Vining, Friend of Life, 94 
44 M. Post Abbott, ‘Transformation of the Light: Jungian thought and 20th century Friends’, Quaker 
History 89 (2000): 49. 
45 L. E. Schmidt, Restless Souls: The Making of American Spirituality, 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012), 230. Schmidt is perhaps overstating the case, neglecting as he does the 
inspiration and contribution from English Quakers such as John Wilhelm Rowntree and Edward Grubb 
and failing to mention that Evangelical Quakers resisted some of Jones’ ideas.  
46 W. Cooper, ‘Reflections on Rufus M. Jones Quaker giant of the twentieth century’, Quaker History 
94 (2005): 25. 
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of his legacy that are of most interest in this thesis, however, concern his views on 
mysticism and the Inner Light.  
Jones’ fascination with mysticism had its roots in his childhood. Although he did not 
use the term at the time, he says of his upbringing that ‘by far the most important 
factor was the unnamed and unconscious mystical propensity of my family’. 47 In 
later years, he would characterize mysticism as a felt but usually undramatic 
experience of God available to all (see Chapter 8). At college he began to interpret 
Quakerism as a mystical religion, and later developed a theory (now widely 
discredited) of its continuity with European mysticism.48 Shortly after graduating, 
while considering his future career on a solitary Alpine walk, he had a religious 
experience in which he saw stretching before him ‘an unfolding of labor in the 
realm of mystical religion’.49 This labour resulted in several books specifically about 
the history of mysticism (see Section 1.2.2.3), although in fact mysticism runs like a 
thread through all his writing. It also meant that he is credited with being the 
founder of modern mystical Quakerism,50 in the sense that mysticism was often an 
element of meetings that emerged where Jones was read or heard.51  
As will become clear in Chapters 7 to 9, Jones’ understanding of mysticism is 
inseparable from his view of the Inner Light. Reacting against dualistic formulations 
that saw the Inner Light as something ‘foreign’ injected into the soul, Jones argued 
that it was an inherent part of human nature. His view took hold to the extent that 
Davie suggested in 2004 that it had become axiomatic for Liberal Quakers.52 It was a 
view that provoked controversy regarding its implications for the traditional 
 
47 R. M. Jones, ‘Why I enroll with the mystics’, in Contemporary American Theology (Vol. 1), ed. V. 
Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), 191.  
48 For a refutation of Jones’s view, see e.g. D. E. Bassuk, ‘Rufus Jones and mysticism’, Quaker 
Religious Thought 46 (1978): 4–23.   
49 R. M. Jones, The Trail of Life in College (New York: MacMillan, 1929), 160. 
50 See Cooper, ‘Reflections’. 
51 P. Appelbaum, ‘Protestant mysticism: Pacifists and the “practice of the presence”’, Quaker History 
94 (2005): 1–24.  
52 M. Davie, ‘Reflections on an ecumenical pilgrimage’, in The Creation of Quaker Theory, ed. P. 
Dandelion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 194.  
32 
 
association of the Inner Light with Christ though. Carole Spencer’s complaint is fairly 
typical, namely that ‘Jones took Christ out of the Light, the soul itself was the Light, 
and the soul became divine.’53 Many of Jones’ ideas about the Inner Light and 
mysticism were aired for the first time in Social Law, to which we now turn. 
1.1.3 Social Law in the Spiritual World 
 
                
Figure 1.1 The front cover of Social Law (published by John Winston, Philadelphia, 
1904) (left), and the publisher’s advertisement (right). The diagram on the front 
cover represents Dante’s vision of a rose, which, Jones explains by way of a 
summary of the entire book, is ‘one consummate flower’ in which the saints are 
petals and God is at the centre.54 
 
The subject matter of Social Law is spelled out clearly in the publisher’s advert (Fig. 
1.1).55 The description hints at two related themes. The first is that human life can 
be understood only in the context of other people.56 The second is that God and 
humans are related, an idea that Jones expounded with reference to the Inner 
 
53 C. D. Spencer, Holiness: The Soul of Quakerism (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007), 204. 
54 Jones, Social Law, 272. 
55 Friends’ Intelligencer, 61 (December 3 1904): 49 
56 Jones, Social Law, 17. 
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Light. As noted, the evidence that Jones provided for these assertions would come 
largely from Royce’s idealism and James’ psychology. 
As will be detailed in Chapter 9, the initial reaction to Social Law was mixed. Some 
reviews praised it; one said it touched important issues but awaited a ‘competent’ 
interpreter; and some of the Quakers in Philadelphia banned it from their library.57 
So far, so inauspicious. Fast forward half a century though, and Elizabeth Vining saw 
fit to devote an entire chapter to it in her biography of Jones, enthusiastically citing 
the eminent pastor and broadcaster Harry Emerson Fosdick as saying, ‘That book 
opened the door to a new era in my thought and life.’58 Fast forward another half 
century, and we find Matthew Hedstrom hailing the book as ‘an influential first 
attempt to make the pragmatic openness of James’s thought religiously relevant 
and accessible’.59 In many ways, then, Social Law was ahead of its time. 
As a final comment it is worth noting that, although in later years Jones would be 
praised for his ‘careful and dignified writing’ and a highly readable style that made 
him popular with the editors of the Religious Book Club, Social Law at times seems 
stilted, and the biblical tone of the last chapter, which was based on his Harvard 
dissertation, jars with the rest of the book.60 Furthermore, being a writer of his 
time, Jones used the male personal pronoun. There is no trace of sexism in his 
writings, however, and in fact Quakers have been comfortable with female 
leadership from the movement’s inception.  
A chapter-by-chapter summary follows. 
 
 
57 For a summary of the reception, see Vining, Friend of Life, 108–110. 
58 Vining, Friend of Life, 110. 
59 Hedstrom, Rise of Liberal Religion, 3. 
60 The review of The Quakers in the American Colonies (North American Review 195 (February 1912): 
675) says ‘The name of Rufus M. Jones stands for the quality in writing most needed in American 
literature. It necessarily means thorough scholarship, careful and dignified writing, and permanent 
work’. Regarding the Religious Book Club, Hedstrom attributes Jones’s popularity to his ‘lively prose 




The book was written because psychology is threatening Christian belief by asking 
questions about the soul itself. Although many books are reinterpreting Christianity 
in the light of psychology, they are too technical for the average person. Hence, this 
one is written in a popular rather than a scientific style. The key idea in the book is 
that psychology has shown that humans are social beings. This discovery has 
profound religious significance, because this ‘group’ characteristic must also apply 
to God.  
2 The Quest 
God cannot be found by logic, because proofs of God’s existence relying on first 
cause, design or the ontological argument are inadequate. Furthermore, God is not 
an object to be found like any other. Fortunately, we can find many realities such as 
love, sympathy and goodness that are not objects in space. We must therefore look 
for God in the spiritual realm, a realm that is reached through personality. Thus, the 
search for God must begin with questions about ourselves: Who am I? What do I 
live by? What does personality involve? How am I related to my fellows and to 
nature?  
3 The Meaning of Personality 
In order to acquire an adequate idea of God we must understand the meaning of 
personality. From the work of William James and James Baldwin, we can conclude 
(1) that personality involves a union in a social, spiritual whole; and (2) that the 
basis of the world we know lies in this fact of interrelated personalities.  
4 The Realization of Persons 
On one hand, personality is an achievement that involves following ideals. These 
ideals have their birth in society, through customs, art and religion, and imply the 
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existence of an infinite Self to whom we are related. On the other hand, nothing 
explains personality: from the first it ‘trails clouds of glory’.  
5 Self-sacrifice 
At some point a child asserts his will and becomes a factor in his own making. But 
this is only half the story – self-sacrifice is also needed. The higher the person is on 
the scale of the spiritual life the more insistent the calls to self-sacrifice. The 
deepest note of the Gospel, namely that God suffers with us and for us, is also the 
deepest fact of all life. Social ethics has come upon this spiritual truth by scientific 
study.  
6 The Subconscious Life 
Consciousness arises out of the wider stream of the subconscious. In geniuses of 
any stripe, the wall between the subconscious and conscious life is thin. This 
suggests that there may be an inner portal to our personality, some real shekinah 
where we may meet with the Divine Companion. 
7 The Testimony of Mysticism 
Mystics find the heart of religion in their consciousness of God, and the mystic 
experience is possible to some degree for everyone. Jones defines two types of 
mystical attitude that are associated with this consciousness of God. Negation 
mystics seek an experience of God as an end in itself. They seek to transcend this 
world and live for a rare moment of ecstasy.  Affirmation mystics, by contrast, seek 
an experience of God in order to know God’s will and to gain strength to serve God 
in practical ways.  
8 The Inner Light 
In order to understand Quakerism, we need to understand the Inner Light. Early 
Quakers used the term Inner Light in three ways: (1) as a Divine Life resident in the 
soul; (2) as a source of guidance; (3) as a ground of spiritual certitude. How do these 
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views fare in the light of more adequate psychological knowledge? Point (2) is 
discussed in Jones’ Chapter 9. Regarding (1), every analysis of personality discovers 
the fact that God and men are bound together. Quakers felt this, but did not always 
formulate the doctrine clearly. The early Quaker Robert Barclay saw the Inner Light 
as something injected into the soul, but this view was formulated under the 
influence of Descartes’ dualistic philosophy and is based on an inadequate 
psychology because there is no basis for a unified personality. Rather, the Inner 
Light is the Divine Life personally apprehended in an individual soul. It is both 
human and Divine. Regarding (3), the belief that certitude comes from spiritual 
experience is in harmony with the modern perception that truth is found in 
consciousness, rather than in external authority. 
9 The Test of Spiritual Guidance 
All spiritual teachers have pointed out that the surest test of Divine guidance is to 
be sought in life-results. We must look not at the origin of an intimation for its 
justification but ask how it will further life and construct character. For ordinary 
men, this is difficult to judge, so a man must read his inward state in the light of the 
social spiritual group, a procedure found within Quakerism.  
10 Faith as a Pathway to Reality 
Faith is not holding onto an unverified opinion or accepting something on authority; 
rather, it is a way of dealing with reality. Faith grows as we act on what faith we 
have, and a transformed self appears. It is a spiritual process that produces a ‘first-
hand’ religion. 
11 The Self and the Over-self 
To answer the question ‘who am I?’ is to undertake a cosmic task, because to be a 
self is to be united to a wider consciousness. Our very sense of finiteness implies the 
existence of the infinite. Furthermore, the self as knower cannot be severed from 
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the object known. Everything in the world is woven out of the thought-stuff of God. 
Thus, every instance of human consciousness opens into the total whole of reality. 
12 The Divine–human life 
The preceding chapters have dealt with the Divine and human inter-relationship but 
have not addressed sin and the need for redemption. Sin is the choice to prefer the 
isolated self. Redemption involves being drawn by Jesus, who is the supreme 
revelation of the Divine and human in one personality. The goal is a society in which 
God lives through men and men live in God.   
 
1.2 Definitions, critical considerations and literature review 
Social Law deals with complex themes in an informal style, which inevitably creates 
some methodological challenges. Below I first flag some of the complexities 
involved in definitions in relation to Christianity and Quakerism. I then discuss my 
critical approach to Social Law. Finally, I provide a brief literature review. 
1.2.1 Christianity and Quakerism: Some comments  
As noted, Jones self-identified as a Quaker and a Christian but has been criticized 
for diverging from Christian (often evangelical) beliefs and from the Quaker 
tradition. Given that he was influential in Britain and that British Quakers began 
questioning whether Quakerism should be tied so strongly to Christianity in the 
1950s, it seems important to attempt to address the three-way relationship 
between Jones’ views, Quakerism and Christianity. Here I first comment on my 
approach to discussing this relationship in Social Law, and then on some definitions 





1.2.1.1 The relationship between Christianity and Quakerism in Social Law 
There are a number of difficulties involved in discussing the relationship between 
Christianity, Quakerism and Jones’ views. First, Christianity is a nebulous term, in 
that although most Christians subscribe to a number of basic beliefs (for example 
the loving nature of God), there is disagreement about others (for example 
regarding interpretations of the atonement and the authority of Scripture). My 
approach here is to use the terminology the ‘core of conviction’ to refer to a 
number of doctrines that I take to be central to Christianity and of particular 
interest in this thesis, namely that (i) God is characterized by love, (ii) God is triune, 
(iii) God created humans, and (iv) there is a distinction between God and creation.61 
Second, Quakerism in Jones’ time encompassed a broad range of beliefs, from the 
evangelical views that were particularly apparent in America to the more liberal 
views of Jones and his fellow reformers that were particularly apparent in Britain. 
My focus here is on Jones’ divergence from evangelical Quaker beliefs, particularly 
regarding points raised in letters to Jones from his concerned evangelical readers. A 
useful reference document here is the evangelical statement of belief recorded in 
the Richmond Declaration of Faith, which was drawn up at a conference of 99 
mostly American delegates in Richmond, Indiana in 1887.62 It was accepted by all 
but two American yearly meetings, but, notably, not by London Yearly Meeting.63  
Jones would later describe it as a poor representation of a vital Quaker faith that 
showed no recognition of the challenges raised by science.64  
Third, Quakers have since their earliest days been challenged regarding their 
Christian credentials, so the relationship between Quakerism and Christianity has 
 
61 I have borrowed this terminology from Davie, British Quaker Theology, 6–8. Davie, however, is not 
specific about what particular beliefs he had in mind.  
62 The text is available at http://www.quakerinfo.com/rdf.shtml. 
63 Vining, Friend of Life, 57. Yearly Meeting refers to an independent body of Friends who belong to 
local meetings but meet, as the name suggests, once a year.  
64 Vining, Friend of Life, 81. 
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never been straightforward.65 My approach to this difficulty is to focus on how 
Quakerism sees itself in relation to Christianity, rather than trying to ascertain the 
similarity or divergence of two wide-ranging sets of beliefs. As noted, Quaker views 
on this relationship have changed dramatically since Jones’ time: Jones and other 
liberal Quakers were often accused of not conforming to Christian belief, but they 
themselves self-identified as Christians; today, however, a significant proportion of 
British Quakers self-identify as adherents of religions other than Christianity or even 
as ‘non-theists’.66 My interest is in how Jones’ formulation of the Inner Light could 
be interpreted as being consistent with Christianity by him while at the same time 
arguably leading to (or at least being consistent with) a form of Quakerism that 
came to see itself as including but not restricted to Christian belief. I refer to this 
latter self-understanding of Quakerism as pluralistic. 
Finally, Jones’ views in relation to both Quakerism and Christianity are often difficult 
to pin down because he was seeking to replace what he felt to be outdated 
theological language: as he put it in a 1906 book that had a similar style to Social 
Law, ‘if I have used theological words I have endeavored to revitalize them’.67  My 
approach here is to try to ascertain whether he was disagreeing with statements at 
a fundamental level or seeking to express the truth they contained using different 
terminology. 
1.2.1.2 Liberal Christianity and liberal/modernist Quakerism 
Christian liberal theology and the Quaker movement often referred to with the dual 
ascription ‘liberal/modernist’ (with which Jones is closely associated) are related, 
 
65 See e.g. R. Moore, ‘Seventeenth-century context and Quaker beginnings’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Quaker Studies, eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 22. 
66 See e.g. Rowlands (ed.), God, Words and Us. 




but again nebulous, terms.68 My modest aim here is to offer some comments on 
them in relation to Social Law.  
Christian liberal theology is difficult to define partly because, as Gary Dorrien points 
out, it is the child of two heritages – an Enlightenment-modernist heritage that 
upheld the authority of modern knowledge, and an evangelical heritage that upheld 
the divinity of Christ.69 A particularly important aspect of it for this thesis is its 
emphasis on experience, as exemplified by Schleiermacher’s ‘feeling of absolute 
dependence’.  Beyond this, its defining features vary according to the 
historiographical stance of individual interpreters.70 We could, for example, start 
with William Hutchison’s 1976 benchmark study The Modernist Impulse in American 
Protestantism, which stressed the adaptation of Christian thought to modern 
cultural developments, especially in the sciences and social sciences, and the 
general optimistic attitude as expressed in the belief of the gradual establishment 
of the Kingdom of God. Jones can certainly be identified with these markers, for 
example in his reinterpretation of Genesis in the light of Darwin (see Chapter 2). Or 
we could start with Dorrien’s The Making of American Liberal Theology, which 
discusses the major Protestant liberal thinkers – including Jones – and situates them 
within the Protestant academic establishment. Again, this approach offers a cogent 
explanation for the origin of some of Jones’ ideas; for example, many aspects of his 
treatment of God and human nature echo the personalism associated with the 
Boston philosopher Borden Parker Bowne (see Chapter 4). Or we could start with 
what Schmidt terms the ‘expansive and often subversive cultural movement’ 
associated with Protestant liberalism. The volume American Religious Liberalism, 
 
68 See, for example, Dandelion, A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 4. 
69 G. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism & Modernity 1900–1950 
(Louisville: WJKB, 2003), 10–20. 
70 L. E. Schmidt, ‘Introduction’, in American Religious Liberalism, eds L. E. Schmidt & S. M. Promey 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 1–14. 
41 
 
edited by Schmidt, for example, includes an article on reading poetry religiously.71 
This wider conception of what constitutes liberalism finds expression in how Jones 
and his Haverford lecturers embraced the concept of the poet-prophet (see Chapter 
2). Whichever way it is characterized, then, Jones was heavily influenced by liberal 
Christianity. 
The defining feature of Quaker liberalism was an emphasis on a direct experience of 
God, or the Inner Light.72 Liberals also tended to be philosophical idealists, to read 
the Bible as an inspired but not inerrant work, and to embrace modernism, namely 
the conviction that faith should make use of the latest knowledge.73 The modernist 
impulse is expressed clearly in Social Law, for example, in Jones’ assertion that our 
view of God must necessarily be different from that of the New Testament writers: 
‘We cannot take over unchanged the gift they have to bestow. We must perforce 
live in our world, and our view of God must fit our entire system of thought.’74  
American Evangelical Quakerism, as exemplified by the Richmond Declaration, 
emphasized the role of Christ, interpreted the atonement in terms of Christ’s blood, 
and attributed authority to Scripture. Some strands of Evangelical Quakerism also 
embraced modernism, however, and it was the modernist impulse apparent in parts 
of the Evangelical tradition that allowed Jones and others to move freely between 
this tradition and the newly instigated Liberal one.75  
The demarcation lines between Quakerism (both Liberal and Evangelical) and liberal 
Christianity are blurred, however, because of the similarities between Christian 
liberal theology and Quakerism. Thus, for example, William James observed in 
 
71 M. Robertson, ‘Reading poetry religiously: The Walt Whitman Fellowship’, in American Religious 
Liberalism, eds L. E. Schmidt & S. M. Promey (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 17–
38. 
72 J. W. Frost, J.W. ‘Modernist and liberal Quakers, 1887–2010’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker 
Studies, eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion, (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 81. 
73 For a discussion of Quaker modernism and the holiness response, see Hamm, The Transformation 
of American Quakerism, 146–171. 
74 Jones, Social Law, 32–33. 
75 P. Dandelion, An Introduction to Quakerism (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 182. 
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Varieties that, ‘So far as our Christian sects to-day are evolving into liberality, they 
are simply reverting in essence to the position which Fox and the early Quakers so 
long ago assumed.’76 I suggest, though, that there are some important differences 
in the motivations that led to certain of the outward similarities that James possibly 
had in mind. First, consider the fact that both Quakerism and liberal Christianity 
emphasize experience. For liberal Christians, this was partly because other areas of 
authority such as the Bible had been discredited. For Quakers, this emphasis 
originated in the conviction that God spoke to individuals as surely now as when the 
Bible was written. Second, consider the liberal emphasis on social reform, which 
resonated with the traditional Quaker emphasis on good works. For Quakers, 
however, this emphasis was traditionally associated with the leading of the Inner 
Light or conscience rather than with the theologically inspired views of post-
millennialism associated with the Social Gospel movement. Finally, the optimism of 
liberal Christianity chimed with the traditional Quaker confidence that humans had 
a ‘seed of God’ within. In other words, although they were natural allies, it is not the 
case that the Quakerism of the 1650s was a precursor to 20th century liberal 
Christianity.  
1.2.2 Critical considerations 
One might expect Jones’ attempts to make modern thought consistent with 
Christianity to be heavy on theological terminology and conventions. But Jones’ 
attitude to theology is not straightforward. As noted, Quakers are generally 
sceptical about the value of theology – the emphasis is on, as George Fox put it, 
knowing ‘experimentally’, and doctrines not backed up by this experiential 
knowledge are often derided as ‘notions’.77 This attitude pulses through Jones The 
Church’s Debt to Heretics, which reveals Jones’ knowledge of, but frustration with, 
theological concepts: ‘It is somewhat difficult for a person who has a practical mind 
 
76 James, Varieties, 7. 
77 Dudiak & Rediehs ‘Quakers, philosophy and truth’, 515. 
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and who is eager to see the actual reign of God advanced to have any patience with 
the Arian battle, which seems to him a futile struggle over dim abstractions’, he 
complains, for example.78 Jones is consequently light on theological terminology 
and he never sets out his views systematically.  
On the other hand, he recognized that ideas about God can affect how people live 
their everyday lives, observing, for example, that ‘the idea that God and man are 
not so related that the whole man may be spiritualized is the false formulation of 
the Inner Light, and wherever it has prevailed confusion and weakness have gone 
with it’.79 Furthermore, he wrote Social Law because of his conviction that a 
theology that fails to fit the current worldview can be a major hindrance to faith. 
What Jones seems to want to do is to provide enough theological analysis to inspire 
action and make faith vibrant and credible, but to avoid straying into the realm of 
abstract speculation. 
This self-imposed limitation inevitably affects the way that Social Law should be 
critiqued. My approach is to focus on the evidence and arguments that Jones uses 
and on the internal coherence of his thought rather than on comparing him with 
the prominent theologians of the day. I do, however, draw attention to where 
theological concepts would have made a difference, in particular in places where 
Jones seems to be diverging from the core of conviction but neither notes nor 
addresses this divergence. 
It is also the case that Jones’ informal style means that, perhaps in deference to his 
intended audience, he is frustratingly sparing with his reference citations. He draws 
heavily on James, but the details of this dependence are apparent only because I 
have identified similar passages in Social Law and Principles. Identifying these ‘twin’ 
passages enables me to ascertain how Jones (re)interprets James. This approach is 
 
78 R. M. Jones, The Church’s Debt to Heretics (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1924), 85. 
79 Jones, Social Law, 175. 
44 
 
perhaps not ideal, because similarity is not as conclusive as a direct citation 
regarding dependence, but the nature of Jones’ writings means that it is the only 
way to proceed. Jones’ methodology is interesting in itself, though, as it illustrates 
one way in which authority was being attributed to ‘science’ or ‘psychology’ in a 
broad and vague sense that often lacked concrete detail. 
Another consequence of his informal style is that Jones often expressed himself 
differently depending on his intended audience. I therefore endeavour to interpret 
Jones’ thought as a whole rather than relying on quotations out of context, and 
point out where I think that commentators have misinterpreted Jones by failing to 
appreciate this characteristic of his writing. 
1.2.3 Primary sources 
My main primary source is Social Law, but I supplement this with some of Jones’ 
other works. This enables me to expand and clarify his ideas, and to draw attention 
to the potential confusion arisng from the different forms of expression that he uses 
at different times.  
1.2.3.1 The two versions of Social Law 
The HathiTrust has three scanned copies of Social Law online – two originating from 
Harvard University and one from Princeton University. I have identified two phrases 
where one of these copies diverges from the other two. Both phrases concern the 
Inner Light. The first occurs on page 174, where the first of the two versions 
originating from Harvard University has the text ‘This view [of the Inner Light] is 
thoroughly unscriptural and contrary to all the known facts of psychology.’80 The 
version from Princeton University, however, has ‘This view is not founded on the 
testimony of experience, and it leads to difficulties which are hopeless of 
 
80 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hnh64l;view=1up;seq=7, accessed 11 November 2017. 
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solution.’81 The second phrase occurs on page 176, where first Harvard version has 
‘It [the Inner Light] is neither human, nor Divine’, whereas the Princeton one has ‘It 
is both human and Divine’.  
Both versions were published by John C. Winston (Philadelphia, Chicago, Toronto) 
with a copyright date of 1904. The second Harvard version listed by the HathiTrust 
and the hardcopy published by Headley Brothers in London are the same as the 
Princeton version. Because both pairs of text take up exactly the same amount of 
space, the surrounding text is unchanged. 
A letter from T. Harvey Haines to Jones about the book in 1905 might shed some 
light on this difference. Haines wrote that ‘Thee says somewhere, I cannot find it, 
that the conjunct soul is neither God nor human. It is this, as I conceive thy 
meaning, because it is both human and divine in parts. If this were added, it would 
be much more useful to many.’82 Given that by ‘conjunct soul’ Haines presumably 
meant the Inner Light, it is possible that Jones sought to clarify the original version 
after receiving the letter, but in such a way that the typesetters could paste the 
correction onto the original without needing to reset large amounts of text. 
Although the changes are minor, Jones wrote to John Wilhelm Rowntree that pp. 
174–175 were the cardinal pages of the book (see Appendix C), so they are 
significant. On the assumption that this theory is correct, I will refer to the first 
Harvard version as the ‘original’ version and to the Princeton version as the ‘revised’ 
version when citing these phrases. 
1.2.3.2 Jones’ published corpus 
Social Law was Jones’ seventh book (see Appendix B), but the first to set forth his 
philosophy as a whole. Later books expand on and clarify the themes in it, but his 
fundamental ideas do not change or develop to a significant extent. As he put it in 
 
81 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101066132844;view=1up;seq=7, accessed 11 
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82 T. Harvey Haines, 6 January 1905, HC Box 9 (underlining as in the letter). 
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1932, ‘I have been endeavoring through all my writings, from Social Law in the 
Spiritual World to my last book, Pathways to the Reality of God, to leave that 
abstract Infinite behind where it belongs and to pass over to an interpretation of 
God which brings “the two worlds” together into a single unity.’83 Of the fifty-plus 
books that Jones wrote, a number are particularly pertinent to this thesis. For 
insights into his spiritual and intellectual development, the three autobiographical 
volumes – Finding the Trail of Life, The Trail of Life in College and The Trail of Life in 
the Middle Years – are particularly useful.84 For clarifying his views on mysticism, 
the prefaces and introductory chapters in New Studies in Mystical Religion and The 
Luminous Life are informative, providing as they do an overview of his thought.85 
Various other works by Jones are referred to throughout the thesis, my aim being to 
balance breadth of coverage to clarify his thought with the depth of focus on Social 
Law.  
I consulted some of Jones’ books as original editions, some online at sites such as 
www.hathitrust.org and www.archive.org, and some in scanned and reprinted form 
(indicated by two dates in the references). These latter books tend to be of poor 
quality, often with paragraphs and footnotes in the wrong places.  
1.2.4 Secondary sources 
Secondary material can be broadly classified into three main categories: 
biographical material, archival letters and critical assessments. 
1.2.4.1 Biographical material 
My main source for biographical information on Jones is Elizabeth Vining’s Friend of 
Life, published in 1958.86 The book is comprehensive, well researched, and sensitive 
 
83 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 211. 
84 Jones Finding the Trail; R. M. Jones, The Trail of Life in College (New York: Macmillan, 1929); Jones, 
Middle Years.  
85 R. M. Jones, New Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan, 1927); R. M. Jones, The 
Luminous Trail (New York, Macmillan, 1947). 
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to Jones’ mission and ideas, perhaps because Vining was a Quaker and knew Jones. 
Vining records in the Preface that she consulted extensively with Jones’ daughter 
Mary Hoxie, as well as with prominent English Quakers who knew him. She also had 
access to a wealth of material, including published and unpublished manuscripts, 
notebooks and photographs. I also consulted David Hinshaw’s biography, Rufus 
Jones, Master Quaker, published in 1951, but found it largely redundant by the side 
of Vining, and somewhat hagiographical in tone.87  
1.2.4.2 Archival letters 
Jones was a prominent figure within Quakerism at a time that was seeing significant 
changes in theology. He thus functioned as a hub for correspondence on a range of 
momentous issues. The Rufus Jones Special Collection at Haverford College contains 
thousands of letters to and from Jones that are currently only available on request. 
The letters are detailed in a 270-page pdf document that records all the material 
available (for example letters, lecture notes, diaries).88 Information provided on the 
letters includes the writer, or the recipient in the case of letters from Jones, the 
date, and a few words describing the content. External users are permitted to 
purchase up to 100 pages of scanned documents per year, so I obtained about 80 
letters (many covering up to 6 pages) and various other documents relevant to the 
topic of this thesis. Some of the letters are reproduced in Appendix C. While a visit 
to Haverford would unearth more material, I have obtained all the letters that 
appear to be relevant to this thesis. 
The letters themselves span half a century. The authors range from Jones’ now-
forgotten readers to Quaker leaders such as John Wilhelm Rowntree and Edward 
Grubb. They include scholars of mysticism such as Evelyn Underhill and William 
Inge, and, in relation to the AFSC, the American Quaker president Herbert Hoover. 
 
87 Hinshaw, Master Quaker.  




Some of the letters raise intellectual concerns. But more than that, their deeply 
personal tone, expressed in flamboyant or cramped calligraphy, reveals the depth 
of emotion that was being aroused by the changes in Quakerism. The liberal 
headmaster Thomas Newlin, for example, regrets that local families are sending 
their sons into military service rather than entrusting them to his school, and is 
clearly hurt by being called an ‘infidel’ and ‘atheist’.89 At the other end of the 
theological spectrum, the elderly John Douglas alternates between vehement 
diatribes against Jones’ ideas, denouncing his book recommendations as ‘Poison’, 
and distress that the faith that was good enough for his ‘dear mother’ was being 
discredited.90 They also serve as an important reminder that the theological issues 
were superimposed on pre-existing loyalties and opinions – Jones’ readers often 
addressed the way that Social Law endorsed or contradicted their current 
worldview, with delight or dismay, respectively. In sum, the sheer range of 
personalities, subjects and reactions on display makes the letters a fascinating 
resource that links theological ideas and Quaker practice to the more subjective and 
emotional factors at play. They are not always carefully argued, but they provide 
vivid snapshots of how Jones’ ideas were being received. 
Note that because of the variety of forms of dates used (American, English and 
occasionally Quaker, with the month referred to by number), I have cited dates with 
a named month. 
1.2.4.3 Academic engagement 
Academic study of Jones is sparse and mostly confined to scholars of Quakerism, so 
there is limited opportunity for critical engagement with the literature. This scarcity 
is clear in Claus Bernet’s 2009 bibliographical work on Jones: the list of primary 
sources runs to 85 pages and that of secondary ones to only nine.91 Many of these 
 
89 Thomas Newlin, 16 August 1897, HC Box 1 [reproduced in Appendix C]. 
90 John Douglas, 13 February 1903, HC Box 7 [reproduced in Appendix C].  
91 Bernet, Rufus Jones. 
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secondary sources are theses written in the 1940s and 1950s (some of which have 
recently become available online via ProQuest) and papers that seem to refer to 
Jones only tangentially. By 1956, when Wilmer Cooper submitted his PhD on Jones 
for publication, he was told that nothing more was being published on Jones 
because demand was insufficient. 92  
In the decades that followed, most of the few articles written on Jones focused on 
his theory of the mystical origins of Quakerism.93 Today, however, there are signs 
that interest in Jones is reviving: Kerry Walters edited a compilation of Jones’ 
writings in 2001, and Michael Hedstrom has discussed how Jones’ books 
contributed to making mysticism middlebrow in an article and as part of a chapter 
in a book.94 Not surprisingly, given his acknowledged contribution to Quakerism, 
Jones also features heavily in the recent Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, in 
which his influence is discussed in 19 out of the 37 articles.95 Of particular interest 
here are two recent papers: Guy Aiken’s analysis of Jones’ Christology in 2011 
(discussed in Chapter 6) and Hugh Rock’s analysis of Jones’s mysticism (discussed in 
Chapter 9).96 The very different view I have from Rock suggests that there is 
considerable scope for further research on Jones and his thought. 
Jones’ ideas are also mentioned in a few of the early Swarthmore lectures. This 
annual lecture series was established in 1908 with a dual aim: ‘to interpret further 
to the members of the Society of Friends their Message and Mission’ and ‘to bring 
before the public the spirit, the aims and the fundamental principles of the 
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Friends’.97 The title of the series is a reference to Swarthmore Hall, the home of 
Margaret Fell, who married George Fox after being widowed. Perhaps because 
these lectures were initially presented rather than published, however, they often 
do not mention Jones by name even when it is very likely that it is his ideas that the 
speaker has in mind. It also needs to be borne in mind that many of the early 
lectures were given by those who were part of the liberal/modernist movement and 
who were therefore  generally sympathetic to Jones’ ideas.98 
1.2.4.4 Records of Quaker Meetings 
Quakers are assiduous record keepers, and consequently an additional, but 
relatively minor, source of information on Jones can be found in the records of 
Quaker meetings now available on ancestry.com. Of the 300 or so records that 
relate to Jones, most are fairly inconsequential, but they do serve to indicate the 
esteem and affection in which he was held. One entry, for example, records that he 
‘received a welcome so cordial as to amount to an ovation’.99 
1.3 Thesis outline  
Because Jones’ thought is a complex synthesis of Quaker-inspired spirituality and 
‘modern thought’, I start by detailing how his experience of God was nurtured and 
given a framework within Quakerism (Chapter 2) and then summarize the main 
strands of the ‘modern thought’ he encountered at Harvard University (Chapter 3). 
The body of the thesis then analyses the ideas in Social Law in detail. First, I look at 
the ‘building blocks’ of his system, exploring and critiquing the way he envisaged 
God, human nature and Christ (Chapters 4 to 6). Next, I look at how he fitted these 
building blocks together both in theory, namely in this concept of the Inner Light 
 
97 See e.g. H. G. Wood, Quakerism and the Future of the Church (Swarthmore Lecture 1920) (London: 
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98 See e.g. Davie, British Quaker Theology, 86 
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(Chapters 7), and in practice, namely in his approach to mysticism (Chapter 8). I 
then consider how Jones’ thought was received and interpreted, both immediately 
after the publication of Social Law and in the century since (Chapter 9). Finally, I 
offer some conclusions and sketch a number of ways in which Jones’s thought could 
be brought into dialogue with present-day theological concerns (Chapter 10).  
This approach, rather than for example an analysis of each chapter of Social Law, 
enables me to present Jones’ thought in a more systematic way than he did himself. 
The strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and the internal coherence of his 
views are thereby more transparent. A brief overview of each chapter is as follows. 
Chapter 2: A worldview in the making: Jones’ childhood experience of God and 
Quaker education 
Social Law aimed to show that God and man are bound up in an organic 
relationship. In this chapter I draw on Jones’ memoirs to explore how this 
conviction had its origins in his childhood experiences of God (i.e. his experiential 
basis). I then explain how it was given an initial framework in terms of Quaker 
concepts and later informed by books he read while a student at Haverford.  
Chapter 3: Encounters with modern thought 
This chapter continues the story by describing Jones’ encounter with various 
aspects of modern thought. I start with the Manchester Conference of 1895, which 
heralded the emergence of the liberal/modernist strand within Quakerism. I then 
consider Jones’ interactions with various Harvard philosophers, focusing on William 
James and Josiah Royce. I suggest areas of consonance between these thinkers and 
Jones, but also point out where they diverged. The next three chapters consider the 
implications of these similarities and differences for Jones’ understanding of God, 




Chapter 4: God is personal 
In this chapter I examine how Jones sought to synthesize the personal, Christian 
God with the potentially impersonal God or ultimate consciousness of idealism. I 
conclude that he tries to do so using insights from James’ psychology but that the 
fact that Royce’s ideas about God were not unequivocally Christian means that 
Jones has a multivalent theism. Furthermore, he emphasizes the immanence of God 
at the expense of the transcendence of God, although this is in part due to his 
theological naivety and he goes some way to redressing this imbalance in later 
years. 
Chapter 5: Humans are socio-spiritual beings 
Jones saw humans as having both social and spiritual aspects. As such, his 
treatment of human nature is a complex blend of psychological insights from James, 
regarding the nature of consciousness, ideals and transformation, and of theological 
concepts from Christianity. In this chapter I discuss and critique Jones’ views on 
consciousness, sin, salvation, habit and conscience. I suggest that his reliance on 
psychology often resulted in accusations of humanism. However, I conclude that for 
Jones God is deeply rooted in human nature, meaning that these accusations, which 
arise in part from his informal style, are unjustified. 
Chapter 6: Christ reveals God  
Jones self-identified as both a Quaker and a Christian and wrote Social Law to 
defend Christianity against the advances of psychology. But just what he 
understood by Christianity is not always clear. In this chapter, I examine some 
central Christological concepts (the incarnation, atonement, Christ’s indwelling) as 
they are expressed (generally in passing) in Social Law and in two of Jones’ 
contemporaneous works. I conclude that Jones sees Christ as the fullest revelation 
of God and as drawing individuals to God by setting ideals, but that the fact that he 
approaches questions about Christ’s nature through his reliance on psychology 
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rather than through the Chalcedonian definition, for example, means that his 
understanding diverges from that of the core of conviction. I end with an interim 
summary of Chapters 4 to 6, commenting on Jones’ view of Christianity from a 
number of angles. With this groundwork in place, the remainder of the thesis looks 
at his particularly Quaker focus, the Inner Light and mysticism. 
Chapter 7: The Inner Light is both human and divine 
The Inner Light has always been a defining, if ambiguous, concept within 
Quakerism. Because it is concerned with the relationship between humans and 
God, and because this relationship was at the centre of Social Law, Jones’ ideas 
naturally found their way into the heart of Quakerism. In this chapter, I first provide 
a brief overview of how the Inner Light has been understood historically and then 
assess the arguments that Jones uses to defend his definition against the traditional 
view of Barclay, namely that the Inner Light was not something ‘foreign’ injected 
into the soul but an inherent part of human nature. I conclude that the picture he 
presents reflects his own experience but that the biblical, philosophical and 
psychological arguments he proposes are too superficial to be convincing, and that, 
furthermore, this picture is complicated in later years because he presents his views 
in different ways at different times. Although this is perhaps what should be 
expected given Jones’ informal style and deliberate theological naivety, it does 
perhaps mean that Jones’ far-reaching influence on this topic rests on shaky 
foundations. 
Chapter 8: Mysticism is a felt experience of God 
Jones’ formulation of the Inner Light implies that everyone should be able to 
experience God’s presence, and in the early 20th century the natural way to express 
this experience was in the language of mysticism. Surprisingly, however, although 
Jones has been called the founder of modern mystical Quakerism, his views on 
mysticism have received relatively little critical attention. In this chapter, I first 
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provide some historical context by charting how mysticism became such a popular 
topic at the turn of the 20th century and comparing Jones’ views with those of 
other prominent scholars of mysticism. I then refer to Jones’ wider corpus to flesh 
out the view of mysticism that is apparent in seminal form in Social Law, arguing 
that he understands it as a felt experience of God that leads to the transformation 
of the individual and society. 
Chapter 9: Reactions to the ideas in Social Law 
This chapter traces the reception of Jones’ ideas both straight after the publication 
of Social Law (through archived letters and reviews) and in the century since 
(through a few articles and comments in books). I conclude that Jones’ thought 
must be considered as a whole and that it must be acknowledged that he views the 
universe as fundamentally spiritual. I suggest that commentators who fail to do 
either of these things misinterpret him. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion: Does Rufus Jones [still] speak to our time? 
Here I first offer a summary of my research. I then briefly consider where Jones’ 
thought might be relevant today. I suggest that arguments from recent research in 
neuroscience and theological anthropology could possibly be used to support his 
view of the Inner Light, that behind his mystical terminology he envisages a 
relationship with God that can be described using more recent terminology from 
the literature on religious experience, and that he may have insights to offer today’s 
Liberal Quakers regarding the relationship between spiritual practices and social 
action. 
Summary 
Social Law in the Spiritual World was the seminal work of an influential Quaker 
thinker. It presents an intriguing blend of Christianity, psychology and idealism at a 
time when Christianity was adapting to ‘modern thought’ and when psychology was 
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simultaneously investigating psychic phenomena, making metaphysical 
pronouncements and seeking scientific credibility. Its central theme was a 
reformulation of the human–divine relationship, and, I suggest, it was because 
Jones cast this relationship in terms of the key Quaker concept of the Inner Light 
and associated it with mysticism that this reformulation had a significant impact on 
the way that Quakerism developed over the course of the 20th century.  
Although the importance of Social Law and Jones’ ambivalent legacy have been 
recognized, the book’s ideas and arguments have not been critiqued in detail. My 
thesis will argue that it can be seen as Jones’ attempt to synthesize his Quaker-
informed experience of the inward presence of God with aspects of the psychology 
of William James and the idealism of Josiah Royce.  I will suggest that while Jones 
approached this synthesis from a Christian perspective, it is consistent with a form 
of Quakerism that could embrace religions other than Christianity. This is because 
the ‘more’ of James’ and the ‘Absolute’ of Royce were not straightforwardly 
identical to the loving Father of mainstream Christianity, because Jones had an 
experiential approach to Christianity and avoided theological concepts, and because 
as a popular, informal writer he was open to being misinterpreted. 
My hope is that this analysis will provide some historical insight into today’s post-
Christian British Quakerism while also offering an informative historical case study 
on the relationship between psychology and Christianity. The starting point is Jones’ 









A worldview in the making:  
Jones’ childhood experience of God and 
Quaker education 
 
The environment into which I came ministered in happy harmony to the natural bent 
of disposition.1 
 
A man ‘trusts his temperament’, observed William James, and ‘wanting a universe 
that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it’.2 In 
other words, a person’s philosophy is determined by their intuitive sense of what 
the universe is like and only secondarily defended by reason. Whether or not James’ 
observation holds universally, the next two chapters will suggest that it does seem 
to do so for Jones.  
As noted in the previous chapter, Jones saw the most important aspect of his 
childhood as the ‘mystical’ propensity of his family, and recalled that ‘The 
environment into which I came ministered in happy harmony to the natural bent of 
disposition.’3 Jones is thus suggesting that his defining characteristic as a child was 
his mystical disposition, which as we will see he took to be the ability to experience 
God’s presence in everyday life. A James-inspired starting point for an analysis of 
Jones’ ideas in Social Law is therefore to focus on his early religious experience, 
which gave him an intuitive sense of what God, and therefore the universe, was 
 
1 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 191. 
2 W. James, Pragmatism (Public Domain Books, 1907), 3. 
3 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 191. 
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like, and on the Quakers of his childhood and youth who provided an initial 
representation of that God and God’s relationship to the universe. This chapter thus 
considers Jones’ childhood and his undergraduate years at Haverford, with the next 
one introducing individuals from outside Quakerism whom Jones met at Harvard 
and whose thought he attempted to make consistent with his early religious 
experience and worldview. 
The task of identifying which figures influenced Jones, both in his childhood and 
during his time at college, necessarily involves making a selection from many 
potential candidates. Back in 1960, Gordon Atkins wrote his thesis on the mystical 
idealism of Jones and made his choice in consultation with Jones’ close friend and 
colleague Douglas Steere. They settled on six figures clearly associated with the 
topic of mysticism: three individuals representing the development of mysticism in 
Western Europe (Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, George Fox), and three more 
representing the development of mysticism in America (John Woolman, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman).4 Given that the focus of my thesis is Social Law, 
my selection is governed by the major influences I see at work therein. 
My selection is informed partly by Jones’ explicit comments about sources of 
influence in Social Law itself, and partly by a judgment about which individuals 
contribute in a more diffuse way to Social Law on the basis of his autobiographical 
books. The Introduction to Social Law states that ‘I owe a very great debt to my two 
teachers, Professor G.H. Palmer and Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard. William 
James, of the same institution, has, through his books, been another teacher of 
great influence’.5 These individuals thus meet my selection criteria, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 
4 G. Atkins, ’A Critical Examination of the Mystical Idealism of Rufus Matthew Jones’ (PhD thesis, 
Univ. Southern California, 1960), 29. 
5 Jones, Social Law, 21. 
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This chapter, however, focuses on individuals that feature in the first two volumes 
of his autobiographies. This first section covers Jones’ childhood, introducing 
significant relatives and teachers, but also two eminent early Quakers, George Fox 
and John Woolman. The second section discusses his undergraduate years at 
Haverford, identifying the diverse figures that Jones encountered in the library, 
namely the Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson, the Romantic poets, the 
ground-breaking scientist/theologian Henry Drummond, the Quaker abolitionist, 
poet and mystic John Greenleaf Whittier, and the 2nd-century theologian Clement 
of Alexandria.  
 
2.1 A Quaker childhood: Spiritual practices and inspiring people  
Jones’ childhood environment encompassed the natural beauty of South China, the 
rural community of farmers and labourers of which he was an integral part, the 
pervading presence of Quakerism, the example of spiritually inspiring relatives, and 
a schooling illuminated by progressive teachers. My aim in this section is to show 
how these childhood experiences formed his character, nurtured his mystical 
disposition, and established the basis of his worldview. I start, though, by taking a 
step backwards and considering two eminent Quakers who shaped the attitudes 
and beliefs of Jones’ Quaker community. 
2.1.1 Eminent Quakers: George Fox and John Woolman 
Many of the early Quakers wrote journals, and those of George Fox and John 
Woolman were especially revered by Quakers. Judging by his comments about 
reinterpreting Fox in the light of Emerson (see Section 2.2.3 below), Jones was 
familiar with Fox growing up, and almost certainly would have been with Woolman, 
although he does not mention this explicitly. They are considered here by virtue of 




George Fox (1624–1691), the charismatic founder of Quakerism, suffered from 
depression in his youth and became a Seeker, wandering the countryside with his 
Bible rather than attending church. Lamenting that no one could ‘speak to [his] 
condition’, he came to realize that ‘to be bred at Oxford or Cambridge was not 
sufficient to fit a man to be a minister of Christ’.6 A turning point came when he 
heard a voice proclaiming that ‘there is one, even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy 
condition’.7 Fox’s distrust of ecclesiastical authority and his emphasis on knowing 
‘experimentally’ (i.e. experientially) that wisdom and guidance come directly from 
God subsequently became cornerstones of Quaker belief and practice and are 
axiomatic to Jones’ thought. 
Jones published a popular edited version of Fox’s journal in 1903.8 Recently 
bereaved, he movingly dedicated it to the memory of his son Lowell: ‘To the sweet 
and shining memory of the little lad whose beautiful life was a visible revelation to 
me of the truth, which this autobiography teaches, that the divine and the human 
are not far-sundered.’9 The dedication suggests that Jones had found his own 
‘experimental’ confirmation of what he saw to be Fox’s central idea: that God and 
humans are not separated. Also of note is that Jones claims that ‘the progress of 
religious truth during the last hundred years has been toward the truth which [Fox] 
made central in his message’.10 Jones was here presumably referring to Fox’s 
emphasis on inward experience, and he adds a footnote to this rather sweeping 
statement from William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience: ‘The Quaker 
religion which [George Fox] founded is something which it is impossible to 
overpraise. In a day of shams, it was a religion of veracity rooted in spiritual 
inwardness.’ This is certainly a commendation from James, although it falls short of 
 
6 R. M. Jones, George Fox, An Autobiography, edited with an Introduction by R.M. Jones 
(Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1903), loc. 702, Kindle. 
7 Jones, George Fox, loc. 704, Kindle. 
8 He wrote to John Wilhelm Rowntree on 9 February 1904 that ‘Everybody in this part of the world is 
reading it and it is really taking hold inside and outside “our Society”’ (Box 48). 
9 Jones, George Fox, loc. 12, Kindle. 
10 Jones, George Fox, loc. 173, Kindle. 
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a convincing proof of Fox’s message. It demonstrates, however, how Jones was 
interpreting this fundamental Quaker idea of the relationship between humans and 
God as being in line with ‘progress’ in knowledge, and that he was appealing to the 
authority of William James in a very general way to back up this claim.  
John Woolman (1720–1772) was variously a merchant, tailor, itinerant Quaker 
preacher and early abolitionist. His journal, in print since 1774, is a prominent 
spiritual work: Jones refers to it as a remarkable document that describes the 
‘silent, ineffable processes by which his soul was brought to inward unity, and then 
into living communion with “the pure Spirit of Life and Truth”.’11 
Many of Woolman’s views about conscience and the importance of social action are 
echoed in Jones’ life and writings. Woolman’s conscience was particularly sensitive, 
and indeed he believed that it was a God-given faculty to be cultivated by 
obedience to its promptings: ‘He whose tender mercies are over all his works hath 
placed a principle in the human mind, which incites to exercise goodness towards 
every living creature; and this being singly attended to, people become tender-
hearted and sympathizing; but when frequently and totally rejected, the mind 
becomes shut up in a contrary disposition.’12 Under the compulsion of his 
conscience, for example, Woolman notoriously began to wear only undyed clothes 
once he realized that dye was harming slaves.13 Jones, as we will see in Chapter 5, 
likewise held that conscience had a divine sense of ‘ought’ but also involved human 
effort. Furthermore, it was obedience to these promptings from God that resulted 
in social action (to be discussed in Chapter 8) that Jones aspired to and identified as 
‘the ideal of Quaker mysticism’.14  
 
11 Jones, Middle Years, 199. 
12 J. Woolman, The Journal of John Woolman, Quaker (Ignacio Hills, 1774), loc. 171, Kindle. 
13 Woolman, Journal, loc. 1432, Kindle. 
14 Jones, Middle Years, 201. 
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As argued by Southern, in the absence of a creed, early Quakers function as a 
source of authority in Quakerism, and it is notable that they would come to be 
interpreted by Jones in terms of the liberal Quakerism that he espoused.15 Their 
spiritual insights were ingrained in Quakerism, as will become apparent as we turn 
to look at the community in which Jones was raised. 
2.1.2 The Quaker community in South China, Maine  
In A Small-Town Boy, Jones reflects on how life in a rural community shaped his 
character.16 He revelled in the beauty of the natural environment – the bald eagles 
that nested near the lake, the distant mountains, the cry of loons, and the horse 
and cart rides to Meeting through majestic woods – and felt that an appreciation of 
this beauty kept him morally and spiritually safe.17 The unofficial leader of the local 
farm-boys, Jones says he gained courage through physical challenges such as 
climbing on ‘perilous roofs’ and, literally, skating on thin ice.18 He claimed that 
although he was no goody-goody (he happily drank a barrel of cider that a farmer 
had carelessly left lying around, and, on one memorable occasion, skipped school to 
sneak into a house that was being hauled along the frozen lake to a new location), 
he learnt that it was possible to ‘maintain one’s own ideals of life without being a 
prig, and to win at the same time the respect and even the affection of one’s 
associates’.19 His oratorical skills were honed at the local grocery store, where the 
owner had Jones mount the counter to read important newspaper articles to the 
men sitting on chairs and barrel heads and boxes. ‘It was here on the counter’, 
reflected Jones, ‘that I first learned how to articulate clearly and to get ideas across 
effectively to a body of listeners.’20 The courage, leadership and communication 
 
15 A. Southern, ‘The Rowntree History Series and the growth of liberal Quakerism’, Quaker Studies 16 
(2011): 7–73 
16 Jones, Small-Town Boy, viii. 
17 Jones, Small-Town Boy, 36; Jones, Finding the Trail, 49.  
18 Jones, Small-Town Boy, 108. 
19 Jones, Small-Town Boy, 70. 
20 Jones, Small-Town Boy, 64. 
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skills that Jones developed in South China would all be put to good use in later 
years. 
Jones gained most of his early religious ideas from his family, whom he described as 
‘intensely evangelical’.21 The Bible certainly played a prominent role in his life – 
there were family Bible readings morning and evening, and Jones began to go to 
Bible School when he was six. At age 10, when he was bedbound for nine months 
with blood-poisoning (a well-intentioned doctor had lanced a bruise on Jones’ foot, 
but unfortunately with a knife sharpened on the scythe stone in the barn), he 
passed the time by reading the Bible out loud to his grandmother. He had 
recuperated by the time he got to the New Testament, but felt that ‘the Old 
Testament was the book of my boyhood ... It gave me my first poetry and my first 
history, and I got my growing ideas of God from it.’22 Crucially, however, although 
his family was not familiar with the rise of biblical criticism, they followed George 
Fox in believing that the Bible was inspired but not God’s final word. This attitude, 
Jones recalled gratefully, enabled him to ‘find and love [the Bible’s] treasures’ while 
making use of ‘all that science and history have revealed of God’s creative work’.23 
Alongside this biblically informed worldview sat the above-mentioned mystical 
propensity of his family and the wider Quaker community. Every day after breakfast 
there was a long period of family silent worship during which the older members 
‘seemed to be communing in joyous fellowship with a real presence’, and by age 
four Jones was joining the two-hour mostly silent Quaker Meeting for Worship, 
where he found ‘a gleam of eternal reality’.24 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that 
Jones claimed that ‘I was the kind of child that had no more difficulty in seeing 
Jacob’s ladders going up from earth to heaven than I had in seeing where the best 
 
21 Jones discusses the role the Bible played in his childhood in Chapter IV of Finding the Trail. The 
comment about his family being intensely evangelical is on p.66. 
22 Jones, Finding the Trail, 65. 
23 Jones, Finding the Trail, 66. 
24 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 192. 
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apples grew.’25 As we will see in later chapters, this experience of God as involved in 
the everyday life of everyday people and the role of the group in fostering this 
awareness are fundamental aspects of Jones’ approach to mysticism.  
Within this Quaker environment, two of Jones’ relatives stood out.  The first was his 
Aunt Peace, whom he describes as a refined and saintly woman with remarkable 
spiritual gifts. She had frequent spiritual insights into his life, Jones says, and on his 
birth had taken him in her arms and proclaimed that ‘This child will one day bear 
the message of the Gospel to distant lands and to peoples across the sea.’26 It 
seems likely that Jones’ conviction that she was ‘having direct intercourse with a 
great Companion’ contributed to his view that God and humans were inherently 
related.27 She also stressed the love and grace of God, so that Jones said he never 
feared the wrath of God, a conviction that again likely affected the position he took 
in arguing against more evangelical forms of Quakerism that stressed the possibility 
of God’s punishment (see Chapter 4).28 
The second was his Uncle Eli. Eli Jones and his wife Sybil were prominent Quaker 
missionaries who had established Friends schools in Palestine. They made sin 
‘awfully real’ to Jones as a boy, but he remembered the striking note of their 
preaching not as sin but as ‘the beauty and joy and peace which the true life 
gives’.29 Complementary to this emphasis was the realization learnt from watching 
Eli that the goodness of character Jones desired was ‘not something miraculous that 
drops into a soul out of the skies, but is rather something which is formed within as 
one faithfully does his set tasks, and goes to work with an enthusiastic passion to 
help make other people good.’30  
 
25 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 191. 
26 Jones, Finding the Trail, 20. 
27 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 193. 
28 Jones, Life in College, 88. 
29 Jones, Finding the Trail, 87. 
30 Jones, Finding the Trail, 121. 
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Jones’ comments on Peace and Eli display two complementary approaches to 
religion that, as we will see, Jones attempted throughout his life to hold in tension. 
What struck Jones about Peace was her intimate relationship with God; and what 
struck him about Eli was the necessity of human effort in forming a good character. 
A focus on a relationship with God without an emphasis on human effort might 
result in what Jones would later called ‘negation mysticism’ (see Chapter 8), namely 
a desire for God that sought an experience of God as an end in itself. An emphasis 
on social action without an underlying relationship with God might result in 
humanism (see Chapter 5). 
The main academic input of note came from Jones’ science teacher, Thomas J. 
Battey. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species had been published 20 years earlier, in 
1859, and Battey had studied with Louis Agassiz, who argued against Darwinian 
evolution, and with Asa Gray, who endorsed it, at Harvard.31 Gray’s view must have 
prevailed, because Jones remarks that it was in Battey’s class that he first heard the 
‘astonishing fact’ that the world was not made in six days 6000 years ago. Battey, 
however, offered an interpretative framework that would inspire Jones for the rest 
of his life: ‘[Battey] carried us over from our childish idea of a God who worked from 
the outside like a mechanic to the higher conception of a God who works from 
within as a living creative energy. He helped us to realize that the account in 
Genesis is a great poetic story … I leaped forward to the new view and with it I won 
my spiritual freedom.’32  
Two points of interest for this thesis are apparent from Jones’ remark. The first is 
the conviction that science and religion can be reconciled. Without the belief that 
this was possible, Social Law would not have been written. The second is the 
emphasis on the immanence rather than the transcendence of God, namely of God 
working from within as a creative energy rather than from the outside. In Social Law 
 
31 Vining, Friend of Life, p.63. 
32 Jones, Finding the Trail, 138–139. 
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Jones tends to emphasize God’s immanence at the expense of God’s 
transcendence, although, as we will see in Chapter 4, in later years he went some 
way to redressing this balance. 
In summary, Jones’ home life fostered his innate mystical temperament, in the 
sense that he was often aware of God’s presence, and convinced him that God 
communicated with individuals on a day-to-day basis. The early framework within 
which he interpreted this experience was biblically informed and drew on the 
spiritual insights of the Quaker tradition.  
Even at this early stage in Jones’ life, three important convictions can be identified. 
First, the religious life involves both a felt relationship with God and the need to do 
good with ‘enthusiastic passion’. Second, God is immanent, with little sense that 
God is also transcendent. Third, science can be reconciled with religion. Each of 
these convictions exhibits a source of tension, namely the need to hold two 
potentially either/or options (spiritual experience/action, 
immanence/transcendence, science/religion) in balance. Subsequent chapters will 
consider how Jones attempted to achieve this balance, and how commentators, by 
emphasizing one side or the other of his resolution of these tensions, have come to 
diverse interpretations of his message. First, though, we consider the next stage of 
Jones’ education, Haverford College, where he began to expand this early 
interpretive framework to include figures from outside the Quaker tradition. 
 
2.2 Haverford College: A broad education  
‘The cure for scepticism is always deeper knowledge’, insisted Jones in Social Law,33 
expressing an attitude that was certainly in line with that prevailing at Haverford. 
The college had been founded by Quakers who held that the 1827 schism that 
 
33 Jones, Social Law, 15. 
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resulted in two strands of Quakerism (Orthodox and Hicksite Quakers, see Chapter 
7 and Appendix A) was the result of ignorance and were keen to provide a 
remedy.34 During Jones’ time as a student there (1882 to 1885), Haverford 
benefitted from strong links with Harvard and had some exceptionally gifted 
teachers. Chief among these was Pliny Earle Chase. Jones described Chase as a 
radiant Christian and, not without reason, a ‘universal savant’ (Chase had published 
200 papers on subjects including astronomy and meteorology and rumour had it 
that he read a hundred languages).35 He was to have a lasting influence on Jones’ 
spiritual and intellectual development.  
Jones’ education at Haverford was broad, and four related strands of it are evident 
both in the content and, less obviously, in the style of Social Law. The first relates to 
the emotional and theological crises engendered by developments in science 
towards the end of the 19th century.36 It was Pliny Chase’s use of Henry 
Drummond’s Natural Law in the Spiritual World that would eventually provide the 
inspiration (and title) for Social Law. The second was Jones’ enduring love of poetry, 
fostered by Thomas Chase, Pliny’s brother and the Principal of Haverford. Jones 
recalls that Thomas Chase gave his students ‘the feel of great literature’ by showing 
‘how noble poetry should be read in meter’.37 The third was Jones’ developing 
fascination with mysticism. Jones wrote his undergraduate dissertation on 
‘Mysticism and its exponents’, and it was in researching this topic that he realized 
that he had ‘found the field of [his] life work’.38 His understanding of mysticism 
owed much to the Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Quaker poet 
John Greenleaf Whittier. The fourth was an interpretation of Christianity that was 
coloured by the 2nd-century theologian Clement of Alexandria 
 
34 Vining, Friend of Life, 35. 
35 Jones, Life in College, 40. 
36 Jones, Life in College, 64. 
37 Jones, Life in College, 56. 
38 Jones, Life in College, 133. 
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What I aim to do in this section is to discuss these strands, to show how Jones wove 
them together, to point out where they diverged from the core of conviction, and to 
indicate how they would reappear in Social Law.    
2.2.1 Science: Henry Drummond  
The need to reconcile science and religion was a pressing one for many Christians at 
the end of the 19th century. Jones recalls that Thomas Huxley, ‘Darwin’s bulldog’, 
was at the peak of his reputation, and the adjustment between Christianity and 
evolution had not yet been thought through.39 Early attempts had centred on 
William Paley’s 1802 Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity. Jones 
was not impressed. ‘What a mistake it was to go on teaching Paley’s Evidences to 
English and American youth clear up to the end of the last century’, he complained: 
‘We all quickly knew that Paley was barren soil on which no nutriment grew for the 
soul.’40  
Relief came when Chase brought a ‘thick, new book’ to class, declaring it to be by a 
‘new prophet’ in the age of science. The book was Natural Law in the Spiritual 
World; the prophet, Henry Drummond. The central question it addressed was, ‘Is 
there not reason to believe that many of the Laws of the Spiritual World, hitherto 
regarded as occupying an entirely separate province, are simply the Laws of the 
Natural World?’41 Drummond thus discusses natural phenomena ranging from 
parasites to the environment and draws spiritual analogies. Jones enthused that, 
while the book was imperfect, it came ‘like water to shipwrecked men’.42 Its impact 
is apparent in the Introduction to Social Law, where Jones wrote of the experience 
that had occurred nearly 20 years previously: ‘We found at a leap that the two 
worlds could go together, that science and religion were not two discordant 
 
39 Jones, Life in College, 64. 
40 Jones, Life in College, 43.  
41 H. Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World (New York, NY: Hurst & Co [1883]), Kindle, p.1. 
42 Jones, Life in College, 64–65. 
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languages … and that all that we had learned or could learn by studying nature only 
added to the riches of the knowledge of the glory of God.’43 In Social Law, Jones 
aimed to do for psychology what Drummond had done for the natural sciences. 
Jones’ reactions to Paley and Drummond, then, reveal that for him reconciliation 
between science and religion needed to be more than just intellectually satisfying. 
Indeed, Jones describes the early rift in almost visceral rather than academic terms: 
‘It will be difficult, perhaps impossible, for my readers now living in peace in the lee 
of the dykes, to realize in any vivid way what it was like to be thrown into that open 
sea when the euroclydon was in full sweep.’44  One of the ways that Jones ensured 
that Social Law was not spiritually sterile was to make use of poetry within the text 
itself. His ability to use poetry effectively again had its origin at Haverford. 
2.2.2 Poetry: The Romantic poets  
As noted in the previous chapter, both Liberal Christians and Liberal Quakers 
embraced the concept of the ‘poet-prophet’. William Blake was the first in a series 
of poets to offer a belief system to supplement, or sometimes replace, conventional 
Christianity.45 Subsequently, Wordsworth tendered an ecstatic nature mysticism, 
Thomas Carlyle made the bold claim that the poet and prophet were fundamentally 
the same and had penetrated the sacred mystery of the universe, and Matthew 
Arnold was convinced that most of what passed for religion would soon be 
overtaken by poetry. In America, the supreme example is perhaps Walt Whitman, 
with his 1871 proclamation that ‘the priest departs, the divine literus comes’.46 
Traditionally Quakers viewed the arts with some suspicion, but by the 1880s 
attitudes were more accepting,47 as evidenced by a 1902 article in The British 
 
43 Jones, Social Law, 10. 
44 Jones, Middle Years, 64–65. 
45 Robertson, ‘Reading poetry religiously’, 18-19. 
46 W. Whitman, ‘Democratic vistas’, in J. Kaplan (ed.) Complete Poetry and Collected Prose (New 
York: Library of America, 1982). 
47 See e.g. W. Jolliff, ‘The practice of writing: A Quaker poet’s perspective’, in Quakers and Literature, 
ed. P. Anderson (Longmeadow, MA: Full Media Services, 2016). 
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Friend, which asserted that ‘the divine message’ is entrusted to poets as well as to 
preachers, and in fact may well prove more enduring, as ‘the poet’s voice goes on 
sounding down the ages’.48 
Haverford in Jones’ era certainly embraced poetry.49 President Chase was well 
connected to prominent literary men. He invited the academic and politician James 
Bryce to lecture the students on Dante, and Matthew Arnold captured the 
imagination of the students all the more strongly because Chase’s invitation to him 
was overruled by more cautious Haverford managers. Chase, as noted, read poetry 
aloud with elan, and he taught some students, including Jones, Italian so that they 
could read Dante in the original. Chase’s enthusiasm was obviously infectious, as 
Jones reports that he discovered Carlyle in part because during his first year there 
was ‘a strong run’ on him by the seniors.50 He recalls becoming ‘almost saturated’ 
with the poems of James Russell Lowell, and also absorbed Wordsworth, Tennyson, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and John Greenleaf Whittier.51 It seems likely that the 
themes of the sublime, nature and the supernatural that are associated with 
Romanticism would have resonated with the mystical element of Jones’ nature. In 
later years he credited Wordsworth and Coleridge as interpreting the spiritual life of 
humans in ‘fresh and transforming ways’ because they had ‘discovered that man is 
essentially a spiritual being’.52 As with his childhood home environment, then, Jones 
was fortunate in that this poetry-soaked milieu again ministered to his disposition. 
Of particular interest here is that Jones’ excursions into poetry were intertwined 
with his developing belief system. As he put it, ‘all my reading fed into my religious 
life and was at the same time in large measure determined by it’, and the passages 
he selected for memorization almost always ministered to his growing faith.53  
 
48 British Friend, ‘A modern “defence of poesie”’ (by G.E.C.), The British Friend (October 1902): 270. 
49 Jones, Life in College, 56, and Chapter VI passim. 
50 Jones, Life in College, 79.  
51 Jones, Life in College, Chapter VI. 
52 R. M. Jones, The Later Periods of Quakerism, Vol. 1, (London: Macmillan, 1921), 438.  
53 Jones, Life in College, 82. 
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Significantly, he tended to put poets on a spiritual pedestal, following Carlyle in 
proclaiming that poets and mystics ‘at bottom pretty much belong to the same 
order of being’, and in Social Law he does not approach any of beliefs expressed in 
the poems critically.54 This uncritical admiration (discussed further in Chapter 5) 
seems to originate in his view that the wall between the conscious self and the 
subconscious life is extremely thin for the genius, whether this be a mystic or a 
poet.55  
It is notable that all the poems that made their way into Social Law, either as 
chapter epigraphs or within the text, describe the poet’s experience of the divine 
but are not explicitly Christian or about Christ. Matthew Arnold is a case in point – 
in spite of his atheism he is quoted by Jones in the context of the relationship 
between humans and God (see Chapter 5). In this respect, T.S. Eliot’s criticism, that 
the move to replace religion with poetry would divorce religion from thought and 
leave religion to be ‘laid waste by the anarchy of feeling’,56 is pertinent, as it is 
congruent with my assertion, discussed later, that one of the reasons Jones 
diverged from the core of conviction was his experiential rather than theological 
approach to Christianity. 
An important step in turning these initial ideas about and experiences of God into a 
coherent system of thought was Jones’ encounter with the concept of mysticism. 
2.2.3 Mysticism: Ralph Waldo Emerson  
As noted, Jones wrote his graduating thesis on ‘Mysticism and its Exponents’. 
Looking back on this decision in his sixties, he reflected that ‘many features of my 
later life, up to the present moment, have been determined by that early decision 
to write a graduating thesis on Mysticism’.57  
 
54 R. M. Jones, Pathways to the Reality of God (New York: MacMillan, 1931), 154. 
55 Jones, Social Law, 123. 
56 W. V. Davis, R. S. Thomas, Poetry and Theology (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 2 
57 Jones, Life in College, 134. 
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Two prominent figures in this emerging field of the study of mysticism had a 
particularly strong influence on Jones. The first was Robert Vaughan, author of the 
seminal Hours with the Mystics (1856). Jones ‘read’ and ‘re-read’ the book, which 
provides an overview of mysticism through time and across cultures.58 The book 
itself and its influence on transforming the perception of mysticism from a 
somewhat disreputable term to a respectable academic discipline is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 8. Here, I focus on the second figure, the Transcendentalist 
essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
Born in 1803, Emerson studied at Harvard Divinity School before becoming junior 
minister at a Unitarian church in Boston, the city of his birth. In 1832 his resignation 
was reluctantly accepted when the congregation decided that they could not agree 
with his view that Jesus never intended communion to be administered in 
perpetuity.59 After some time travelling in Europe, where he met and embraced the 
ideas of Coleridge, Wordsworth and Carlyle (the very poets admired by Jones), 
Emerson returned to Concord, Massachusetts. There he gathered around him a 
group that would become known as the Transcendental Club and earned his living 
as an essayist, poet and orator. His message was stirring (‘Hitch your wagon to a 
star’; ‘We live among surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate on them’60), rather 
than drily intellectual. As the writer Harriet Martineau put it, ‘He conquers minds, as 
well as hearts, wherever he goes; and without convincing anybody’s reason of any 
one thing, exalts their reason, and makes their minds worth more than they ever 
were before.’61 
Members of the Club emphasized that divinity pervaded humanity and nature. Of 
interest here is that this view was influenced by Quakerism. In fact, Emerson 
 
58 Jones, Life in College, 133. 
59 R. D. Richardson Jr, Emerson: The Mind on Fire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 
Kindle, loc. 2573. 
60 See R. W. Emerson, The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. B. Atkinson (New York: 
The Modern Library, 2000). 
61 From the Introduction Emerson, Essential Writings, xvi. 
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described himself as ‘more of a Quaker than anything else’.62 He refers to George 
Fox and other Quakers in his journals, and took three Quaker volumes (History of 
the Quakers, A Life of Fox and Life of Penn) with him on retreat when he was 
thinking through his position on communion.63 Furthermore, the list of the eight 
individuals who Emerson identified as having ministered to his highest wants 
included the Quakers Mary Rotch and Edward Stabler.64 The former was a 
formidable woman who emphasized the importance of the Inner Light as a source 
of wisdom and guidance and provided the inspiration for Emerson’s acclaimed 
essay ‘Self-Reliance’.65  
Jones first encountered Emerson as a ‘more or less accidental’ choice of 
philosopher, picked to fulfil the requirements for a philosophy course,66 but given 
that Emerson took his inspiration from the Romantic poets and Quakerism, and that 
he was a gifted writer who appealed to the heart as well as the head, there is little 
wonder that he would prove to be a lasting source of inspiration. Jones started by 
reading George Willis Cooke’s Life of Emerson, which traced Emerson’s spiritual 
pedigree and emphasized that he believed ‘in the Inner Light of the Quaker, the 
Ecstasy of Plotinus, the Divine Illumination of Swedenborg’.67 It was this alignment 
of Fox with the wider spiritual tradition that instigated a profound shift in 
perception within Jones.  Fox himself was transformed from a ‘provincial’ to a 
‘cosmopolitan’ figure, and Jones reports that he became conscious for the first time 
that the heart of Quakerism was mysticism, and that it was this that was the ‘secret’ 
 
62 C. D. Gelatt, ‘The Quaker Influence on Emerson’ (MA dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1939), 
1.   
63 Gelatt, ‘The Quaker Influence’, 15. 
64 Richardson, Emerson, loc. 4496, Kindle. 
65 Richardson, Emerson, loc. 3239, Kindle. Rotch was ejected from her position of elder in New 
Bedford for defending her ‘New Light’ beliefs that ‘the Light within, not the Bible, was the final 
authority in Religion, for the Bible was only one expression of the spirit constantly active in every 
human soul’ (loc. 3212). 
66 Jones, Life in College, 89. 
67 Jones has possibly misquoted the book’s title here. The quotation is from G.W. Cooke, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson: His Life, Writings and Philosophy, 2nd edn (Boston: James R. Osgood, 1882), 323. 
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of his early religious life.68 As will become clear in later chapters, these ideas 
permeate all of Jones’ writing: he was not exaggerating when he called them 
‘epoch-making’.69  
Regarding Emerson’s essays themselves, Jones claimed to have read all of them as a 
student, but to have focused on ‘The Oversoul’, ‘Nature’, ‘Self-Reliance’ and 
‘Spiritual Laws’.70 Discernible echoes and direct quotations from these writings 
appear in many of Jones’ books. Perhaps the most significant concept that Jones 
took from Emerson was that of the Oversoul, that Unity ‘within which every man’s 
particular being is contained and made one with all other’.71 He expressed the 
impact of the idea in a letter to his future wife Elizabeth Bartram in 1902: ‘Now why 
didn’t thee tell me more about the “Oversoul”? ... I also wanted to know what thee 
saw in Emerson’s great essay. It has had so much to do with my life and I wish thee 
had given me thy glimpse.’72 The essence of the idea that Emerson conceptualized 
so succinctly and that Jones embraced so readily is that God and humans are 
related, and that, through this relationship, humans are related with each other. It 
is an idea that will be seen to underlie every chapter in this thesis. 
Various other influences can be discerned in the above-named essays. In ‘Self-
Reliance’, Emerson counsels that ‘A man should learn to detect and watch that 
gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the 
firmament of bards and sages.’73 As noted, the inspiration for this essay came from 
Quaker Mary Rotch’s ideas about the ‘Light within’. The idea would surely have 
found experiential confirmation and therefore have gained credibility for Jones, 
both from the Quaker tradition generally and from his memories of relatives who 
experienced divine guidance. In ‘Nature’, Emerson expresses a reverence for the 
 
68 Jones, Life in College, 91. 
69 Jones, Life in College, 90. 
70 Jones, Life in College, 90. 
71 Emerson, Essential Writings, 237. 
72 Quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 92–93.  
73 Emerson, Essential Writings, 132. 
75 
 
natural world that would have resonated with Jones’ belief that nature kept him 
spiritually safe. Emerson at times comes close to pantheism though, for example 
when he declares that ‘Standing on the bare ground – my head bathed by the blithe 
air and uplifted into infinite space … I am part or parcel of God.’74 In ‘Spiritual Laws’, 
Emerson encourages his readers to ‘draw a lesson from nature, which always works 
by short ways. When the fruit is ripe, it falls. When the fruit is despatched, the leaf 
falls.’75 Jones uses a similar analogy to describe his approach to influencing Quakers 
with whom he did not agree: ‘I felt convinced that there was no legitimate way to 
shake off the dry, dead leaves of these old theological opinions until the deeper life 
of the soul itself was awakened, which would in time produce its own fresh and vital 
truth of experience and quietly push off the desiccated variety.’76 Indeed, this is 
possibly one example of Jones’ admission that ‘the effect of that long and intimate 
study of Emerson left its touch, unnoticed at the time, on my use of English and my 
way of putting things’.77 
It is worth noting one important difference between the Transcendentalists and 
traditional Quaker thought. In 1889, Jones had drawn attention to the ‘immense’ 
difference between the Quaker conviction that there is nothing in human nature 
that can lead to salvation and the Transcendentalist view that the ‘God-given 
teacher’ is a ‘natural endowment of the human mind’, and there is no suggestion 
that he wishes to diverge from the traditional Quaker formulation.78 As we will see 
in later chapters, however, in Social Law Jones was confidently decrying the 
traditional Quaker view as psychologically inadequate and embracing a position 
that was, in fact, congruent with that of the Transcendentalists. 
 
74 Emerson, Essential Writings, 6. 
75 Emerson, Essential Writings, 175. 
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77 Jones, Life in College, 91. 
78 R. M. Jones, Eli and Sybil Jones: Their life and Work (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1889), 301 
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In summary, then, Emerson and Jones shared what might be termed a mystical 
orientation that was informed by the Romantic poets and aspects of Quakerism. 
Jones gained two important concrete ideas from Emerson: the conviction that 
Quakerism was a mystical religion, and the concept of the Oversoul as an 
expression of the relationship between humans and God. More nebulously, Jones 
seems to have assimilated Emerson’s style of writing, a style that was informed and 
lucid and that appealed to the heart. The next individual to be considered knew 
both Jones and Emerson: the so-called ‘Quaker poet’, John Greenleaf Whittier. 
2.2.4 Quaker mysticism: John Greenleaf Whittier 
Outside Quakerism, the poet Whittier (1807–1892) is perhaps best known for his 
hymns. Dear Lord and Father of Mankind, with lines such as ‘Speak through the 
earthquake, wind, and fire / O still, small voice of calm’, for example, epitomises the 
guidance received through the listening silence that is sought in a Quaker Meeting. 
For Whittier, this guidance resulted in a vigorous fight for the abolition of slavery, in 
which he combined lobbying politicians and public speaking with poetry and 
writing. Jones praised Whittier as ‘a profoundly mystical person, dwelling deep, 
listening acutely to the inward voice’, and with ‘a burning moral passion’ for the 
enlargement of human freedom.79 
Jones admits that he did not immediately recognize the significance of Whittier’s 
poetry, despite the fact that he was a close family friend. Poems such as ‘The 
Meeting’ and ‘Eternal Goodness’ eventually put Jones ‘in living touch with his 
spiritual world’, however, and by his final year in Haverford, Whittier was one of his 
‘chosen guides’.80 Jones met him in about 1887, by which time Whittier was frail 
and elderly but ‘rich in spiritual insight’.81 Whittier reminisced about his friendship 
with Emerson, and the two discussed the poetry of Emerson and Lowell.  
 
79 R.M. Jones, A Poet’s Faith (London: Friends Home Service Committee, 1948), 27. 
80 Jones, Life in College, 85. 
81 Jones, Life in College, 169. 
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In his 1948 pamphlet A Poet’s Faith, Jones gives some indications of what he found 
attractive about Whittier. He appreciated Whittier’s conviction that science could 
not disprove religion because the latter was experiential: at an address at 
Haverford, Whittier had insisted that ‘a Quaker college can have no occasion to 
renew the disastrous quarrel of religion with science … No possible investigation of 
natural facts; no searching criticism of letter and tradition can disturb [faith], for it 
has its witness in all human hearts.’82 Jones also recognized that Whittier managed 
to hold together the ‘yeasty doctrine of immanence in sane balance with the 
equally important fact of transcendence’.83 Indeed, Whittier told Jones that he had 
criticized Emerson for letting his emphasis on the immanence of God drift towards 
pantheism.  
What is significant about Whittier is that he weaves together many of the themes 
that have been touched on above. He was a lifelong friend of Eli Jones and of Jones’ 
mother, so he understood rural Quaker life and had first-hand experience of the 
spiritual atmosphere of Meetings. Like Woolman, he valued both silence and action. 
Like Drummond, he believed that there was no argument between science and 
religion. Like Emerson and the Romantic poets, he strove to express spiritual truths 
and experiences through poetry. Unlike Emerson, however, he resisted pantheism. 
It is not surprising, then, that Jones extolls Whittier in Social Law as ‘in modern 
times the finest interpreter of the inner meaning of Quakerism’.84  
2.2.5 The Christian tradition: Clement of Alexandria 
One final figure whose influence is apparent in Jones’ thought is Clement of 
Alexandria. Jones refers to him in Middle Years as ‘one of my most loved religious 
 
82 Jones, A Poet’s Faith, 19. 
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guides’, and in 1910 he published a selection of Clement’s writings.85 Clement was 
born ca. 150, probably in Athens, where he studied philosophy. During his 
subsequent travels he discovered Christianity, converted, and settled in Alexandria, 
the then intellectual centre of the Roman world. He became a teacher at the 
Catechetical School in about 180, numbering Origen amongst his pupils, and 
produced three important works: Protrepticis (Exhortation), Paedogous (Tutor) and 
Stromateis (Miscellanies). He died between 211 and 215.  Jones’ Introduction to 
Clement’s writings gives some insight into the ways in which Clement’s thought 
resonated with his own, the most notable of which are as follows. 
Relevance to the present day. Clement aimed to present Christianity in a way the 
educated Greek world in Alexandria found acceptable.86 Twentieth century liberals 
were likewise trying to make their message relevant to their own generation, a 
similarity not lost on Jones: ‘[Clement] did in his century what we are trying to do 
now. He expressed the Christian message in terms of prevailing thought.’87 
Universal inspiration.  Clement is known for drawing on non-Christian poets and 
philosophers.88 As Jones puts it, ‘He makes no distinction between sacred and 
profane literature, divine and secular writings … Homer and Isaiah, Heraclitus and 
St. John, alike bear witness in his pages to the presence of an immortal Divine 
Word, breathing through men and guiding the race.’89 Jones, as we have seen, 
likewise believed poetry to be inspired and to reveal God. These first two 
characteristics of Clement are, then, consistent with Jones’ desire to produce a 
synthesis of Christianity and modern thought. 
 
85 Jones, Middle Years, 117. R.M. Jones, Selections from the Writings of Clement of Alexandria 
(London: Headley Brothers, 1910). 
86 K. Ware and A. Louth, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, in Journey to the Heart: Christian Contemplation 
through the Centuries, ed. K. Nataraja (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2011), 35. 
87 Jones, Clement, 7. 
88 Ware and Louth, ‘Clement’, 36. 
89 Jones, Clement, 14. 
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Incarnation. Jones interprets Clement as believing that ‘The Incarnation was the 
breaking forth in a definite Person of the God who had through all previous history 
been an immanent Word and who had all along been preparing for such a 
consummation’.90 As we will see in Chapter 6, Jones agreed, claiming that Christ ‘is 
a revelation here in time and mutability of the eternal nature and character of that 
conscious personal Spirit that environs all life and that steers the entire system of 
things’.91  
Sin. Clement’s treatment of sin is ‘characteristically Greek’, says Jones, and it ‘lacks 
the tragic depth of the Hebrew or the Augustinian diagnosis of it … it is failure to 
realise the goal of our true being.’92  Jones view of sin was similar, as we will see in 
Chapter 5, and in fact he was often accused of not taking sin seriously enough. 
Salvation (the harmonized man). Clement’s view of salvation is related to deification 
(theosis), a concept that originated with him.93 Salvation for Clement is not, explains 
Kallistos Ware, a change in our juridicial status through imputed righteousness, nor 
does it mean imitating Christ through moral effort. Rather, salvation means that we 
share in the life and power of God. We do not become God, as there is still a 
distinction between the uncreated God and created human beings, but our sharing 
in the life of God results in inner transformation. Jones likewise insists that salvation 
is something we experience. He frequently draws on Clement’s term the 
‘harmonized man’ to express this process of transformation (although as far as I am 
aware, he never uses the term deification). It is a ‘profound conception’, says Jones: 
‘the entire self must be won to holy ends until goodness becomes natural and 
habitual’, a point I return to in Chapter 5.94  
 
90 Jones, Clement, 16 (italics as in the original). 
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94 Jones, Clement, 19. 
80 
 
The human–divine relationship. Throughout his corpus, Jones uses Clement’s phrase 
‘mutual and reciprocal correspondence’ to describe the relationship between 
humans and God.95 He explores this correspondence from a number of angles, 
although he does not always use the term explicitly. For example, on the basis of 
idealism (see Chapter 4) he concludes that there is a correspondence between an 
object and the observing subject, and because God is the source of consciousness, 
this means that there is a profound correspondence between humans, God and the 
world of objects.96 Most importantly, however, Jones’ view of the Inner Light (see 
Chapter 7) has at its heart the idea that humans and God are in this mutual and 
reciprocal correspondence. For Clement, as noted above, there was a difference 
between created humans and the uncreated God. But for Jones, as we will see, his 
use of psychology and idealism meant that this difference was blurred.  
Nous. Clement, in bringing together Greek thought and Christianity, associates 
Plato’s concept of nous (soul) with the imago Dei.  It is the fact that we have 
something in common with God, that we are made in God’s image, that enables us 
to have communion with God, as according to Greek thought ‘only like can know 
like’.97 Jones insists that conceptions of the Inner Light that see God and humans as 
separate mean that God remains ‘forever unknowable to human consciousness 
except by miracle’. He does not, however, refer to the imago Dei; rather, it is a 
sharing of consciousness with the divine that means that God can be known. This 
again means that he cannot separate God and humans in the way that Clement 
does.98 
Good works. Jones emphasizes that for Clement there is no schism between faith 
and works, because Clement holds that ‘faith is the beginning of action’.99 We will 
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see this idea reappearing in Jones’ view of ‘affirmation mysticism’, namely that the 
experience of God is not an end in itself but a means of gaining strength and vision 
for service. 
In summary, Jones saw in Clement someone who had aims similar to his own, 
namely of making Christianity relevant to his generation and embracing the best of 
human knowledge. Furthermore, Clement’s concepts of the ‘harmonized man’ and 
‘mutual and reciprocal correspondence’ were in line with Jones’ ideas about 
transformation and the Inner Light, as will become apparent in later chapters. There 
is, though, an important theological difference underlying these latter two points of 
similarity, in that Clement, unlike Jones, maintained a distinction between created 
humans and uncreated God.  
 
Conclusion 
The Quaker influences on Jones’ childhood reverberated throughout his life, 
contributing to his experiential basis. His family’s daily practice of silence and 
weekly pattern of attending Quaker Meeting were more than mere rituals – they 
fostered his intuitive sense of what he took to be God’s presence. Furthermore, his 
family and school teachers offered an interpretation of this experience in terms of a 
biblical view of God and of the Quaker insistence that there was ‘that of God’ in 
everyone. In particular, his Aunt Peace and Uncle Eli convinced him by their 
example that God could be encountered within and guided individuals, and that this 
guidance needed to be married to human effort to act for the good of others. What 
would also prove to be important was that the Quaker community to which he 
belonged enabled Jones to appreciate the wisdom of the Bible while being open to 
the discoveries of science. 
At Haverford, Jones expanded his intellectual horizons, but in a way that would 
strengthen, rather than weaken, his Quaker inheritance. His education was broad, 
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encompassing poetry, Christian history, science and mysticism. As we will see in 
more detail in later chapters, this breadth of knowledge is apparent in Social Law as 
he synthesizes aspects of the Oversoul of Emerson, the spiritual nature of humans 
found in the Romantic poets, and the ‘mutual and reciprocal correspondence’ of 
Clement with the Quaker concept of the Inner Light. Furthermore, his conviction 
that science revealed God meant that he would in due time interpret this concept in 
terms of James’ psychology.  
Many of the individuals who influenced Jones were not unequivocally Christian 
though. The Transcendentalists and Romantic poets emphasized an experiential 
relationship with the divine that was often mediated by nature rather than by 
Christ, and that at times verged on pantheism. Jones uncritical acceptance of these 
views is an example of his theological naivety and, as will become clearer in later 
chapters, contributed to his multivalent theism. Moreover, he embraced those 
elements of Clement’s theology that emphasized the close relationship between 
humans and God, but neglected the elements that differentiated between the 
Creator and the created, an approach that contributed to the divergence of his 
views from the core of conviction. 
It is also notable that Jones’ spiritual awareness, so evident in his childhood, 
continued to develop at Haverford. ‘The certainty of God as the stupendous fact of 
the Universe was steadily rising in my soul’ he writes, ‘I finished college not on “the 
shining tablelands to which God Himself is moon and sun,” but with my feet on the 
road toward that tableland. I could at least say “Abba, Father,” and I could live 
henceforth confident that Love works, and works triumphantly, at the Heart of 
Things.’100 While in one sense Jones was fortunate that his intellectual and spiritual 
development were mutually enriching, and it was undoubtedly this symbiosis that 
gave his writing such conviction, it is perhaps surprising that there is not more of a 
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sense of struggle when the two did not cohere: he certainly struggles over the 
apparent clash between science and religion, but with a few exceptions he does not 
seem to have struggled unduly over the problem of evil, for example.101 
In brief, this chapter has considered the major intellectual and spiritual influences at 
work throughout Jones’ childhood and youth. I have suggested that his intuitive 
awareness of God’s presence was nurtured and given an intellectual framework first 
by Quaker relatives and teachers and then through the books he encountered at 
Haverford, but that crucially not all aspects of this framework were congruent with 
the core of conviction. As we will see in the next chapter, his quest to find a 
representation of the universe that fitted his spiritual disposition continued apace 
when he encountered various psychological, philosophical and social strands of the 
optimistic liberal theology that characterized the turn of the 20th century. 
 
101 See e.g. Jones, Finding the Trail, 40 for a brief comment on Jones’ reaction as a child to an act of 
arson. Like many liberals, he was sobered by two world wars and in 1943 acknowledged that evil 









Encounters with modern thought 
 
We must perforce live in our world, and our view of God must fit our entire system of 
thought.1 
 
The years following Jones’ graduation from Haverford were theologically 
tumultuous, with liberal theologians insisting that claims to truth should be made 
on the basis of reason, modern knowledge and experience rather than on 
ecclesiastical or scriptural authority. Quaker responses to this new theological 
paradigm were diverse. While some recognized the need to embrace ‘modern 
thought’ if they were to retain young, educated Quakers and eagerly grasped what 
they saw as a God-given opportunity to dispense with incorrect doctrine, others 
vehemently rejected change in favour of traditional biblically based formulations of 
faith. In addition, developments in psychology were raising questions about the 
nature of religious experience and the existence of God, and the prevailing 
philosophy of idealism was compatible with a universe grounded in an ‘ultimate 
consciousness’ that was not straightforwardly identified with the loving Father of 
Christianity. It is Jones’ engagement with these momentous developments that is 
the focus of this chapter. 
I identify three key milestones related to modern thought between Jones’ student 
days at Haverford and the publication of Social Law. The first, discussed in Section 
3.1, is the seminal Quaker conference held in Manchester in 1895, which set British 
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Quakerism on a course that embraced both liberalism and modernism. Although 
Jones did not attend, his meeting with John Wilhelm Rowntree two years later 
convinced him that Quakerism had to be brought in line with modern thought if it 
was to survive. The second, discussed in Section 3.2, is his discovery of William 
James. Jones stumbled on Principles of Psychology in a local library in the early 
1890s, already convinced that psychology was the best way to study mysticism, and 
there are several passages in Social Law where Jones appears to have drawn on 
Principles. Psychology was an emerging discipline at the time, however, with many 
psychologists, including James, investigating psychic phenomena such as 
spiritualism and crystal-gazing as a window into the subconscious. It was James’ 
metaphysical speculation related to the subconscious in Varieties, namely that we 
all partake in a ‘more’ beyond the subconscious, that would influence Jones’ 
reformulation of the Inner Light. The third, discussed in Section 3.3, is his year of 
postgraduate study (1900/01) at Harvard. It was here that Jones encountered the 
philosopher Josiah Royce and the ethicist G. H. Palmer and absorbed much of the 
material and the framework of idealism found in Social Law.  
This chapter thus covers a lot of ground. My aim is merely to draw attention to 
some of the key ideas related to modernism, psychology and idealism that are 
apparent in Social Law and to indicate where they had the potential to diverge from 
the core of conviction. The chapter completes the groundwork for the detailed 
analysis of Jones’ thought in the rest of the thesis. 
 
3.1 The Manchester Conference 
The well-attended Manchester Conference of 1895 would mark the beginning of 
the so-called Quaker Renaissance, characterized by the Society’s increasing 
engagement with modern thought and an emphasis on mysticism and social 
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engagement.2 In his analysis of the conference, Martin Davie notes that of the 139 
contributions, 25 were evangelical in tone and 22 liberal.3 The latter had the 
following characteristics: (1) recognition that religion should adapt to fit the 
changing patterns of contemporary thought; (2) acceptance of Darwinian evolution; 
(3) acknowledgment that it was impossible to reconcile a literal reading of the early 
chapters of Genesis with advances in scientific knowledge; (4) acceptance of the 
results achieved by Biblical criticism; (5) acceptance that the historical investigation 
of the gospels in the 19th century had resulted in a greater knowledge of Jesus as a 
historical figure; (6) an emphasis on the immanence of God; and (7) a belief that 
theology had ultimately to be based on an appeal to immediate experience of God 
(appeals to the Bible and miracles were no longer credible).  
My particular interest here is how contributors treated the relationship between 
‘science’ (which they referred to in a very general and monolithic sense) and 
Quakerism. In order to gain some traction on this issue, I make use of the categories 
proposed by Ian Barbour in the 1960s, which are well known in the field of science 
and religion. That is, the relationship between science and religion can be classified 
as conflict, integration, independence or dialogue.4 Briefly, the conflict model sees 
science and religion as almost at war, for example setting interpretations of Genesis 
as literally true against theories of evolution. The independence model sees science 
and religion as having their own distinct fields of enquiry: in the often-cited 
terminology of the palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould, they are ‘nonoverlapping 
magisteria’.5 The dialogue model sees science and religion as engaged in a 
conversation that leads to enhanced mutual understanding. Finally, the integration 
 
2 For a discussion see M. Stanley, Practical Mystic: Religion, Science and A. S. Eddington (Chicago: 
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Introduction (Chichester: John Wiley, 2010), 45–50. 
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model resists the idea that the universe has sharply defined ‘spiritual’ and ‘physical’ 
components, insisting that explanations must encompass both. 
The Manchester session of interest here is that entitled ‘The Attitude of the Society 
of Friends towards Modern Thought’, presided over by Thomas Hodgkin on the 
evening of 13 November. Although the ensuing discussion was lively, with some 
delegates emphatically disagreeing with the general stance of the predominantly 
liberal/modernist speakers, the liberal/modernist agenda prevailed in the years to 
follow and is central to Social Law.   
3.1.1 ‘The Attitude of the Society of Friends towards Modern Thought’ 
In his introductory paper, Hodgkin noted that the subject under discussion was ‘The 
Relation of Quakerism to Modern Thought’, clarifying that Quakerism was to be 
understood as ‘that mode of apprehending Christianity in which the Society of 
Friends has differed from other churches’, and that ‘modern thought’ comprised 
aestheticism, pessimism, socialism and scientism.6 He made two points about 
scientism. First, that George Fox and Quakers since have, under the influence of the 
‘Spirit of Christ Himself’, refused to call the Bible ‘The Word of God’, so can offer 
this mode of interpretation to those troubled by the clashes between science and 
Scripture. He was thus aligning himself with the wider Christian liberal attitude to 
Scripture, but motivated by Quaker tradition as much as by an openness to science. 
Second, that although science may change the way we think about the universe, it 
would not change the way we thought about its Maker. Here Hodgkin is illustrating 
Barbour’s category of independence, because science will not affect our view of 
God. 
This attitude of independence was also apparent, albeit for different reasons, in the 
next speaker. J. Bevan Braithwaite was the evening’s lone evangelical contributor 
and advised Quakers to concentrate on practical holiness and to ‘put a check upon 
 
6 Report of the Proceedings of the Conference in Manchester (London: Headley Brothers, 1895), 
Paper by Thomas Hodgkin, 203–208. 
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many curious but unprofitable enquiries’.7 Braithwaite is implicitly advocating 
‘independence’, by assuming that living a good life and forming a holy character 
would not be aided by science. 
The next speaker, the biblical scholar J. Rendel Harris, was in contrast adamant that 
science and religion could not be separated. Human development, he explained, 
involves intellectual and emotional growth. It is not ‘an atrophy of the intellect in 
the interest of emotions, nor a fossilizing of the heart in order for a more close 
study of the universe’.8 Furthermore, false science led to false doctrine. Harris 
illustrated this with respect to a statement of the 19th century Quaker reformer 
Elias Hicks, who claimed that God loved all people equally and placed them in the 
same condition as ‘our first parents’. Modern man knows we never had a first 
parent, Harris objected, so insisting on this doctrine in opposition to science might 
cause people to doubt the rest of Hicks’ statement, namely the love of God. He 
concluded by urging Quakers to embrace science, assuring them that suspicion of 
modern thought belonged ‘more to the clergy than to a Society like our own’.  
Doing so, he confidently proclaimed, would bolster Quaker credibility, redeem the 
Society from the ‘reproach of conservative timidity’ and set Quakers in their rightful 
place amongst the intellectual forces of the world. Harris, then, is advocating 
Barbour’s category of dialogue as a way to make faith and doctrine credible. 
The physicist Silvanus P. Thompson followed Harris by asking ‘Can a scientific man 
be a sincere Friend?’ The answer was ‘yes’, and in fact the practice of science and 
the plain speech favoured by Quakers reinforced one another, in that ‘the habit of 
accurate thought and speech, of letting yea mean yea and no more, which is 
characteristic of Friends, is one that the scientific method tends ever to 
strengthen’.9 Echoing Harris, he too thought that ‘modern thought will clear away 
only the human error that has grown up around divine truth’. Crucially, though, 
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science has its limits. Thompson insisted that ‘To every man there comes a 
consciousness, not to be analysed in the test-tube of the chemist, nor probed with 
the scalpel of the physiologist, not to be touched by the syllogism of the critic, nor 
disposed of by the reading of a codex, a consciousness of something quite other 
than those things which are to be apprehended by the physical senses.’ Thompson 
is thus proposing integration at the methodological level, dialogue at the epistemic 
level, but independence when it came to experience of God or spiritual values. 
In the final paper, John William Graham stressed that the religious world now 
viewed the ‘Indwelling Voice as its central conception’.10 Quakerism had always 
held this position, he proudly asserted, so ‘holds the future in the hollow of its 
hand’. He too held that Scripture is not infallible – even though in practice it excels 
all other books, its mechanical infallibility has ‘nothing to rest on but the ill-formed 
views of the bishops of the early centuries’. Graham also touched on how God 
interacted with the world: ‘In contemplating Divine Providence, a modern religion 
regards it as constant, not as occasional … The fatal result of claiming “Special” 
Providence is to banish God from the other 99% of causation.’ Here Graham is 
perhaps veering towards pantheism or at least panentheism. Although he does not 
develop his ideas, he might be expected to fall in the category of integration 
regarding how God interacts with the world, because God is involved in physical 
processes. 
In summary, all the liberal speakers at the Manchester Conference embraced 
science. Views on the relationship between science and Quakerism encompassed 
independence, dialogue and integration, in various forms. The potential conflicts 
between science and religion were resolved on the one hand by giving authority to 
‘science’, which was treated as a homogeneous, fixed entity, and on the other by 
claiming that Quakers had never viewed the Bible as infallible.  
 
10 Manchester Conference, Paper by John William Graham, 240–246. 
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The recorded comments to the papers reveal a marked diversity of opinions among 
the audience. One anonymous Friend objected strenuously that ‘I feel concerned to 
utter my earnest protest against the views uttered here tonight. It seems to me that 
this Conference, representing London Yearly Meeting, cannot do justice to itself 
without placing on record a protest.’11 Although the complaints are general rather 
than specific, it seems likely that the consternation felt by some centred on the 
criticism of Scripture (this is certainly the case in letters to Jones; see my Chapter 9). 
Such was the strength of feeling that it was decided to delay further discussion until 
the next day. When the appointed time came, however, the clerk explained that to 
extend the discussion would interfere with the programme, and compromised by 
writing a minute, namely ‘We think it desirable that it should be distinctly 
understood, as applicable to all the sittings of the Conference, that it assumes no 
responsibility for the opinions expressed in any of the papers read before it.’12  
It is against this backdrop of these diverse, strongly held opinions that Social Law 
was written, so we now turn to look at Jones’ response to the conference. 
3.1.2 Jones’ response 
Jones did not attend the conference but was informed of what had happened in a 
letter from Henry Newman, editor of the British Quaker journal The Friend. 
Newman wrote that it was the first serious attempt of the Society to come to terms 
with modern thought and a vital effort to retain ‘highly educated & intelligent 
young men and women belonging to our best old Quaker families’ who were 
‘drifting theologically’.13 Many American Quakers were still ignorant of the 
challenges posed by new developments in higher criticism and modern scientific 
thought, Newman suggested, and he urged Jones, in his position as editor of The 
 
11 Manchester Conference, 247. 
12 Manchester Conference, 248. 
13 Henry Stanley Newman, 25 November 1895, HC Box 1 [see Appendix C]. 
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American Friend, to make full use of the double number of the conference issue of 
The Friend that he was sending.  
Jones’ involvement in the drive for modernism did not start in earnest until a few 
years later though, when he met John Wilhelm Rowntree on a walking holiday in 
Switzerland. The two very quickly realized that they had similar aims for reforming 
Quakerism and formed a deep and enduring friendship. Jones invested considerable 
energy over the coming decades in promoting the liberal/modernist agenda 
through journal articles, summer schools and the ambitious seven-volume 
Rowntree history of Quakerism14 in collaboration with British Quakers such as 
Rowntree (to whom Social Law is dedicated), Charles Braithwaite (who contributed 
to the Rowntree series) and Edward Grubb (a teacher and Quaker writer).  
Many of the ideas about the relationship between science and Christianity in Jones’ 
writings bear the imprint of ideas expressed at Manchester. For example, the 
category of dialogue expressed in the conviction that religious doctrine should be 
subject to science lies at the root of Social Law, and we will see in Chapter 7 that 
Jones appealed to the authority of psychology as evidence that Barclay’s view of the 
Inner Light was false. At times, however, this dialogue gave way to a relationship of 
independence. In a passage redolent of Thompson’s address, Jones writes that ‘We 
do not surrender love and sympathy, goodness and patience, because we cannot 
dig them up with a pick or find them under the microscope.’15  
Hodgkin’s neutral observation that science would not alter the way we thought 
about God was recast in a more positive light by Jones though: for Jones, as for 
Drummond, the study of nature added to our knowledge of the glory of God.16 
Indeed, at times Jones moves towards ‘integration’, in that his belief that there is a 
 
14 Southern, ‘Rowntree History Series’. 
15 Jones, Social Law, 42–43.  
16 Jones, Social Law, 10. 
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Person at the heart of the Universe (see Chapter 4) means that the insights of 
psychology reflect spiritual laws. 
Finally, whereas Braithwaite suggested that Quakers should concentrate on 
practical holiness rather than ‘unprofitable enquiries’, Social Law was written under 
the assumption that engagement with psychology, far from being unprofitable, was 
essential for those troubled by the apparent clash between psychology and faith. 
It should also be noted that Jones’ alignment with British, rather than prominent 
American, Quakers reflects the fact that the liberal/modernist strand would become 
dominant in Britain but not in America. In part this seems to have been because of 
the stronger hold of evangelical forms of Quakerism in America. (As noted in 
Chapter 1, while American Meetings accepted the evangelically flavoured Richmond 
Declaration of Faith, London Yearly Meeting rejected it.) The evangelical criticism of 
the liberal approach in America is summed up well by William Pinkham in a 1904 
article in The American Friend. Dubbing the New Theology a ‘grouping of heresies 
long since discarded by the Church of Christ because contrary to the teachings of 
Scripture’, his complaint covers many of the issues that will be raised in subsequent 
chapters so is worth quoting at length:  
In the name of evolution it denies the fall of man; and in the name of Higher 
Criticism it denies the historicity of the early chapters of Genesis. It stands 
diametrically opposed to the doctrine of a substitutionary atonement, to a 
resurrection after physical death, to a personal return of our Lord, and to a 
collective judgement. It makes inspiration a product of human consciousness, 
rather than a supernatural revelation to that consciousness. It sits in 
judgement upon the statements of Scripture, and accepts or modifies them at 
will.17 
 




Jones was clearly frustrated by this attitude, accusing American Quakers of timidity 
and ‘obscurantism’, namely failing to admit ‘the unpleasant facts that threaten 
disaster to ancient pet doctrines’. 18  
In summary, Jones’ approach to the relationship between Christianity and 
psychology, like that of the Manchester speakers in relation to Quakerism and 
‘science’ more generally conceived, encompasses dialogue, independence and 
integration. The question of authority in this relationship will prove to be important, 
as we will see in subsequent chapters. Both the Manchester speakers and Jones 
gave authority to ‘science’ over ‘Scripture’. However, the recognition that spiritual 
experiences captured something of worth about the universe but were outside the 
remit of science suggests that experience could in some circumstances trump both 
science and Scripture as a source of authority.  
This already complex multi-faceted relationship was complicated even further, as 
we will now see, by the fact that psychology was not an established edifice but a 
shifting and developing field that itself incorporated a range of religious, scientific 
and metaphysical suppositions. 
 
3.2 Christian and Quaker responses to psychology 
While studying in Europe at age 24, Jones wrote to his fiancée Sallie Coutant that 
‘My interest in mysticism had been steadily growing and deepening, and now I saw 
that the best approach to an understanding of this great human experience was to 
be found in philosophy and psychology.’19 About 15 years later, while this 
conviction is apparent in practice in the way he used psychology in Social Law, 
Jones’ assessment of psychology as a whole is more guarded: he acknowledges in 
the Introduction that ‘There is no religious view or practice so sacred that it does 
 
18 Jones, Middle Years, 61–62.  
19 Quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 54. 
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not sooner or later find itself summoned into the sanctum of the psychologist, 
where it is calmly asked by what right it continues to survive.’20  
Jones’ shift in attitude arose partly because psychology, compared with, say, the 
physical sciences, has a particularly close but complex and multi-faceted 
relationship with religion/spirituality. As we will see, some psychologists used their 
research to argue for the existence of or to reveal the character of God, while 
others were convinced that psychology would show religion to be an outdated 
stage in human development.  
The shift was also precipitated by the fact that psychology was a new field, still 
seeking to define itself. At the end of the 19th century, the increasing scientific 
respectability of psychology as reflected in its adoption of the laboratory and 
academic journals has to be seen in relation to what Eugene Taylor terms its 
‘shadow culture’, namely a preoccupation with psychic phenomena such as crystal-
gazing, mesmerism and spiritualism.21 This preoccupation was epitomized by 
William James, and the key point that will emerge later in this thesis is that James’ 
metaphysical speculations resulting from his research into psychic phenomena 
found their way into Social Law.  
In this section, I first give a brief and broad overview of the early years of 
psychology, looking at its relationship with psychic phenomena and its reception 
within the Church. I then narrow the focus to look more specifically at the Quaker 
response to William James, and then narrow it even further to make some 




20 Jones, Social Law, 13. 
21 See E. Taylor, Shadow Culture: Psychology and Spirituality in America (Washington DC: 
Counterpoint, 1999), Chapter 8. 
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3.2.1 Psychology, psychic phenomena and the Christian response 
3.2.1.1 Psychology and psychic phenomena 
Pre-scientific psychology in universities took place in philosophy departments.22 
From the 17th century, students typically linked the physical and mental worlds by 
considering the thought of Kant, Locke and Hume on sensation and perception in 
relation to knowledge. In the late 19th century, this philosophical framework was 
married to experimental physiology, a new science that showed that psychological 
processes could be measured.23 Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894), for example, 
carried out experiments to measure the speed of the nervous impulse, and Ernst 
Heinrich Weber (1795–1878) asked subjects to hold two similar weights in order to 
determine the ‘just noticeable difference’ between them, thereby showing that the 
physical and psychological worlds were not the same. These developments required 
equipment, which in turn led to a need for laboratories. Thus, the dating of the 
origin of scientific psychology, or the ‘new psychology’, is associated with the 
establishment of the first psychological research laboratory – that of Wilhelm 
Wundt at the University of Leipzig, Germany in 1879. In America, the first laboratory 
was established at John Hopkins University in 1883, and by 1900 there were 40 
more.24 The laboratory at John Hopkins was founded by G. Stanley Hall, a prominent 
Christian psychologist who had studied at Union Theological Seminary before 
gaining his PhD under James.25 Hall went on to strengthen the position of 
psychology as a respectable scientific discipline by founding the American Journal of 
Psychology in 1887 and the American Psychological Association in 1892. 
 
22 See L. T. Benjamin, Jr, A Brief History of Modern Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), Chapter 1; 
D. E. Leary, ‘German idealism and the development of psychology in the nineteenth century’, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 18 (1980): 299-317.  
23 For a discussion of the types of measurements that were used, see R. D. Tweney & C. A. Budzynski, 
‘The scientific status of American psychology in 1900’, American Psychologist 55 (2000): 1014–1017.  
24 L. T. Benjamin, Jr ‘The psychological laboratory at the turn of the 20th century’, American 
Psychologist 55 (2000): 318–321.  
25 See e.g. V. H. Kemp, ‘G. Stanley Hall and the Clark school of religious psychology’, American 
Psychologist 47 (1992): 290–298.  
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The desire for scientific respectability, though, was in tension with the prevailing 
fascination with psychic phenomena. In the 1880s, magnetic healers, phrenologists, 
hypnotists and mediums abounded, especially in Boston, and were much in demand 
for consultations. In 1885, the American Society for Psychical Research was 
established to investigate their claims. Hall was a founder member, as was James, 
who headed the Committee on Hypnotism and the Committee to Investigate 
Mediumistic Phenomena. James added a Ouija board and hypnotizer to his 
laboratory equipment, commandeered Harvard undergraduates for extensive 
studies into hypnosis, crystal-gazing and automatic writing, and spent many years 
investigating the celebrated Boston medium Leonora Piper.26 Some psychologists 
hoped to prove that ‘psychics’ were fraudulent, and in so doing founded a 
subdiscipline of psychology on deception and belief. Others used their investigation 
into psychic phenomena to establish the reality of the subconscious, demonstrating 
that there are states in which it can appear as if there are invasions from another 
level and offering the hope that religious visions could be understood.27 In the years 
to follow, many psychologists grew more sceptical however, coming to view 
psychics as frauds and James’ continuing preoccupation with psychic phenomena as 
an embarrassment to the scientific ethos.28 Hall, for example, had resigned his 
membership of the Society by 1890.29  
The relationship between psychic phenomena and organized religion was also 
shifting and heterogeneous. Spiritualism, for example, arose out of the experience 
of two adolescent Quakers: in 1848, Kate and Margaret Fox attributed the knocking 
they heard in their basement to a peddler who had been murdered and buried 
there, and, partly because they were related to prominent abolitionist Quakers in 
Rochester New York, the sisters soon became well known in lecture halls and 
 
26 Coon, D. J. ‘Testing the limits of sense and science’, American Psychologist 47 (1992): 143–151. 
27 See e.g. Taylor, Shadow Culture, Chapter 8. 
28 Benjamin, Modern Psychology, 12. 
29 Coon, ‘Testing the limits’, 144. 
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private parlours.30 On the one hand, spiritualism seemed to prove that there was 
life after death; on the other, some Christians objected that the claim of a pleasant 
afterlife for everyone was inconsistent with Christianity.31 A further example is the 
‘New Thought’ or ‘Mind-cure’ movement. Originating in Boston, New Thought 
blended elements of Christianity, Transcendentalism, Berkeley’s idealism and even 
Hinduism.32 It held that the divine dwelt in each person and promoted psychic 
healing based to a large extent on positive thinking. As we will see in Chapter 9, 
Jones received an enthusiastic response to Social Law from a Quaker who was 
involved with the movement and saw close links between its premises and Jones’ 
view of the Inner Light.  
If the relationship between psychic phenomena and Christianity apparent from the 
above examples was complex, so too was the relationship between Christianity and 
the more ‘scientific’ face of psychology. 
3.2.1.2 Psychology and Christianity 
Both Christians and psychologists exhibited a broad spectrum of attitudes towards 
the relationship between this new science and Christianity. Broadly speaking, 
whereas conservative Christians dismissed it as the latest form of materialism, 
liberal Christians sought to use it, whether to attain liberation from sin or to 
understand mysterious inner forces.33 Hall, for example, wanted to use psychology 
as an aid to developing virtue. Often at the forefront of explaining psychology to a 
general public concerned about its implications for religion, Hall discussed concepts 
such as self-control, moral development and the meaning of life and religion, 
enthusing that they were now being better understood by controlled experiments 
 
30 Coon, ‘Testing the limits’, 143. 
31 Benjamin, Modern Psychology, 11. 
32 James, Varieties, 94. 
33 C. G. White, Unsettled Minds: Psychology and the American Search for Spiritual Assurance 1830–
1940 (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), 1 and 67. 
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in the laboratory than by philosophers and metaphysicians.34 Another psychologist 
falling within this category was E.W. Scripture, in charge of the laboratory at Yale, 
who argued in 1899 that psychology could produce a system of character building 
based on a careful study of how to develop virtues such as truthfulness, honesty, 
persistence and courage.35 Of interest for this thesis is that William James felt this 
responsibility of psychology to facilitate self-improvement deeply, and his chapter 
on habit in Principles was popular sermon material (see Chapter 5). Many of these 
Christian psychologists, however, were accused of sacrificing their distinctively 
religious message and transforming Christianity into self-realization.36 
A further area of interest was whether psychology could shed any light on the 
existence, or otherwise, of God. Hall, for example, surmised in Harper’s Monthly in 
1894 that the new psychology provided a deep religious feeling that the world was 
ultimately rational.37 On similar lines, James Walsh, writing in a Catholic magazine, 
proclaimed that evidence from the new psychology brought one face to face with 
the necessity of a guiding force.38 And Edwin Starbuck, a Quaker psychologist who 
supplied much of the material for James’ Varieties and knew Jones,39 argued that 
psychology not only revealed God but showed that God existed: because inner 
dispositions can be relied upon for a true knowledge about the world, religious 
feelings point to the existence of an objective spiritual reality.40 
James Leuba, in contrast, took a naturalistic stance. His main critique came after 
Social Law, but Jones singles him out in the opening sentence of New Studies in 
Mystical Religion (1927), where the general assertion that ‘The main attack in 
 
34 White, Unsettled Minds, 56. 
35 For a brief discussion of early attitudes to the relationship between psychology and Christianity, 
see W. E. Pickren, ‘A whisper of salvation: American psychologists and religion in the popular press, 
1884–1908’, American Psychologist 55 (2000): 1022–1024. 
36 White, Unsettled Minds, 1–2. 
37 Pickren, ‘A whisper of salvation’, 1023. 
38 Pickren, ‘A whisper of salvation’, 1023. 
39 Jones and Starbuck lectured together at a Quaker Summer School in 1903, see Kent, ‘Psychological 
and mystical interpretations of early Quakerism, 269. 
40 White, Unsettled Minds, 151. 
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recent years on the validity of mysticism as a religious experience is the 
characteristic attack of the psychologist’ comes with a specific footnote: ‘See 
especially Leuba’s The Psychology of Religious Mysticism’.41  Leuba had developed 
an admiration for the scientific method while studying for his BSc, and eventually 
accepted the Comtian view of religion as something that people outgrew as they 
came to embrace a scientific worldview.42 Psychology, he predicted, would dispel 
the belief that God intervened on behalf of humanity, and although the loss of 
belief might initially cause ‘dismay and discouragement’ its acceptance would 
eventually be ‘for the best’.43 Leuba held that belief in God arose partly  from a 
natural human tendency to sense that somebody was present even if nobody was, a 
position he tried to demonstrate experimentally by blindfolding students in a thickly 
carpeted room and observing that they sometimes incorrectly reported that 
someone was with them.44 He also asserted that when mystics yearned for God 
what they really wanted was self-affirmation, peace and sexual fulfilment.45 
Although he admitted that spiritual practices and experiences had a beneficial 
effect on the character of mystics, he assured his readers that psychotherapy 
provided a quicker and more reliable method that would have saved mystics a great 
deal of physical and spiritual suffering.46 As we will see in Chapter 8, Jones, by 
contrast, took the transformed lives of mystics as proof that their religious 
experiences were grounded in God. The different explanations offered by Leuba 
and Jones illustrate the different metaphysical assumptions that underlay 
interpretations of psychology. 
 
41Jones, New Studies, 9. Leuba and Jones must have known each other through their connection with 
Bryn Mawr College (a women’s Quaker college with close associations with Haverford). Leuba spent 
his career as a lecturer there and Jones was elected chairman of the board in 1916 (Vining, Friend 
of Life, 184), but Jones makes no mention of their acquaintance as far as I am aware  
42 D. Hay, ‘Psychologists interpreting conversion: Two American forerunners of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion’, History of the Human Sciences 12 (1999): 64. 
43 J. Leuba, The Psychology of Religious Mysticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1925), 320. 
44 Hay, ‘Psychologists interpreting conversion’, 67. 
45 Note that Leuba is in line with Freud here: Freud lectured in the US in 1909, but it was not until the 
1920s that his ideas became well known. 
46 Leuba, Religious Mysticism, 322. 
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This above survey has been very brief: its aim has merely been to highlight the 
changing and complex interdependence between psychology, psychic phenomena 
and Christianity at the end of the 19th century, and to show that psychologists 
engaged with a variety of religious questions and held a variety of religious 
opinions. The next subsection narrows the focus, by looking at the Quaker response 
to William James.  
3.2.2 William James and the Quaker response 
James began his academic career at Harvard in 1872 in physiology and spent the 
rest of his career periodically shifting between the departments of philosophy and 
psychology. His first major work was the mammoth two-volume Principles of 
Psychology. More than 12 years in gestation, and running to more than 1400 pages, 
Principles was published in 1890 and quickly became the leading text in America, 
influencing generations of psychologists.47 It covers many aspects of psychology, 
from the transmission of nervous impulses to the formation of habit. James 
followed Principles with the classic The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) on 
religious psychology, covering topics such as religion and neurology, the religion of 
healthy-mindedness and the ‘sick soul’, conversion and mysticism. His other major 
works include and the more philosophical Pragmatism (1907), A Pluralistic Universe 
(1909) and the post-humous Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).  
Of particular interest here are James’ religious views, and specifically the fact that 
he found himself unable to accept what he termed ‘popular Christianity’.48 A fuller 
account of his unorthodox beliefs can be found in Slater’s book William James on 
Ethics and Faith, 49 but a few points of interest pertinent to Social Law can be 
gleaned from the Conclusion and Postscript in Varieties.  
 
47 Benjamin, Modern Psychology, 57–58. 
48 James, Varieties, 521. 
49 M. Slater, William James on Ethics and Faith (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
102 
 
James’ religious views were influenced by his father, Henry James Senior, who 
believed God to be in all people equally,50 and by Emerson, a close family friend.51  
James was also an empiricist, however, and thus came to many of his conclusions 
based on the numerous case studies detailed in Varieties. He concluded that the 
visible world is part of a spiritual universe that gives it its chief significance,52 and 
that a man’s higher part is ‘conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same 
quality, which is operative in the universe outside of him’ (a view that resonates 
with Emerson’s Oversoul).53 The best way to describe this ‘more’, he thought, was 
in terms of the well-accredited psychological identity of the subconscious self. Thus, 
‘whatever it may be on its farther side, the “more” with which in religious 
experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious 
continuation of our conscious life’.54 Crucially, the ‘farther’ side of the ‘more’ did 
not have to be infinite or solitary. It might even, speculated James, be ‘a larger and 
more godlike self’, such that the universe might be a collection of such selves with 
no absolute unity realized in it at all.55 I will return to criticisms levelled at Jones 
that seem to have this view at their heart in Chapter 9. 
James (again like Emerson) favoured experience rather than the trappings of 
organized religion, claiming that, ‘Churches, when once established, live at second-
hand upon tradition; but the founders of every church owed their power originally 
to the fact of their direct personal communion with the divine.’56 In line with this, 
his definition of religion prioritized individual experience above churches: religion is 
‘the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the 
 
50 James, Varieties, xi. 
51 Slater, William James, 136. 
52 James, Varieties, 485. 
53 James, Varieties, 508. 
54 James, Varieties, 512 (italics as in original). 
55 James, Varieties, 525. 
56 James, Varieties, 30. 
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divine’.57 It was a definition that carried with it an inescapable pluralism, as each 
person has a different temperament and different needs.58 Perhaps surprisingly, 
though, James admitted that he himself had ‘no living sense of commerce with a 
God’, but he felt that in the experience of others he recognized truth, referring to 
this ability as his ‘mystical germ’.59 
Most liberal/modernist Quakers had little hesitation in embracing James. Perhaps 
they saw similarities between their own views and James’ egalitarian emphasis on 
experience, and perhaps they were encouraged by his unequivocal esteem for 
Quakerism: It is a religion that is ‘impossible to overpraise’, he had proclaimed in 
Varieties, further suggesting, in line with the tone at the Manchester Conference, 
that Christian liberalism was only now discovering something that Quakers had 
known all along.60 John Wilhelm Rowntree seized on this endorsement in one of his 
essays, interpreting it as justifying the Quaker dependence on ‘the inward’,61 and a 
glowing review of Varieties in the Quaker journal The British Friend expressed the 
desire that it would be placed in all Meeting House libraries so that all ministers 
might have access to it.62 The review did sound a note of caution, though, perhaps 
implicitly acknowledging James’ unorthodox beliefs in the warning that ‘the final 
statement of the author’s conclusions we must not attempt to follow’, but it made 
no attempt to address the issue. The Quaker William Littleboy was a notable 
exception to this enthusiasm, worrying that Varieties reduced religious experience 
to psychology, and his concern caused Rowntree to ask Jones to backtrack on plans 
to invite James to lecture at a Quaker summer school.63 Jones did so, but, as we will 
now see, had no such qualms himself. 
 
57 James, Varieties, 31. 
58 James, Varieties, 487. 
59 James, Varieties, xxiv. 
60 James, Varieties, 7. 
61 J.W. Rowntree, ‘Essays and Addresses’, ed. by Joshua Rowntree (London: Headley Brothers, 1906), 
102. 
62 British Friend, ’A study of religious experience’, October (1902): 262–263. 
63 Kent, ‘Psychological and mystical interpretations’, 256. 
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3.2.3 Jones’ use of James’ research 
After graduating from Haverford, Jones travelled in Europe for a year and then took 
up a teaching post at Oak Grove Seminary. Although busy with administrative and 
teaching duties, he set apart time to study, making use of the library five miles away 
at Colby College.64 It was in this library that he encountered Principles, exclaiming in 
his memoirs that ‘No man with my interests could ever forget an event like that!’65  
Jones held James in exceptionally high regard throughout his life. He had a portrait 
of James in his study, and a few months before he died wrote in a somewhat shaky 
hand to his daughter that ‘I am reading a wonderful book on the James family’.66 In 
Middle Years, Jones reports that he had begun to consult James before he was a 
student at Harvard (1900/01), and there is evidence that they met in 1906 in the 
form of a brief handwritten note from James that states ‘I will be glad to see you on 
Friday the 30th [of November] at 3.30 o’clock’ (see Appendix C).67 The 
correspondence was evidently both affirming and invigorating: Jones reports that 
James ‘had the heartiest sympathy’ with his interest in mysticism and devotion to 
Quaker ideals and that ‘It was a characteristic of James to see “genius” in every 
young man who confided in him … When you saw how enthusiastic this great man 
was over your half-born mental child, you were assured that it must be a 
superlative offspring.’68 
Indeed, Jones seems to have been flattered by James’ attention, if name-dropping is 
anything to go by. The Introduction to the Finding the Trail, for example, proudly 
 
64 Jones, Life in College, 180. 
65 Jones, Life in College, 180. 
66 To Mary Jones, 21 January 1948, HC Box 60. 
67 William James, 20 November 1906, HC Box 10 [Appendix C]. 
68Jones, Middle Years, 7–8. Note that Jones was not alone in seeing this characteristic of James. 
George Santayana, another Harvard philosopher, observed that James became a friend and helper to 
‘those groping, nervous, half-educated, spiritually disinherited, passionately hungry individuals of 
which America is full.’  (R. D. Richardson, William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), loc. 3215, Kindle). 
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notes that William James ‘loved’ the earlier version.69 He also rather gratuitously 
quotes a letter from Alice James in Middle Years: ‘I should like to thank you for the 
Editorial Letter in the American Friend on the death of William James. Many voices 
have been raised in affectionate memory of a man who truly loved his kind but no 
one has spoken more justly or with finer appreciation than yourself.’70  
Jones used Jamesian psychology in two main ways. First, and most 
straightforwardly, he followed James’ texts when teaching, in the face of many 
alternatives.71 It seems that James provided what Paley did not, namely ‘spiritual 
nutriment for the soul’, as Jones recalls seeing ‘an entire class hushed with a solemn 
awe under the moral power of his wonderful chapter on Habit’.72  
More important here, however, is that Jones, as noted, believed that mysticism 
should be studied through psychology, and James was his primary source in this 
endeavour.73 Thus, Jones used psychology to inform his conception of God (Chapter 
4), to propose a meeting place of humans and God in the subconscious (Chapter 5), 
to give credence to the doctrine of the incarnation (Chapter 6), and to argue that 
Barclay’s view of the Inner Light was false (Chapter 7).  
In Social Law, Jones cites material from both Varieties and Principles. There are also 
a number of passages that do not have a reference but that are similar to passages 
from Principles. It is also possible that he drew on James’ articles or on private 
discussions with him, again without references. Hedstrom claims that Social Law 
was the first significant effort to translate Varieties for a popular audience, but this 
 
69 Jones, Finding the Trail, 9. Jones is referring to an earlier memoir, A Boy’s Religion from Memory 
(Philadelphia: Ferris & Leach, 1902). 
70 Jones, Middle Years, 9. 
71 James produced a shorter version of Principles, called Psychology: A Briefer Course (known by 
students as ‘Jimmy’), in 1892. The Haverford file lists this as the textbook for Jones’s psychology 
course, which he gave in 1901-1909, 1911, 1915, 1918, 1921 and 1924 (Rufus M. Jones Papers, 
p.262, available at www.haverford.edu/library/special/aids/rufus jones/rmjones.xml, accessed 
August 2015). For information on alternative textbooks, see A. H. Fuchs, ‘Teaching the introductory 
course in psychology circa 1900’, American Psychologist 55 (2000): 492–495. 
72 American Friend September 15 (1910): 583, quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 133. 
73 Although he also acknowledges Baldwin in the Introduction. 
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is an overstatement, for at least two reasons.74 First, the Introduction to Social Law 
states that much of the raw material was presented at the Woodbrooke and 
Scarborough summer schools. The latter was held in 1901, so Social Law must have 
been more than a reworking of the 1902 Varieties.75 Second, although Jones did 
take his ideas about the subconscious from Varieties, a large portion of Social Law is 
about mysticism, and Jones complained in a letter to his wife that the chapter on 
mysticism in Varieties ‘though good, did not satisfy me. It gave little new insight’.76  
In spite of Jones’ dependence on James, there were some important difference 
between them. Most significantly, James’ concept of the ‘more’ was, as noted, not a 
Christian one. In 1931, Jones explicitly pointed out this difference, clarifying that ‘I 
am not here endorsing James’ well-known conception of God which I do not share, I 
am only borrowing some of his luminous phrases to help supply vivid imagery for 
making God as Spirit real to our minds.’77 Jones does not allude to this difference in 
Social Law, which raises the question of to what extent he recognized both the 
difference and its significance. The implications of this difference in relation to the 
Inner Light would turn out to be profound, however, as we will see in later chapters. 
Furthermore, in later life, made more cautious by the theories of Freud, Jones 
wrote that ‘I went too far in my early period toward the adoption of his theories of 
the religious significance of the subconscious.’78 It is notable, however, that he does 
not rework the ideas in Social Law in the light of this recognition.  
There are also differences that are less significant, in the sense that they are not 
inherent to Jones’ formulation of the Inner Light. First, Jones’ experience of Quaker 
worship convinced him that mysticism flourished best in a group, meaning that he 
could never embrace James’ above-quoted private and individualistic definition of 
 
74 Hedstrom, Liberal Religion, 19. 
75 Vining, Friend of Life, 102. 
76 Quoted in Kent, ‘Psychological and mystical interpretations’, 268, f/n 24. 
77 Jones, Pathways, 209. 
78 Jones, Middle Years, 8. 
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religion. Second, he objected to James’ definition of Quakerism as a ‘religion of 
spiritual inwardness’. On the contrary, he insisted, ‘No religion can be rightly called 
“a religion of spiritual inwardness”, as Professor James has characterized 
Quakerism, unless it is at the same time a religion of spiritual outwardness’.79 The 
great Quakers in all periods, claimed Jones, have sought social transformation 
rather than private, inward peace and joy.80 Jones’ views on both of these issues are 
discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, he never accepted James’ pragmatism, complaining 
that it came too close to ‘implying that truth is something to be settled by our 
democratic vote’.81 
In summary, Jones admired James enormously, both as a person and as a 
psychologist, and claimed that Principles was one of the most influential books he 
had ever read. The two men shared an interest in religious experience and a belief 
that the universe was fundamentally spiritual. Jones, however, identified more 
closely with Christianity than James. This difference was potentially incongruous 
with his attribution of authority to James’ research in relation to the metaphysical 
underpinnings of the subconscious, and, as we will see in later chapters, had 
implications for the relationship of Quakerism to the core of conviction. James, as 
we will now see, however, was not the only Harvard philosopher to inspire Jones. 
3.3 Lessons from Harvard: Philosophical idealism and the Social 
Gospel  
Haverford, as noted, had close links with Harvard. Jones had originally intended to 
go there to study philosophy in 1889, but instead accepted the post of Principal at 
 
79 Jones, Social Law, 197–198. 
80 Jones, Social Law, 200-201. Note that Jones is evidencing his preference for action here and being 
subjective here in not including quietist Quakers among ‘the great Quakers’. For a discussion on 
Jones’s view of Quaker Quietism, see E. Pryce, ‘”Negative to a marked degree” or “an intense and 
glowing faith”?: Rufus Jones and Quaker Quietism’, Common Knowledge 16 (2010): 518–531. 
81 Jones, Pathways, 14.  
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Oak Grove Seminary.82 In 1893 the opportunity arose again, and again was 
deferred, this time to take up the position at Haverford. Circumstances were finally 
favourable in 1900/01, which proved to be an exceptionally stimulating period. 
Jones arrived in the wake of President Charles Eliot’s ambitious program of 
expansion, building, and academic restructuring,83 and during what has been 
termed the Golden Age of American Philosophy: William James and Josiah Royce 
were engaged in vigorous but amicable philosophical sparring over the nature of 
God, Francis Peabody was breaking new ground by introducing social concerns to 
the study of theology, and George Herbert Palmer was discussing ethics in terms of 
the ‘conjunct self’.  
With James absent in Europe preparing the Gifford lectures (later published as 
Varieties), Jones settled on four courses: ‘Ethics’ and ‘The Ethics of Idealism’ with 
Palmer; ‘Problems of Comparative and Social Psychology’ with Hugo Münsterberg; 
and ‘New Testament Interpretation’ with Joseph Henry Thayer. He also audited 
Royce’s course on ‘Metaphysics’ and George Santayana’s on ‘Greek Philosophy’.84 
Jones formed lasting friendships with Royce and Peabody, and the Introduction to 
Social Law acknowledges the influence of the Harvard trio of Royce, James and 
Palmer. Here I focus mainly on Josiah Royce and his brand of idealism, because of 
its pervasive influence in Social Law, but I also briefly consider his other lecturers. 
3.3.1 Josiah Royce and idealism 
Royce was the leading American proponent of absolute idealism, the view that all 
aspects of reality, including those we experience as disconnected or contradictory, 
are ultimately unified in the thought of a single all-encompassing consciousness, 
often referred to as the Absolute. It was a view that left him open to accusations of 
monism and pantheism. William James certainly accused him of both, and the two 
 
82 Vining, Friend of Life, 59. 
83 See, for example, Richardson, William James, loc. 2801, Kindle. 
84 Vining, Friend of Life, 86. 
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were known for their friendly engagement in what was termed the ‘Battle of the 
Absolute’.85 Royce’s thought is complex. In 1900, for example, The World and the 
Individual introduced the mathematical concept of the determinate infinite to 
clarify the relationship of the individual to the infinite community, which in turn was 
associated with God. It also evolved. In 1885, Royce called universal Thought God, 
but the concept had little resemblance to the traditional God of Christianity, and 
Royce confessed to being quite indifferent to whether his view was termed Theism 
or Pantheism.86 By 1895, he was insisting that his conception of God was distinctly 
theistic, but nonetheless his fellow philosopher Joseph Le Conte complained that 
‘For Professor Royce, God is Thought; conscious, indeed, but passive, powerless, 
passionless Thought.’87 By the time of his Gifford lectures in 1899, however, Royce 
had concluded that his earlier concept ‘Thought’ was inadequate to express the 
meaning of Individuality, and was trying to reorganize his conception of God around 
‘Personality’.88 A detailed analysis of Royce’s work is clearly far beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The key point to bear in mind, however, is that his work as a whole can 
be seen as an attempt to understand the place of finite individuals in an infinite 
universe.  
There is little doubt that Jones saw Royce as a particularly inspiring figure. In ‘Why I 
enroll’, he enthuses that ‘Professor Josiah Royce had a larger influence on my 
intellectual development, I think, than any other one person’.89 And in Life in 
College he attests that Royce’s Spirit of Modern Philosophy ‘at once took a great 
place in my developing thought’.90 He stressed, however, that ‘I was never [Royce’s] 
 
85 F. M. Oppenheim, How Did William James and Josiah Royce interact philosophically? History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1999): 81–96. 
86 P. E. Johnson, ‘Josiah Royce – theist or pantheist?’ Harvard Theological Review 21 (1928): 199 
87 Le Conte’s reply to Royce’s 1895 essay ‘The Conception of God’ in J. Royce, The Conception of God 
(New York: Macmillan, 1898), 68–69. 
88 Johnson, ‘Josiah Royce’, 201. 
89 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 196. 
90 Jones, Life in College, 180. 
110 
 
“disciple” in the sense that I adopted his system of thought as my own, but I was 
powerfully stimulated by his lectures and his books, and I had the rare privilege of 
enjoying his friendship and personal intercourse as long as he lived.’91  
It is not always possible to say where Jones was directly influenced by Royce 
though. The reference to the stimulation Jones found in Royce and to his friendship, 
combined with the scarcity of actual citations (only three in Social Law) suggest that 
perhaps Royce contributed to Jones’ overall worldview in a way that is difficult to 
define.  Furthermore, Jones himself says that prior to Harvard he had already 
become deeply interested in the Neo-Hegelian position, which he had discussed 
with Edward Caird at Oxford, so he was ‘sympathetically prepared for Royce’s 
leadership’ by the time he was taught by him.92 Below I discuss a few points of 
similarity (a claim weaker than dependence, note) between Jones and Royce that 
are apparent in the three books of Royce that Jones mentions, and then a few 
points of divergence. 
3.3.1.1 Similarities between Royce and Jones 
In the first book that Jones came across, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892), 
there are at least three ideas in the Introduction alone that are apparent in Social 
Law. First, Royce asserts that there is ‘no beauty in a metaphysical system, which 
does not spring from its value as a record of a spiritual experience’,93 a conviction 
that chimes with Jones’ view that experience of God was evidence of God’s 
existence (see Chapter 4). Second, Royce claims that ‘if the universe is a live thing, a 
spiritual reality, we, in progressing towards a comprehension of its nature, must 
needs first comprehend our own life’.94 Similarly, Jones advised that ‘There is one 
approach to an infinite realm where God might be…. The true path is through 
 
91 Jones, Middle Years, 5–6. 
92 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 196–197. 
93 J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (New York: Dover, [1892] 1983), 23. 
94 Royce, Modern Philosophy, 17 
111 
 
personality.’95 Third, Royce asserts that the task of humanity is to organize on earth 
a worthy social life.96 Similarly, Jones had always valued ‘good deeds’ and stressed 
the importance of social reform (see Chapter 8). It is perhaps not surprising, then, 
that Modern Philosophy was one of two textbooks that Jones used when teaching 
his ‘History of Philosophy’ course at Haverford.97 
In a subsequent book, Studies of Good and Evil (1898), Royce acknowledges his 
dependence on James Baldwin’s ‘well-known works on Mental Development in the 
Child and in the Race’.98 Baldwin had developed a social theory of consciousness, 
essentially arguing that community is necessary for the formation of self-
consciousness. Jones similarly acknowledges Baldwin in his Introduction, and in his 
own discussion of this subject provides a broad footnote to the effect of ‘See 
Baldwin’s “Mental Development” and Royce’s “Studies of Good and Evil”, pp.169–
248.’99  
The ideas in The World and the Individual (1899–1900), originally given as the 
Gifford lectures between 1898 and 1900, however, seem particularly pervasive in 
Social Law. This is probably because it was this book that Jones worked through 
while taking Royce’s course at Harvard. After nearly 1000 pages, Royce provides a 
no-doubt welcome summary: ‘The one lesson of our entire course has thus been 
the lesson of the unity of finite and infinite … of the World and all its Individuals, of 
the One and the Many, of God and Man’.100 Similarly, Jones emphasizes in his 
Introduction that Social Law is concerned mainly with ‘the extent and the 
significance of this Divine interrelationship’.101 Mysticism is also a major theme in 
Social Law, and Jones recalled that during Royce’s course he ‘came to grips with 
 
95 Jones, Social Law, 44. 
96 Royce, Modern Philosophy, 6. 
97 Taught in 1895–1907, 1909, 1911, 1915, 1918, 1921, 1924. 
(http://www.haverford.edu/library/special/aids/rufusjones/rmjones.xml, p.263). 
98 J. Royce, Studies of Good and Evil (New York: D. Appleton, 1898), x. 
99 Jones, Social Law, 55. 
100 J. Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1901), 417. 
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[Royce’s] profound treatment of mysticism as one of the major pathways to reality’ 
but also that he greatly profited from his ‘searching criticisms’.102 In comparing 
realism and mysticism, for example, Royce concludes that ‘Both are abstractions; 
both, if analysed, go to pieces upon their own inner contradictions; both have had a 
long history; both express a fragment of the whole truth about Being.’103  
In summary, a comparison of Royce and Jones is no easy task, mainly because 
Royce’s thought is so complex and because Jones is sparing in direct references. 
What can be said, though, is that they were both idealists, respected the insights of 
mysticism, and used social psychology to understand consciousness. In Royce, Jones 
had thus discovered a philosopher who would provide an intellectual framework for 
much of his thought. They did not, as we will now see however, agree on 
everything.  
3.3.1.2 Why Jones was not Royce’s disciple 
As far as I know, Jones does not state explicitly in his books why he did not become 
Royce’s ‘disciple’. Vining, and also Dorrien citing Vining, point to ‘Why I enroll’, in 
which Jones states that monistic idealism came too close to pantheism, whereas he 
himself was seeking ‘the line between a defeative dualism of a two-world theory 
and an equally dangerous pantheism’.104 This point of departure is certainly 
plausible, especially given the above-mentioned criticisms of Royce, but against it, it 
is notable that Jones’ complaint does not specifically refer to Royce, and also that 
Royce’s thought was arguably less obviously pantheistic by the time Jones was at 
Harvard than it was initially.  
There are two other possibilities, both related to the way in which Royce arrived at 
his conclusions. The first is that for Jones the personality of God was revealed 
primarily in Christ: ‘in Him was exhibited the eternal patience and sacrifice and love 
 
102 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 197. 
103 Royce, The World and the Individual, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1900), 84. 
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of God’.105 Royce, by contrast, was at times trying to deduce the character of God 
based on philosophical considerations.106 Second, whereas Royce argued for the 
existence of God based on logic, Jones eschewed proofs, preferring to draw 
analogies from personality and quote poetry. For example, in the final chapter of 
Social Law, Jones describes the relationship of individuals to God not in terms of a 
Roycean mathematical proof but by quoting Dante.107 
Whatever the point of divergence, it is clear that Royce was indeed powerfully 
stimulating, and aspects of Royce’s idealism are central to Jones’ thought, as will 
become clear in the next chapter. One important aspect for Jones of the 
relationship between God and humans as conceptualized by Royce was its social 
implications. Here, the stimulation came from some of Royce’s colleagues. 
3.3.2 Other ‘Harvard men’ 
3.3.2.1 Francis Greenwood Peabody 
Francis Greenwood Peabody (1847–1936) was a pioneer of the Social Gospel, a 
movement that combined the demand for individual transformation with a call to 
transform society and that would become the dominant expression of 
Protestantism in America by the end of the first decade of the 20th century.108 
Jones did not study with Peabody, but they became friends, and Jones described 
him in a letter to Elizabeth as ‘about as near perfect as any man I have ever seen 
and a remarkable speaker’.109 Peabody wrote to Jones on the publication of Social 
Law saying ‘It gives me renewed courage in my own task to find how nearly your 
movement of thought coincides with my own’, and ending with the accolade that ‘It 
is a happiness to feel that you are in some sort one of our Harvard men.’110 The 
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109 Vining, Friend of Life, 88. 
110 Francis Peabody, 12 December 1904, HC Box 8. 
114 
 
coincidence of thought to which Peabody refers is especially apparent regarding the 
link between mysticism and action. 
Peabody’s own interest in mysticism was almost certainly kindled by Emerson – he 
had embraced Transcendentalism when attending graduate lectures by Emerson 
given at Harvard. 111 He went on to join Harvard Divinity School in 1880 to lecture 
on ethics, approaching the subject from the point of view of practical case studies 
rather than metaphysics. In 1883 he was the first American theologian to introduce 
the subject of social reform into the divinity school curriculum, covering subjects 
such as temperance, charity, labour and prison discipline. His approach to these 
topics was not purely secular, however. For him, the mystic’s insight into the divine 
will was the gift that kept theology fresh.112  
The similarities between Peabody and Jones will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8 on mysticism. From what has already been said about Jones, however, it 
should be clear why he found Peabody’s Social Gospel so appealing. Peabody’s 
ideas and approach would have resonated with Jones’ emphasis on action as 
exemplified by Eli in particular and Quakers in general, and with his interest in 
Transcendentalism as exemplified by Emerson. Furthermore, the Social Gospel is 
sometimes described as the religious expression of progressivism, a belief that it 
was incumbent on Christians to establish the kingdom of God on earth,113 a view 
that was in line with the liberal/modernist strand of Quakerism that had emerged at 
the Manchester Conference. This affinity with Quakerism was made clear in a 1902 
Quaker review of Peabody’s Jesus Christ and the Social Question, which concluded 
that ‘It is hardly too much to say that any minister who knowingly neglects it is 
neglecting his duty.’114   
 
111 For a brief overview of Peabody’s life and thought, see J. Herbst, ‘Francis Greenwood Peabody: 
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3.3.2.2 Hugo Münsterberg 
The psychologist Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916) does not warrant a mention in 
Middle Years, nor in ‘Why I enroll’, which is intriguing given Jones’ interest in 
psychology and the use he makes of social psychology in Social Law. One can 
speculate on academic and personal reasons for this omission. From an academic 
point of view, Münsterberg’s general approach would have been anathema to 
Jones: he aimed to show that there was no such thing as free will and that even 
human culture was nothing but the product of automatic reactions.115 Jones 
recognized that this created problems for ethics.116 Furthermore, Münsterberg’s 
psychology undermined the idea that the individual accurately perceived the world 
around him, or indeed was ‘master of his own house’.117 Here the problem is that if 
Münsterberg is right then there are serious problems with the insights associated 
with the Inner Light, because intuitions cannot necessarily be trusted. On a personal 
level, Münsterberg’s biographer notes wryly that ‘His adult behaviour could often 
be described, generously, as immature, and his career was beset by one 
controversy after another.’118  Given the warmth with which Jones eulogizes Royce 
and Palmer and the importance that he placed on friendship going beyond the year 
at Harvard, it is likely that both personal and professional affinity were missing from 
his relationship with Münsterberg. 
3.3.2.3 George Herbert Palmer, Joseph Thayer and George Santayana 
Jones discusses three other Harvard lecturers in his autobiographies. He describes 
George Herbert Palmer as ‘the lucid interpreter of the great ethical systems of the 
centuries’.119 Palmer utterly disapproved of mysticism and disliked the basic 
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conceptions and principles of Quakerism, but Jones recalls that he criticized what he 
liked to call Jones’ pursuit of ‘wandering fires’ with a ‘kindly smile’.120 Jones took the 
term ‘conjunct self’, a term that appears many times in Social Law, from Palmer. 
Palmer used the term in relation to ethics – iniquity was for Palmer the result of 
setting the ‘unitary self’ against the conjunct.  Jones, however, extended its use to 
describe the relationship between humans and God, suggesting that humans and 
God are conjunct.121 Jones likewise drew ethical implications from this relationship 
(see the section on sin in Chapter 5), and this may be why the Quaker scholar 
Howard Brinton described Social Law as a reworking of Palmer’s ethics.122 
Joseph Henry Thayer is referred to as ‘that fine New Testament scholar’.123 He 
supervised Jones’ thesis on the mysticism of St Paul and St John, which was later 
used as the basis for the final chapter in Social Law.124 Of George Santayana’s 
course, Jones notes that ‘the Platonic stream of life and thought, most certainly a 
gulf stream which circulates through the entire history of the Western world, has 
been ever since one of my major interests’.125 
Jones’ year at Harvard was thus a fruitful one, in which he formed life-long, 
significant friendships with a number of professors and embraced aspects of the 
modern thought that is so apparent in Social Law. Jones never appropriated the 
thought of his professors wholesale though: he took what he found to be useful and 
modified it in line with his Quaker-informed worldview and experience. 
Furthermore, although any influence from Münsterberg is speculative because of 
Jones’ silence here, it is at least plausible that Münsterberg’s reductionist approach 
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to psychology was one of the reasons that Jones felt he had to write Social Law, as 
an attempt to defend Christianity against the ‘progress of psychology’. 
 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter considered Jones’ Quaker upbringing, emphasizing that by the 
time he graduated from Haverford, Jones was convinced that experience of God 
was a normal part of life, that humans and God were in mutual and reciprocal 
correspondence, and that good deeds were an essential component of the spiritual 
life and led to a transformed character. This chapter has continued the story, 
considering Jones’ theological and philosophical development in the light of the 
Quaker interaction with ‘modern thought’, specifically his encounters at Harvard 
with idealism, psychology and the Social Gospel.  
The story started in Manchester in 1895, with the seminal Quaker conference that 
set the course for the ascendency of the liberal/modernist agenda. The liberal 
speakers embraced ‘science’ in a number of ways, for example by attributing 
authority to science over a literal interpretation of the Bible and comparing the 
scientific method with the Quaker preference for ‘plain speech’. They were 
motivated in part by the recognition that many young, educated Quakers were, as 
Henry Newman put it, ‘drifting theologically’. Social Law was aimed at a wider 
audience than Quakers, but, as will become apparent, it likewise attributed 
authority to science and was aiming to make Christianity credible to its educated 
but potentially troubled readers.  
It is notable that both the liberal speakers at Manchester and Jones conceived of 
science in generalities rather than particularities, with no distinction made between 
different scientific enterprises and no appreciation that its findings could be revised. 
Furthermore, Jones was selective in attributing authority to science. On the one 
hand, he clearly recognized that psychology was threatening to undermine Christian 
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belief (this was after all one of the factors that motivated the writing of Social Law), 
but he does not view the psychology behind these challenges as authoritative. On 
the other, as we will see, he did attribute authority to those insights from 
psychology that were in line with his religious experience. This inconsistency 
illustrates Jones’ experiential basis. It implies that, curiously, religious experience 
seems to have carried more weight than ‘psychology’, even though the latter was 
called on to defend the basis of the former. 
I continued the story by considering the genesis of psychology, paying particular 
attention to its fuzzy boundary with investigations into psychic phenomena. The 
interest in this ‘shadow culture’ was epitomized by William James, who was held in 
high esteem by Liberal Quakers generally and by Jones in particular. Social Law 
draws heavily on James’ ideas, which had, as will become apparent, two significant 
consequences. The first is that James’ unorthodox religious beliefs, particularly 
regarding the nature of the ‘more’, contributed to Jones’ multivalent theism. The 
second is that Jones’ reliance on psychology meant that the inherent human–divine 
relationship was universal, a position that diverged from the core of conviction. 
Finally, I discussed Jones’ year at Harvard, showing that much of the material he 
studied there found its way into Social Law. In particular, Royce’s concern to relate 
individuals to an ultimate consciousness is a central theme in Social Law. Peabody’s 
blend of social concern and a sympathy for mysticism is reflected in Jones’ 
treatment of affirmation mysticism as a felt experience of God that results in social 
action. Palmer’s term the ‘conjunct self’ is expanded in terms of a relationship God 
and appears throughout Social Law. Finally, Thayer supervised the thesis that was 
the basis of the final chapter in Social Law. 
It is worthwhile to pause here briefly to consider the magnitude of the task that 
Jones set himself in synthesizing all these themes. Not only were James’ and 
Royce’s ideas of God not Christian, they were not even compatible with each other. 
James was opposed to idealism, and following Royce’s Gifford lectures wrote a 
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critique that Royce responded to in a 23-page letter.126 And when James was 
preparing his own Gifford lectures, he wrote to Royce that he was doing so in the 
exclusive hope of overthrowing Royce’s idealism and ruining his peace.127  Whether 
we view Jones’ attempt as supremely ambitious or simply naïve, it is no surprise 
that it generated controversy.  
In summary, the Manchester Conference consolidated the liberal/modernist agenda 
within Quakerism, and the particular form that modern thought took for Jones was 
shaped by his year at Harvard. Significantly, however, although many aspects of this 
thought were consistent with Jones’ disposition and experience and with some of 
the tenets of Quakerism, they were not always consistent with the core of 
conviction. In the next chapter, I start to explore in more detail Jones’ efforts to 
synthesize his Quaker-informed experience and modern thought, starting with his 
attempts to reconcile the nebulous and potentially impersonal ‘more’ of James and 
‘Absolute’ of Royce with the personal, Christian God.  
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God is personal 
 
If we could drop our plummet down through the deeps of one personality we could 
tell all the meanings of the visible world, all the problems of social life and all the 
secrets of the eternal Personal Self.1 
 
Jones’ childhood experience was of a personal God who guided individuals, and the 
theological framework within which he expressed this was that of the loving Father 
of Christianity. In later years, his insistence that psychology, a science that studied 
the person, would shed light on God’s character also implies that he thought of God 
as personal. Royce’s idealism, with which Jones was attempting a synthesis, 
however, faced criticism for its impersonal picture of God. The difference between 
the Christian and idealism-inspired conceptions of God and the implications of this 
difference were recognized by the psychologist James Leuba, who pointed out that 
‘A strenuous effort is made in religious circles, supposedly in the interest of religion, 
to conceal the magnitude of the difference between the God of the Christian 
religion and the impassable, infinite Reality of metaphysics. It seems clear, however, 
that the passage from the former to the latter belief would mean nothing less than 
the disappearance of the religious worship of today.’2 Thus Jones’ attempted 
synthesis encountered a significant problem at a very basic level, namely whether 
God should be thought of as personal or impersonal. 
 
1 Jones, Social Law, 66. 
2 Leuba, Psychology of Religious Mysticism, 304. 
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Jones’ solution to this problem is obscured by his desire to write a work that was 
not ‘a metaphysical treatise’.3 This self-imposed theological and philosophical 
naivety means that he never addresses this difference directly, so the details of his 
resolution have to be inferred before they can be assessed. Furthermore, his 
informal style means that he sometimes stresses one conception of God over the 
other, leaving himself open to being misunderstood or quoted out of context. All 
the above factors likely contributed to Emil Brunner’s claim that Jones was not a 
Christian but a neo-Platonist,4 and to Hugh Rock’s (see Chapter 9) conclusion that 
Jones retained language of God as a ‘gloss’:5 neither of these comments reflects the 
idea that Jones believed in a personal, loving God.  
In view of these ambiguities, I supplement Social Law with material from some of 
Jones’ early editorials from The American Friend, which were initially published in 
1899 in a volume entitled Practical Christianity, and then again in a substantially 
extended edition in 1905. Practical Christianity aimed to show Quakers how to 
‘practice the presence of God’.6 It returns again and again to a handful of themes: (i) 
Christianity must be applied to life – active service strengthens faith and brings 
about the Kingdom; (ii) internal evidence is of primary importance – every Christian 
needs an awareness of God’s presence; and (iii) the formulation of Christianity has 
to change according to current thought, although its essence remains the same. In 
effect, then, Social Law and Practical Christianity are two books written at about the 
same time on broadly the same subject, but with different audiences (Quakers in 
Practical Christianity and the general public in Social Law) and with different aims 
(an enhanced spiritual life in Practical Christianity and the intellectual credibility of 
that life in Social Law).7 Practical Christianity at times has a more evangelical tone 
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than Social Law (see Chapter 6), but together they provide a fuller picture of Jones’ 
thought than either one would in isolation. 
On the basis of these two works, I will suggest that there are three main strands in 
Jones’ discussions about God. Drawing on Christianity, as expressed both through 
the way he interpreted his personal religious experience and through the Bible, 
Jones presented a picture of God as personal and loving. Drawing on idealism, as 
expounded by Royce, he seized on the idea that human consciousness is a particular 
instance of God’s consciousness. Drawing on psychology, as propounded by James, 
he projected human attributes onto God. Underlying these three strands is a theme 
that chimes with the Social Gospel, namely that God is at work to improve society. 
The three strands could result in very different views of God: as noted above, a God 
based on idealism could be an impersonal universal consciousness rather than an 
active personal God guiding society through individuals; and a God based on 
psychology could resemble the gods of the Ancient world with their human vices 
rather than the Christian God of love. 
I will further suggest that Jones synthesizes ideas about God arising from 
Christianity with those arising from idealism by using insights from psychology 
about love, consciousness and ideals, and that he synthesizes ideas about God 
arising from Christianity with those arising from psychology by being selective in the 
qualities he attributes to humans and projects onto God. Although these strategies 
go some way creating a coherent picture of God, Jones still ends up with a 
multivalent theism. I also identify several areas where Jones diverges from the core 
of conviction and the Quaker tradition; in particular, his reliance on idealism and his 
reliance on psychology both require a universal, inherent relationship of humans 
with God. Finally, I identify several weaknesses in his arguments, for example that 
he assumes that the best in human nature reveals the nature of God, but glosses 
 
that Jones taught during the week often reappeared during Meeting, but with a different slant to 
better suit the place and congregation (Hinshaw, Master Quaker, 149). 
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over the implications of this strategy when it comes to the human capacity for evil. 
As far as I am aware, analysing Jones’ theism in terms of his reliance on Christianity, 
idealism and psychology is a novel approach. 
I start by commenting on early 20th century descriptions of God in relation to 
whether God is personal. I then explore how successful Jones was in his aim of 
reconciling fundamentally different views of God in relation to God’s character and 
attributes.  
 
4.1 Jones’ view of God in historical context 
Jones’ presentation of God has to be seen in the context of two seemingly 
contradictory tendencies regarding discussions about God at the start of the 20th 
century. The first is the emphasis on the personal associated with the Boston 
philosopher Borden Parker Bowne. The second is the common practice of using 
impersonal language about the divine. I discuss these briefly before offering an 
overview of Jones’ thought about God. 
Borden Parker Bowne (1847–1910) was the dominant figure in the movement 
known as Boston personalism, or personal idealism,8 and there are certainly many 
similarities between Bowne and Jones. Dorrien, for example, notes that Bowne’s 
personalist school affirmed ‘moral intuition and religious experience and the social 
gospel and metaphysical reason’.9 Jones did too, and they both asserted that life 
only made sense if the world exists through a mind analogous to the human mind, 
and that matter cannot cause mind.10 Bowne was a more circumspect theologian 
than Jones though: whereas in Theism (originally published in 1887 and revised in 
1902) Bowne cautions that ‘a little reflection warns us against transferring our finite 
 
8 See e.g. G. Dorrien, ‘Making liberal theology metaphysical: Personalist idealism as a theological 
school’, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 24 (2003): 214–244. 
9 Dorrien, ‘Making liberal theology metaphysical’, 215.  
10 Dorrien, ‘Making liberal theology metaphysical’, 216; Jones, Inner Life, 148. 
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peculiarities and limitations [to God] without careful inspection’,11 Jones displays 
little hesitation in attributing human qualities to God. I do not discuss Bowne in 
detail here though, primarily because Jones does not refer to him in Social Law, nor 
in his wider corpus as far as I am aware. Indeed, given that a number of Bowne’s 
books were not published until after Social Law (e.g. The Immanence of God in 1905 
and Personalism in 1908), it is possible that Jones was not familiar with Bowne’s 
work directly in 1904. It is, however, possible that Bowne’s thinking reached Jones 
at second-hand through his Harvard teachers: elements of Bowne’s personalism can 
be found in Palmer, James and Royce, although the latter did not classify himself as 
a personalist.12    
Curiously, however, in spite of the background of personalism, a number of 
religious writers who believed in a personal God used impersonal language. In his 
PhD thesis, for example, Raymond Brown analysed the language of three scholars of 
mysticism, namely Friedrich von Hügel (a devout Catholic), Ralph Inge (the Dean of 
St Paul’s) and Evelyn Underhill (a prominent Anglo-Catholic), concluding that all of 
them used both personal and impersonal language and symbols to refer to God.13 
Similarly, the language that Jones uses throughout his corpus to refer to God – the 
More of Life, the Oversoul or Over-self, the Concrete Infinite – is not unequivocally 
personal (although his capitalization of James’ term ‘the more’ perhaps indicates 
that he was attempting to make it so). In other words, Jones’ use of impersonal 
terms for God was not unusual and does not imply that he held an impersonal view 
of God.  
Because Jones’ conception of God as it is presented in Social Law is not systematic 
but has to be pieced together from comments scattered throughout the book, and 
 
11 B. P. Bowne, Theism (American Book Company: New York, 1902), 170. 
12G. Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Imagining Progressive Religion 1805–1900 
(London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 380. 
13 R. L. Brown, ‘The Doctrine of God in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century English Mysticism as 
Found in Baron Friedrich von Hügel, Evelyn Underhill, and William Inge’ (PhD thesis, New Orleans 
Baptist Theological Seminary, New Orleans, LA, 1978). 
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because Jones’ thought as a whole is coherent, it is useful to start with an overview 
of his view of God in relation to the rest of his thought.  Jones provides such an 
overview in a 1926 lecture entitled ‘My Idea of God’.14  
Jones revealed the centrality and scope of his idea of God when he told his 
audience that ‘It is impossible for me to tell how I think of God without first giving a 
brief review of the way in which I think of the universe, of man, of the development 
of history and literature, and especially of the supreme event of history, the life of 
Christ.’15 Briefly, he asserts that the universe is spiritual, evolving and reveals 
beauty, truth and love; that humans are spiritual beings; that the historical process 
is progressive; and that Christ is the personal face of God that has broken through. 
After these preliminaries, Jones sketches his idea of God: ‘When I think of God as 
Spirit, then, I think of Him as the Ground and Source of all that we can call Mind or 
Reason in the universe.’16 This statement, with its emphasis on immanence, is 
immediately tempered, however, with the recognition that ‘not everything in the 
universe is God … there are things here that ought not to be here … God is that 
intelligent Spirit who is accomplishing the good.’17 The necessary implication, Jones 
continues, is that God must ‘be the maker of goals, the creator of onward trails, the 
builder of unattained purposes’.18 Far from this Spirit being remote and 
unapproachable, however, God provides light and guidance in Christ. Thus, Jones’ 
mature concept of God is as both immanent and transcendent, as being revealed in 
Christ, and as working out good purposes through humans.  
Although this lecture was given two decades later than Social Law, the picture of 
God in the two works is fairly similar (with, as we will see, the exception of a more 
balanced emphasis on God’s transcendence in the later work). In Social Law, 
 
14 R. M. Jones, ‘My idea of God’ (typewritten manuscript), HC Box 74. 
15 Jones, ‘My idea of God’, 1. 
16 Jones, ‘My idea of God’, 6. 
17 Jones, ‘My idea of God’, 7. 
18 Jones, ‘My idea of God’, 8. 
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however, the emphasis is on showing how this picture is consistent with insights 
from social psychology and idealism. Obvious questions about this endeavour 
include which insights are relevant, and, just as importantly, which are not, and how 
the leap from a science about humans to knowledge of the divine can be justified. 
Here I look at how Jones answered these questions by referring to both Social Law 
and Practical Christianity.  
My discussion is structured around how Jones viewed the character of God (Section 
4.2), the transcendence/immanence of God (Section 4.3), and the related questions 
of how we can know God and know that God exists (Section 4.4). For each section, I 
determine how Jones drew on Christianity, idealism and psychology to inform his 
views, and how he attempted to synthesize the insights he gained from these three 
fields. 
 
4.2 The character of God 
I have taken one aspect of the core of conviction to be the fact that God is 
characterized by love. There is no doubt that Jones was in conformity on this point. 
What is of particular interest is how he viewed the love of God through the lenses 
of psychology and idealism. 
4.2.1 Insights from Christianity 
In Social Law, the character of God is seen as being revealed primarily through the 
character of Jesus: ‘we can hardly hope that a higher idea of God’s nature will be 
revealed to men than that which was embodied in Jesus Christ.’19 Most of the book 
is, however, devoid of explicit biblical references about God’s character. The 
exception is the final chapter, which was, recall, written under the supervision of 
the biblical scholar Thayer. Here Jones quotes numerous verses and stresses that 
 
19 Jones, Social Law, 33. 
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‘“[God] is Love,” which is another way of saying that it is fundamental to His nature 
to go out of Himself, to give and share Himself.’20  
In Practical Christianity, aimed at a Christian Quaker audience, Jones leaves his 
readers in no doubt that God is associated primarily with love: ‘this God is Love’; 
God’s plan is to realize the Kingdom by drawing men to it by ‘Grace and Love’; God 
is ‘an impalpable Spirit of Life and Love’.21 The editorial ‘Behind the gate’, written 
shortly after Lowell’s death, gives an illustration of what it might feel like to be on 
the receiving end of this love.22 Jones was walking down a street when he saw a 
young girl unable to open the gate to get back into her garden. She pounded to no 
avail, but when she burst into loud tears the response was immediate: ‘Hastily the 
gate was pulled open, the little child was caught by the mother’s loving arms and 
the tears were kissed away.’23 Jones himself found the scene comforting and was 
quick to draw a parable for his readers: ‘But the love behind our gate is every bit as 
real as that which the little child found when her cry reached through.’ This love is 
not one-way, however: the human response to God involves ‘an intense love and 
devotion, a profound appreciation of His forgiveness and unbounded love’.24 When 
writing for a Quaker audience, then, Jones draws on the Bible, descriptions of 
emotional responses to God, and what may best be described as spiritual intuition, 
namely the leap from an observed event (a child at a gate) to a spiritual reality.  
The two books taken together thus present the traditional Christian idea that God is 
love, although, notably, omit any mention that God judges with a view to punish. 
This picture reflects the message that Jones had heard in his childhood: Eli and 
Peace emphasized the love rather than the judgement of God, recall. It is 
exemplified in an incident that Jones says proved a turning point in his spiritual life. 
 
20 Jones, Social Law, 266. 
21 Jones, Practical Christianity, 17, 30, 34, respectively. 
22For details on the background to this editorial, see R.M. Jones, Quakerism, A Spiritual Movement 
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Meeting of Friends, 1963), 23. 
23 Jones, Practical Christianity, 35–36. 
24 Jones, Practical Christianity, 24. 
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Having done something that ‘grieved’ his family, Jones was expecting a rare 
punishment, but instead his mother took him to his room, knelt beside him and 
prayed in a way that made him see ‘just what I was, and no less clearly what I ought 
to be, and what with [God’s] help I might be.’25  In other words, Jones’ view of God 
is biblically informed but with an experiential basis of love rather than punishment. 
4.2.2 Insights from psychology  
Jones, like Drummond in relation to the natural sciences, was convinced that the 
laws of psychology could reveal the character of God: ‘the laws and principles which 
our inner life reveals enable us to discover also the nature and spirit of the infinite 
Person with whom our finite lives are bound up.’26 Thus ‘Jones the psychologist’ 
points out that because all the laws of an individual’s life are social laws, personal 
life is necessarily ‘conjunct, i.e. in an organic group’.27 From this he draws the 
conclusion that ‘the fact that personal life is conjunct must necessarily have 
profound religious significance. If man cannot be a self alone, no more can God. 
Love, if it is to be anything more than a bare abstraction, means that the one who 
loves, loves somebody that His life is interrelated with other lives.’28  
Note that here Jones is moving from an observation about human social, or group, 
life to one about God, which is a strategy not without risks, as Bowne was aware. 
First, Jones is being selective in associating group life with love. Groups are perfectly 
capable of exploitation, marginalization, racism and in-fighting, for instance, 
characteristics which Jones presumably would not want to apply to God. In effect, 
he is advocating the psychologically informed equivalent of a view of God’s 
character that might, for example, draw on the beauty and grandeur of a sunset but 
ignore the destructive power of a volcanic eruption. Second, Jones seems to be 
 
25 Jones, Finding the Trail, 110. 
26 Jones, Social Law, 16. 
27 Jones, Social Law, 17. 
28 Jones, Social Law, 17–18. 
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implying that God created humans because God needed to have someone to love. 
But humans who love each other could have been created by a god who recognized 
that humans would need to be able to give and receive love to survive but who did 
not need a relationship with them. To be able to establish a connection between 
the love apparent in group life and God’s purported need for humans, Jones would 
need to start from God being characterized by love, and humans then reflecting this 
characteristic, rather than starting with a characteristic of humans and ending with 
a characteristic of God. That is, Jones’ observation that humans love each other is 
consistent with the New Testament understanding of God as love, but is not a proof 
that God needs humans in order to have someone to love.  
4.2.3 Insights from idealism 
Royce, recall from Chapter 3, was accused by LeConte of identifying God primarily 
with thought rather than with love,29 and it is perhaps the case that any picture of 
God based on idealism, as recognized by Leuba, is most naturally impersonal and 
impassive. Indeed, Jones’ statement that ‘we must admit the reality of an infinite 
Self who is the Life of our lives and that every little inlet of human consciousness 
opens into the total whole of reality’ emphasizes a shared consciousness rather 
than a shared ability to love.30 As will become apparent in Chapter 7, however, this 
concept of shared consciousness is crucial to Jones’ formulation of the Inner Light. It 
is thus important for Jones to be able to synthesize the God of idealism with the 
God he saw as being characterized by love. His implicit strategy, as we will now see, 
involved using insights from psychology. 
4.2.4 Jones’ synthesis 
Jones does not set out his synthesis explicitly, but from isolated comments it is 
possible to see how he associated love with infinite consciousness. First, he views 
 
29 Royce, Conception of God, 68–69. 
30 Jones, Social Law, 244. 
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an essential characteristic of consciousness as the ability to work for a desired end. 
James discusses this in Principles, making a comparison between iron filings, which 
are drawn to a magnet but cannot find their way around obstacles to get there, and 
Romeo’s creative attempts to meet Juliet: ‘With the lover it is the end which is 
fixed, the path may be modified indefinitely.’31 Although Jones does not cite James, 
he similarly gives one of the marks of personality as the ‘power to forecast an end 
or purpose and to direct action toward it’.32 Or, as he puts it in another context in 
Social Law, a ‘person is a being who is living toward an unrealized purpose, an 
unattained ideal’.33 
Crucially, Jones assumes that the ideals that are the mark of personality are ‘good’, 
and, he says, we would not have them if we were not rooted in a ‘larger Self’.34 In 
fact, we can seek good ends ‘only by belonging in a larger Life which already 
possesses the Good. We discover the good by discovering the purposes of the Self 
in whose life we share.’35 In other words, Jones is assigning ‘good’ ideals to God, 
and because ideals are a psychologically validated marker of consciousness (at least 
according to James), he is in effect using research from psychology on the nature of 
consciousness to draw together the God of idealism, or absolute consciousness, and 
the loving Father of Christianity.  
Jones’ understanding of what the ‘good’ ideals of God entailed owed much to the 
prevailing progressivism and Social Gospel movement. Thus in Practical Christianity, 
God’s ideals are expressed in terms of the gradual building of the kingdom of God: 
‘Christ’s work could have been finished in a moment, but it was rather God’s plan to 
realize the kingdom on the earth progressively – to draw men to it by Grace and 
 
31 James, Principles, 10. 
32 Jones, Social Law, 51. 
33 Jones, Social Law, 231–232. 
34 Jones, Social Law, 232. 
35 Jones, Social Law, 234. 
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Love.’36 Similarly, in Social Law ‘[the affirmation mystic’s] mission on earth is to be a 
fellow worker with God … bringing to reality a kingdom of God.’37  
There are a number of weaknesses to this approach. First, Jones’ assertion that we 
have good ideals because we are rooted in ‘the Good’ raises the question of the 
implications of our selfish or evil ideals for God’s character: presumably Jones 
would not want to say that these too originated in God. Second, he is being 
selective in taking his psychological insights from James. Münsterberg, as noted in 
the previous chapter, was one psychologist who disagreed with James, insisting that 
there was no such thing as free will and that human culture should be considered 
materialistically and was nothing but the result of automatic reactions:38 in other 
words, for Münsterberg, ideals, if they can be said to exist at all, certainly do not 
originate in God. The fact that Jones was writing for lay people notwithstanding, 
Social Law might have been more balanced if he had addressed Münsterberg’s 
view. 
In summary, it seems clear that Jones, as a Christian, identified the character of God 
with love, and God’s purposes with ‘building the kingdom’. This is the picture 
presented in both Practical Christianity and Social Law. In Social Law, Jones 
implicitly makes this idea consistent with the latest research in psychology and 
ideas in philosophy. His inferences from psychology on the character of God 
necessitate that the human capacity for evil is neglected, a weakness in his 
argument that we could perhaps attribute in part to the general liberal optimism 
and to his experiential basis arising from a home life in which love was central. His 
inferences from idealism involved assuming that consciousness involves the 
capacity to work for ends, and, crucially, that these ends are ‘good’. It seems likely 
that this capacity was informed by James’ Principles, meaning that Jones was using 
 
36 Jones, Practical Christianity, 30. 
37 Jones, Social Law, 153–154. 
38 Hale, Münsterberg, 40 
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insights from psychology (albeit insights that were not universally agreed on, cf. 
Münsterberg) to identify the God of idealism with the God of Christianity. Jones 
does not always make this identification clear in his discussions, however, meaning 
that at times his view of God seems more similar to an impersonal universal 
consciousness than to a traditional Christian conception.  
 
4.3 The transcendence and immanence of God 
It is inherently difficult to express the balance between the transcendence and the 
immanence of God. Jones confessed his early inadequacy in this regard in 1934, 
when he wrote that in college he knew ‘that transcendence is as essential for a God 
of spiritual reality as immanence is’, but that he ‘did not yet know how adequately 
to hold fast to the one without losing the other’.39 Here I discuss his treatment of 
immanence and transcendence in Social Law and Practical Christianity, but also 
comment on how the emphasis on immanence therein became more balanced with 
transcendence in later years. 
4.3.1 Insights from Christianity 
In Practical Christianity, Jones asserts that ‘The man who goes to work in the line of 
his duty finds that the God who did not come in the great forces of nature – wind, 
earthquake, fire – does come in quieter, and in less striking ways, as the power 
which makes use of a feeble human instrument.’40 In other words, God does not 
work as a transcendent, dramatic, outside agency but as an immanent, subtle, inner 
strength. Note that Jones’ argument for God’s immanence here refers to the Bible 
but is primarily experiential: long ago, Elijah found God in the whisper after the 
 
39 Jones, Middle Years, 41. 
40 Jones, Practical Christianity, 38. 
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wind, earthquake and fire (1 Kings 19); today, individuals experience God though 
finding inner strength.  
In Social Law, Jones once more refers to Elijah’s experience,  affirming that ‘As of 
old [God] is not in the storm, He is not in the earthquake, He is not in the fire’.41 And 
in the cluster of biblical verses at the end of the book, he quotes 1 Jn 3:9, 
concluding that ‘He is the ever-abiding, immanent God, producing a society of those 
who know Him, because He dwelleth with them and is in them.’42  The importance 
of action arising from God’s immanence is not brought out here, although it is 
arguably implicit, but it is discussed in his chapters on mysticism and the Inner Light 
(see my Chapters 7 and 8). Conversely, Jones’ reluctance to embrace the 
transcendence of God is apparent in a footnote, where he links an emphasis on the 
transcendence of God to a type of mysticism that aims to experience God apart 
from the world and that Jones disliked precisely because it did not result in action.43  
From the material in Practical Christianity and Social Law, then, we can conclude 
that Jones argues for the immanence of God on an experiential and scriptural basis 
and associates it with strength for carrying out God’s will. Note that this emphasis 
on immanence reflected Jones’ own childhood religious experience (his experiential 
basis) in the context of a Christian Quaker community. Those who undergo a 
conversion experience would, by contrast, perhaps be more aware of God’s 
transcendence, because they had had an experience of being separated from God.  
4.3.2 Insights from Royce 
In addition to expressing the immanence of God within a Christian framework, 
Jones stresses that God is everywhere by quoting from Royce, who in turn is 
referring to a passage in Chandogya. A youth is asked to cut open a small seed by a 
sage and is queried about what he sees. When the youth answers ‘nothing’, the 
 
41 Jones, Social Law, 38. 
42 Jones, Social Law, 270. 
43 Jones, Social Law, 42. 
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sage replies ‘Believe, O gentle youth, what that hidden thing is, of whose essence is 
all the world – that is the Reality, that is the Soul, that art thou.’44 The immediate 
impression here is that Jones is subscribing to a Christless pantheism. Jones’ failure 
to address the discrepancy between this passage and the Christian conception of 
immanence that is clearly apparent elsewhere in his work arguably arises from his 
theological naivety and his informal style. This failure has potentially serious 
consequences though: as we will see in Chapter 9, it is a passage similar to the one 
from Chandogya that Jones used elsewhere that led one modern commentator to 
conclude that Jones made the soul divine and divorced it from Christ.  
Jones also argued that the fact that we have ideals points to God’s immanence. This 
is because every idea and ideal suggests an organic interrelation between ourselves 
and God, who ‘manifests a bit of His life at our minute focus-point’.45 And, in fact, a 
transcendent God, one who sat aloof in ‘splendid isolation’, would provide no 
explanation for ‘our seekings and findings’. 46 As we will see in Section 4.3.4, 
however, in later life Jones used the fact that we have ideals to argue for rather 
than against the transcendence of God (in essence, the very existence of ideals 
implies that there is a transcendent aspect to the world, something beyond it as it is 
at the moment).  
4.3.3 Insights from psychology 
Jones also objects to the transcendence of God on psychological grounds, in that he 
claims that to view God and humans as separated is ‘contrary to all the known facts 
of psychology’.47 This rather sweeping statement is modified in the later version (if 
my theory of Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.1 is correct) to the assertion that ‘This view is 
not founded on the testimony of experience’. Although Jones is in fact discussing 
 
44 Jones, Social Law, 148. 
45 Jones, Social Law, 242. 
46 Jones, Social Law, 243. 
47 Jones, Social Law, 174. 
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the Inner Light here, the assertions in both versions (one referring to psychology 
and the other to experience) are used to make the point that the idea of a 
transcendent God results in ‘an unbridged and unbridgeable gulf between the 
divine and the human’.48 In other words, the fact that we can experience God has 
the corollary that God is immanent, because a transcendent God would mean that 
there was a divine realm on the one hand separated from an un-divine realm on the 
other.  
The weaknesses of this argument are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 on the 
Inner Light. I merely note here that Jones is making assumptions about God’s 
immanence based on psychological insights that suit his purpose. He is ignoring, for 
example, psychological research that suggested that experience of God was self-
deception (cf. Leuba’s experiment with blindfolded students described in Chapter 
3). 
4.3.4 Jones’ view in later years and his attempted synthesis 
In later years, Jones maintained his insistence that God was immanent. In ‘Why I 
enroll’, for example, he stresses that from Social Law onwards he had been trying to 
show that God is revealed ‘in the finite–infinite nature of our own self-
consciousness as persons’.49  He increasingly recognized, however, that an 
overemphasis on immanence had its dangers, and that transcendence was also 
important. In The Faith and Practice of Quakers, for example, he was aware that 
immanence could drift into pantheism: ‘We find it easy and normal to think of God 
as immanent … though I hope none of us would be satisfied with an immanence 
which confused God with the universe and identified Him with it.’50 In Pathways to 
the Reality of God, in a chapter entitled ‘The Immanence of God’, Jones explains 
how God can be both within us and beyond us, namely immanent and 
 
48 Jones, Social Law, 175. 
49 Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 211. 
50 R. M. Jones, The Faith and Practice of the Quakers (London: Methuen, 1927), 42. 
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transcendent: ‘We see stars billions of miles away, only because something from 
the star is actually operating on the retina and in the visual center of the brain; and 
so, too, we find God, only because Something that is God – God as Spirit – is 
actually in contact with the spiritual center within us that is kindred to Him.’51 In 
other words, just as stars are in some sense experienced within (through the retina 
and brain) although they are external, so God is experienced in our spiritual centre 
but is also beyond it. 
Jones also expressed this more balanced understanding in a couple of letters in the 
1930s, to Ellen Carr and Mack Williams. Carr must have written to him about the 
conceptual difficulty of praying to a God who was within. ‘It is not a very serious 
difficulty’, Jones assures her. Ever ready with an analogy, he explains that ‘Nobody, 
of course, for a moment supposes that the entire nature and reality of God is ever 
present in any person, any more than the whole of sunlight ever comes through one 
single window. There can be a point of light from God break [sic] into our human 
souls, but there is infinitely more of Him beyond us.’52 
The letter to Williams gives the following advice: ‘It seems to me that you ought to 
emphasize a good deal more than you do the point that any God who could be 
adequate for us must be transcendent as well as immanent’.53 Interestingly Jones 
justifies this latter suggestion by pointing out ‘the spirit in any man is always 
transcendent. It goes far beyond anything that has yet been expressed in and 
through the life … It is necessarily even more so with the God of the universe that 
He is more than any expression of His life in terms of the visible present universe.’54 
In effect, he is saying that humans have ideals, which points to the transcendence of 
humans and therefore to the transcendence of God. This is clearly a shift from the 
discussion of ideals in Social Law mentioned in Section 4.3.2 above, where the fact 
 
51 Jones, Pathways, 21 
52 To Ellen Carr, 6 February 1935, HC Box 57. 
53 To Mack Williams, 25 October 1930, HC Box 56. 
54 To Mack Williams, 25 October 1930, HC Box 56. 
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that humans have ideals is used to emphasize the fact that God is in a relationship 
with them and is not ‘aloof’.  
In summary, although both the transcendence and the immanence of God are 
apparent within Christianity, Jones emphasized immanence at the expense of 
transcendence in Social Law. At least two reasons can be proposed for this. First, as 
noted in Chapter 2, a stress on the immanence of God was a hallmark of liberal 
theology (although in later years it would elicit a corrective reaction from the 
Barthian school). Second, it seems likely that an emphasis on God’s immanence best 
explained Jones’ own experience of God’s presence. This emphasis on God’s 
immanence at times verges on pantheism, partly as a result of Jones’ informal style 
and theological naivety. For example, he quotes Royce’s use of Changdoya to give a 
picture of God’s close relationship with the world, but does not point out that this 
illustration is pantheistic, nor that it diverges from the core of conviction. In later 
years he went some way to recognizing his early failure to adequately emphasize 
the transcendence of God and to achieving a better balance.  
The stress on God’s immanence goes hand in hand with an awareness of God’s 
presence, which brings us to our next topic: the related questions of how we can 
know God and thereby know that God exists. 
 
4.4 Knowing God and proving that God exists 
Jones devotes a chapter (‘The Quest’) to discussing how we can know that God 
exists. He critiques traditional arguments for the existence of God based on 
causality (a God discovered in this way would be finite and impersonal) and on 
design (the Artist himself will be forever outside creation and his character will 
remain unknown). Neither can God be found by science: ‘Our rigid methods of 
scientific research increase our reverence and deepen our solemnity, but they do 
not and they cannot find God for us. Science deals only with describable things, i.e., 
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one thing alongside other things, therefore this quest is not for science.’55  For 
Jones, we know that God exists because we experience God, and this is the case 
only because, as noted above, God is immanent: ‘either God is to be thought of as 
interrelated and conjunct with us, or we are compelled to give up finding Him and 
sink back into a quiescent agnosticism; for if we did not possess some common 
qualities, we could not know Him even though we found Him.’56 Once again, he 
draws on Christianity, psychology and idealism to make his case. 
4.4.1 Insights from Christianity 
Jones found that experience (and therefore knowledge) of God could occur in 
almost any situation (through prayer, Meeting for Worship, beauty in nature, 
serving others etc.). Some of these will be discussed further in Chapter 10. Here I 
focus on prayer, because it brings together many of the themes discussed above. In 
Social Law, prayer is envisaged in the context of union with God. For example, Jones 
cites George MacDonald as expressing an ideal prayer: ‘Leave me not, God, until – 
nay, until when? / Not till I am with thee, one heart, one mind.’57 With reference to 
the Bible, he asserts that ‘the profound prayer in Ephesians asks that ‘Christ may 
dwell in your hearts’ and that for John prayer is the ‘sign and mark of a union with 
God’.58 Jones view of prayer, then, is in line with his emphasis on God as love and as 
immanent. 
Jones’ comments on intercessory prayer reflect this emphasis. An editorial in 
Practical Christianity entitled ‘What not to pray for’ is informative in this respect.59  
Prayer is ‘the highest activity of the soul’, Jones professes, and it should certainly 
not be used for selfish gratification. Although Jones does not make the point, it is 
perhaps the case that a selfish request of God puts a distance between God and the 
 
55 Jones, Social Law, 38; see also a similar sentiment in Jones, Practical Christianity, 34. 
56 Jones, Social Law, 19 (italics as in original). 
57 Jones, Social Law, 156. 
58 Jones, Social Law, 256 and 271. 
59 The article and following quotations are in Jones, Practical Christianity, 39–40. 
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person praying, because the person praying and their prayer would not necessarily 
be reflecting the love of God. In other words, selfish prayer arises from a 
relationship with God in which God is primarily transcendent. Requests to God 
should, by contrast, originate in a transformative relationship with God: ‘It is only as 
a person enters more deeply into the life of the Spirit that he sees the true things to 
ask for, so that the increase in the power of prayer is a good test of spiritual 
growth’. Here, then, the requests arise from a relationship with God in which God is 
immanent. 
It is also notable that praise as a form of prayer sits more readily with an emphasis 
on the transcendence rather than the immanence of God, and Jones appreciated 
this in later years.  His 1930 letter to Mack Williams cited above explains that the 
transcendence of God is the basis of ‘the awe, reverence and adoration that are so 
essential to genuine religion’, so perhaps Jones underwent a change in how he 
thought about prayer that coincided with his shift away from an over-emphasis on 
the immanence of God. 
Prayer, then, seems to be for Jones essentially about union with God, 
transformation, and alignment with God’s purposes. It is a way to experience God 
and therefore a way to know that God exists. 
4.4.2 Insights from psychology 
Jones believed that knowledge of God would also come through psychology: ‘All 
attempts to find God apart from and dissevered from personal life have failed’ he 
asserted. Rather, ‘[t]he true path is through personality. The search must begin in 
our own bosom: Who am I? What do I live by? What does personality involve? How 
am I related to my fellows and to nature?’60 This, he says, involves a study ‘of both 
the conscious and the subconscious life’,61 which in practice for him meant the 
 
60 Jones, Social Law, 44. 
61 Jones, Social Law, 45. 
141 
 
psychological insights of James, Royce and Baldwin. The logic of Jones’ reasoning 
here is clear enough: God is found within; psychology illuminates the inner life; so 
psychology can provide knowledge about God.  
There are, however, several potential problems with this approach, discussion of 
which is deferred until later chapters. First, we run again into the obvious objection 
that humans are flawed, so that there needs to be a way of distinguishing which 
aspects of personality reveal God and which do not. This problem is discussed in 
Chapter 5. Second, we can ask why, if God can be found within, there is a need for a 
historical Christ. This problem is discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Jones’ hopes that 
psychology would reveal God were disappointed as psychology moved towards 
behaviourism and Freud developed theories of the subconscious that saw it as 
home to repressed sexual urges rather than as revealing God. This problem is 
discussed in Chapter 10. 
4.4.3 Insights from idealism 
Jones’ comments on knowledge of God relating to idealism are found in his chapter 
‘The self and Over-Self’. We know we are finite, so there must be an infinite aspect 
to us, he argues, and, furthermore, ‘that consciousness which knows finitude is 
joined into a Life which is infinite and eternal’.62 Even the fact that we can name 
objects points to the existence of God, because ‘every “object” which we seek to 
know, if it is an object which has reality in the nature of things, is already a mental 
fact in the life of that larger Self in whom we share’.63 In other words, ideas and 
intimations of finiteness both point to the existence of God.  
Furthermore, Jones sees proof of God’s existence in the fact of consciousness itself. 
For him, consciousness can never be reduced to movements of molecules and a 
physical explanation. This is most clearly spelled out in The Inner Life, where he 
 
62 Jones, Social Law, 230. 
63 Jones, Social Law, 242. 
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declares that ‘it seems absurd to suppose that consciousness is a product of matter 
or of any natural, mechanical process’.64 Rather, the consciousness of an individual 
is an expression of a universal consciousness: in Social Law, he writes that ‘we must 
admit the reality of an infinite Self who is the Life of our lives and that every little 
inlet of human consciousness opens into the total whole of reality’.65 Clearly, this 
argument will be substantially weakened and require modification if consciousness 
is explained scientifically. From a philosophical point of view, the proof also 
becomes less compelling if idealism is no longer fashionable, which was the case 
towards the end of Jones’ life. Proofs of God’s existence arising from idealism are 
therefore a product of Jones’ historical context and thereby susceptible to future 
challenges. 
4.4.4 Towards a synthesis 
Jones denied that we could find God through arguments based on causality or 
design or through science (by which he presumably meant the physical sciences 
rather than psychology), all of which would reveal a transcendent God. Rather, his 
proofs for God’s existence were based on God’s immanence. Ultimately, for Jones 
experience was sufficient proof, and Christianity, psychology and idealism offered 
complementary approaches to exploring this experience. Prayer, seen in the 
context of union with God, offered a pathway to the experience itself. Psychology 
provided the tools to analyse it. Idealism provided the metaphysical foundation. 
There are, however, problems with all of these approaches. Jones’ reliance on 
personal experience of God as proof of God’s existence, as will be discussed in more 
detail in later chapters, makes the problematic assumption that everyone is capable 
of an awareness of God. Psychology, in the theories of Freud and behaviourism, 
could be used to argue that God did not exist. And idealism was beginning to wane 
by the end of Jones’ life. Furthermore, proofs that rely on a universal experience of 
 
64 Jones, Inner Life, 148. 
65 Jones, Social Law, 244. 
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God have the potential to diverge from the core of conviction, because there is no 
need for a historical Christ to reconcile humans and God. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed Jones’ theism in relation to Christianity, psychology and 
idealism, proposed ways in which he tried to synthesize potentially incompatible 
views of God, and pointed out where and how he diverged from the core of 
conviction. My approach was to consider Jones’ view of the character of God, the 
immanence and transcendence of God, and knowledge of God. Because Jones 
himself presents neither his view of God nor his synthesis systematically, I have 
attempted to clarify his views by consolidating comments from throughout Social 
Law. At various points I also referred to Practical Christianity, a work written at 
about the same time as Social Law but with a different audience and therefore with 
a different emphasis and form of expression. 
Regarding the character of God, Jones’ foundational idea is that God is 
characterized by love, in particular as revealed by Christ. In Practical Christianity, 
the basis of this picture is biblical and the affective response of humans is 
acknowledged. In Social Law, Jones again takes the biblical picture as fundamental 
but implicitly makes it consistent with the potentially impersonal character of God 
according to idealism by using material that appears in James’ Principles. He argues 
that one aspect of human consciousness is the ability to work for ends, and, 
assuming that these ends are good, he transposes this ability to God, who is seen as 
building the kingdom of God on earth and thereby as exhibiting love. The weak 
point of this argument is that humans often work for ends that are not good, so 
there is no reason why God’s aims should be conceived of as good if humans are 
taken as the starting point. Furthermore, although his view of God is consistent with 
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the core of conviction, Jones does not address the biblical theme of judgement 
leading to punishment. 
Regarding the immanence and transcendence of God, both Practical Christianity 
and Social Law emphasize the immanence of God and link it with social action – God 
gives inner strength and guidance for the tasks that need to be done. This idea is 
given a firm biblical foundation and is in line with the emphasis of liberal Christianity 
and the Social Gospel. Jones also argues that the immanence of God is consistent 
with psychology, in that we would not be able to experience a transcendent God 
because of the unbridgeable gulf between the divine and the ‘un-divine’, an 
argument I return to in Chapter 7. He further explores God’s immanence with 
reference to a quotation from Changdoya lifted from Royce. The problem here is 
that the passage in question has the flavour of a Christless pantheism, a difference 
from Christianity that Jones does not address. The emphasis on immanence from 
Christianity, psychology and idealism neglects the biblical strand of transcendence 
that is apparent in the core of conviction, although Jones went some way to 
recognizing and correcting this imbalance in later years. 
Finally, Jones insists that knowledge of God and proofs for God’s existence start 
with experience. His view of prayer is of an experience of God in the context of a 
transformative union that focuses on the needs of the world; it thus reflects his 
view of God as being characterized by love and as immanent. In Social Law Jones 
was confident that knowledge of God within would be illuminated by psychology, 
but this confidence was later eroded. He also relied on idealism to show that God 
exists, in that our experience of finitude and of having ideas and ideals all point to 
the existence of a greater consciousness. The problem here is that idealism would 
soon become unfashionable, and there is always the possibility that an explanation 
for consciousness will be found, meaning that these aspects of his arguments are 
historically contingent.  
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It can thus be seen that Jones attempted to synthesize modern thought and 
Christianity in relation to theism, but in doing so diverged at points from the core of 
conviction. This discrepancy can be analysed in terms of the five factors identified in 
earlier chapters. That is, the fundamental difference between the ‘Christian God’ 
and the ‘Absolute’ resulted in Jones’ multivalent theism. Jones attempted to 
overcome this difference through his reliance on psychology, arguing that one of 
the criteria of consciousness is the ability to work for desired ends and that God, as 
ultimate consciousness, is working to establish the Kingdom. However, this strategy 
implicitly assumes universalism, because everyone is related to God through 
consciousness. This in turn marginalizes the unique mediating role of Christ. Jones 
also over-emphasizes the immanence of God and neglects God’s transcendence. I 
suggested that this is partly because of his lifelong experience of God as immanent, 
his experiential basis, and partly because of his acknowledged difficulty in holding 
both of these aspects of God together, a difficulty that is related to his deliberate 
theological naivety. Finally, his use of the passage from Changdoya could be taken 
in isolation to imply that Jones embraced pantheism, an example of confusion 
arising partly from his informal style.  
Two further points are worth noting. First, the above ideas about God’s character, 
God’s immanence and the way in which God should be sought are inter-related, 
meaning that although Jones’ work is not systematic it is internally coherent. Thus, 
for example, a God characterized by love might be expected to be immanent, and 
therefore experience of this God will offer knowledge about God. Second, the 
important characteristic that arises from all the considerations above is that God is 
personal: the facts that God is characterized by love, has purposes that are good, 
and can be found through psychology all point to this. This conviction was certainly 
in line with the prevailing personalism, but for Jones was based on the personal 
nature of God apparent in the Bible and assumed by Quakers. For example, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Jones was convinced that God spoke to and guided his fellow-
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Quakers, and for God to be able to communicate and have a plan, God is most 
naturally interpreted as personal.66  
In brief, Jones was convinced from his own experience and from the Bible that God 
was personal, and he attempted to make this belief consistent with the potentially 
impersonal God of Royce. His synthesis was successful in some areas insofar as it 
used insights about the nature of consciousness to attribute a personality and 
purpose to God. There are other areas, however, for example his universalism and 
lack of emphasis on God’s transcendence, where he diverged from the core of 
conviction. One of the key implications of Jones’ treatment of God as ultimate 
consciousness is that human consciousness is a finite expression of this ultimate 
consciousness. The next chapter thus focuses on Jones’ understanding of human 
nature. 
 
66 See, however, Rowlands, ed., God, Words and Us, for a discussion about how today’s non-theist 





Humans are socio-spiritual beings 
 
The most fruitful outcome of the study of inner, personal life has been the revelation 
of inherent relationship.1 
 
In Christian theology, many key doctrines are related to how human nature is 
understood. How are individuals related to God? What is salvation and who effects 
it? How should the idea of sin in Genesis 1 be interpreted in the light of scientific 
discoveries? What is the relationship between human effort and divine grace? 
Jones’ answers to all these questions, as we will see in this chapter, were coloured 
by his reliance on psychology.  
Broadly speaking, he held two fundamental ideas in concert regarding human 
nature, both of which were psychologically informed. The first is that humans are 
social beings. Jones makes this conviction very clear right at the start of Social Law, 
writing in the Introduction that ‘This idea, that personal life is of necessity conjunct, 
i.e., in an organic group, will appear in every chapter of this book’.2 As noted in 
Chapter 3, the terminology ‘conjunct’ came from his Harvard lecturer G. H. Palmer, 
and it was explored in the light of psychological insights from James Baldwin’s 
Mental Development, a book that showed how the social group influenced the 
development of self-consciousness.3 The second is that humans and God are 
inherently related. Jones argues for this based on psychological insights from James, 
 
1 Jones, Social Law, 16. 
2 Jones, Social Law, 17 (italics as in original). 
3 Jones does not cite Baldwin’s work explicitly but acknowledges it as having ‘brought much light 
upon many of the matters here treated’ (Jones, Social Law, 21). 
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in particular his theory of the subconscious. These starting points in psychology, 
however, meant that Jones frequently diverged from the core of conviction. His 
evangelical readers in particular were not slow to criticize him for this departure, 
and there are a number of letters in the Haverford archives written at about the 
time of Social Law that relate directly or indirectly to his views on human nature. 
Many of them have at their root Martin Davie’s observation that ‘Jones sees the 
possibility of direct personal experience of God as based on the nature and 
psychology of Man, whereas the Quaker tradition sees it as based on the 
supernatural activity of God.’4  
One particular criticism (and it usually is a criticism rather than a commendation) 
that has been raised consistently since Social Law was written and that, as we will 
see, is related to Jones’ use of psychology is that of humanism. Guy Aiken, for 
example, claims that Jones was often accused of being a ‘mere’ humanist; Douglas 
Gwyn associates him with an ‘optimistic’ humanism that was inadequate for a 
nuclear age; and Hugh Rock thinks that Jones was moving towards a ‘fully humanist 
basis for religion’.5 Furthermore, because Jones was so influential within Quakerism, 
his views on this topic affected the Society as a whole: Damiano argues, for 
example, that as a result of Jones liberal Quakerism tends to be ‘self-sufficient, 
humanistic and individualistic’.6 And, as William Thorpe pointed out in his 1968 
Swarthmore lecture, a humanistic Quakerism represents a divergence from the 
Society’s Christian roots.7 Jones himself, however, consistently insisted that he was 
opposed to humanism because it reduced humans to natural beings.8 Clearly, then, 
 
4 Davie, British Quaker Theology, 106 
5 Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’ 44; D. Gwyn, Apocalypse of the Word: The Life and 
Message of George Fox (1624–1691) (Richmond, IN: Friends United Press, 1986), 215; Rock, ‘Rufus 
Jones never did establish’, 61. 
6 K. Damiano, ‘On Earth as it is in Heaven: Eighteenth Century Quakerism as Realized Eschatology’ 
(PhD thesis, The Union for Experimenting Colleges and Universities, Cincinnati, OH, 1988), 64.    
7 W. H. Thorpe, Quakers and Humanists (Swarthmore Lecture 1968) (London: Friends Home Service 
Committee, 1968), 10. 
8 Vining, Friend of Life, 106. 
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Jones’ use of psychology in relation to human nature is both important and open to 
misinterpretation.  
Here, I try to ascertain Jones’ views on various facets of human nature, namely 
consciousness, the subconscious, sin, salvation, habit and conscience (Sections 5.1 
to 5.6, respectively). For each of these facets I first analyse how Jones attempted to 
synthesize psychological insights with traditional Christian and Quaker teaching. I 
then point out the strengths and weaknesses of his position and, where relevant, 
refer to letters from his readers to show where he was in conflict with the views of 
evangelical Quakers and the core of conviction. Broadly speaking, I will suggest that 
the picture presented in Social Law is that humans are socio-spiritual beings for 
whom altruism is as basic as selfishness and who are capable of self-improvement 
by their own effort. I argue, however, that Jones prevents this from becoming a 
secular humanism by virtue of the role he ascribes to God regarding consciousness, 
conscience and habit. 
 
5.1 Consciousness 
Self-consciousness lies at the centre of Jones’ view of human nature: ‘for all 
practical purposes the contrast between a person and a thing … is clear enough. The 
fundamental contrast is the possession of self-consciousness by the person and the 
absence of it in the thing.’9 Note that this means that when Jones uses the term 
‘personality’ he often has self-consciousness in mind. 
5.1.1 Jones’ view: Consciousness originates in God 
Given Jones’ dependence on James, it is worth noting here the different emphases 
in Principles and Varieties. In Principles, James wanted a scientific explanation for 
consciousness: ‘The demand for continuity has, over large tracts of science, proved 
 
9 Jones, Social Law, 51. 
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itself to possess true prophetic power. We ought therefore ourselves sincerely to 
try every possible mode of conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it may not 
appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe of a new nature non-existent 
until then.’10 (This passage is, in fact, used as the epigraph in Peter Godfrey-Smith’s 
recent book on the evolution of consciousness.11) Varieties has a more metaphysical 
flavour at times, with James broadening his horizons beyond consciousness: ‘the 
conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences 
come’.12  
Jones himself endorsed both metaphysical and psychological explanations in 
relation to self-consciousness. On the one hand, consciousness is for Jones 
inexplicable: ‘There is nothing simpler by which we could describe it. It itself is 
ultimate (at least to us), elementary and unanalysable.’13 Its origin, too, is a 
mystery: ‘personality gets no sufficient origin in the phenomenal world; nothing 
here explains it.’14 This inherent mystery obtains because, for Jones, consciousness, 
as we saw in the last chapter, has its origin in God, a position that was in line with 
Royce’s idealism: ‘What we really have, when the person appears, is the self-
consciousness of the world manifest at a focus point.’15 This picture presented in 
Social Law is retained throughout Jones’ corpus. He claims in Testimony, for 
example, that ‘We may have collateral connections with flat-nosed baboons, but at 
the same time we are of direct noumenal origin.’16 The closest he comes to an 
explanation is a passing comment, again in Testimony, that hints at panpsychism, as 
he surmises that one day it will be discovered that ‘what we have been calling 
 
10 James, Principles, 102. 
11 P. Godfrey-Smith, Other Minds: The Octopus and the Evolution of Intelligent Life (London: William 
Collins, 2017), 1. 
12 James, Varieties, 515. 
13 Jones, Social Law, 51–52. 
14 Jones, Social Law, 84–85. 
15 Jones, Social Law, 85. 
16 R. M. Jones, Testimony of the Soul (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), 70. 
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“physical” or “material” or “molecular” is vastly more interpenetrated by “spirit” 
than we have usually supposed.’17  
Note that Jones was not alone in this view that consciousness was inexplicable: 
William James records that the opinion of many of his contemporaries was that 
‘with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature seems to slip in, something 
whereof the potency was not given in the mere outward atoms of the original 
chaos.’18 Thus, while today some may find Jones’ determination to avoid a scientific 
explanation unsatisfactory, at the time it was not unusual. This is not to say that 
Jones denied that consciousness was related to activity in the brain; rather, he 
thought that science could never give the whole story. He acknowledges that ‘If we 
were able to look in upon the brain of our friend with magnifying eyes, we should 
see marvelous molecular motions going on among the cells.’19 To focus on this 
would, though, be missing the point, because ‘Where we saw a storm of activities in 
a brain-centre, [our friend] was overcoming a temptation or was thrilled with a 
rapture of aspiration.’20 In other words, for Jones consciousness has its origin in God 
and is mediated, rather than produced, by the brain. In line with this, science can 
provide a description of what is going on, but can neither explain it nor capture its 
significance or meaning. 
On the other hand, Jones draws on psychological theories to explain the 
development of self-consciousness. With a general citation to Baldwin and to 
Royce’s Studies of Good and Evil, he explains that it is only in the social group that 
the child learns the difference between ‘I’ and ‘thou’, ‘ego’ and ‘alter’, ‘self’ and 
‘not-self’.21 He also quotes Royce as saying that if a child were to grow up without 
others ‘there is nothing to indicate that he would become as self-conscious as is 
 
17 Jones, Testimony, 171. 
18 James, Principles, 101. 
19 Jones, Social Law, 139.  
20 Jones, Social Law, 140. 
21 Jones, Social Law, 54. 
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now a fairly educated cat’.22 Thus, the development of self-consciousness in a given 
individual can be explained psychologically, even if its origin can not.  
In summary, Jones’ view of consciousness is based on the metaphysics of idealism 
and incorporates some insights from social psychology regarding its development. 
Although there is scant explicit biblical input, we saw in the last chapter that Jones 
sees ultimate consciousness, from which all consciousness derives, as reflecting 
Christian ideas about God’s character and purposes. 
5.1.2 Assessment of Jones’ position 
A number of criticisms of Jones’ approach can be made. Those that pertain to the 
inherent relationship between God and humans implied by Jones’ views will be 
deferred until Chapter 7 on the Inner Light. Here I focus on objections relating to his 
insistence that consciousness originates in God.  
First, although Jones’ views have to be seen in historical context, it may be felt to be 
inconsistent that, while he embraces scientific theories for the development of self-
consciousness in an individual so enthusiastically and admits the correlation 
between brain activity and consciousness, he is convinced that no scientific 
explanation for consciousness will ever be found.23 In this respect he faces problems 
similar to those apparent in arguments for God’s existence that rely on a ‘God of 
the gaps’. Here it is not so much the existence of God that is being predicated on 
the current absence of scientific knowledge, however, but the relationship of 
humans with God. Given that Jones’ whole thought is based on this inherent 
relationship, it might be thought a very risky strategy to make the foundations 
dependent on the absence of a scientific explanation for consciousness. The fact 
 
22 Jones, Social Law, 53. 
23 That said, there are a number of present-day philosophers and psychologists (such as Steve Pinker 
and Colin McGinn) who are dubbed ‘new mysterians’ because they believe that no explanation for 
consciousness will ever be found. 
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that Jones insists that consciousness arises in God, however, means that his 
understanding of humans is inescapably theistic rather than naturalistic.  
Second, Jones’ insistence that consciousness arises in God means that it is difficult 
to separate the creator from the created. This merging of humans and God is a 
departure from the core of conviction, and Jones’ theological naivety means that he 
neither recognizes nor addresses this issue. Furthermore, Jones’ treatment does not 
really explain how aspects of consciousness that are not God-like exist. The fact that 
individuals can have conscious thoughts that might be aimed at harming another, 
for example, surely implies that consciousness is not completely dependent on God. 
This problem, which is at root the lack of an explanation for sin, crops up, as will 
become apparent below, in one guise or another in many facets of Jones’ views on 
human nature. Jones’ approach can be contrasted with that of one of his 
contemporaries, H. G. Wood, who claimed that he was too aware of the reality of 
sin to be able to endorse an innately divine human nature.24 
Finally, the fact that Jones places such a premium on human consciousness means 
that he is open to accusations of anthropocentrism. In fact, this criticism can be 
made of the whole of his thought, built as it is on the necessity of listening to God 
and performing good deeds. There is no room in his scheme, for example, to 
explore what a redeemed creation might look like, just a redeemed human society. 
Here though, Jones is a child of his time, as the redemption of society was the 
emphasis seen in the Social Gospel movement, and ecological concerns and 
Christian responses had not yet made an appearance. That said, for Jones the moral 
nature of the universe comes to fruition in the moral nature of humans: ‘We know 
only of a universe which includes man. The inevitable process of our world leads up 
to a being who is self-conscious, who has experience of values, and who reveals 
moral preferences … When we talk of the cosmic universe, we must include in it the 
 
24 Thorpe, Quakers and Humanists, 15. 
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emergence of man and the processes of history.’25 In other words, Jones might be 
expected to view the redemption of humans as in some sense incorporating the 
redemption of the universe. 
In summary, Jones’ position has substantial flaws (it relies on the lack of scientific 
explanation for consciousness and does not explain how human consciousness can 
be decidedly un-God-like) and it diverges from the core of conviction (there is no 
separation between the creator and created, and no adequate treatment of sin). On 
the other hand, the fact that it is impossible for Jones to view humans apart from 
God means that accusations of ‘mere’ humanism are unfounded, a point to which I 
return in the Conclusion. The particular point of contact between God and humans 
within consciousness, and the subject of the next section, is the mysterious 
workings of the subconscious. 
 
5.2 The subconscious 
Jones was clearly fascinated with the subconscious, as he devotes a 
disproportionately large amount of space to its curious manifestations in Social 
Law. In later years, though, he admitted that he went too far in adopting James’ 
theories of its religious significance.26 Both his early fascination and his later caution 
reflect shifts in the science of psychology itself, for example increased scepticism 
about psychic phenomena and the theories of Freud and Jung. The discussion here 




25 R. M. Jones, The Nature and Authority of Conscience (Swarthmore Lecture 1920) (Kessinger, 
[1920]), 16–17. 
26 Jones, Middle Years, 8. 
155 
 
2.1 Jones’ view: The subconscious is the ‘shekinah of the soul’ 
 
Figure 5.1 Extract from Jones’ lecture notes on psychology (undated), HC Box 97. 
 
The first part of the chapter consists mainly of manifestations of the subconscious 
at work. Jones’ point seems to be that events that seem inexplicable – recurring 
dreams, predictions from crystal balls, the sudden ability to speak another language 
– are in fact all explained by the subconscious. Thus he provides anecdotal evidence 
of a recurring dream that was rooted in a long-forgotten childhood incident, of an 
image seen in a crystal ball that was actually an event registered subconsciously the 
previous day, and of a man ‘of the lower classes’ who on his deathbed suddenly 
spoke Greek only for it to be discovered that he had learned a few sentences of 
Greek as a child. Jones does not give source references, but it is possible that he 
consulted the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. This journal 
detailed numerous case studies and is referred to in Jones’ lecture notes (undated, 
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see Figure 5.1). At least one example may have been lifted from Principles: Jones 
notes that a mother can sleep through rattling windows and traffic but wake up to 
the slightest movement of her baby, a phenomenon James draws attention to in 
Principles.27  
Jones’ main interest, however, was in the religious significance of the subconscious. 
In this respect, it seems likely that he relied on two insights from James, one from 
Principles and one from Varieties.  The first, for which there is no direct citation, 
relates to the operations of consciousness. In Principles, James discusses 
consciousness in terms of the brain-tracts that are excited: ‘If recently the brain-
tract a was vividly excited, and then b, and now vividly c, the total present 
consciousness is not produced simply by c’s excitement, but also by the dying 
vibrations of a and b as well.’28 For James, the purpose of the illustration is 
scientific, namely to show that psychologists should pay as much attention to the 
relation between objects as to the objects themselves: ‘We ought to say a feeling of 
and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a 
feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. Yet we do not.’29  
The second is James’ metaphysical speculations in Varieties, which Jones quotes 
directly, where James says that ‘there is actually and literally more life in our total 
soul than we at any time are aware of … The conscious person is continuous with a 
wider self”.’30  
 
 
27 Jones, Social Law, 114 and James, Principles, 143. 
28 James, Principles, 161. 
29 James, Principles, 163. 




Figure 5.2 Jones’ diagram of consciousness (Social Law, p.111). The beginning of the 
footnote on the verso page reads ‘In the figure, (a) shows the “peak” of….. 
 
Jones combines these two insights in the diagram reproduced in Figure 5.2, which 
appears in a footnote. Here, like James, he refers to ‘peaks’ (a) and (b) rising above 
a threshold (c), and notes that the ‘thought of any moment is influenced by what is 
just dying out and by what is just coming in’.31  He adds an extra component, 
though, namely the ‘vast realm of the subconscious’ (d) that lies beneath 
consciousness, surmising that the subconscious is related to God: ‘for all we know, 
[the subconscious] borders upon the infinite Life, rises out of it, and may receive 
“incursions” from it.’32 Furthermore, he ends the chapter with the suggestion that 
in the subconscious there may be ‘some real shekinah where we may meet with 
that Divine Companion, that More of Life, in whom we live’.33   
Jones, then, offers a description of the human–divine relationship that likely drew 
on James’ ‘scientific’ comments in Principles and his more metaphysical comments 
 
31 Jones, Social Law, 111. 
32 Jones, Social Law, 111. 
33 Jones, Social Law, 135. 
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on the subconscious in Varieties, but he replaces James’ ‘more’ with the ‘More of 
Life’, the personal God of Christianity.  
Jones also refers to poetry to describe this experience of God that arises in the 
subconscious, quoting Matthew Arnold: 
Beneath the stream, shallow and light, of what we say we feel, 
Beneath the stream, as light, of what we think we feel, 
There flows with noiseless current, obscure and deep, 
The central stream of what we feel indeed.34 
 
The poem is actually slightly misquoted (the line breaks and punctuation are not as 
in the original, and the first line should be ‘Below the surface-stream…), and there is 
no reason to associate the ‘central stream’ with God. (Indeed, given Arnold’s 
atheism, it seems unlikely that he would have made this association in a Christian 
sense.) It does, however, convey Jones’ conviction that our ‘shallow’ consciousness 
arises from a deeper, hidden consciousness, which he associated with God.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, Jones’ developing religious views owed much to poets, and his 
use of poetry here provides a good example of how he synthesized these early 
views with later psychological/metaphysical insights from James. 
5.2.2 Reaction to and assessment of Jones’ position 
Regarding his use of a psychological insight from James to draw a spiritual 
conclusion, Jones could first be criticized for crossing epistemological boundaries. It 
is worth emphasizing in his defence, however, that he was in line with many 
psychologists who were speculating on the metaphysical role of the subconscious 
(see Chapter 3), and he is careful in his writing to make it clear that he is drawing 
analogies and pointing out similarities rather than offering rigorous proofs. Second, 
he is perhaps again unwise in linking the unexplained, namely the subconscious, to 
God. As noted above in relation to consciousness, he runs the risk of seeing his 
 
34 Jones, Social Law, 110. 
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system collapse if an explanation for the subconscious is found. That said, James did 
in fact propose a use for the subconscious, that of making certain actions 
automatic,35 and, as we will see below in Section 5.5, Jones gave a ‘spiritualized’ 
interpretation of this aspect of the subconscious, weaving it into his view of God-
inspired transformation.  
George Coe, who taught the psychology of religion at Northwestern University, 
Illinois, raised a further concern. While enthusing that ‘he would not know where to 
look for a better synthesis’ of the religious significance of psychology and 
metaphysics than Social Law, he admits that he is not totally clear about Jones’ 
position: ‘At one point you seem to hold that there may be a shekinah of divine 
revelation within the subconscious; at another you seem to test this subconscious 
revelation by the fully conscious experience.’ 36 What Coe is objecting to is that a 
subconscious revelation supposedly from God is then subject to the authority of 
conscious thought. There is no record of how Jones replied, if indeed he did, in the 
Haverford records. Coe is correct, in that the fact that inspiration is not always 
divine is acknowledged on a practical level in Social Law; indeed, Jones devotes a 
whole chapter to discussing how one can discern which intuitions do actually come 
from God (see my Chapter 8). He does not, however, address this ambiguity 
theologically.  
Post-Social Law, the biggest challenge to Jones’ position would come from the work 
of Jung and Freud, who, as Jones himself put it in 1937, had shown that the 
subconscious contained ‘hissing serpents as well as glorious birds of paradise’.37  By 
this time, he had concluded that ‘we cannot yet, if ever, leap forthwith to the sound 
conclusion that God is assuredly most at home in regions which we cannot at 
 
35 Today, for example, there have been developments in this area, with some seeing the 
subconscious as a rapid process of assessing a situation that aids survival. See, for example, D. 
Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Penguin, 2012). 
36 George Coe, 7 April 1905, HC Box 9. 
37 Jones, Testimony, 61. 
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present explore’.38 Although Jones eventually distanced himself from James’ view of 
the subconscious, he does not, as far I am aware, attempt to replace the ‘shekinah’ 
of the soul located in the subconscious in Social Law with another explanation of 
how God and humans are related. Given the centrality of this idea for his overall 
scheme and its eventual acceptance by liberal Quakers, this represents a weakness 
in his thought and legacy. 
In summary, Jones’ reliance on psychology means that he used James to suggest 
that the subconscious was the shekinah of the soul. His view does not take into 
account theologically the fact that often what arises from the subconscious may not 
be ‘of God’, and it encountered further problems from psychology itself post-Social 
Law. His failure to address these issues is an example of his theological naivety. 
Furthermore, this interpretation, in which the possibility of experience of God is a 
natural ability, captures Jones’ memories of growing up in a Quaker community in 
which God was always a felt presence and is therefore an example of his 
experiential basis. Notably, it diverges from the core of conviction.  
 
5.3 Sin  
Sin and salvation are closely related concepts. Very broadly speaking, if sin is seen 
primarily as an offence against God that has hell or eternal damnation as a 
consequence, then it requires supernatural help to overcome it (e.g. to ‘forgive’ or 
‘defeat’ it), and salvation is seen in terms of eternal life in heaven. If sin is human 
weakness, then it involves (but is not necessarily restricted to) human strategies to 
overcome it, and salvation is seen in terms of improved character and/or a more 
ethical society. This section on sin and the next on salvation are therefore closely 
related. 
 
38 Jones, Testimony, 61. 
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5.3.1 Jones’ view: Sin is a fact of consciousness 
There are two main passages about sin in Social Law. The first occurs in the context 
of a discussion of the Inner Light, where Jones is concerned to stress that 
Quakerism teaches that the truths of Christianity, here sin and salvation, are to be 
apprehended by each individual. He quotes George Fox to this effect: ‘I was 
commanded to turn people to the inward Light that they might know their 
salvation.’39 In fact, Jones is so passionate about this understanding of sin that he 
resorts to capitals to get his view across: ‘SIN IS A FACT IN CONSCIOUSNESS; not a doctrine 
which logic establishes from Adam’s sin.’ 40 In concert with this, God’s grace and 
forgiveness are real not because they occur in Scripture but because ‘THEY ARE 
ETERNAL FACTS OF THE DIVINE NATURE, which any human soul may experience.’ As far as 
sin and salvation are concerned, the point is that, for Jones, they are both matters 
of experience rather than of doctrine. They are true because they are ‘witnessed 
within’, not because ‘some man in sacred garb has announced it, or because I have 
read in a book that such an experience might be mine’.41 
The second discussion of sin takes place towards the end of the book, where Jones 
is attempting to explain how the preceding chapters relate to sin and the need for 
redemption.42 Three main points can be identified. First, sin is defined in relation to 
God and God’s plans for society: it is an act ‘which is aimed at the structure of 
society and at the entire Divine Order’. Note that there are some similarities to 
Jones’ Harvard lecturer G. H. Palmer here, in that Palmer defined iniquity as the 
tendency to set the individual against the conjunct.43 Jones, as noted, extended the 
understanding of ‘conjunct’ to apply to God, and saw God as having plans for 
society, so there is a corresponding extension in his ideas about sin to include the 
 
39 Jones, Social Law, 170. 
40 Jones, Social Law, 170. 
41 Jones, Social Law, 172. 
42 The quotations in this paragraph are all from Jones, Social Law, 250–252. 
43 Vining, Friend of Life, 86. 
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setting up of the individual against both society and God (which are in any case 
related for Jones). Second, the process of overcoming sin forms one’s character: the 
inward dispositions that cause sinful actions are to be ‘put down and triumphed 
over’, and by so doing an individual ‘gains a new degree of goodness’. Third, sinners 
are still very much part of God’s world – it is just that they display the point at which 
Divine harmony is disturbed. In broad terms, then, Jones is defining sin in terms of 
the aims of God, which we saw in the last chapter was building the kingdom of God. 
As per the Social Gospel, this involves transforming individuals within a transformed 
society.  
In addition to these two expositions of sin, Jones also discusses the related concept 
of egoism. Here the discussion is in the context of the development of self-
consciousness in the child. He makes the point that human life is group life in the 
sense that virtues require the existence of others. ‘You cannot sympathize without 
“another” – another whose inner life you can appreciate and with whom in some 
real sense you can share.’44 Likewise, the so-called ‘egoistic tendencies’ also require 
others. Pride, for example, requires another person to compare oneself against. 
Although Jones does not mention sin in this discussion, he is presumably criticizing 
the doctrine of original sin and perhaps referring to evolutionary theory when he 
draws the conclusion that ‘There is no truth at all in any view which makes egoism 
more primitive or fundamental than altruism. They are born together and neither 
can claim the birthright.’45  
In summary, Jones sees sin as a tendency that opposes God’s aim of building the 
kingdom. It therefore has a liberal Christian framework in that it is based on 
experience, science (i.e. evolution and social psychology) and the Social Gospel 
rather than on a literal interpretation of Genesis 1.  
 
44 Jones, Social Law, 57. 
45 Jones, Social Law, 57. 
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5.3.2 Reaction to and assessment of Jones’ position  
Jones’ treatment of sin as an inevitable outcome of evolution/social development 
and as a matter of experience rather than doctrine, and perhaps more significantly 
his relatively light emphasis on it, troubled his evangelical letter writers in a variety 
of ways. J. H. Douglas, for example, focused on the atonement, thundering that ‘Sin 
must be seen and felt with all its awful and eternal condemnations of the Holy Law 
of God and Jesus and His blood be seen as the only escape from Hell.’46 S. A. Wood 
was more troubled by Jones’ attitude to Scripture: ‘If thee believes that the story of 
creation in the Bible is trustworthy and that the story of temptation and fall of man 
is not a “myth” as John Hicks says it is, let us know. In short we want to know 
whether thee believes the Bible or not.’47  
A more general assessment of the liberal position can be found in a 1902 article in 
The British Friend, which worried that ‘Those who have begun to assimilate the 
thought of Evolution are specially liable to experience a weakening of the sense of 
sin, and in consequence of the desire for salvation.’48 Even the modernist Thomas 
Hodgkin, who had chaired the session on science at the Manchester Conference, 
believed that sin was more than a result of our evolutionary heritage: ‘By all means 
let the elimination of the bestial nature be conceived of as going forward in 
humanity … But there will remain in the possibilities of the human character 
something darker, subtler, more malignant: a poison not of the flesh but of the 
intellect.’49 
A further insightful and wide-ranging criticism can be found in a letter from Esther 
Pritchard. Her letter to Jones was written in 1900, so before the publication of 
Social Law, but her criticisms of his treatment of the origin of sin are pertinent here. 
 
46 J. H. Douglas, 17 November 1898, HC Box 3. 
47 S. A. Wood, 27 November 1899, HC Box 3. 
48 British Friend, ‘Personal salvation’ March (1902): 52. 
49 T. Hodgkin, Human Progress and the Inward Light (Swarthmore Lecture 1911) (London: Headley 
Brothers, 1911), 16. 
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Pritchard had chaired the Woman’s Missionary Conference of Friends in 1888, and 
the report on the conference (written by the editor of the evangelical Christian 
Worker) states that the tone was that ‘Jesus Christ and the salvation of souls was at 
the front’ and praises a talk on the necessity of accepting ‘baptism with the Holy 
Ghost as a qualification to execute the great commission’.50 It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that, if nothing in the intervening years convinced her 
otherwise, Pritchard had a low opinion of humanity’s natural goodness.  
Her letter is somewhat long-winded and the cursive script is difficult to read in 
places (see the original and transcript in Appendix C).51 Her main point is that she 
wants to retain the biblical account of how sin originated: ‘I am very slow to receive 
a theory that wipes out the record of creation & of man’s first disobedience & of 
the promised seed, & makes Gen I-III children’s legends.’ She goes on to make a 
number of interesting points regarding this question of biblical authority that are 
still being debated today. The first is that she wished that ‘scientists would be 
content to stay on their own ground & not invade the domain of theology with their 
generalizations’. This position of independence is exemplified in recent times by 
Steven Jay Gould’s ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ (see Chapter 3 on the Manchester 
Conference). The gist of the second point (which is especially difficult to decipher) is 
that Christianity should be trusted because Christians have for centuries had 
‘conquests in the realm of grace’ and have won ‘trophies in the field’. Science, 
however, is still in its ‘swaddling clothes’ and should not be allowed to ‘jump into 
the saddle’. Today, science is no longer in its swaddling clothes, but the general 
thrust of Pritchard’s complaint is apparent in the arguments of those, like Marilynne 
Robinson for example, who object to the fact that the attribution of authority solely 
to science negates the ‘voice of any ancient poet, saint, or visionary on the far side 
of the threshold who has attested to his or her own sense of the holy’.52 In essence, 
 
50 C. W. Pritchard, Woman's Missionary Conference of Friends. The Independent (1848–1921) 40: 14. 
51 Esther Pritchard, 23 February 1900, HC Box 5 [Appendix C]. 
52 M. Robinson, Absence of Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 7. 
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then, Pritchard is criticizing Jones’ treatment of sin because he does not accept 
biblical authority and promotes scientific authority.  
It is also notable that Jones’ evangelical readers had different ideas from him about 
what activities were ‘sinful’. J. H. Douglas, for example, condemns activities such as 
‘card playing, dancing, theatre going. Secret societies for both men and women. 
Clubs for women’, without considering inner motives.53 Jones, however, felt that 
there was some ambiguity in recognizing sin. Self-seeking inevitably involves self-
sacrifice, he observes. We have to surrender one thing to gain another, so that ‘all 
altruism is more or less egoistic; all egoism is more or less altruistic’.54  The result of 
this is that ‘Many a canonized saint has been egoistic.’55 Here again it is possible 
that he is drawing on James, who notes in Principles that selfishness can be 
mistaken for saintliness: ‘If it be the “other-worldly” self which [a man] seeks, and if 
he seeks it ascetically, – even though he would rather see all mankind damned 
eternally than lose his individual soul,– “saintliness” will probably be the name by 
which his selfishness will be called.’56 Jones’ approach to sin is thus more 
psychologically nuanced than approaches that see sin purely in terms of behaviour, 
but this may not have been appreciated by Douglas.  
Finally, one of the most common accusations levelled against Jones, both at the 
time and since, is, as noted, that he did not take sin seriously enough. There are a 
number of factors that might have influenced Jones in this respect. First, his views 
were in line with the wider Christian liberal optimism of the time. Second, he 
admired Clement, who as Jones himself points out (see Chapter 2) had none of the 
‘tragedy’ of the Hebrew view of sin. Third, he was inspired by the generally 
optimistic view of human nature exemplified by his Haverford teacher Pliny Chase 
(see Chapter 2): Chase’s interpretation of the Quaker concept of the Inner Light 
 
53 John H. Douglas, 13 February 1903, HC Box 7. 
54 Jones, Social Law, 101–102. 
55 Jones, Social Law, 102. 
56 James, Principles, 209. 
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meant that he saw the nucleus of man’s inner life forming ‘a living junction with the 
Eternal Reality of the universe’, and Jones took this as meaning that individuals 
could be ‘set burning with a light of truth and a warmth of love that reveal God’, 
and that human life was given ‘a new glory and a noble dignity’. 57 In later years, the 
two World Wars gave him (along with liberal theologians generally) pause for 
thought, but he maintained his optimistic view of human nature. No doubt referring 
to his meeting with the Gestapo (see Chapter 1), he commented that ‘We have seen 
in new and awful light in our times how low in the scale man can sink … I personally 
saw and dealt with the most debased men in the list. Christ saw a similar depravity 
in man [but] He kept His hope and His faith that God and man belonged together, as 
branches belong to a vine.’58  
Note that Jones does not mention sin in relation to judgement or punishment, a 
position that was in line with his emphasis on God as love (see Chapter 4). This 




5.4.1 Jones’ view: Earthly joy in union with God 
It is notable that Jones does not link salvation with heaven. As far as I am aware, he 
does not speculate on the specifics of heaven anywhere in his corpus, although he 
seems to assume that eternal life is a natural progression for everyone: ‘If rather 
the body is only a medium for giving temporal manifestation to that which is 
essentially spirit, the falling away of the body may be only a stage in the process, 
like the bursting of the chrysalis by the insect which was meant to have wings and 
 
57 Jones, Life in College, 29. 
58 Jones, A Call to What is Vital (New York: MacMillan, 1960), 112. 
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to live on flowers.’59 Rather, he links salvation with an experience of God in this life, 
insisting that salvation ‘is to be witnessed as an actual experience’.60 He goes on to 
suggest what this experience might feel like: ‘freedom from the sense of sin, joy in 
union with the Infinite Spirit, peace through forgiveness’.61  
A more biblically based treatment of salvation is found in the final chapter of Social 
Law, where it is seen in terms of the human–divine relationship. Here Jones asserts 
that the profound prayer in Ephesians, which asks that ‘Christ may dwell in your 
hearts that ye may be filled to all fulness with God’ shows that ‘salvation is not only 
the product of the resident Divine Life – it is the resident Divine Life in a human 
life’.62 Furthermore, he claims that ‘a study of Paul’s use of “faith” will show that 
this Divine–human idea permeated his entire conception of salvation in all its 
stages’.63 Note that Jones approaches biblical authority in terms of the experience 
of the biblical authors, not in terms of biblically derived doctrine: Jones is of the 
opinion that Paul’s understanding of faith, which permeated his conception of 
salvation, was not learned but ‘had its birth rather in his own personal 
experience’.64  
5.4.2 Reaction to and assessment of Jones’ position 
Jones’ attribution of authority to experience may be in line with the Quaker 
tradition, but he does not consider the possible weaknesses in this position, namely 
that positive feelings might be dependent on good health, a full stomach or a 
sanguine disposition, that negative ones might depend on poor self-esteem, and 
that it is possible that neither reflects ontological reality.  
 
59 Jones, Social Law, 84. 
60 Jones, Social Law, 170. 
61 Jones, Social Law, 171. 
62 Jones, Social Law, 256. 
63 Jones, Social Law, 257. 
64 Jones, Social Law, 257. 
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Furthermore, there is also a sense in which his views diverged from the core of 
conviction and evangelical Quakerism. Henry Newman, for example, was worried 
about the incipient universalism in Jones’ view of salvation. Newman was a 
prominent Quaker who supported the modernist agenda – it was Newman who, as 
we saw in Chapter 3, had written to Jones about the Manchester Conference and 
encouraged him to disseminate the proceedings. He was eminently tactful in his 
criticism, implying that Jones perhaps had not appreciated the implications of his 
formulation. ‘There is a side current running through [Social Law] that puzzled me in 
receiving it, & it was a line of thought that seemed to run up to the conclusion that 
somehow all souls are going to be ultimately saved’, he ventures, continuing that ‘I 
do not mean that I think thou states this in thy book, but thou appears to leave the 
“way open” for scholars to draw this possible conclusion.’65 For Newman, this goes 
against Scriptural teaching that ‘immortality is only in God, only in Christ’. Even 
though Newman has perhaps missed the point of what Jones meant by salvation, he 
is correct in identifying the universalism inherent in Jones’ thought. For the divine–
human relationship and immortality to be anything less than universal would 
require Jones to revoke the idea that human consciousness originates in God and 
that the human–divine relationship is mediated by the subconscious. In other 
words, as already noted, Jones’ divergence from the core of conviction is caused by 
his reliance on psychology, and his theological naivety means that he does not 
address the issue. 
In summary, by approaching sin and salvation from the point of view of personal 
experience, Jones diverges from the views of evangelical Quakers, who emphasized 
Scripture in addition to experience. Essentially, his treatment means that all humans 
are ontologically ‘in the same boat’, as it were. There is no sharp dividing line 
between ‘saved’ and ‘condemned’, between ‘saint’ and ‘sinner’, just differences in 
the extent to which individuals experience salvation on earth. This in turn means 
 
65 Henry Stanley Newman, 22 December 1904, HC Box 8 [Appendix C]. 
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that the role of Christ is marginalized, as discussed in more detail in the next 




Self-improvement was a popular theme in American Christianity at the time of 
Social Law and had a multi-faceted relationship with psychology, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. The next two sections focus on two means to self-improvement that can 
be identified in Social Law, namely the formation of habit and the role of 
conscience. 
5.5.1 Jones’ view: Habits make goodness second nature 
Jones’ discussion of habit occurs within the context of his discussion of the 
subconscious. It is highly likely that he relied on James, although he does not refer 
to him or provide a reference. James felt that psychology had a responsibility to 
facilitate self-improvement and urged his fellow psychologists to respond to the 
expectations of the public by teaching and providing therapy.66 Many Christians 
embraced in particular James’ chapter on habit in Principles, to the extent that the 
president of Brown, W. H. P. Faunce, told a Yale audience in 1908 that the chapter 
had been ‘preached in a thousand pulpits’,67 and, as noted in Chapter 3, Jones was 
struck by the awe it provoked in his students. Habit was presented as arising from 
willpower, an ethos that chimed with a widespread conviction that the secret of 
‘character’ was self-mastery and self-control.68 Clearly, this was a view that 
resonated with humanism and liberal Christianity more than with evangelical 
interpretations of Christianity. 
 
66 E. B. Holifield, A History of Pastoral Care in America (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1983), 184. 
67 Holifield, Pastoral Care, 187. 
68 Holifield, Pastoral Care, 188. 
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James writes that habits are formed because of the plasticity of the organic material 
of which bodies are composed. Thus, in the brain, ‘A path once traversed by a 
nerve-current might be expected to follow the law of most of the paths we know, 
and to be scooped out and made more permeable than before.’69 James 
emphasized the utility of this phenomenon. Habits result in the ‘saving of trouble’ 
because ‘to reproduce the effect, a less amount of the outward cause is required’.70 
He offers practical suggestions arising from this observation regarding how new 
habits can be formed, for example advising ‘Never suffer an exception to occur till 
the new habit is securely rooted in your life.’71 
Jones adds a ‘spiritual’ dimension to James’ psychology by linking habit to choosing 
the good. Drawing an analogy with how writing self-consciously makes the writing 
lose its grace and flow, Jones posits that the aim for individuals is to make the 
choice of goodness natural rather than strained: ‘Happy is the man who not only 
has won the skill of body by his habitual exercise, but has also by his choices  and 
decision gained a moral dexterity of the soul so that it has become second nature to 
choose the good! … i.e., truth-telling and righteousness have become 
subconscious.’72 The practice of forming good habits, then, makes a person good. 
Furthermore, Jones overlays his optimistic view of human nature on James’ 
discussion of the effect of habits. James points out that we become drunkards by 
many separate drinks and saints by many separate acts, because ‘Every smallest 
stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar.’73 In his treatment, however, 
Jones neglects the vice and focuses on the virtue, claiming that ‘Every victory 
confers power for further victory … The things that once were hard duties … we 
now do almost by second nature.’74 In other words, whereas James mentions virtue 
 
69 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 76. 
70 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 75. 
71 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 87. 
72 Jones, Social Law, 121. 
73 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 89. 
74 Jones, Social Law, 83. 
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and vice, Jones refers only to victory, which from the context is spiritual and related 
to virtue.  
This view is again in line with Chase’s optimistic view of human nature (see Section 
5.3 above). It also reflects Clement’s concept of a ‘harmonized man’, namely 
someone who ‘has the vision of God, and whose life is harmoniously adjusted to 
God’s purposes’,75 and the example of his Uncle Eli, who convinced Jones that a 
good character was formed by doing good deeds.  
5.5.2 Assessment of Jones’ position 
Jones, as noted, was often branded a humanist, and although the commentators in 
question invariably omit to define what they mean by the term, it seems likely that 
two of the factors they had in mind were Jones’ optimistic view of human nature 
and his conviction that one could acquire good character through effort. In relation 
to the latter, for example, it could be argued that Jones leaves God out of the 
picture: good character can be attained by forming good habits, which is a natural 
process related to the propensity of nerve currents to traverse the same path, 
without recourse to divine help. I suggest, however, that Jones incorporates God 
into the picture in a number of ways. For example, the decision to foster good 
habits is related to ideals, which have the power to inspire and motivate. Jones 
assumes that it is ideals that help the human race progress towards goodness, and 
then states that this shows that ‘the spirit in us corresponds with an Absolute Self-
conscious Life in whom all our ideals of worth and goodness are at once realities’.76 
We could of course object that not all ideals are good, and that not everyone would 
want to follow those that were, but the point here is that for Jones the inspiration 
for establishing good habits ultimately originates in God.  Furthermore, as will be 
 
75 Jones, Clement, 19. 
76 Jones, Social Law, 218. 
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discussed in Chapter 6, Christ provides the ultimate example of an ideal that 
inspires people to live lives that build the kingdom of God. 
It is also the case that Jones sees the formation of good habits within the wider 
context of a spiritual universe. The ‘physical universe’, he says, has ‘a running-down 
system’ (i.e. hot bodies cool down, organisms die).77 In the spiritual life, by contrast, 
‘the gains from our deeds are conserved and builded into the advancing power of 
life’.78 This phenomenon finds expression in the Bible: ‘Every victory confers power 
for further victory. In Paul’s great phrase, which is literally true: “We are more than 
conquerors”.’79 In other words, James’ views on habit are, for good habits, given a 
biblically authenticated pedigree, and the resulting increase of goodness is a 
spiritual principle woven into the universe itself.  
In summary, accusations of humanism, and the associated implied divergence from 
the core of conviction, are partly down to Jones’ reliance on psychology. (Recall 
from Chapter 3 that, similarly, many liberal Christians were being accused of using 
psychology to turn Christianity into self-realization.) However, the fact that Jones 
sees habit in relation to God means that accusations of humanism based on the role 
of human effort need to be examined carefully. The fact that commentators do not 
always recognize this may be due in part to Jones’ informal style, in that he does not 
always make it clear that he views humans as spiritual beings in a spiritual universe, 
a point I return to in Chapter 9. 
But how does an individual know what good habits to foster? This question is 
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Conscience is often associated with the Inner Light (see Chapter 7), although they 
are not necessarily identical and the relationship envisaged between them has 
changed over time. Early Quakers, for example, located the Light in the conscience, 
but often asserted that the Light was a supernatural function and conscience a 
natural one.80 As noted in Chapter 2, the importance of conscience for Quakers is 
exemplified by John Woolman, known as the ‘gentle conscience of Quakerism’.81  
5.6.1 Jones’ view: Conscience has human and divine aspects 
For Jones, conscience is the means by which God’s will is known and obeyed. It is a 
composite divine–human faculty, and his treatment thus diverges from that of early 
Quakers. Its divine component is attested to by the fact that it does not seem to 
originate with the person: ‘When it speaks, the voice does not seem our own. 
Rightness and wrongness and the sense of oughtness, are deeper than any human 
plummet can sound.’82 Further evidence that this attribute is from God can, for 
Jones, be found in the fact that all naturalistic attempts to explain it have failed: 
‘We cannot discover its origin either in the race or in the individual.’83 Moreover, 
there is a sense of progress related to conscience. As he put in his 1920 Swarthmore 
lecture The Nature and Authority of Conscience, ‘Great moral geniuses … push the 
common ideal of goodness a stage further on, and by degrees the whole race is 
raised to that height.’84 Given that for Jones genius involves contact with God, we 
can infer that this progress is God-ordained. 
Conscience is also, however, a human faculty formed by the particular social and 
cultural norms to which an individual is exposed: ‘Each individual’s concrete 
 
80 Angell, S. W. ‘God, Christ, and the Light’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, eds S. W. 
Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015): 159. 
81 Woolman, Journal, loc. 147, Kindle. 
82 Jones, Social Law, 122. 
83 Jones, Social Law, 99. 
84 Jones, Conscience, 68. 
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conscience is “formed and filled” by the social and personal experiences of the 
lifetime. The atmosphere of the home into which the infant comes … the habits, 
traditions, manners, contagious ideas of the family group – all these things begin to 
form a conscience which will always bear its nurture marks.’85 It also involves 
reason. This influence is not brought out particularly strongly in Social Law, but is 
clear in A Service of Love in Wartime, in Jones’ discussion of the problems that 
Quaker boys faced when conscripted. He makes the point that whereas one class of 
conscientious objectors were satisfied if they themselves did not have to kill, others 
objected to the whole system of war. For this latter class, conscience was not a 
‘mystically-conceived inward voice’ that allowed them to be part of the army but 
not to kill, but was ‘closely linked with common sense and reason, and with certain 
definite ideas as to what kind of action makes for progress and perfection of life and 
what does not’.86  
Conscience, then, is for Jones a divinely instituted inner voice that one feels 
compelled to obey, but this voice is informed by society and thoughtful, reasoned 
consideration of a concrete situation. His view is thus the synthesis of an important 
Quaker concept with an experience of ‘oughtness’, an emphasis on reason, and a 
psychologically informed understanding of society. 
5.6.2 Reaction to and assessment of Jones’ position 
Not all Quakers agreed with Jones’ proposed reliance on reason. On the one hand, 
Quakers of a quietist disposition viewed reason as unnecessary when it came to 
obeying God.  W. L. Martin wrote to Jones expressing the hope that the role of 
reason would be subsumed under direct guidance: ‘[the great Lord] will have a 
chosen people who will live near Him, who will only move as he moves and directs, 
whose ministry will have none of the reasons of man in it’.87 On the other hand, 
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evangelical Quakers viewed the human capacity to reason with a certain amount of 
caution when it came to discerning God’s will. The Richmond Declaration, for 
example, says that ‘We own no principle of spiritual light, life, or holiness, inherent 
by nature in the mind or heart of man’.88 So both quietist and evangelical Quakers 
might have regarded Jones’ reliance on reason as ‘humanistic’ because it was 
unnecessary or unreliable, respectively. Furthermore, for evangelical Quakers, 
Jones’ view diverged from their biblically inspired beliefs. 
I will return to this topic from a different angle in the chapters on the Inner Light 
and Mysticism (Chapters 7 and 8), but the point to note here is that, contra purely 
humanistic interpretations, conscience for Jones had a divine ‘depth’ and 
compulsion about it. Furthermore, it was conditioned by but went beyond social 
norms because it was one of the means by which God guided individuals to build 
the kingdom of God. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described how Jones synthesized insights about human nature 
from psychology, liberal Christianity and Quakerism. I have explored how he 
understood consciousness, the subconscious, sin, salvation, habit and conscience in 
relation to God, pointing out the weaknesses of his arguments and where he 
diverged from the core of conviction and from evangelical Quakerism.  
Jones’ position can be summarized as follows. Human consciousness is an 
expression of God’s consciousness, although society plays an essential part in its 
development, and the subconscious is where God and humans meet. Sin is not a 
doctrine but a fact of experience. Insofar as it is associated with egoism, it 
developed, along with altruism, as humans evolved. However, Jones brought God 
 




into the picture by defining sin as a turning away from God’s purposes (which were 
in turn associated with building the Kingdom) to the desires of the individual self. 
Correspondingly, salvation involves primarily a felt relationship with God in this life 
rather than eternal life in heaven. Habit and conscience are both routes to the 
formation of good character. Jones seems to have relied on James’s psychological 
analysis of habit, but he ‘spiritualizes’ James’ treatment: the fact that good habits 
transform a person so that they are good in their inward parts, and the fact that 
‘every victory confers power for further victory’ reflect for Jones the spiritual nature 
of the universe.89 Finally, conscience is formed by society and involves reason, but 
God is ultimately responsible for the sense of otherness involved in the feeling of 
‘ought’ and for the fact that individuals who follow their conscience can draw 
humanity to new heights. God, then, is central to Jones’ formulation of human 
nature.  
In spite of the importance Jones placed on God, some of his Quaker readers were 
unhappy. They objected to his acceptance of evolution, to his universalism, and to 
his reliance on reason. All these criticisms are rooted in his reliance on psychology 
(although his readers did not always recognize this, see Chapter 9). For example, sin 
did not originate with the ‘Fall’ but is a natural part of an individual’s development. 
Universalism, reflected in the fact that all humans are related to God through 
consciousness, replaces individual salvation obtained by responding to Christ. 
Inspiration from God occurs in the context of socially informed reason rather than 
through an inner voice unrelated to the world.  
In addition, Jones can undoubtedly be criticized for his optimistic view of human 
nature. This optimism was partly historically contingent, given the emphasis on self-
improvement and liberal optimism in general. It was also in line with that strand of 
Quakerism that emphasized particularly strongly that humans did not have a 
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‘congenital seed of sin’ but ‘a seed of God’.90 It is also arguably related to the 
experiential basis of his own faith. In Life in College, Jones attributes his optimism to 
‘the slowly fructifying product of a deep-lying faith in a loving and victorious God’.91 
Here Jones is talking about optimism in life in general – but for Jones optimism 
about life is closely associated with an optimistic view of human nature, because he 
believed that God worked through individuals to change the world. 
Regarding the divergence of this view from the core of conviction, it is notable that 
by the time he wrote The Church’s Debt to Heretics in 1924, Jones had linked his 
view of human nature with Pelagianism. Far from condemning Pelagius as a heretic, 
however, Jones enthuses that ‘Pelagius had a “modern” outlook and habit of mind. 
For him, Grace is infused into and through all that God has done in creation and in 
history. He felt little need of looking for magical interventions and for divine 
schemes to “restore” a ruined universe, since he did not believe it to be ruined.’92 I 
will return to this point in relation to Jones’ Christology in the next chapter. 
In light of the above, what can we say about the attributions of humanism from 
Gwyn, Aiken, Rock and Damiano cited at the beginning of this chapter? Their 
comments are reflections on Jones’ thought as a whole, but given that Social Law is 
a representative work, I address them briefly here. Their comments need to be seen 
in relation to the fact that Jones himself insisted that he never endorsed a purely 
secular humanism. In The Faith and Practice of the Quakers, for example, he is clear 
that ‘If anyone supposes that Friends have inclined to be “humanists” and to 
assume that man is so inherently good that he can lift himself by his own belt into a 
life of consummate truth and beauty, he has not yet caught the deeper note of the 
Quaker faith.’93 And in a 1932 sermon he denounced ‘the prevailing humanism of 
 
90 As exemplified by Pliny Chase in Chapter 2. See also Jones, Social Law, 173; Jones, Faith and 
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our times’ but endorsed ‘a lofty type of Christian humanism’ that believed that 
there is in humans ‘a beyond within’.94  
Definitions of humanism are nebulous and multi-faceted, but I focus here on one 
aspect, namely whether Jones believed that humans could transform themselves 
and society by their own efforts. Gwyn accuses Jones of an ‘optimistic’ humanism 
inadequate for a nuclear age. I suggested above that this optimism derives from 
Jones’ view of God, however, a point that is not acknowledged in Gwyn’s comment. 
I suspect, too, that Jones himself would have denied that his view was inadequate 
for a nuclear age, simply because, as noted, he saw God as guiding human decisions 
and leading humanity forwards. Furthermore, he declared that the ability to win 
and practice an optimistic frame of mind was a spiritual gift that Quakers could 
offer to the world.95 Rock claims that God language is a gloss on Jones’ humanism, 
but my analysis here suggests that, on the contrary, God is fundamental to Jones’ 
view of human nature. Aiken states that Jones was branded a ‘mere’ humanist, but 
does not cite any examples, and in view of the centrality of God in his thought it is 
hard to envisage how such a label could be applied to Jones with any degree of 
conviction. Finally, Damiano’s accusation that Jones’ humanism was self-sufficient 
and individualistic also seems wide of the mark, given the importance Jones 
attributed to God and the social group (seen here and discussed further in Chapter 
8). Overall, then, I suggest that accusations of humanism arise because 
commentators neglect how Jones incorporates God into his understanding of 
human nature. In part, as will be discussed further in Chapter 9, this is because of 
his informal style. 
In brief, I have suggested that in Social Law Jones presents humans as socio-spiritual 
beings. For example, consciousness and conscience originate in God but are shaped 
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by society, and it is God who in conjunction with human effort provides the ability 
for humans to transform themselves and society. He diverged from the core of 
conviction because his reliance on psychology means that everyone is related to 
God through the subconscious, and because sin and salvation are not doctrines but 
experiences. In later years Jones regretted his reliance on James’ theory of the 
subconscious, but maintained his belief that humans and God were inherently 
related. Jones’ view of humans as socio-spiritual beings raises questions about the 
role of Christ though, so the next chapter asks whether his opinion that humans are 









Christ reveals God and sets ideals 
 
Jesus Christ is the supreme channel in human history for the personal 
communication of God.1 
 
Jones’ view of Christ has been criticized repeatedly over the years. After reading 
Social Law, for example, Henry Newman, editor of the British Quaker journal The 
Friend, wrote to Jones worrying that the book was diverging from the view that 
‘Salvation is only in Christ’.2 Four years later, Rendel Harris scribbled a brief warning 
to Jones on the subject of Christ, probably in relation to the proofs of Jones’ book 
Studies in Mystical Religion (1909). He promises further discussion at the upcoming 
Yearly Meeting but cautions that ‘Thy book will be of great service: but the 
quotations must be verified & certain dangerous tendencies warned against. Thee 
will see it for thyself in going about. A Christless Quakerism will neither save itself 
nor the people.’3 More recently, Guy Aiken wrote an article entitled ‘Who took the 
Christ out of Quakerism?’ in relation to Jones’ legacy, and Carole Spencer 
complained that Jones ‘severed the inward light from Christ’.4 And yet Jones self-
identified as a Christian, and he made the orthodox-sounding claims that in Christ 
‘God and man came together in a single, undivided life’ and that Jesus Christ was 
 
1 Jones, Social Law, 253. 
2 H. S. Newman, 22 December 1904, HC Box 8 [Appendix C]. 
3 Rendel Harris, 12 May 1908, HC Box 11 [Appendix C]. 
4 Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’; Spencer, Holiness, 204. 
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the ‘supreme channel for the personal communication of God’.5 Jones’ 
understanding and presentation of Christ, then, require careful analysis.  
Some of the difficulties associated with interpretations of Jones’ Christology are 
apparent if we compare the picture presented in Social Law with that in two 
roughly contemporaneous works: Practical Christianity, which we encountered in 
Chapter 4, and The Double Search, published in 1906, which deals with God’s search 
for us and our search for God. Briefly, the description of Christ in Practical 
Christianity has an evangelical feel to it – Christ is eternal, forgives our sins, is the 
way to God, and lives in union with the Christian. In Social Law, I will suggest, these 
biblically based doctrinal-sounding formulations are still apparent, but Jones’ 
attempts to make Christianity consistent with psychology occasionally cause him to 
diverge from them; for example, Christ is related to God in the same way as 
humans, and there is no sense that he is the second person of the Trinity. In The 
Double Search, the biblical references all but disappear, and the consistency 
between psychology and Christological doctrines that is demonstrated in Social Law 
is upgraded to an attribution of authority to psychology: ‘I believe’, states Jones 
near the beginning of the book, ‘that no psychological discovery has ever thrown so 
much light upon the meaning of the atonement and prayer as this fact of the 
conjunct life does’.6 Social Law thus presents an interesting transition point for 
Jones’ attempted synthesis in relation to Christology and the authority he attributed 
to psychology.  
The diversity of these formulations in the early years of the 20th century is perhaps 
one reason why it is generally acknowledged that Jones’ Christology, and thereby 
the relationship he envisaged between Quakerism and Christianity, is open to a 
range of interpretations. The decades that followed certainly did not bring clarity. In 
1927, for example, he prefaced his book The Faith and Practice of Quakers with a 
 
5 Jones, Social Law, 253. 
6 Jones, Double Search, 14. 
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quotation from Dean Inge stating that ‘The Quakers, of all Christian bodies, have 
remained nearest to the teaching and example of Christ’,7 thereby explicitly 
associating Quakerism with Christianity. An article published in the London Friend in 
the same year entitled ‘New light on the Inner Light’, however, sets the discussion 
of God dwelling within in terms of a philosophical Kantian framework that does not 
even mention Christ.8 Jones thus seems to have valued the teaching and example of 
Christ, and saw Quakerism as Christian, but perhaps partly as a result of his informal 
style and desire to assimilate modern thought he does not express this consistently. 
A further source of ambiguity is caused by Jones’ theological naivety, namely that 
he does not discuss the nature of Christ with respect to traditional doctrines, such 
as that in the Chalcedonian definition. As noted previously, Jones taught Christian 
history, wrote about the Church Fathers, and authored The Church’s Debt to 
Heretics, so was aware of Christological ideas and terminology, but they are 
conspicuous by their absence in his writings. To complicate the matter further, it 
needs to be borne in mind that when Jones does talk about the union of two 
natures in Christ, he is approaching this union from the perspective of the ‘conjunct’ 
nature of humans and God that he took to be revealed by idealism and psychology 
rather than in the ‘more technical’ sense of the two natures of Christ as envisaged 
in the Chalcedonian definition. Consider, for example, the statement in Social Law 
that in the incarnation ‘God and man came together in a single undivided life’. 9 
Taken at face value, this could be read as conforming to the Chalcedonian 
definition: Christ has two inseparable natures, one divine and one human, which 
are both preserved in one person. We will see below, however, that this is not what 
Jones had in mind. Rather, as Davie puts it, Jones diverges from the core of 
conviction because he held that ‘what took place in Christ was a union between 
God and Man that resulted in the existence of one nature that was both Divine and 
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human’.10 Jones clearly felt that this psychologically informed approach was more 
satisfactory than traditional ones: as he put it in The Double Search, ‘Modern 
psychology and recent studies of social life have made us familiar with a deeper 
view of human personality and have prepared for a more adequate study of Divine 
personality than was possible when the historic creeds were formulated.’11 
The literature on Jones’ Christology is sparse.  It consists of a few general criticisms 
from evangelical Quakers,12 some general descriptions of Jones’ Christology in PhD 
theses, and the above-mentioned recent paper by Guy Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ 
out of Quakerism?’ My conclusions are, broadly speaking, in line with those of Aiken 
insofar as he claims that Jones saw Christ as historically but not ontologically unique 
and viewed the atonement in terms of the ‘moral influence’ theory. I differ, 
however, from Aiken’s conclusion that Christ’s example is not necessary because 
humans are in any case related to God. Although this is a valid corollary of Jones’ 
view of how God and humans are related in theory, he did not seem to hold this 
view in practice. I will suggest that, at least according to the books discussed here, 
Jones saw Christ’s example as essential to a transformative Christian life.  
The discussion of Christ in Social Law is sparse, so the analysis here is relatively 
brief. The first section draws on the few scattered comments that do appear to 
analyse various elements in Jones’ Christology. Then, as an interim summary, in the 
second section I draw together some of the material in this and the previous two 
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6.1 Elements of Jones’ Christology 
Here I discuss a number of elements of Jones’ Christology, namely the incarnation, 
the atonement, the sense in which Christ can be said to dwell within an individual, 
and the extent to which Christ is necessary for a relationship with God. My 
approach is to compare the treatment of these elements in Social Law with their 
treatment in Practical Christianity and The Double Search in order to try to ascertain 
how Jones’ thought, or, perhaps, his expression of that thought, developed during 
the first decade of the 20th century. I start, though, with some general comments 
on these two additional books. 
6.1.1 Some comments on Practical Christianity and The Double Search 
Both liberal and evangelical Christological formulations are apparent in Practical 
Christianity, a fact that has its origin in the book’s genesis. As noted in Chapter 4, 
Practical Christianity consisted of Jones’ editorials in The American Friend. What is 
of interest here is that this journal arose out of the merger of two earlier journals 
with very different audiences, namely the evangelical The Christian Worker, edited 
by Walter Malone and read mostly by Quakers in the west, and the more liberal The 
Friends Review, which Jones had edited since 1893 and which was read mostly by 
Quakers in the east.13 Partly as an attempt to promote unity between these two 
strands of Quakerism, Jones and Malone decided to merge the journals in 1894, 
with the new publication, The American Friend, to be edited by Jones.14  
Understandably, it was a difficult task to produce a journal that appealed to the 
wide-ranging views of the merged readership, especially after 1897 when Jones 
embraced the modernist cause.15 Unsurprisingly, the letters Jones received suggest 
 
13 Jones, Middle Years, p.23 
14 Financial considerations and falling circulation may have been additional factors. For a discussion 
of the merger and of the differences between Malone and Jones, see J. Oliver, ‘J. Walter Malone: 
“The American Friend” and an evangelical Quaker's social agenda’, Quaker History 80 (1991): 63–84.  
15 A letter from John B. Garrett to Isaac Sharpless on 21 March 1901 warns that Quakers in the West 
were unhappy and thinking of starting their own journal. This would disrupt the Society, writes 
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that he favoured the liberal position. The liberal Thomas Newlin was supportive, for 
example, reassuring Jones that he was ‘succeeding admirably’ in a difficult position, 
but perhaps hinting that he wished Jones would move more quickly towards 
liberalism in his comment that ‘The truth must often be given in small doses’.16 
Eight years later, in 1904 so at the time of Social Law, Jones had perhaps indeed 
picked up the pace, giving cause for concern to the evangelical William Pinkham: 
‘Those who know thy antecedents must feel confident that thy early education was 
such as to make thee acquainted with the fundamental principles of the Christian 
faith as held by evangelical Christians the world over’ he starts, before complaining 
vehemently that ‘thy articles display either ignorance of these principles or the 
questionable tactics of a debater in misrepresenting them’.17 Edward Grubb, a 
British Quaker editor himself, and therefore no doubt familiar with the problems of 
keeping a diverse readership happy, summed up Jones’ problems with a cheerful 
limerick in the same year: ‘An American editor, Rufus, / Each Monday encountered 
a new fuss. / Correspondents like bees, / Deprived him of ease, / But he cornered 
them all – Good old Rufus!’18  
Jones’ articles in Practical Christianity display many traditional Christian assertions, 
and some have an almost credal feel about them. For example, Jesus is perfectly 
human and perfectly divine (p.13), God generated the Son from eternity, and death 
did not end Christ’s life (p.17). Furthermore, Christ forgives an individual’s sins 
(p.16) and is a source of power for the Christian (p.10), forming their character and 
keeping them from sin (p.13). Jones favours a liberal exemplarist rather than a 
substitutionary view of the atonement though, claiming that an individual is drawn 
to God by Christ’s example: ‘his own heart is touched, so that he sets his face, 
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through love to this Christ’ (p.8). He continues, however, that it is impossible to say 
what the atonement meant from the perspective of God.  
The Double Search is concerned with God’s search for us (the atonement) and our 
search for God (prayer), and as such it provides one of the fullest expressions of 
Jones’ Christology. Jones’ aim for this slim volume was certainly ambitious, namely 
to ‘show how the historical Christ, as a revelation of God, fits into a cosmic system 
of evolution and how He is related to the Spirit that witnesses with our spirits’.19 
Here Jones is less constrained by a partly evangelical readership: there is less of a 
credal feel in his writing, and he relies on experience, idealism and psychology to 
make his case. ‘Modern psychology’, he confidently but vaguely asserts, has shown 
that God needs us and that ‘our lives are mutually organic’.20 He also uses 
scientifically informed analogies to illustrate his claims about Christ, for example 
claiming that the way Christ lives in a believer is a process of assimilation similar to 
the way an oak tree absorbs sunlight. This is a long way from some evangelical 
formulations that involve repentant sinners accepting Christ into their hearts 
resulting in an ontological change in status before God.  
My aim here is to try to ascertain Jones’ Christology in Social Law, and to compare 
this with his more ‘evangelical-sounding’ formulations in Practical Christianity and 
more ‘scientific-sounding’ ones in Double Search. I start with the incarnation. 
6.1.2 The incarnation 
Throughout his writings, Jones never wavers in his conviction that Jesus is the 
ultimate revelation of God. In Practical Christianity, he tells his readers that ‘There 
has been in our world but one Person who was perfectly divine and perfectly 
human. He revealed God and He showed what it means to be a son.’21 Similarly, in 
Social Law, he writes that ‘Jesus Christ is the supreme channel in human history for 
 
19 Jones, Double Search, 22. 
20 Jones, Double Search, 24. 
21 Jones, Practical Christianity, 13. 
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the personal communication of God.’22 Again, in Double Search, ‘[Christ] reveals 
God as a Father whose very inherent nature is love and tenderness and 
forgiveness.’23  
The issue at stake here, though, is that ‘revelation’ is not necessarily the same as 
identity, and ‘supreme’ is not necessarily the same as ‘ontologically unique’, so we 
are left with the question of what Jones actually meant by these statements. One 
way to answer this question is to focus on how Jones justifies them. It might be 
expected, for example, that a statement made on the basis of a biblical text would 
have different implications and resonances from one based on the latest social 
psychology. Here, then, I consider the different bases of authority in the three 
books in order to see whether they result in different implications regarding the 
uniqueness of the divine–human relationship exhibited in the incarnation. 
In Practical Christianity, Jones tends to make statements about Christ but not to 
justify them. For example, in the article ‘The Father and the Son’, he writes that 
‘There is but one God … from eternity God generated the Son, who is the express 
image of His person.’ 24 Later in the same article, he affirms that ‘The death of the 
body in no way ended the Life. Christ, the Word of God, has never ceased to be, and 
He is proved to be the Son of God by the power of His endless Life.’ These 
statements presumably have a biblical basis, but this is not made explicit. They have 
a ‘doctrinal feel’ about them, and it is possible that Jones was influenced here by 
the Richmond Declaration of Faith and/or by his evangelical upbringing. On the 
whole, then, the picture of the incarnation in Practical Christianity is broadly 
consistent with that of evangelical Christianity. References to the eternal nature of 
Christ and statements such as ‘There has been in our world but one person’ suggest 
that Christ is ontologically unique. 
 
22 Jones, Social Law, 253. 
23 Jones, Double Search, 68. 
24 Jones, Practical Christianity, 17. 
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In Social Law, the question of how Jesus is related to God is inextricably tied up with 
Jones’ theory of human nature, specifically his belief that God and humans are 
conjunct. Thus in Social Law he asserts that ‘The fact of the Incarnation ought to 
settle the question for all who accept it as a fact. It declares forever that the sharp 
duality of natures is impossible. Here God and man came together in a single, 
undivided life.’25 He continues that ‘Our latest science completely fits this testimony 
and confirms it. It finds everywhere common aspects in God and in man.’ Here, 
then, the inherent relationship between God and Christ is a given ‘fact’ and is used 
to validate Jones’ claim that humans in general are inherently related to God. What 
Jones is doing is emphasizing the consistency between the incarnation and the 
findings of ‘science’ (presumably the psychology of Baldwin, Royce and James) as 
they relate to human nature. Crucially, however, in doing this Jones has redefined 
the traditional understanding of the incarnation that sees Jesus as the second 
person of the Trinity. Because the human–divine relationship the incarnation entails 
obtains in all humans, Jones is perhaps giving Christ a special status, but the 
‘undivided life’ that he exhibits is no longer unique. Perhaps because of his 
deliberate theological naivety and informal style, though, he does not address the 
implications of this bold move.  
In The Double Search, Jones is explicit about giving authority to psychology when it 
comes to interpreting the incarnation. Asking whether Christ was man or God, Jones 
identifies the problem as being that ‘The difficulty in almost all the theological 
discussions on the subject has been that they started with God and man isolated, 
separated, unrelated … Modern psychology and recent studies of social life have 
made us familiar with a deeper view of human personality and have prepared for a 
more adequate study of Divine personality than was possible when the historic 
creeds were formulated. We know that God and man are conjunct and that neither 
 
25 Jones, Social Law, 19. 
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can be separated absolutely from the other.’26 This starting point of the human–
divine relationship as conjunct means, he explains, that ‘there are no metaphysical 
difficulties in the way of an actual incarnation of God. It is rather what one would 
expect.’27 Here, then, the psychological evidence that is being used is the same as in 
Social Law, but, from the way that the argument is constructed, Jones is even more 
confident in the authority of ‘modern psychology’. That is, while in Social Law it is 
the fact of the incarnation that validates the psychology, here it is psychology that 
shows that all humans and the divine are related, and this in turn sheds light on the 
incarnation. Furthermore, the implication is that this psychological knowledge is to 
be trusted more than ancient theological formulations. So in Double Search, Christ’s 
nature, because it is treated in terms of the human–divine relationship exhibited in 
all humans, again has a fragile claim to ontological uniqueness.  
There are two related points to be made here. First, claims for Christ’s ontological 
uniqueness are weakened from Practical Christianity to Social Law and Double 
Search. Second, this shift corresponds to the progression from unjustified doctrinal 
statements in Practical Christianity, to the consistency of doctrinal statement and 
psychology in Social Law, to the authority of ‘modern psychology’ in Double Search. 
A number of comments can be made regarding this somewhat unusual use of 
psychology. First, it is an overstatement to say that we now know that humans and 
God are conjunct, as Jones claims. This will be discussed further in the chapters on 
the Inner Light, but note, for example, that although this may have been the 
conclusion of some psychologists, others, as previously noted, used psychology to 
argue that God did not exist. Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, Jones’ appeal to 
‘our latest science’ and ‘modern psychology’ requires further justification if it is to 
be used to draw conclusions about God, as the personalist Bowne appreciated. It is 
something of a leap to go from the insights of social psychology to assertions about 
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the relationship between Christ and God. Finally, Jones’ optimistic assertion that 
this psychologically informed view of humanity dispenses with the metaphysical 
problems of the incarnation is premature: as noted, he himself came to regret his 
dependence on James in later years. 
Jones’ interpretation comes under discussion in at least two Swarthmore lectures. It 
was endorsed by Edward Grubb (author of the limerick quoted above) in 1914. 
Grubb does not mention Jones by name, but summarizes the main message of 
Social Law, concluding with the assertion that psychology has been teaching us that 
our personality is developed by ‘the interpenetration, mainly in the sub-conscious 
region, of our own personality with that of others, and most of all by communion 
with the Universal Spirit.’28 For Grubb, psychology’s discovery of the subconscious 
means that ‘there may well have been depths beyond depths in the personality of 
Jesus Christ, depths of relation to God and to the whole of humanity which did not 
appear to others, and of which He Himself, in His humiliation, may have only been 
dimly and fitfully conscious.’29 It is notable that, far from seeing this as pushing the 
boundaries of Christian orthodoxy, Grubb sees it as countering the old accusations 
that early Quakers were diverging from Christianity: this new understanding 
‘removes altogether the ancient difficulty that in saying Christ is the “Light” or 
“Seed” in men we are reducing Him from a person to a principle’.30 
The theologian H. G. Wood, who delivered the Swarthmore lecture six years later, 
was, however, more critical. ‘To look for the decisive religious influence in the 
subconscious or the unconscious seems to me a mistake’, he asserts. ‘The 
suggestion that the seat of Divinity in Christ is to be found in His subliminal 
consciousness does not attract me. It is the manifestation of God in Christ’s human 
consciousness, especially in His thought and in His will, that constitutes the 
 
28 E. Grubb, The Historic and Inward Christ: A Study in Quaker Thought (Swarthmore Lecture 1914) 
(Bishopsgate: Headley Brothers, 1914), 78. 
29 Grubb, Historic and Inward Christ, 77–78 
30 Grubb, Historic and Inward Christ, 78 
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Incarnation.’31 Wood makes a valid point: Jones does not address the issue of why 
Christ’s will should be perfectly aligned with God’s will while human wills need to 
win ‘spiritual victory’ (see Chapter 8), nor the implications of this difference for the 
uniqueness of Christ.  
Various questions arise from this view of the incarnation. The first to be considered 
is why the atonement is necessary if humans and God are already conjunct.  
6.1.3 The atonement 
Jones was familiar with traditional theological atonement theories but disliked 
them, intensely. He complained that they were ‘crude literal views’ that offered a 
purely mechanical view of a transaction.32 His evangelical readers had no such 
qualms, however, with many subscribing to a substitutionary view. Jones highlights 
the different understandings in Middle Years, where he quotes a letter from one of 
his ‘watchful critics’ who informed him in no uncertain terms that ‘Jesus Christ was 
sent into the world for no other purpose but to be offered as a sacrifice for the sins 
of the whole world by shedding his blood on Calvary.’33 The view that Jones himself 
adopted corresponds, as Aiken points out, most nearly to the ‘moral influence 
theory of atonement’, in which Christ draws individuals to God by the power of his 
life.34 Jones expresses this conviction differently in the three books though. 
In Practical Christianity, Jones explains in his editorial ‘Coming to God’ that from the 
human side the atonement is made when an individual’s ‘heart is touched, so that 
he sets his face, through love to this Christ, to begin a new life as a child of God’.35 
From God’s perspective, however, he insists that what the atonement meant is ‘not 
our question or our concern, and we do not wish to explore it or pronounce upon 
it’. In ‘The Father and the Son’ there is perhaps a rare hint of his evangelical 
 
31 Wood, Quakerism and the Church, 74. 
32 Jones, Middle Years, 90. 
33 Jones, Middle Years, 88. 
34 Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’, 42. 
35 Jones, Practical Christianity, 8. 
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heritage, in that Jones alludes to the death of Christ, not just his power to attract 
individuals, as being significant: ‘we must not speak as though we could tell what 
took place in the death of this unparalleled Personality, but in this gift of Self, 
atonement is made for us.’36 But he still notably fights shy of substitutionary 
theories. 
In Social Law, Jones expands on the exemplarist explanation that he undoubtedly 
favoured. Rather than make his case theologically, however, he again appeals to the 
discoveries of psychology: first in relation to suffering and second in relation to 
ideals. In relation to suffering, Jones claims that Christ’s suffering and his life 
illustrate that ‘the deepest note of the Gospel, – namely, that Christ suffers with us 
and for us, – is also the deepest fact of all life’.37 He continues that ‘the prophet felt 
the truth, Christ revealed it in the culmination of His life, and now our social ethics 
has come upon the same truth by an independent path of scientific study’. Although 
Jones does not provide a reference citation, it is certainly possible that the 
‘scientific study’ he had in mind was found in James. The above statement comes at 
the end of a discussion in which Jones is describing an ascending scale of self-
sacrifice from mothers to patriots to saints before concluding that ‘the higher the 
person in the scale of the spiritual life the more insistent will be the calls to self-
sacrifice’.38 This hierarchy resonates with a similar one in James’ Principles, which 
states that, ‘In all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by the most 
distant ends has been held to possess the highest intelligence. The tramp who lives 
from hour to hour … and finally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for 
humanity and for eternity, – these range themselves in an unbroken hierarchy.’39 
Note that if Jones was indeed indebted to James here, he has ‘spiritualized’ James’ 
observations. The latter’s reference to ‘intelligence’ is changed to the more 
 
36 Jones, Practical Christianity, 17. 
37 Jones, Social Law, 101. 
38 Jones, Social Law, 100–101. 
39 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 20. 
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spiritually charged notion of ‘self-sacrifice’, and James’ chain of examples of people 
who exhibit ever-increasing self-sacrifice is extrapolated to Christ. Whatever the 
source of Jones’ observation though, it is clear that he is saying that one aspect of 
the atonement, namely the suffering and self-sacrifice of Christ, is consistent with 
an insight from psychology. Furthermore, this suffering draws humans to God 
because it reveals God’s suffering over us: ‘Yes, [Christ] has led or drawn men, but 
He has done it by unveiling God to us and by showing us the Father, not as a 
Sovereign, not as a stern Judge – but as Infinite Lover who yearns over us and who 
suffers through our sin and blindness.’40  
In relation to ideals, Jones points out that the ability of humans to respond to an 
ideal, which is a crucial part of the exemplarist theory, is also explicable 
psychologically. In Principles, James draws a distinction between the passive 
movement of inanimate objects that are operated on by ‘a tergo’ (from behind) 
forces and living objects that have the ability to choose and pursue future ends 
under the influence of ‘a fronte’ (in front) forces.41 Similarly, Jones differentiates 
between a tergo forces (‘The moon moves the tide. The wind blows down the 
tree’42) and a fronte ones. It is this latter type, he says, that is responsible for 
spiritual development.43 In particular, the spiritual life that has become available in 
Christ is attained when a person sees an ‘ideal standard’ and rises to it ‘through 
effort and discipline’.44 In other words, the fact that individuals are drawn to Christ 
is coherent with the a fronte forces identified by psychology, and it is not necessary 
for Christ to be a substitutionary sacrifice. 
In Double Search, Jones proposes an explanation of the atonement that is fairly 
similar to that in Social Law: ‘[Christ] is the pattern in the mount, the a fronte force 
 
40 Jones, Social Law, 253–254 (italics as in original). 
41 James, Principles, Vol. 1, 10. 
42 Jones, Social Law, 71. 
43 Jones, Social Law, 71–72. 
44 Jones, Social Law, 265. 
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which has drawn the individual and the race steadily up to their higher destiny.’45 
He supplements this with a few comments about how the atonement should be 
interpreted. He complains that ‘No one can carefully study the theories of the 
atonement which have prevailed at the various epochs of Christian history without 
discovering that there has been in them a very large mixture of paganism. They 
have been deeply colored by mythology and by the crude ideas of primitive 
sacrifice.’46 Jones envisaged a better way: ‘We shall abandon illustrations drawn 
from law courts and judicial decisions and we shall rise to conceptions which fit the 
actual facts of inward, personal experience … The drama will not be in some foreign 
realm, apart from human consciousness.’47 In other words, Jones wanted an 
explanation that is based on psychology.  
A weak point in Jones’ reliance on an exemplarist explanation of the atonement is 
that his belief that the human and divine are conjunct implies that everyone should 
find the example of Christ attractive. Clearly, not everyone does. Jones’ solution to 
this problem is characteristically practical rather than theological. In Practical 
Christianity, the emphasis is on the necessity of creating conditions in society that 
enable people to live good lives: ‘The tramp who crawls up to the back door for his 
unearned meal, and the drunkard who reels home to turn a family circle into an 
earthly hell, are both products of our social system, and there can be no pious ease 
for the church until such a system is destroyed.’48 Here he is in line with the 
prevailing thought of the Social Gospel movement in that he is advocating removing 
social barriers to advance the kingdom of God. In Social Law, although it is not 
stated explicitly with respect to the atonement, Jones’ overall aim is to demonstrate 
that psychology is consistent with Christianity because he recognizes that some 
 
45 Jones, Double Search, 35. 
46 Jones, Double Search, 59. 
47 Jones, Double Search, 83. 
48 Jones, Practical Christianity, 7. 
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Christians felt that their faith was being undermined by modern thought. Here, 
then, he is concerned with removing not social but intellectual barriers.  
In summary, regarding the atonement we again see a progression in the authority 
given to psychology. In Practical Christianity, with its joint evangelical/liberal 
readership, Jones avoids the question, refusing to ‘speculate’. In Social Law, he 
‘spiritualizes’ a passage possibly taken from James to show how Christ’s suffering is 
consistent with the psychological insight that the call to self-sacrifice increases with 
one’s spiritual maturity, and he explains how a person is drawn to Christ in relation 
to the psychologically validated vector of ‘a fronte’ ideals. In Double Search, Jones 
wants to find an explanation of the atonement that draws on psychology, thereby 
to some extent attributing authority to psychology.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that Jones dispenses with the objective 
necessity of Christ’s death, proposing a view that is most similar to the ‘moral 
influence theory’. Indeed, in Heretics Jones links this theory to Abelard, who denied 
that expiation was necessary and presented the work of Christ as ‘vital and 
spiritual’. 49 This, for Jones, meant that, ‘Here in germ, if not something more, is the 
profoundest modern view of the atonement.’ But this approach raises the question 
of how Christ exerts this influence and to what extent knowledge of him is 
necessary. 
6.1.4 Is Christ necessary? 
As we saw in the last chapter, Jones was often associated with humanism, which on 
some understandings has a concomitant marginalization of the need for Christ. 
Damiano, for example, asserts that Jones promotes ‘an over-reliance on human 
capabilities rather than the need for Christ as mediator between God and 
humanity’.50 Aiken explores this question, asking whether Jones retained the 
 
49 Jones, Heretics, 195. 
50 Damiano, On Earth as it is in Heaven, 65.  
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necessity of Christ’s moral example, and answering with an unequivocal ‘No, he 
does not’.51 He justifies his answer by pointing out that the ‘the divine–human light, 
or reason, or capacity for infinity intrinsic to human nature, proves sufficient for 
turning persons away from “sin” and toward the “Unchangeable Good”.’ There are 
certainly passages in Jones’ corpus that support this assertion, and I discuss the 
relationship between Christ and the Inner Light further in Chapter 7. I suggest here, 
however, that Aiken’s question and answer cannot do justice to Jones’ thought in 
this area – primarily because they neglect the emphasis Jones placed on ideals as an 
intrinsic part of the development of consciousness and because they assume that 
the divine and natural realms can be separated, whereas Jones sees them as 
continuous.  
As noted above, Jones attached a great deal of importance to ideals. In Social Law, 
he emphasizes that Christ is the supreme revelation of God, and part of what this 
means is that Christ established ideals that were far and above any others: ‘It fills 
one with awe and wonder to see how his truth and wisdom and spiritual insight 
outstrip the stock of the ages behind him and move on ahead of the foremost files 
of after generations. He brought and continues to bring a new quality of life into 
humanity.’52 The issue is undoubtedly complex, but the importance Jones laid on 
ideals suggests that, when assessing the necessity of Christ, we need in practice to 
look beyond whether the human–divine light is in theory ‘sufficient for turning 
persons away from “sin”’, as Aiken puts it. In other words, while Aiken is correct to 
point out that in Jones’ view humans have the capacity to know God directly, it is 
also the case that this capacity is mediated in practice through ideals in society, and 
that the best of these ideals are established by Christ. This need for Christ is spelled 
out even more clearly in an analogy in Double Search. Just as someone wanting to 
know about music would turn to a Mozart or Beethoven rather than to a ‘boy with a 
 
51 Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’, 43. 
52 Walters, Essential Writings, 111 (extract from the Eternal Gospel). 
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harmonica’, so the ‘supreme education of the soul comes through an intimate 
acquaintance with Jesus Christ of history’.53 That said, at times Jones seems to imply 
that Christ’s influence can be felt at second-hand, observing that ‘this Life has, 
profoundly or remotely, touched every personal life in Europe’.54 What he is 
perhaps saying here is that Christ’s ideals are reflected in society, so individuals 
might be aware of them and be affected by them even if they do not appreciate 
their origin. 
In view of these ambiguities, it is useful to approach the question from another 
angle and ask how God initiated the incarnation. In Social Law, Jones asserts that, 
‘By [Christ] God came to humanity and through Him was expressed the Type toward 
which personal life should move.’55 This implicitly acknowledges God’s role in 
initiating the incarnation, and sees it as part of the gradual development of 
humanity towards the ‘Type’ of Christ. In Double Search, Jones’ perspective is much 
grander. He sees Christ as the inevitable revelation of God in a universe that has 
God at its heart: ‘The moment it is settled that there is a divine Person as the 
ultimate reality of the universe, it is also settled that He will reveal Himself … that 
He will find His joy in “working all things up to better,” to use Clement’s phrase.’56 
This revelation could only come about once consciousness had arisen, he says, 
which allowed a ‘new kind of evolution’ to begin.57 For centuries before Christ there 
was a ‘Christ ideal’, which ‘lighted the sky for the future’58 until Christ came as ‘the 
type and goal of the race … a revelation of what man at his height and full stature is 
meant to be’.59 
 
53 Jones, Double Search, 45. 
54 Jones, Double Search, 35. 
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56 Jones, Double Search, 26. 
57 Jones, Double Search, 29. 
58 Jones, Double Search, 34. 
59 Jones, Double Search, 34. 
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Jones is thus in line with Clement, in that ‘the Incarnation was the breaking forth in 
a definite person of the God who had through all previous history been an 
immanent Word and who had all along been preparing for such a consummation’.60 
Hence, although there is certainly a case for saying that Jones thought that Christ 
was not necessary on account of the conjunct relationship between humans and 
God, it seems that in practice Jones thought that Christ was necessary in two senses 
– first from a human perspective, because Christ set ideals that go far beyond any 
others, and second from God’s perspective, because the incarnation is an inevitable 
outcome of the unfolding of the universe made fundamentally spiritual by the 
immanent Word. 
6.1.5 Christ within 
A further way of approaching Jones’ Christology is to explore how he sees 
individuals as being related to Christ. We can ask, for example, whether Jones 
distinguishes between Christ and God ‘dwelling within’ an individual. This 
distinction is potentially informative because it is related to the uniqueness of 
Christ. Paul refers to the indwelling of both Christ and God, which is a reflection of 
the divinity he attributes to Christ.  If Jones talks in terms of God dwelling within, 
but of Christ as inspiring ideals in the same way that any person might do, then this 
would suggest that Christ is no different ontologically from humans regarding his 
divinity.  
Unfortunately, Jones’ position is obscured because of the language he uses to 
describe ‘Christ within’. This ambiguity is best illustrated by a passage in Middle 
Years. Jones is referring to an early editorial, in which he had written that, ‘It is the 
direct contact of a living Christ with the soul of man that effects the change [i.e. 
gives them power to live by].’61 This statement would presumably have satisfied his 
evangelical readership of the time regarding the divinity of Christ. He goes on, 
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however, to dissociate himself from a literal interpretation of these words, clarifying 
that ‘I used the words “living Christ” in those days to express the fact that God is 
actually here operating in us as a dynamic Presence, and that it is the same God in 
character and purpose that the Christ of Galilee and Judea revealed in the days of 
the Incarnation.’62 This statement could arguably be taken to mean that God could 
be operating in us even if the historical Christ had never lived, and it is not obviously 
compatible with an understanding of Christ as the second person of the Trinity.  
To return to the three books under consideration here. In Practical Christianity, 
Jones seems to be absolutely clear that a Christian must have Christ dwelling within: 
‘Until Christ is in a man’s life and organic with his deepest self … the man is not in 
the truest sense a Christian.’63 This is far more important than belief in the sense of 
intellectual assent to an idea about Christ: ‘Union with Christ, and not an opinion 
about Christ, is what we mean.’64 Jones does not discuss what he means by ‘union’ 
in metaphysical terms, but he is in line with evangelical Christianity. Given his later 
hedging in regard to terminology, however, we should perhaps treat his assertion 
with caution.  
In Social Law, there is no talk of union with Christ; rather, Jones describes the 
experience of being strengthened: ‘We see something new come into us … We go 
from the belief in a report to an experience of power at work upon us.’65 It is 
ambiguous where the power comes from though: is it from Christ or God? Jones 
explains that the founders of Quakerism identified this power with ‘the Eternal 
Christ come again to human consciousness’.66 The fact that he makes this statement 
in terms of early Quakers, who, he says, reached their interpretation ‘without much 
critical analysis’, perhaps implies that he is distancing himself from this 
 
62 Jones, Middle Years, 94–95. 
63 Jones, Practical Christianity, 11. 
64 Jones, Practical Christianity, 11 (italics as in original). 
65 Jones, Social Law, 222. 
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interpretation to some degree, but again his position is not clear. In another 
passage, he quotes Paul as saying ‘Christ liveth in me’,67 which sounds orthodox 
enough. But he then adds in a footnote that ‘Christ, for Paul, means the Divine 
Nature as revealed in Christ’. In the light of Jones’ understanding of the relationship 
between Christ and God discussed above, the footnote arguably puts Christ on the 
same level as any other human, because, as we have seen, the Divine Nature is part 
of (and is therefore revealed) not only in Christ but in all humans.68   
Likewise, in Double Search the emphasis is on the transformation of the person. 
Although knowledge of the historical Christ is important, it is the presence of God 
that is emphasized: on the one hand, ‘the supreme education of the soul comes 
through an intimate acquaintance with Jesus Christ of history’;69 on the other, 
‘whether we use the expression Holy Spirit or Christ within or spiritual Christ, we 
mean God operating upon human spirits and consciously witnessed and appreciated 
in them’.70 So Christ as the second person of the Trinity does not dwell within, even 
if the language that is sometimes used (i.e. Holy Spirit/spiritual Christ) suggests that 
he does.  
Jones continues to use a variety of expressions in later years, but it is unlikely that 
his understanding changed. When he is addressing a Quaker audience, for example, 
he tends to revert to expressions that are more in line with those in Practical 
Christianity. Thus, in his 1908 Swarthmore lecture, he proclaims that ‘Our supreme 
testimony, as a Society has been the testimony of the real presence of Christ, as an 
ever-living Spirit who reveals Himself to all souls of vision and loyalty.’71 Likewise, 
even in 1927, Jones writes in The Faith and Practice of the Quakers that ‘Friends 
have always exalted Christ. They have been as eager as any Christians to know the 
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facts of the gospels … But, like St. Paul, they are most concerned with the inward 
Christ. He is the source of their life and power.’72 Both of these passages could be 
taken to imply that Christ dwells within, possibly as the second person of the Trinity, 
but given my analysis in the previous sections and his reflections in Middle Years 
above, it is unlikely that this is what he meant.  
There are also different attributions of authority used by Jones in each of the three 
books in relation to the idea that Christ, or God, dwells within. In Practical 
Christianity, Jones defers to Paul regarding the necessity of union with Christ, 
informing his readers that ‘Paul at once fixed upon this as the central truth of 
Christianity’.73 The source of authority here, then, is biblical. In Social Law, Jones 
also cites biblical passages as authoritative, but with a slightly different emphasis. It 
is the experience of God as expressed by biblical authors that is authoritative. 
Referring to Paul, for example, he says that ‘A study of Paul’s use of “faith” will 
show that this Divine–human idea permeated his entire conception of salvation in 
all its stages. The significance which he gives this word was not learned in the 
rabbinical school, it was not absorbed from the intellectual atmosphere of the 
period; it had its birth rather in his own personal experience.’74 In Double Search, 
Jones uses an extended biological analogy to show how different people are 
transformed to different extents:  
[A century-old oak tree] is forever drawing upon the streams of sunshine 
which flood it and it builds the intangible light energy into leaf and blossom 
and fibre until there stands the old monarch, actually living on sunshine!  But 
the little daisy at its feet, modest and delicate, is equally consolidated 
sunshine…. Some have but feebly drawn on the Spiritual Light out of which 
strong lives are builded, others have raised the unveiled face to the supreme 
Light and have translated it into a life of spiritual beauty and moral fibre.75  
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The analogy is both confident and exuberant, and serves to show that Jones saw the 
Divine–human relationship and the transformation it entailed as organic and 
natural: It is not merely a doctrine found in the Bible but reflects the way the 
natural world works. As Drummond might have said, it is natural law in the spiritual 
world. 
To summarize this section, then, we can say that Jones’ Christology is at times 
ambiguous. In all three books considered he is clear that Christ is the supreme 
reflection of God’s character, that Christ draws people to God, and that the 
incarnation is an inevitable occurrence in a universe with a personal God at its 
centre. In other areas he is less consistent, especially in relation to terminology and 
psychology. In Practical Christianity, Jones refers to the Bible or makes doctrinal-
sounding assertions that Christ is eternal and is in union with an individual Christian. 
In Social Law, aspects of Christology are shown to be consistent with psychology. 
Specifically, the incarnation is compared with the psychologically informed insight 
that (in Jones’ view) all humans are conjunct with God, and the atonement is 
consistent with psychological insights into the influence of ideals. Thus, Christ is no 
different ontologically from humans, and it is not so much union with Christ that a 
Christian experiences as inner strength and inspiration. In Double Search, it is 
psychology that is authoritative. Christ is part of the evolutionary process, which is 
guided by God. Furthermore, the emphasis is on God dwelling within and there are 
calls for a psychologically informed theory of the atonement.  
This ambiguity in Jones’ Christology and the divergence from the core of conviction 
can be related to three of the five factors identified earlier. First, the ambiguity in 
many aspects of his Christology is partly a result of his informal style, in that he uses 
theological language loosely and on occasion seems to want to express his views in 
a way that appeals to his audience. Second, the divergence from the core of 
conviction apparent in the fact that Christ is ontologically the same as humans 
rather than the second person of the Trinity is a result of Jones’ reliance on 
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psychology. Third, his failure to address this issue arises from his deliberate 
theological naivety. For example, although I have argued that Jones saw Christ as 
necessary in practice, critics certainly have a good basis for disagreeing, and Jones 
does not address this issue head on. This ambiguous, non-Trinitarian Christology 
diverges from both the core of conviction and evangelical Quakerism. 
In view of the above comments, it is useful to pause at this point to draw some of 
the themes together from this and the previous two chapters in order to determine 
how Jones understood Christianity. 
 
6.2 Interim summary for Chapters 3 to 5: Jones’ understanding of 
Christianity 
The main findings of the thesis so far can be summarized as follows. 
(1) Jones wrote Social Law because he was convinced that Christianity had to be 
made consistent with ‘modern thought’, a conviction that was in line with the 
liberal Quaker view that had emerged at the Manchester Conference of 1895.  
(2) His understanding of Christianity was shaped by Quakerism, so although he 
self-identified as a Christian, there were aspects of his faith that were not in 
accordance with the core of conviction.  
(3) His appropriation of ‘modern thought’ focused on the idealism of Josiah 
Royce, under whom he studied at Harvard in 1900/01, and the psychology of 
William James, with whom he corresponded. Neither Royce nor James held views 
that matched the core of conviction. In particular, there is a fundamental difference 
between the loving Father of Christianity and both the ultimate consciousness of 
Royce and the ‘more’ of James. Jones seems to assume that they are the same, in 
the sense that he neither flags nor addresses these differences, but the differences 
mean that his theism is in fact multivalent. 
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(4) Furthermore, Jones’ reliance on psychology led him to propose that the 
subconscious housed the ‘shekinah of the soul’. This view universalizes a 
relationship with God because this relationship is part of what it means to be 
human. It also means that Christ is neither ontologically unique nor the second 
person of the Trinity because the relationship between Christ and God is cast in the 
same terms as the relationship between humans and God.  
(5) An analysis of Jones’ attempted synthesis between Christianity and modern 
thought is complicated by two factors. The first is his informal style, which means 
that he uses theological terminology loosely and can easily be quoted out of 
context. The second is his deliberate theological naivety, which means that he does 
not compare his views directly with traditional Christian doctrine.  
(6) Liberal/modernist Quakers, including prominent ones such as John Wilhelm 
Rowntree and Edward Grubb, endorsed Jones’ views. For them, it made Quakerism 
intellectually credible. Letters from evangelical Quaker critics accused him of 
diverging from biblical teaching about sin, salvation and the role of Christ, and from 
the Quaker tradition. Furthermore, Jones’ multivalent theism and reliance on 
psychology meant that his Quakerism was potentially pluralistic. 
 
This question of the relationship between Quakerism and Christianity is complex, as 
noted in Chapter 1. A snapshot of some of the issues involved at about the time of 
Social Law can be gleaned from H. G. Wood’s 1920 Swarthmore lecture, Quakerism 
and the Church. First, as noted, Quakers have since their inception been challenged 
regarding their understanding of the Inner Light and its relation to Christ. Indeed, 
Wood saw these challenges as legitimate, complaining that Fox’s principle did not 
do justice to the historic revelation in Jesus Christ.76 Second, Christianity was itself 
changing at the time of Social Law¸ and many of the criticisms made by evangelical 
Quakers of Jones could equally well be made of Christian liberal theology generally. 
 
76 Wood, Quakerism and the Church, 78. 
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To quote Wood again, ‘Darwin, by forcing the recognition of the non-scientific, non-
historical character of the Biblical account of creation, challenged the popular 
Evangelical conception of the authority of the Scriptures.’77 This, he says, dealt a 
fatal blow to Calvinism. Third, Christianity encompasses a broad range of theological 
positions, so it is inevitably the case that Quakers would diverge from some 
expressions of Christianity while finding an affinity with others. This is again 
apparent in Wood, as he criticized the Roman Catholic church but proposed that 
‘Friends generally would do well to take more interest in other churches, especially 
in the Free Churches, then they usually do.’78  
With these complexities in mind, I make a few brief comments on Jones’ thought in 
relation to Calvinism, Trinitarianism and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Some of the 
issues mentioned will be picked up in more detail in later chapters. 
Calvinism: Jones frequently distanced himself from what he termed ‘Calvinistic’ 
interpretations of Christianity, although he never defines what he means by this nor 
identifies which particular brand of Calvinism he had in mind. Regarding the Quaker 
insistence that there is something of God in every human life, for example, he 
asserts in Social Law that ‘as against Calvinism, the Quaker was assuredly right’.79 In 
fact, he saw Quakerism as the polar opposite to Calvinism, claiming that Fox ‘met 
the Calvinistic theory of a congenital seed of sin in the new-born child by the 
counter claim that there is a seed of God in every soul’,80 and more generally that 
‘Quakerism, in its historical significance, can be rightly understood only as a 
profound revolt against the Calvinistic interpretation of man.’81 It is Jones’ view that 
all humans are inherently related to God that necessitates this radical difference 
from Calvinism.  
 
77 Wood, Quakerism and the Church, 26. 
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As noted above, though, Calvinism was in decline anyway at the time of Social Law. 
One disadvantage of the fact that Jones habitually defined his position in opposition 
to Calvinism is that he never enters into dialogue with other forms of Christianity, 
for example those that emphasize that humans are created in the image of God and 
those that place a high premium on a felt relationship with God. Had he done so, he 
might have forged a stronger relationship between Quakerism and Christianity.  
Trinitarianism: Jones never really sets out his position on Trinitarianism explicitly. 
As noted above, and also by Aiken, he does not identify Christ with the second 
person of the Trinity.82 Mention of the Holy Spirit in Social Law is almost exclusively 
restricted to the final, biblically oriented chapter. Here Jones interprets Paul’s 
conception of the Holy Spirit as ‘the self-communication of God, manifested in 
persons and producing a Divine–human life’.83 He is thus focusing on an aspect of 
the Holy Spirit that resonates with his view of the relationship between God and 
humans, and there is little sense that the Spirit is the third person of the Trinity. Nor 
is the Holy Spirit explicitly associated with the Inner Light here, although, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, they are related concepts.   
Jones’ reluctance to embrace or develop a Trinitarian theology was in line with the 
general Quaker modernist position: as Frost says in his article on modernist 
Quakers, it was difficult to ascertain their views on the Trinity because they judged 
all conceptions of the divine to be flawed.84 In fact, this attitude goes back to the 
very beginnings of Quakerism. Fox viewed the concept of the Trinity as a ‘notion’, 
and when William Penn questioned the doctrine in his treatise The Sandy 
Foundations Shaken, he was imprisoned in the Tower of London.85 Neither Fox nor 
 
82 Aiken, ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’, 46. 
83 Jones, Social Law, 261. 
84 Frost, J. W. ‘Modernist and liberal Quakers, 1887–2010’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker 
Studies, eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 81. 
85 For Fox and the Trinity, see S.W. Angell, ‘God, Christ, and the Light’, 160. For Penn and the Trinity, 
see W.A. Cooper, A Living Faith (Richmond, IN: Friends United Press, 1990), 34. 
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Penn, then, did much to encourage the development of a Quaker Trinitarian 
theology. 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity:  The relationship between Quakerism and Eastern 
Orthodox Christianity is beyond the scope of this thesis, 86 but there are some 
intriguing and under-researched resonances between Jones’ thought and the recent 
work of Christopher Knight, for example. These arise in part from Jones’ and 
Knight’s reliance on Clement of Alexandria. Thus, for example, Jones’ similarity to 
Clement regarding the incarnation (as discussed above) is coherent with Knight’s 
panentheism, one implication of which is that the incarnation is not the sudden 
arrival of an otherwise absent Logos but the outworking of God’s purpose begun in 
creation.87 Or we could compare Knight’s acceptance of the philosophy of 
emergence, which means that God ‘designed’ the universe with the particular aim 
that there should arise within it, through naturalistic processes, beings who can 
come to know God, with Jones’ belief that a God who is at the heart of the Universe 
will inevitably be revealed through beings that develop consciousness.88  
In summary, the last three chapters have looked at Jones’ view of three key 
theological concepts within Christianity: God, human nature and Christ. In brief, 
Jones believed in a personal, loving God in relationship with humans through the 
subconscious and revealed supremely in Christ. His understanding was not 
Trinitarian, was opposed to Calvinism, but has points of contact with aspects of 
modern-day Eastern Orthodox theology as expressed by Knight. His ideas were 
biblically informed, but took experience, idealism and psychology as authoritative. 
The second half of the thesis shifts the focus to look at Jones’ distinctively Quaker 
 
86 Some work has been done on the similarities of the views of early Quakers to theosis; see Spencer, 
Holiness, 51–52 and 255–258. 
87 Knight, C.C. The God of Nature: Incarnation and Contemporary Science (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2007), 32. 
88 Knight, God of Nature, 9. 
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contribution by focusing on the relationship between humans and God in terms of 










The Inner Light is both human and 
divine 
 
Instead of regarding the Inner Light as something foreign, it should rather be 
thought of as the Divine Life personally apprehended in an individual soul.1 
 
What catapulted Jones’ belief that humans are related to God through 
consciousness to the heart of Quakerism was that he expressed this belief in terms 
of a key Quaker concept: the Inner Light. As Jones put it, the Inner Light is ‘the key 
to every peculiarity in Quakerism’,2 and it is this concept more than any other that 
provides the primary point of contact between the synthesis of idealism, psychology 
and Christianity seen in the previous three chapters and Quakerism. The Inner Light 
is central to Social Law – as noted in Chapter 1, Jones’ letter to Rowntree refers to 
the pages dealing with the Inner Light as the cardinal ones. 
Intriguingly, even though the Inner Light is such a defining concept, there has been 
throughout Quaker history little consensus on what it actually is and what it actually 
does. Broadly speaking, it expresses the idea that there is ‘something of God’ in 
every human soul.3 The aspect of the Inner Light that Jones took issue with and that 
is the subject of this chapter was the traditional view (as he saw it) that the concept 
was dualistic. The significance he attached to the issue is clear in a letter he wrote 
 
1 Jones, Social Law, 176. 
2 Jones, Social Law, 167. 
3 Jones, Social Law, 168. 
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to Norman Penney: ‘The question of whether the Light belongs to man’s own 
nature and being or whether it is something from beyond himself is, of course, one 
of the most important of all the problems.’4 Jones saw the formulation of the Inner 
Light in binary terms: either it was a supernatural faculty (as he put it, ‘foreign’ to 
human nature), or it was an inherent part of human nature (i.e. belonging to man as 
man).5  
The traditional view of the Inner Light had been formulated in the 17th century by 
the Quaker theologian Robert Barclay. Jones seems to have adopted this view up to 
a few years prior to Social Law. In his first book (1889), he drew attention to the 
‘immense’ difference between the Quaker conviction that there is nothing in 
human nature that can lead to salvation and the Transcendentalist view that the 
‘God-given teacher’ is a ‘natural endowment of the human mind’, and there is no 
suggestion that he wishes to diverge from the traditional formulation.6 By the time 
of Social Law, though, Jones had unequivocally rejected this understanding, 
claiming that Barclay’s dualistic formulation was based on ‘woefully imperfect 
psychology’ and insisting that the Inner Light was an integral part of human nature.7 
Not surprisingly, Jones’ radical new formulation initially met with some opposition. 
The evangelical Quaker William Pinkham, for example, spoke for many when he 
insisted that God did not dwell in souls that were in hell, were unrepentant or had 
no faith in Christ.8 Jones’ view gradually gained ground among Liberal Quakers, 
however, and certainly by the 1950s his was the leading name in the predominant 
tendency in Quaker theology regarding the Inner Light.9 Jones, then, instigated an 
important shift in this quintessentially Quaker concept. 
 
4 To Norman Penney, 11 November 1930, HC Box 56. 
5 Jones, Social Law, 174. 
6 Jones, Eli and Sybil Jones, 301 (italics as in original). 
7 Jones, Social Law, 174 (footnote, revised version). 
8 Angell, ‘God, Christ, and the Light’, 168. 
9 L. Eeg-Olofsson, The Conception of the Inner Light in Robert Barclay’s Theology: A Study in 
Quakerism (Studia Theologica Lundensia, 5) (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1954), 18. 
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The Inner Light is important partly because it is more than an abstract theological 
concept. Rather, it was seen as having implications for behaviour and spiritual 
practices.10 Regarding behaviour, for example, Jones complained that Quietist 
Quakers, who viewed the Inner Light as something foreign to human nature, were 
prone to passivity because they waited for divine inspiration rather than engaging in 
a ‘strenuous preparation of life’,11 and Joel Bean claimed that evangelical Quakers 
were experiencing moral decline because they had turned away from the Inner 
Light.12 The practical implications of Jones’ formulation were certainly recognized in 
1907 by the liberal English Quaker George Newman, whose editorial in the Friends’ 
Quarterly Examiner argued that Jones’ treatment of the Inner Light reminded 
Quakers that the inward life could be revealed only in service to others.13 
Furthermore, Quaker scholar Jackie Scully notes that for modernist Quakers the 
phrase ‘that of God in everyone’ (and therefore also, I suggest, the phrase the Inner 
Light)  came to be seen as a non-negotiable claim to the value of human 
personhood, which has ethical implications regarding how people should be 
treated.14 Regarding spiritual practices, Bible reading is necessarily approached 
differently depending on whether one sees the Inner Light as authoritative over the 
Bible or as an aid to reading it.15  
In spite of Jones’ influence regarding the Quaker understanding of the Inner Light, 
there has been little analysis of how credible his views are. Jones contended that his 
position was supported by philosophy, psychology, experience and Scripture, so in 
this chapter I assess the strength of his arguments and consider whether the 
 
10 Scully argues that although early Quakers grounded allowed ‘inward revelation’ to guide their 
decisions, they also relied on Scripture, for example citing the Golden Rule. The 20th century 
liberal/modernist Quakers, however, aimed to respond to God within others with love. See J. L. 
Scully, ‘Quakers and ethics’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, eds S. W. Angell & P. 
Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 536 and 546.  
11 Jones, Social Law, 175. 
12 Joel Bean, 28 September 1893, HC Box 1. 
13 G. Newman, ‘The Divine Immanence and Quakerism’, Friend’s Quarterly Examiner April (1907): 
155. 
14 Scully, ‘Quakers and ethics’, 546. 
15 See Macy, ‘Quakers and Scripture’. 
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evidence he provides supports his view that the Inner Light is part of human nature 
(I term this the ‘inherent’ view) or is in fact consistent with the Inner Light being 
something Divine implanted in humans, as per Barclay (I term this the ‘dualistic’ 
view). My conclusion is that Jones’ arguments are too superficial to be convincing. 
These findings are potentially significant for Quakerism’s self-understanding. If 
Jones’ arguments are indeed weak, then it would seem to be important to at least 
acknowledge that today’s views may be resting on shaky intellectual foundations.  
I start by providing a brief history of interpretations of the Inner Light in order to 
illustrate both the importance of the concept and its implications for faith and 
practice. I then discuss Jones’ formulation of the Inner Light, examining the strength 
of the evidence he provides to support it in Social Law. The final section discusses 
the development of his thought post-Social Law.  
As a preliminary remark, it is worth noting that Dandelion and Angell see an 
important difference between the terms Inner Light and Inward Light.16 According 
to them, early Friends used the term ‘the Light within’ or ‘Inward Light’, with the 
term ‘Inner Light’ coming into use in the late 19th century. Furthermore, they point 
out that some see this shift as marking a change in emphasis from a transcendent 
God from whom Light comes inwardly to an immanent God, a source of Light 
within. Interestingly, though, Jones, who was largely responsible for the latter 
interpretation and terminology, seems not to have recognized this distinction. In 
the letter to Norman Penney referred to above he wrote that ‘In reference to the 
terms, “Inner Light” and “Inward Light” I find throughout Christian history that the 
terms are used interchangeably and have been ever since 1530. They are also used 
more or less interchangeably by the early Friends themselves and by Friends of later 
periods. I doubt very much whether it is wise to make a careful discrimination 
 
16 P. Dandelion & S.W. Angell, ‘Introduction’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, eds S. W. 
Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 7. 
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between the two terms.’17 I do not adjudicate on this issue here, because the 
terminology in and of itself is not directly relevant to the focus of this chapter. I 
have opted to use the term Inner Light as this is the term favoured by Jones. 
 
7.1 Brief overview of the history of the Inner Light 
The distinctive emphasis of early Quakers was the divine Light of Christ, which was 
held to be universally present in all humanity. As the liberal Quaker Edward Grubb 
put it in his 1914 Swarthmore lecture, ‘this [light], which they felt within them, was 
no prerogative of a favoured few, but was, as the Fourth Evangelist declared, a 
“Light that lighteth every man”.’18 This view was widely criticized by the Puritans of 
the time. John Bunyan, for example, asserted that Quakers denied the historical 
Christ by saying that he was only God manifested in their flesh.19 Quakers refuted 
such criticisms biblically: Margaret Fell, for example, quoted Jn 8:12 and Jn 12:35–
36 to associate the biblical image of light with Christ in a letter to Puritan opponent 
James Cave.20 The common Quaker view that individuals did not have equal access 
to the light but needed to be faithful to the ‘measure’ they had was also given 
biblical authentication, specifically 2 Cor 10:12 (‘When they measure themselves by 
themselves and compare themselves with themselves, they are not wise’) and Eph 
4:7 (‘But to each one of us grace has been given as Christ apportioned it’).21 In 
addition to the Bible, personal experience was an important strand in the 
formulation of the concept. When a Presbyterian in North Carolina objected to 
Fox’s conviction that the Light was available to all irrespective of whether they had 
heard of Christ, Fox summoned an American Indian and asked if he was aware of 
 
17 To Norman Penney, 11 November 1930, HC Box 56. Note that the reference to 1530 is relevant to 
Jones’ views on Quakerism (founded by George Fox in the 1650s) to originating in continental 
mysticism. 
18 Grubb, Historic and the Inward Christ, 26. 
19 Grubb, Historic and the Inward Christ, 28 
20 Angell, ‘God, Christ and the Light’, 159. 
21 Angell, ‘God, Christ and the Light’, 160. 
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‘something in him’ that told him when he did wrong. When the Indian agreed that 
there was, Fox took this as demonstrating the universality of the saving light of 
Christ.22   
The challenge of trying to formalise the doctrine of the Inner Light in the face of 
criticisms during this early period was taken up by Robert Barclay, an aristocratic 
Protestant Scot who had distinguished himself academically at the Roman Catholic 
Scots College in Paris. He became a Quaker on his return to Scotland in 1667, after 
attending Meetings where he famously ‘found the evil weakening in me and the 
good raised up’.23 Barclay produced the first, and arguably only, systematic Quaker 
theology: An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, published in Latin in 1676 and 
in English in 1678. The Apology rejects predestination (against Presbyterians) and 
the imputation of sin to infants (against Catholics) but maintains a pessimistic view 
of human nature.24  
Jones rather sweepingly asserted that Barclay viewed the light as originating in God 
but implanted in humans as a ‘divine seed’, and thus as being ‘foreign’ (Jones’ term) 
to humans.25  Eeg-Oloffson, however, gives a more subtle interpretation, arguing 
that although Barclay taught that humans had a divine principle working within 
them, which ‘was no part of his soul and body, and yet constitutive of his being a 
man’, he nevertheless saw this as a vestige of what Adam had before the fall. 26 This 
spiraculum vitarum (breath of life), though, does not enable humans to do good or 
be convicted of evil unless it is visited afresh from God. Eeg-Olofsson concludes that 
Barclay’s dualism is not complete, and that Quaker criticism of him on this point is 
 
22 Angell, ‘God, Christ and the Light’, 161. 
23 Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 122.  
24 Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 123 and 125.  
25 Jones, Social Law, 174. 
26 Eeg-Oloffson, Inner Light in Robert Barclay’s Theology, 72. 
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unjustified.27 As we will see, Jones’ arguably over-simplistic treatment of Barclay 
means that some of his objections to Barclay’s view are unjustified. 
As the 17th century gave way to the 18th, Quakerism entered what is known as its 
Quietist period. Jones saw it as sanctioned by Barclay, who advocated that the Light 
Within required the suppression of all ‘creaturely activity’, and as inspired by 
continental Quietists such as Madame Guyon and Francois de Sales.28 Quietism is 
characterized by the suspension of human reason, planning and activity in favour of 
passive receptivity of divine revelation.29 In line with this, authority is given to the 
Light, and human reason is, to varying degrees, viewed with suspicion.30 The 
authority given to the Light inevitably had an impact on the authority given to 
Scripture, first in that Quietists tended to rely on Spirit-directed, internal 
understandings, and second in that the importance of the Bible diminished because 
the direct inward teaching of Christ was held to be both superior and sufficient.31 
The 19th century saw two major divisions within Quakerism, both triggered by 
evangelicalism. Although Quakers were initially wary of this movement, realizing 
that to adopt it would involve a radical change concerning the primacy of the Inner 
Light, between 1775 and 1825 Quaker thought was undoubtedly influenced by 
evangelical doctrine.32 There was also, however, a counter-current that sought to 
reaffirm the Inner Light ‘as the sole and sufficient basis of religion’.33 These 
opposing currents caused the first split within Quakerism, the ‘Great Separation’ of 
 
27 Eeg-Olofsson, Inner Light in Robert Barclay’s Theology, 73. 
28 R. Rogers Healey, ‘Quietist Quakerism, 1692–c.1805’ in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, 
eds S. W. Angell & P. Dandelion (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 49–50. Punshon agrees with Jones’s 
assessment of Barclay, claiming that he put Quakerism into ‘a quietist kind of straitjacket by his 
philosophical dualism and distrust of the powers of the human mind’ (Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 
125). Note, however, that differences between Quaker and continental Quietism mean that others 
disagree with Jones’ assessment (Rogers Healey, ‘Quietist Quakerism’, 50) 
29 Rogers Healey, ‘Quietist Quakerism’, 49. 
30 A complete mistrust of reason was mitigated to some extent by Enlightenment views (see Rogers 
Healey, ‘Quietist Quakerism’, 51). 
31 Macy, ‘Quakers and Scripture’, 192. 
32 Jones, Later Periods, Vol. 1, 275. 
33 Jones, Later Periods, Vol. 1, 275. 
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1827. The dispute coalesced around the views of Elias Hicks (1748–1830), an elderly 
farmer, self-taught theologian and travelling minister from Long Island, New York, 
who, according to Jones, was ‘a profoundly mystical type of person, able to sit for 
long periods in “a perfect sweet calm”’.34 Followers of Hicks became known as 
Hicksites, and in later years they readily embraced liberal theology. Their opponents 
were known as Orthodox Quakers. Although there were certainly sociological 
factors at play in the resulting schism (Hicksites tended to be rural, and Orthodox 
Quakers to be urban), the main point of contention was fundamentally that Hicks 
attributed primary authority to the Light whereas Orthodox Quakers attributed it to 
Scripture.  
Divisions subsequently occurred within the Orthodox Quakers, again partly in 
response to the influence of evangelicalism and in particular that of Joseph John 
Gurney (the English banker, whom we met in Chapter 1, whose visit to America was 
so successful). Gurney emphasized the importance of Scripture rather than the Light 
and, in fact, tended to refer to the Holy Spirit rather than the Light. In a criticism 
reminiscent of that posed by earlier Puritans, he complained that identifying Christ 
with the influence he bestows (i.e. light) would deprive the Saviour of his personal 
attributes and reduce him to a principle.35 Unsurprisingly, some Orthodox Quakers 
had serious reservations about Gurney because they worried about his 
marginalization of the Light. Opposition was led by New England schoolteacher John 
Wilbur (1774–1856), who, in contrast to the personable Gurney, had a reputation 
for being rather glum – Jones describes him as uncompromising and ‘very 
annoying’.36 Wilbur argued that if the true light signified nothing more than Christ 
incarnate, then ‘Quakerism would be no more’.37 He also insisted that the Bible 
should be read with reverence and awe rather than being analysed with the 
 
34 Jones, Later Periods, Vol. 1, 442. 
35 Angell, ‘God, Christ and the Light’, 165. 
36 Jones, Later Periods, Vol. 1, 521. 
37 Angell, ‘God, Christ and the Light’, 166.  
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intellect. The first Wilburite separation occurred in New England Yearly Meeting in 
1845,38 with Wilburite Quakerism being strongest in Philadelphia and Ohio. One 
visible aspect of the separation was that Wilbur feared that contact with the world 
would distract individuals from pursuing holiness, so Wilburites maintained a 
Quaker ‘hedge’ of plain dress and speech.39 Jones knew many Wilburite Quakers in 
Philadelphia and described them as ‘wide-awake, well-educated, prosperous and 
broad-minded’.40 Many of them were at Haverford and, he said, contributed to the 
atmosphere of liberal and progressive thought. 
In the late 1800s, then, American Quakerism comprised Hicksites, Gurneyites and 
Wilburites, with some of the main reasons behind the splits attributable to the role 
of the Inner Light. Gurneyites were closest to evangelical Christianity and tended to 
refer to the Holy Spirit rather than the Light. Hicksites and Wilburites emphasized 
the centrality and authority of the Inner Light. Both of these groups tended to be 
theologically liberal, but because Wilburites conserved the traditional Quaker traits 
of plainness they are, rather confusingly, often referred to as Conservative Quakers. 
A summary of the Quaker schisms in relation to the Inner Light is given in Appendix 
A. 
At this point, idealism, liberal theology and psychology were making their presence 
felt, necessitating further modifications in the formulation of the Inner Light. 
Spencer notes that discussion often centred on the views of Barclay, with Liberal 
Quakers generally dismissive of his work as a meaningful expression of Quakerism 
but evangelical Quakers appreciating its Christian orthodoxy.41 Jones was a leading 
figure in the debate and in Social Law does indeed, as we will now see, expound his 
interpretation of the Inner Light using Barclay’s views as a foil. 
 
38 Wilson, ‘Conservative Friends, 127. 
39 Dandelion, A Very Short Introduction, Chapter 2; Vining, Friend of Life, 63–63. 
40 Jones, Middle Years, 24. 
41 C.D. Spencer, ‘Quakers in Theological Context’, in The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies, eds S. 




7.2 The Inner Light according to Jones  
Jones argues that the early Quakers felt the truth of God’s presence within 
profoundly but failed to express it clearly because Barclay was writing within a 
framework of Cartesian dualism. At the end of his chapter on the Inner Light in 
Social Law, he summarizes his own view: ‘Instead of regarding the Inner Light as 
something foreign, it should rather be thought of as the Divine Life personally 
apprehended in an individual soul. It is both human and Divine. It is the actual inner 
self formed by the union of a Divine and a human element in a single, undivided 
life.’42 The insistence that the Inner Light is not ‘foreign’ is a refutation of Barclay’s 
view. However, the difficulty of expressing an alternative view clearly is perhaps 
apparent in that Jones refers to ‘Divine’ and ‘human’ elements, which has at least a 
flavour of dualism about it. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 1, it seems likely that 
Jones rewrote this phrase following criticism from Haines, suggesting that he was 
struggling to express what he meant.  
Jones structures his discussion according to the three ways that he understood early 
Quakers to have used the term Inner Light (or its synonyms ‘seed’, ‘Light of Christ’, 
‘that of God in everyone’): (i) as a Divine Life resident in the soul; (ii) as a source of 
guidance and illumination; and (iii) as a ground of spiritual certitude.43 I suggest that 
the first point, that the divine life is resident in the soul, is theoretical, in that it 
involves philosophical, theological and psychological issues. The second is practical, 
concerning how the Inner Light influences the decision-making process. The third is 
related to authority: it means that spiritual authority resides ‘in the individual’s own 
heart and not somewhere outside him’ (i.e. within rather than in the Bible, Christ or 
the Church).44  In this section I discuss the first and third of these aspects of the 
 
42 Jones, Social Law, 176. 
43 Jones, Social Law, 171. 
44 Jones, Social Law, 169. 
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Inner Light. The second is deferred until Chapter 8 on Mysticism, as it is related to 
Jones’ conviction that experience of God (i.e. mysticism) should result in action. 
7.2.1 The Inner Light as a ‘Divine Life’ in the soul 
Jones asserts that the Quaker position that there is something of God in every 
human life is ‘assuredly right’,45 and that there is ‘theological’ and ‘psychological’ 
evidence to support this claim. I consider both types of evidence below and assess 
whether they support an inherent or a dualistic view of the Inner Light. 
7.2.1.1 Theological evidence 
Jones claims that the ‘theological’ evidence for his inherent view can be found in 
‘Scripture teaching’ and in the writing of the ‘Fathers’.46 He does not provide any 
details of this broad assertion, but it is possible to infer what he might have had in 
mind from elsewhere: from the final chapter in Social Law for the former and from 
his wider corpus for the latter. 
The final chapter is concerned not with the Inner Light per se but with the closely 
related idea that God and humans are united. This material was based on his 
dissertation at Harvard in 1900/01, and likely formed the core of a book ‘Study in 
New Testament Mysticism’, which was rejected by the publishers Mifflin Houghton 
in 1902 on the grounds that there would be insufficient interest.47 The title of the 
rejected book gives an indication of Jones’ orientation towards New Testament 
material: we might expect an emphasis on ‘mystical’ union with God, rather than on 
the need for atonement, for example. The chapter in Social Law discusses the 
human–divine relationship according to Paul, the Synoptics and John, as detailed 
below.  
 
45 Jones, Social Law, 173. 
46 Jones, Social Law, 173. 
47 Mifflin Houghton, 10 July 1902, HC Box 5. 
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Pauline material. Jones interprets Paul as saying that God dwells within, but he does 
not consider counter-arguments. For example, he quotes the prayer in Ephesians 
that ‘Christ may dwell in your hearts’.48 But (at the risk of being overly pedantic) he 
does not consider that the very fact that this prayer is necessary presupposes that it 
is possible to have a heart wherein Christ does not dwell, a state of affairs that 
would argue against a universal indwelling. He also asserts that the divine–human 
relationship permeated Paul’s entire conception of salvation, and that this was born 
in Paul’s own personal experience.49 This appeal to Paul’s experience needs more 
careful consideration though, because the pre-Damascus Paul persecuted 
Christians. In other words, Jones takes Paul’s post-conversion experience as 
normative and does not address how an individual in whom God dwelt could 
persecute Christians. 
Synoptic material. The synoptic passage Jones refers to is Matt 25:40: ‘Inasmuch as 
ye have done anything unto one of these my brethren, even the least, ye have done 
it unto me.’50 The passage is consistent with a theory of divine indwelling (i.e. with 
an interpretation that sees charitable acts as directed at God because God is 
actually within the hungry, thirsty, needy). But it is not required by it. The passage 
could be understood in the sense that a service to anyone suffering and loved by 
God is a service to God. Jones also remarks in passing that in the synoptics ‘the 
kingdom of God is proclaimed as within’.51 It is curious that he does not make more 
of this, as it would seem to support his position. 
John’s Gospel. Jones notes that John uses the expressions ‘Abide in God’ and ‘God 
dwells in you’ (from the ‘Vine passage’ in Jn 15:1-10) to describe ‘a vital Divine–
human relationship’.52  He does not, however, consider verses that oppose this 
 
48 Jones, Social Law, 256. 
49 Jones, Social Law, 257. 
50 Jones, Social Law, 264. 
51 Jones, Social Law, 264. 
52 Jones, Social Law, 269–270. 
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view. One could point, for example, to the need to be born again (Jn 3:5) or to 
receive the Holy Spirit (Jn 20:22), which could be interpreted in the sense of an 
individual and their relationship to God needing to change in a profound way. 
Furthermore, in his discussion of the union of the soul with God in Testimony of a 
Soul (1936) Jones writes that ‘This depth-view of the soul lies at the very heart of 
Johannine Christianity, though it is thought of there as an imparted gift of grace 
rather than as a native capacity.’53 Whether this union is a ‘gift of grace’ or a ‘native 
capacity’ is the key question under discussion in Social Law, however, so either 
Jones had not recognized this in 1904, or he had come up with an explanation that 
satisfied him that he does not elaborate on, or he chose to ignore it. 
In summary, Jones’ biblical arguments for God and humans being united, and 
therefore for an ‘inherent’ view of the Inner Light, are too superficial to be 
effective. He is selective in his choice of passages, fails to consider alternative 
explanations for those that he does, and fails to recognize and address 
inconsistencies. Part of the problem is undoubtedly down to the fact that, because 
of his informal style, he is cramming a complex problem of biblical interpretation 
into a few pages, so he cannot hope to do it justice. In essence he adopted a ‘proof 
text’ approach – quoting verses that fitted his interpretation, ignoring others, and 
not engaging in detailed exegesis. He was certainly aware that the Bible supported 
dualistic interpretations, at one point asking ‘Did [Paul] hold to a rigid dualism of 
body and spirit? If he did, he forgot it here’, but he does not address this 
complexity.54 Being charitable, it seems that his priority was to show that his view of 
the human–divine relationship was supported by the Bible (or at least by an 
important strand of it), rather than to argue for it rigorously. 
The Fathers: Jones provides no details in Social Law of what he refers to as ‘the 
writings of the “Fathers”’ that allegedly support his interpretation of the Inner Light. 
 
53 Jones, Testimony, 168. 
54 Jones, Social Law, 262. 
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Because there is a close link between the Inner Light and mysticism (see Chapter 8), 
however, it is possible to infer the direction his argument might have taken, had he 
spelled it out. In Studies in Mystical Religion, Jones devotes a chapter to ‘Mysticism 
in the Church Fathers’, making the case that although the Church Fathers were not 
‘mystics’ but rather statesmen and philosophers, there are scattered passages in 
the writings of almost all of them that express a direct and inward religious 
experience that can be called mystical.55  
Particular emphasis is given to Augustine, whom Jones calls the ‘real father of 
Catholic mysticism’.56 Any appeal to Augustine as endorsing Jones’ view of the Inner 
Light, however, needs to deal with the fact that Augustine emphasized the distance 
between humans and God, to the extent that some have argued that he should not 
be classed as a mystic at all.57 Jones does not go into detail but suggests that 
Augustine’s mystical experience of God can be separated from his theology: 
‘Through the hard crust of cooled theology the warm religious life ever and anon 
breaks out.’58 In other words, he seems to be suggesting that Augustine taught one 
thing but experienced another, and that it is the experience that is authoritative. 
One can see why Jones, as a Quaker who emphasizes experience but dislikes 
‘notions’, might well adopt this strategy, but he leaves himself open the criticism 
that he is misinterpreting Augustine. It would in fact be more natural to interpret 
Augustine as supporting Barclay’s dualistic view, such that God is experienced and 
found within but is not part of human nature. 
It is also possible that Jones is thinking of Clement of Alexandria, who as noted in 
previous chapters was one of Jones’ ‘spiritual heroes’ and stressed the immanence 
of God, teaching that humans and God were in ‘mutual and reciprocal 
 
55 R. M. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan, 1909), 80. 
56 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 87. 
57 M. Lane, ‘St Augustine of Hippo’, in Journey to the Heart, ed. K. Nataraja (Norwich: Canterbury 
Press, 2011), 135–147. 
58 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 97. 
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correspondence’.  As discussed in Chapter 2, though, Clement maintained a 
distinction between humans and God. It is by no means certain, then, that the 
Fathers supported Jones’ inherent view. 
7.2.1.2 Psychological evidence 
Jones asks and answers a question of the early Quaker view that there is something 
of God in every human life: ‘But does psychology give any ground for such a view? Is 
the doctrine founded in the nature of things? Both yes and no.’59 Jones’ ‘yes’ refers 
to the fact that God is indeed experienced within; the ‘no’ refers to Barclay’s 
formulation.  
Jones’ first argument is based on Pascal’s insistence that ‘Thou wouldst not seek 
God if thou hadst not found Him.’60  He continues with the assertion that ‘Every 
analysis of personality discovers the fact that God and man are inherently bound up 
together. Personal consciousness looms up out of an infinite background.’61 In other 
words, he is suggesting that the fact that we search for God is consistent with 
recent discoveries that God is part of human nature through consciousness: it is, in 
fact, this knowledge of God that enables us to search for God. The logic of this 
connection is sound, in that it might be expected that God can be sought and 
recognized because he is in a sense familiar (cf. the Greek idea, noted in Chapter 2, 
that only like can know like). The problem is, however, that the evidence on the 
basis of an analysis of personality for the assertion that God and humans are 
‘inherently bound’ is thin. As discussed in Chapters 4 to 6, this proposition does not 
explain sin, assumes that consciousness will never have a scientific explanation, and 
requires idealism as a philosophical framework. So overall, Jones’ defence of his 
‘inherent’ position using Pascal is not particularly convincing. Moreover, Pascal’s 
statement is consistent with Barclay’s view of the Inner Light as a ‘foreign’ seed 
 
59 Jones, Social Law, 173. 
60 Jones, Social Law, 173. 
61 Jones, Social Law, 173. 
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inside humans: even if God is ‘foreign’, God is present, and therefore might be 
sought further if, say, the desire to search for God was one of the consequences of 
the presence of the ‘seed’. Jones’ use of Pascal, then, is inconclusive as regards 
support for an inherent rather than a dualistic view of the Inner Light. 
Jones’ second argument is that Barclay’s view means that ‘there is no basis for a 
unifying personality which binds into one organic and vital whole the divine and the 
human, making a new spiritual creation’.62 This is perhaps not an accurate reflection 
of Barclay’s view though. Barclay says, ‘So we understand not men as simply having 
grace in them as a seed; which we indeed affirm all have in a measure; but we 
understand men that are gracious, leavened by it into the nature thereof, so as 
thereby to bring forth those good fruits of a blameless conversation, and of justice, 
holiness, patience, and temperance, which the apostle requires as necessary in a 
true Christian bishop and minister.’63 Jones does not define what he means by a 
‘new spiritual creation’, but one might reasonably assume that it would be 
manifested in the transformation or ‘leavening’ envisaged by Barclay. Jones’ 
objection that Barclay’s view does not allow for a unifying personality, then, is 
arguably unduly harsh. 
In summary, Jones’ main objection to Barclay on psychological grounds is his 
objection to dualism – recall that Jones insists that in Social Law he was trying to 
avoid the ‘defeative dualism of a two-world theory’.64 His first argument takes 
inspiration from Pascal’s statement that to seek God is to have found him, but 
Jones’ treatment of the Inner Light in relation to this ability to seek God is equally 
consistent with inherent and with dualistic formulations. His second argument, that 
Barclay’s view leaves individuals ‘unspiritualized’, is flawed because his 
representation of Barclay is over-simplistic: Barclay believed that transformation of 
 
62 Jones, Social Law, 175, italics as in original. 
63 R. Barclay, Barclay’s Apology for the True Christian Divinity as Professed by the People called 
Quakers, 2nd edn, Abridged by George Harrison (London: Harvey and Darton, [1678] 1822), 162. 
64 As stated in Jones, ‘Why I enroll’, 211. 
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the individual was possible through the Inner Light (or seed, in Barclay’s 
terminology) even though it was ‘foreign’ to human nature.  
Thus neither Jones’ theological arguments nor his philosophical/psychological ones 
provide a convincing defence of his view that the Inner Light is an inherent part of 
human nature. We now turn to his treatment of the Inner Light as a source of 
‘spiritual certitude’, namely to his conviction that ‘the ground of religion is in the 
individual’s own heart and not somewhere outside him’.65 
7.2.2 The Inner Light as spiritual certitude 
The belief of early Quakers that the Inner Light is ‘a self-demonstration of spiritual 
experience’ is, according to Jones, ‘in harmony with the profoundest philosophical 
movement of the modern world’. 66 It ‘has been settled for all time’, he continues, 
‘that the criterion of truth is to be found in the nature of consciousness itself – not 
somewhere else’. Jones’ point here seems to be that the fact that truth is found 
within means that the Inner Light is inherent. 
Jones’ claim is fairly sweeping, and he does not provide any details. He summarily 
dismisses the Church and Bible as criteria for truth, stating that spiritual truths are 
known ‘because it is witnessed within, not because some man in sacred garb has 
announced it, or because I have read in a book that such an experience might be 
mine’.67 Edward Grubb’s 1908 work Authority and the Light Within (a book we will 
consider in more detail in Chapter 9), however, indicates the general liberal Quaker 
attitude. Briefly, Grubb argues that the Church is not authoritative because there is 
nothing in the teaching of Jesus that foreshadows it, and there is no clear evidence 
that Peter was Bishop of Rome.68 The Bible is not authoritative because, in addition 
to requiring the authority of the Church to institute the canon, it assumes that 
 
65 Jones, Social Law, 169. 
66 Jones, Social Law, 171. 
67 Jones, Social Law, 172. 
68 Grubb, Light Within, 21. 
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God’s truth was perfectly comprehended and infallibly transmitted and 
interpreted.69 Christ is not authoritative because we do not know if we have an 
accurate recollection of his words. Note, however, that this view was not held 
throughout Quakerism: the evangelical Quaker William Pinkham, for example, 
wrote to Jones insisting that ‘The Friends Church has held from its beginning that 
the Scriptures are the final outward authority in questions of faith and practice’.70  
The issue I address in more detail here, however, is that not everyone has ‘spiritual 
certitude’, namely a felt experience of God’s presence or a conviction that a certain 
action is ‘God’s will’. This ability to experience God is a key component of Jones’ 
thought and his formulation of the Inner Light, so it is important to see how he 
deals with this discrepancy between theory and practice. The complaint of the 
devout Quaker William Littleboy is a case in point. 
Littleboy claimed not to have any experience of God and wrote to Jones with 
palpable anguish: ‘I believe that you, to whom we look for a prophetic revelation 
would greatly extend the circle of your helpfulness if you recognised … that there 
are probably hundreds of your readers who are filled with a sense of utter 
helplessness and hopelessness when they see this deep spiritual consciousness 
taken for granted as a necessary and basal fact of life.’71 Littleboy objected that he 
did not think it was necessary for a Christian to be able to experience the presence 
of God, first ‘because God is absolutely reasonable, and it would be unreasonable to 
set up as a condition a state of soul which is absolutely beyond the power of the 
human will to attain’, and secondly because he found ‘nothing of this in the 
Synoptic teaching of Christ’.72 
 
69 Grubb, Light Within, p.30. 
70 William Pinkham, 12 November 1904, HC Box 8. 
71 William Littleboy, 13 March 1912, HC Box 12. 
72 Littleboy went on to write a gentle and eloquent pamphlet, The Appeal of Quakerism to the Non-
Mystic (London: Friends Home Service Committee, 1916, reprinted in ‘Quaker Classics, 1964), arguing 
that ‘It is a fundamental mistake to assume that mystical experience (first hand communion with, and 
revelation from, God) is equivalent to, or necessarily accompanied by, strong emotion or even clear 
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Jones’ reliance on psychology means that everyone should be able to experience 
spiritual certitude because they are in contact with God through the subconscious. 
It is this that implicitly lies behind statements such as, ‘the God who is the 
unquestioned object of reality for the greatest spiritual geniuses breaks, at least 
dimly, on the souls of the most ordinary of us’.73 He does, however, seem to take 
Littleboy’s objection on board at times in his wider corpus. In Spiritual Reformers, 
for example, he acknowledges that ‘There are numerous persons who are as serious 
and earnest and passionate as the loftiest mystical saint, and who, in spite of all 
their listening for the inner flow of things, discover no inrushes, feel no invasions, 
are aware of no environing Companion…[Thus] To insist on mystical experience as 
the only path to religion would involve an “election” no less inscrutable and pitiless 
than that of the Calvinistic system – an “election” settled for each person by the 
peculiar psychic structure of his inner self.’74  
Jones does on occasion offer a number of explanations in passing of why this 
experience is not universal in practice, and it is notable that his explanations all 
occur in the wider literature on religious experience. For example, he uses what 
Caroline Davis terms a ‘sense perception analogy’.75 These types of explanation 
propose that not having the ability to have a religious experience is like having a 
deficiency or lack of training in a particular sense organ – someone might not have 
‘an ear for music’, for example. In Social Law, Jones picks sight as the specific sense, 
claiming that those who have not had a mystic experience ‘are no more justified in 
denying its reality than the blind man is in denying reality to the stars which he 
 
consciousness of His nearness’ (p.7). He encouraged his readers to persevere in following Jesus: ‘In so 
doing your whole life will be illuminated, and though no ecstasy be yours, you shall have the peace 
that comes of the assurance that God is yours and you are His’ (p.17).  
73 Jones, New Studies, 17. 
74 R. M. Jones, Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries (London: Macmillan, 1914), xxii. 
75 C. F. Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 1999), 
69. I also refer to Davis’ book in Chapters 8 and 10. I am not concerned with the main thesis of her 
book – that religious experience most effectively provides evidence for religious belief within a 
cumulative style of argument that uses evidence from a wide range of sources – but rather in finding 
a suitable set of categories and definitions with which to analyse Jones. 
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cannot see’.76 Similarly, in Middle Years he suggests that if someone ‘has no 
spiritual light and is not moved or stirred by celestial currents, it is not because God 
has failed to come, but because the spiritual eye has not yet opened’.77 
Furthermore, the reason for this ‘blindness’ (or deafness etc.) is often ascribed to 
‘sin’ in the wider literature.78 Jones also made this assertion, surmising that ‘There is 
but one possible separation between [humans and God], namely sin, which, like a 
cataract destroys vision, not the light, and which, once removed, leaves the two 
spirits face to face.’79 Given that it seems unlikely that Littleboy would be 
substantially more ‘sinful’ than Jones himself, though, this latter suggestion seems a 
fairly weak explanation in his particular case. 
Another widely used explanation in the literature is the so-called ‘moral analogy’, 
which proposes that if someone has no perception of what ‘ought’ means, it is 
impossible to convey the meaning to them. Most people can however, so the 
theory goes, come to have discriminating moral experiences by learning from those 
who are particularly attuned to moral significance.80 This is similar to what Jones 
says is happening in a Meeting for Worship. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, he 
believed that each individual became more attuned to the presence of God in a 
group situation in which all were deliberately seeking God. In other words, an 
individual who for some reason has only a weak perception of God’s presence may 
find their capacity increased by being in the company of those who are more 
attuned to God: the capacity is innate but needs to be fostered. Again, though, this 
explanation could hardly be applied to a sincere Quaker such as Littleboy, who 
regularly attended Quaker meetings. In the round, then, Jones’ conviction that 
spiritual certitude reflects an inherent view of the Inner Light suffers because he 
does not offer a convincing explanation of why some people do not experience this 
 
76 Jones, Social Law, 145.  
77 Jones, Middle Years, 93. 
78 Davis, Evidential Force, 74. 
79 Walters, Essential Writings, 66 (extract from A Dynamic Faith).  
80 Davis, Evidential Force, 68. 
231 
 
certitude, which should be universal.81 
In summary, Jones’ aim was to show that the experience of spiritual certitude was 
consistent with the Inner Light being ‘inherent’ rather than ‘dualistic’. He does this 
by summarily dismissing biblical and ecclesiastical authority and asserting that it has 
now been proved that authority resides in conscious experience. This seat of 
authority is consistent with the Inner Light being inherent because it sees God as 
related to humans through consciousness. The problem here is that this view 
implies that everyone should experience spiritual certitude, but many people do 
not. Jones does propose a number of reasons for this lack, but they are comments 
in passing rather than a carefully constructed defence of this weakness. Regarding 
the particular case of the sincere, committed Quaker William Littleboy, for example, 
explanations such as sin or the need for communal worship seem inadequate. I do, 
however, return to this issue from the perspective of what sort of experience might 
qualify as ‘spiritual certitude’ or ‘mystical’ in the next chapter. 
These weaknesses notwithstanding, Jones’ view gradually became axiomatic. It is 
therefore useful to look at the way Jones expressed his views on the Inner Light 
post-Social Law. 
 
7.3 The Inner Light post-Social Law 
The quest to provide a chronological overview of Jones’ thought on the Inner Light 
is complicated by the fact that he often discusses the human–divine relationship 
 
81 Jones could also be expected to encounter problems in explaining religious experiences that were 
in some sense ‘false’ or manufactured. The Quaker psychologist Edwin Starbuck, for example, 
concluded that revivalists used discernible methods (affirmation of statements without rational 
support, repetition, a reliance on the ‘contagion of feeling’) to encourage sudden conversion, which 
meant that neurologically speaking something other than conversion may be happening, namely a 
relaxed, uninhibited state that rendered the mind suggestible (Hay, ‘Psychologists interpreting 
conversion’, 62). We will see in Chapter 8 that Jones addressed the practicalities of this possibility in 
relation to group discernment. 
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without using the phrase the ‘Inner Light’ itself. Furthermore, this relationship is so 
central to his thought that a comprehensive analysis is impractical here owing to 
the sheer size of his corpus. Thus, below I have selected relevant passages from 
some of his books and articles with the aim of providing a series of snapshots of his 
understanding of the Inner Light, even if the term is not mentioned explicitly. I have 
also given a brief overview of the context of the books and articles considered, as 
Jones expressed himself differently depending on his intended audience and the 
ideas with which he was preoccupied at the time. The survey is by no means 
exhaustive, but it is sufficient to provide at least a suggestion of the constants and 
variables that emerge in relation to his discussions of the Inner Light over the 
course of over 50 books spanning nearly 50 years.  
7.3.1 Selected quotations from Jones’ corpus 
A Dynamic Faith (1900): This work consists of some of Jones’ summer school 
lectures and presents a history of Quakerism. He writes that the first fact of 
Christianity is that God is self-revealing and the second is that humans have the 
capacity to know God.82 The key point here is that both the revelation of God and 
the ability of humans to receive that revelation are essential: they are two sides of 
the same coin. As in Social Law, this knowledge of God is mediated through an 
individual’s ‘subliminal self’. Furthermore, when Jones wrote a preface to the 
French edition 41 years later, he maintained that the book still represented his 
religious outlook.83 It is worthwhile to bear this assertion in mind when considering 
the extracts below, because this consistency of thought is not always obvious from 
the way he expresses himself. 
Divine Presence in Human Life (1907): This article, published in Friends Fellowship 
Papers, sets out the problems with the early Quaker dualistic understanding of the 
Inner Light. There is, Jones complains, Divine visitation but not Divine Immanence, 
 
82 For more details, see the discussion on A Dynamic Faith in Davie, British Quaker Theology, 105. 
83 Vining, Friend of Life, 84 
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and the formulation promotes passivity and favours asceticism because there is a 
schism between the natural and the supernatural. Jones emphasizes that human 
nature has a divine component, stressing that man, ‘by his inherent nature, is both 
Divine and human’.84 He goes on to set out the practical implications of this for 
transformation: ‘The truth is that our souls open inwardly into God’s … we can 
become corporate with Him by acts or response, or we can become more and more 
isolated by living unto self.’85 To paraphrase, Jones seems to be saying that the 
Inner Light can increase in intensity through human effort, as we become more 
‘corporate’ with God, and that the result of this effort is alignment with God’s 
character and will. 
Quakerism: A Religion of Life (1908): Jones’ inaugural 1908 Swarthmore lecture 
claims that ‘Men are asking for a religion which builds solidly on the veritable facts 
of experience … They want to feel their own souls burn within them with a sense of 
His Presence now. They seek a consciousness of finite spirit meeting infinite Spirit, 
an inward testimony to the Great Companion of our souls.’86 Here, then, Jones is 
emphasizing the role of personal experience, but the relationship between humans 
and God is perhaps not quite as integrated as it is in Social Law; that is, humans 
have finite spirits or souls, but not, perhaps, an inherently divine component (cf. the 
passage from ‘The Divine Presence’ above). This message would presumably have 
been acceptable to evangelical Quakers, so it is possible that Jones chose his words 
carefully at such an auspicious occasion to avoid controversy.  
Stories of Hebrew Heroes (1911): This is a children’s book of stories about biblical 
characters including Adam and Eve, Abraham, and Noah. Not surprisingly, there is 
no attempt to define the relationship of humans and God (i.e. the Inner Light) in 
abstract terms, but the experiential essence of this relationship is captured in how 
 
84 R. M. Jones, ‘The divine presence in human life’, Friends Fellowship Papers, April (1907): 22. 
85 Jones, ‘The divine presence’, 23. 
86 Jones, Quakerism, 24–25. 
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these characters are described as listening to God and being transformed. It 
seemed to Noah, for example, that sometimes ‘he could hear a quiet voice speaking 
inside and telling him what to do, and when he heard it he would always do what it 
told him, and just because he did this, little by little he grew so that he could hear 
the quiet voice better and better’.87 Paraphrasing this in terms of the Inner Light, it 
seems that obedience to the promptings of the Inner Light means that an individual 
is changed in the sense that they become more sensitive to future promptings.88 
The essential goodness of humans is captured in the story of Jacob and his battle 
with God (Gen 32). Jacob ‘discovered that God was trying to pull the good self in 
him up out of the mean old self, the way you pull up a plant by the roots. Perhaps 
now the old bad self would drop off and a new and noble man would come out.’89 
The point to note here is that humans need God to help them discover and act on 
this inner goodness. Furthermore, Jones is recognizing that in practice there is a 
part of humans that is not ‘good’, although he does not explain how this can be the 
case. 
The World Within (1918): Comprising essays published in The Friend (London) and 
the Homiletic Review, this book sets forth Jones’ fundamental conviction that a 
conscious relationship with God gives the energy we need for our lives.90 Jones 
emphasizes the power that God provides:  ‘But deeper and surer than all other 
invisible realities is that divine Spirit, not seen, but felt, who is the ground of our 
real being, the source of our longings, the inspirer of our larger hopes, the energy 
by which we live.’91 This divine power has to be seen, however, in relation to the 
effort that needs to be expended by individuals: ‘The saint is no accidental 
 
87 R.M. Jones, Stories of Hebrew Heroes (London: Headley Brothers, 1911), 33 
88 There is some overlap here with Woolman’s comments about conscience being heightened by 
obedience; see Chapter 5. 
89 Jones, Hebrew Heroes, 89. 
90 Vining, Friend of Life, 196. 
91 The chapter ‘The Deeper Universe’ is published as a standalone book: R. M. Jones, The Deeper 
Universe, (Kessinger, [1918]), 11. 
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mutation. Moral dexterity of soul and beauty of character are the result of human 
effort and of cooperation with God.’92 In other words, we see again the ‘mutual and 
reciprocal correspondence’ between humans and God, here in relation to 
inspiration and transformation in everyday life. 
Fundamental Ends of Life (1925): Here Jones makes use of discoveries in science to 
argue that humans are not subject to original sin but naturally act for the good of 
others: ‘The entire stream of life was believed to be loaded with an irresistible 
nisus, or bent, toward self-survival, self-achievement … Nobody thinks so now. 
Struggle for the life of others is just as much a “law” of nature as struggle for 
existence is … We come “trailing clouds of glory” to this extent, that we are born 
with instinctive tendencies which make us interested in and concerned for others 
than ourselves.’93 The use of Wordsworth’s expression ‘clouds of glory’ points to a 
divine aspect of human nature, which is identified here with a natural instinct to act 
for the benefit of others. In other words, human compassion has its origin in and is 
an expression of God’s compassion, so Jones is once again making humans and God 
inseparable.  
London Friend (1927): Jones’ article ‘New Light on the “Inner Light”’ focuses on one 
of Kant’s papers ‘Opus Postumum’ that had recently become the subject of 
scholarly attention. He stressed that Kant had become ‘a positive interpreter of 
divine immanence and an advocate of a God who is revealed within the soul of 
man’.94 Despite not mentioning Christ in the article, he concludes it by surmising 
that ‘I feel sure that Isaac Pennington would have said a solemn and quiet “amen” 
to these words, if he had heard them, for they fit perfectly with what he describes 
as his own experience of the healing which came into his soul from under God’s 
wings.’ This comment is of interest because Jones is suggesting that interpretations 
 
92 Jones, Deeper Universe, 16. 
93 R.M. Jones, The Fundamental Ends of Life (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 10–11. 
94 Jones, ‘New light on the “Inner Light”’, 533–534. 
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of God’s immanence that were not explicitly Christian were in fact consistent with 
the views and experience of early Quakers, who certainly self-identified as 
Christians.  
The Faith and Practice of Quakers (1927): This book was one of a series edited by L. 
P. Jacks under the title ‘The Faiths: Varieties of Christian Expression’. As already 
noted, Jones uses a quotation from Dean Inge on the frontispiece that sums up the 
essence of his message: ‘The Quakers, of all Christian bodies, have remained 
nearest to the teaching and example of Christ’. In the book Jones denies the 
doctrine of original sin but does see God as essential to transforming humans: ‘The 
Puritan saw in man a wreck like that of a ship hopelessly stranded on a reef of 
jagged rock. The Quaker saw in him a wreck, if wreck at all, like that of the buds in 
spring, burst from within by the warm sun, after having been tightly sealed all 
winter against sleet and storm, wrecked indeed, and by the push and power of a 
deeper, larger life working within and preparing for vast future possibilities.’95 
Crucially, Christ is here integral to this process: ‘[Quakers] have felt that theory and 
doctrines are “sounding brass and clanging cymbals” compared with the actual 
formation of the spirit of Christ in the fibre and structure of the inner life.’96 Here 
again Jones is advocating an intimate relationship between God and humans (who 
are essentially good) and, moreover, describing it within a Christian framework.97 
New Studies in Mystical Religion (1927). The year before the publication of New 
Studies, Jones had had a memorable meeting with Gandhi. He wrote to Margaret 
Jones that the life of the Ashram was very simple and would delight John Woolman 
and that they had talked of Christ and Quakerism as a way of life.98 In his journal, he 
 
95 Jones, Faith and Practice, 44. 
96 Jones, Faith and Practice, 49. 
97 It could be argued that Jones is presenting the views of Quakers rather than his own views, but 
this seems unlikely: he distances himself from the view of early Friends that the Inner Light as 
‘something supernaturally added’ to the but does not do so in relation to Christ (Jones, Faith and 
Practice, 41). 
98 To Margaret Jones, 2 December 1926, HC Box 55. 
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described Gandhi as ‘an extraordinarily great man and a beautiful character’, but 
regretted that he had ‘very little of that universal mystical experience which is the 
ground and basis of a really universal spiritual religion’.99 In these comments, then, 
we see Jones beginning to engage with religious experience beyond Christianity. 
More than that, he seems to be in favour of a ‘universal spiritual religion’, a position 
that is all the more intriguing given that the book was published in the same year as 
the unequivocally Christian Faith and Practice.  
Perhaps inspired by his visit, Jones expresses the hope in New Studies that one day 
‘we in the West will learn the secret which India has always possessed – that the 
soul is the eternally important fact and its testimony the ground of all truth.’100 The 
book ends with a story from India: Eight hundred years before Christ, a king asked a 
sage ‘what is the light of man?’ The sage replied, ‘When the sun is set, and the 
moon is set, and the fire is gone out, THE SOUL IS THE LIGHT OF MAN.’101 Taken at face 
value, the statement seems to preclude any association of the light with the 
historical Christ. Furthermore, it could be interpreted as implying that humans are 
divine. A few paragraphs earlier, however, Jones had insisted that ‘All the 
knowledge of God which is possessed by men has come to us in the last resort 
through some human consciousness of Him.’102 In other words, what Jones seems 
to mean, but arguably does not express very well, is that the soul is the light of man 
not in and of itself but by virtue of its relationship with God.  
Pathways to the Reality of God (1931): Here Jones sets himself against the dualism 
he saw as characteristic of ‘the Barthian school’, namely their insistence that God 
must be ‘an absolute Other’. He insists that ‘If nothing of the divine nature can be 
expressed in the human then the incarnation of God in Christ has no real meaning 
or significance, and nothing that we say about God is anything more than a flatus 
 
99 Quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 221. 
100 Jones, New Studies, 204. 
101 Jones, New Studies, 205. 
102 Jones, New Studies, 204. 
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vocis, an empty breath of sound.’103 So, whereas Barth believed that knowledge of 
God is obtainable only through Christ, Jones believed that it is only because God is 
present in individuals that God can, in any case, be revealed in Christ.  
A Preface to Christian Faith in a New Age (1932): In 1930, Jones was asked to be 
part of a commission of ecumenical laymen studying foreign missions in India, 
Burma, China and Japan. In preparation for the six-month trip, he gathered together 
a council of religious leaders and asked them the question ‘What seem to you to be 
the most striking and difficult intellectual and practical obstacles to the revival and 
spread of Christian faith in the world of this present generation?’ The result was A 
Preface to Christian Faith, which was addressed primarily to ministers but was 
chosen as the May ‘book of the month’ by the Religious Book Club.104 Perhaps 
surprisingly, given its genesis, the chapter on ‘The Testimony of Human Experience’ 
wholeheartedly embraces the experience of God in other spiritual traditions.105 
Jones starts with the Book of Proverbs, which claims that ‘the spirit of man is a 
candle of the lord’.106 This, he says, represents something more than the testimony 
of a solitary individual – it bears the mark of communal experience. He goes on to 
link this experience to the experience of a Sufi poet of Persia, who in a similar 
phrase wrote: ‘Every heart that has slept one night in Thy air, / O God, is like a 
radiant day’.107 Likewise, Indian sages recognized that ‘the soul is the light of man’; 
Confucius declared that ‘Like the rush of mighty waters, the presence of unseen 
Powers is felt, sometimes above us and sometimes around us’; and a 
‘Mohammedan mystic’ commanded ‘Go sweep out the chamber of your heart, / 
Make it ready to be the dwelling place of the Beloved’.108 Returning to Christian 
 
103 Jones, Pathways, 48. 
104 Vining, Friend of Life, 229. 
105 R.M. Jones, A Preface to Christian Faith in a New Age (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 71–105. For 
background on Jones’ inclusive, but controversial, attitudes to other faiths, see Angell, ‘Rufus Jones 
and the layman’s foreign mission enquiry’. 
106 Jones, Preface, 91. 
107 Jones, Preface, 92. 
108 Jones, Preface, 93–94, 
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mysticism, Jones asserts that the great saying of Christ, ‘the Kingdom of God is in 
you’, may be taken as ‘a headwater source of this stream of mystical life’.109 Jones 
here was in line with many scholars who were interpreting mysticism as a universal 
experience (see Chapter 8), and he is perhaps also echoing Clement, who was of the 
opinion that ‘the way of truth is one, but into it, added to a never failing river, there 
flow different streams on this side and that’.110 What is relevant here is that the 
assertion that experience of God is found at different times and in different cultures 
is consistent with (although does not necessarily imply) Jones’ view that God is part 
of human nature. 
Spirit in Man (1941): This book comprises the three West memorial lectures given at 
Stanford University under the original title ‘Implications of Man’s Mind’.111 In some 
ways it is similar to the 1927 article in The London Friend referenced above, in that 
Jones’ approach is philosophical rather than Christian. The point to note here is 
that, as Aiken puts it, here ‘Jones can define the Inner Light as “spirit” or “mind” 
without reference even to God, let alone Christ’.112 
A Call to What is Vital (1948): Jones’ final book was conceived following a 
conversation with a ‘prominent Quaker of New England’, who urged him to write a 
book ‘that will help the college-trained persons who have the scientific outlook to 
find their way back to a vital religion’.113 There is no doubt that the religion in 
question was Christianity. Here again he stresses that the incarnation means that 
we have to reinterpret human nature such that there is ‘mutual and reciprocal 
correspondence between the divine and the human’.114 The ‘scientific outlook’ 
promised in the book seems somewhat dated, however.  Jones is still quoting 
 
109 Jones, Preface, 94. 
110 Ware and Louth, ‘Clement of Alexandria’, 37. 
111 R. M. Jones, Spirit in Man (Berkeley, CA: Peacock Press, 1963). 
112 Aiken ‘Who took the Christ out of Quakerism?’, 43. 
113 Jones, Call to what is Vital, vi. 
114 Jones, Call to what is Vital, 111. 
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James, that ‘the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which 
saving experiences come’ rather than engaging with Freud or Jung.115  
7.3.2 Some comments on Jones’ thought post-Social Law 
The above survey of Jones’ corpus reveals that the human–divine relationship, or 
Inner Light, was a constant preoccupation throughout his life. If we are to believe 
his assertion in A Dynamic Faith, his fundamental position does not change, 
although the way he expresses himself certainly does.  
In particular, there is a move away from the historical Christ in some discussions, 
but a more explicitly Christian presentation in some of his books addressed to 
Quakers. The year 1927 is especially notable in this regard. Faith and Practice uses 
Christian terminology, in that the spirit of Christ is within; New Studies sees the soul 
as the light of man in all religions; and the article in the London Friend discusses 
divine immanence without reference to Christ. While these expressions might on 
the surface seem incompatible, it needs to be borne in mind that, from Chapter 6, 
Jones viewed the spirit of God, as revealed supremely in Christ, as immanent in 
creation, so even though the terminology used to describe the human–divine 
relationship varies in the examples given here, the underlying message is the same. 
These shifts in expression notwithstanding, a number of recurring themes can be 
identified in Jones’ perception of the Inner Light that relate to previous discussions 
about God, Christ and human nature. First, Jones never conceives of the soul 
without reference to God. This and his attempts to balance the power that God 
provides and human effort make it clear that he is not a secular humanist. Second, 
Jones believes that an individual’s capacity to hear God is increased by obedience, 
so the Inner Light is not stagnant but is strengthened, or brightens, perhaps. 
Furthermore, because Jones believed that individuals are transformed by good 
deeds (Chapter 5), this ‘brightening’ is accompanied by the transformation of the 
 
115 Jones, Call to what is Vital, 66. 
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individual, a conviction that finds expression in Clement’s conception of the 
‘harmonized man’. 
What is also notable is that there is no attempt after Social Law to provide evidence 
for this inherent view of the Inner Light. This is in spite of the fact that, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, in later years Jones regretted his reliance on James’ theory of the 
subconscious and in Spiritual Reformers goes as far as to say that experience of God 
is not an ‘experience that attaches itself to the very nature of consciousness’.116 
 
Conclusion 
The Inner Light has always been a central, arguably the defining, concept in 
Quakerism. It has always resisted precise definition though, and different 
conceptions of it have historically caused schisms within Quakerism and shaped the 
practices and beliefs of the resulting groups. Broadly speaking, 17th century 
Quakers associated the Inner Light with Christ and defended their position biblically. 
Eighteenth century Quietist Quakers emphasized the inner witness of the Inner 
Light at the expense of the Bible and reason, developing a somewhat passive 
spirituality structured around listening for a voice from beyond themselves. Those 
19th century Quakers influenced by evangelicalism viewed Scripture as more 
authoritative than the Light and associated the Light with the Holy Spirit, whereas 
others saw this trend as threatening the very essence of Quakerism. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Jones radically reshaped the way in which liberal 
Quakers thought about the concept, casting his view against the dualistic 
understanding that he attributed to Barclay. 
Social Law constituted Jones’ first written expression of his ideas on the Inner Light, 
although they had been aired at summer conferences in 1901 and 1903. Jones 
 
116 Jones, Spiritual Reformers, xxii. 
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claims in his chapter on the Inner Light that the Bible, the Fathers, philosophy, 
psychology and experience all supported the idea that the Inner Light was part of 
human nature. Perhaps because of his deliberate theological naivety and informal 
style, however, the evidence he provides is fairly superficial and he does not engage 
with possible objections, which are in fact fairly easy to find.  
Regarding biblical evidence, Jones used ‘proof texts’ to support his claim but 
ignored the strand of biblical thought that views humans and God as separate, even 
though he was aware of it. His evidence from the Fathers (not detailed in Social Law 
itself) is equally ambivalent, as his interpretations of Clement and Augustine are 
unconventional. Regarding philosophical/psychological evidence, Jones complains 
that transformation of the person is not possible with the Barclayan view of the 
Inner Light, but in fact Barclay himself envisaged that individuals would be 
‘leavened’ by the seed of God within. Furthermore, his reliance on Pascal’s 
statement that one needs in some sense to have found God before searching for 
God is also inconclusive: it is consistent with Barclay’s view, in that a ‘foreign seed’ 
within could cause an individual to search for God, and in that sense, God is on 
some level already ‘found’. Finally, Jones’ formulation requires that in theory 
everyone should experience spiritual certitude, but this is not borne out in practice, 
as exemplified by William Littleboy. Although Jones does offer passing remarks to 
explain this lack of experience, which he acknowledges at times in other works, he 
does not give the issue sufficient attention, given that it is such a basic implication 
of his formulation of the Inner Light. This is, perhaps, a reflection of the fact that he 
seemed to take his own experience as normative, a propensity I have referred to as 
his experiential basis.  
My survey of Jones’ use of the Inner Light in his wider corpus revealed that, while 
Jones claimed that he retained this view of the Inner Light throughout his life, he 
expressed himself in a variety of ways in relation to a Christian framework. As we 
will see in Chapter 9, this has led to a variety of interpretations of his thought. It is 
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also significant that nowhere else does he attempt to justify his view in the way he 
does in Social Law, nor to reformulate it in the face of potential problems arising 
from the work of Freud and Jung. 
The weaknesses of Jones’ arguments aside, it is clear that what he was attempting 
to do was to bring Quakerism into alignment with modern thought. He was making 
Quakerism consistent with his interpretation of Christianity as detailed in the last 
three chapters by associating the view of human nature he obtained from 
synthesizing liberal Christianity, idealism and psychology with the quintessentially 
Quaker concept of the Inner Light.  
This task was aided by the fact that, as noted in Chapter 3, liberal Christianity and 
Quakerism had some important similarities: for example, they shared (i) an 
optimistic view of human nature, (ii) a commitment to social reform, and (iii) an 
emphasis on experience. All three of these similarities can be expressed in relation 
to the Inner Light. In particular, they can be related to the three attributes of the 
Inner Light identified by Jones (see Section 7.2 above), namely that the Inner Light is 
(i) a Divine life resident in the soul, (ii) a source of guidance and illumination, and 
(iii) the ground of spiritual certitude. That is, the two sets of points are related as 
follows: (i) an optimistic view of human nature is a natural consequence of God 
being resident in the soul; (ii) a concern for social reform goes hand in hand with 
the Inner Light as a source of guidance (to be discussed in Chapter 8); (iii) the 
emphasis on experience is a necessary corollary of seeing the Inner Light as a source 
of spiritual certitude. 
Jones’ views of the Inner Light have proved enormously influential. Given the 
weaknesses of his arguments that I have identified here, this influence arguably 
rests on somewhat shaky foundations. This accusation is serious but not without 
precedent: T. Vail Palmer disagreed with Jones’ interpretation of Quakerism as 
historically a mystical religion and concluded that, because of Jones’ mistake, 
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contemporary Quakerism is ‘founded on an egregious misunderstanding’.117 
Chapter 9 will explore Jones’ influence in more detail by tracing how his ideas were 
received both by his contemporaries and by later Quakers and scholars of 
Quakerism. First, though, we turn to look at how Jones’ ideas about the Inner Light 
were incorporated in the dominant framework for expressing religious experience 









Mysticism is a felt experience of God 
 
Any person who has these moments of consciousness in which he feels his 
relationship to the Infinite is so far a mystic’.1 
 
As we have seen, Jones’ synthesis of Quakerism and modern thought meant that he 
saw the Inner Light as an inherent part of human nature. This chapter will argue 
that this novel formulation of the Inner Light was, in turn, integral to his view of 
mysticism. Indeed, I will suggest that Jones’ understanding of mysticism represents 
the pinnacle of his synthesis, being an ingenious blend of his formulation of the 
Inner Light gained from idealism and psychology, the contemporary interest in the 
Social Gospel, the traditional Quaker emphasis on experience and social action, and 
his own awareness of God from childhood onwards. 
Mysticism was a natural framework for Jones to use to express his thought about 
the human–divine relationship because it was a topic of huge interest to both 
scholars and the general public in early 20th century America. Jones was an 
enthusiastic participant in academic and lay conversations, and his association with 
mysticism is so strong that he has been called the founder of mystical Quakerism.2 
In fact, his influence in this area reached far beyond the confines of the Society. 
Howard Thurman, a prominent civil rights leader, was inspired by Jones’ message 
about the social utility of mystical experience, and Harry Emerson Fosdick, a well-
known 20th century liberal preacher and broadcaster, vigorously promoted both 
 
1 Jones, Social Law, 142. 
2 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 31. 
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pacifism and a psychologically informed mysticism under the influence of Jones.3 
More generally, the historian Michael Hedstrom claims that Jones made mysticism 
middlebrow in the 1930s, and Patricia Appelbaum notes that he was an influential 
figure within a Protestant movement that practised ‘presence mysticism’, a form of 
mysticism that assumed the constant presence of God in a way that provided 
strength for work for peace and social action.4 Beyond even Protestantism, Schmidt 
holds that Jones played a significant role in developing America’s ‘spiritual-but-not-
religious’ culture.5 
Given Jones’ legacy in regard to mysticism, it is important to establish what he 
meant by the term, how it is related to his ideas about God and the Inner Light, and 
how his contribution was distinctive. I will suggest that in Social Law, Jones’ 
understanding of mysticism has two main components. The first is that it involves 
an experience of God. The second is that this experience should ideally lead to 
action, although in practice it sometimes does not. Jones therefore differentiated 
between negation mystics, who desired an experience of ecstasy as an end in itself, 
and affirmation mystics, who aimed to transform the world based on this felt 
encounter with God. Affirmation mysticism, then, can be seen as the means by 
which the Inner Light is manifested in practice: it involves an experience of God that 
results in guidance regarding social action and provides the strength to act.  
The above interpretation of Jones’ mysticism is not universally held, however. Hugh 
Rock recently claimed that Jones’ mysticism involves thought not feeling and that 
talk of God is a gloss.6 Rock’s conclusion will be addressed in detail in the next 
chapter, which deals with the interpretation of Jones’ thought, but the discrepancy 
between my interpretation and Rock’s is perhaps an indication that more research 
 
3 M. Hedstrom, ‘The Quakerization of everything’, Quaker Religious Thought 122 (2014): 39–40. 
4 Hedstrom, ‘Mysticism for the masses’; Appelbaum, ‘Protestant mysticism’, 1–24. 
5 Schmidt, Restless Souls, 237. Note that Quakers today tend to refer to spirituality rather than 
mysticism; see Chapter 10. 
6 Rock, ‘Rufus Jones never did establish’, 61. 
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into Jones’ understanding of mysticism, rather than into its impact, is needed. The 
above-cited authors, Hedstrom, Schmidt and Appelbaum, for example, approach 
Jones’ mysticism through the discipline of religious studies rather than offering a 
comprehensive analysis of Jones’ use of the term itself: Hedstrom explores the role 
that Jones’ books played in American liberal culture; Schmidt takes in the grand 
sweep of the development of American spirituality; and Appelbaum discusses four 
mid-20th century mystics who were influenced by Jones’ conception of a ‘spiritual 
religion’.7 A further approach to Jones’ mysticism is that of Paul Marshall, who 
refers to Jones in the context of mystical epistemology, considering what type of 
knowledge can be gained through mystical experiences, and cites him as an early 
proponent of the view that religious experiences have a real ‘mystical object’ but 
are mediated by social and religious expectations.8  
Works that do offer a description of Jones’ mysticism are over 50 years old. Vining 
provides an uncritical analysis in a chapter in her biography,9 and a 1960 PhD thesis 
by Atkins, ‘A critical examination of the mystical idealism of Rufus Jones’, argues 
that Jones reconciled the tension between the intellectual approach to mysticism 
exemplified by Jonathan Edwards and William James and the informal development 
and practice of mystical religion exemplified by John Woolman, Emerson and 
Whitman.10  
What is missing, then, is a historically sensitive analysis of Jones’ view of mysticism 
that relates it to his views on God and the Inner Light. Here I first give some 
historical context: Section 8.1 summarizes how mysticism evolved from being 
somewhat marginal and disreputable to a respectable field of research at the turn 
of the 20th century, and Section 8.2 discusses Jones’ relationship with some of his 
 
7 Hedstrom, ‘Mysticism for the masses’; Schmidt, Restless Souls; Appelbaum, ‘Protestant mysticism’. 
8 P. Marshall, Mystical Encounters with the Natural World: Experiences and Explanations (Oxford: 
OUP, 2005), 179. 
9 Vining, Friend of Life, Chapter 23. 
10 Atkins, Mystical Idealism of Rufus Jones, 9–10.  
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contemporaries, namely Evelyn Underhill, William Inge, Friedrich von Hügel and 
Francis Peabody. These two sections thus provide the context for Jones’ views both 
before and after the publication of Social Law. Section 8.3 deals with Jones’ views 
themselves, specifically his characterization of mysticism, his introduction of the 
terms affirmation and negation mysticism, and his Quaker-inspired conviction that 
mysticism flourished best in a group. My focus is on the presentation of mysticism 
in Social Law, but I also illustrate how the views therein were expressed in his wider 
corpus. I conclude that Jones’ understanding of affirmation mysticism draws 
together many of the themes considered in earlier chapters and therefore 
constitutes a coherent synthesis of his thought.  
 
8.1 Mysticism in historical context 
Mysticism has had a chequered history regarding both understandings of the term 
itself and its reputation. In this section I give a very brief overview of some of the 
main strands in the development of mystical terminology, and of how opinions of it 
changed in the latter half of the 19th century. The historical context is drawn mainly 
from Schmidt’s 2003 paper, but I relate the historical developments therein to 
Jones. 
8.1.1 The roots of mystical terminology 
The word ‘mystica’ came into Christianity through the 5th century Syrian monk 
known as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.11 It derives from the Greek term mu, 
which has connotations of secrecy (as in the phrase ‘keeping mum’). For Pseudo-
Dionysius, mystical theology involved secrecy of mind, or a state of consciousness 
beyond knowing that experienced God as ‘a ray of divine Dark’.12 He proposed two 
 
11 In line with accepted conventions, this unknown monk claimed authority by purporting to be 
Dionysius, a convert of Paul at Areopagus (Acts 17).  
12 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 109. 
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ways in which God could be encountered: the affirmative and the negative path. 
According to Jones’ analysis of Pseudo-Dionysius, seekers on the affirmative path 
gather what light they can from the revelation of God in a process akin to that of 
gathering crumbs that fall from the Divine table. This way is, however, limited: it is 
like trying to know someone only through the shadows they cast. Ultimately, 
knowledge itself must be transcended and the soul must rise to a union with God.13 
Pseudo-Dionysius uses the image of the sculptor (drawn from Plotinus) to illustrate 
the situation: just as the sculptor removes material to bring to light the hidden 
Beauty within, ‘So we abstract (negate) everything in order that without veils we 
may know that Unknown which is concealed by all the light in existing things.’14 The 
negative, or apothatic, theology introduced by Pseudo-Dionysius thus stresses the 
inability of human ideas to convey the reality of God. There are ways to discover 
truths about God from his manifestations in the world, but these are inferior to a 
mystical union.  
The writings of Pseudo-Dionysius surfaced in the 6th century, were translated into 
Latin by John Scotus Erigena in the 9th century, and proved to be enormously 
influential within the Western monastic tradition from the 12th century onwards. In 
his Introduction to the 14th century classic The Cloud of Unknowing, for example, 
Wolters notes that Dionysius’ authority on spiritual matters was unquestioned at 
this time and that The Cloud ‘shows his influence on every page’.15 The anonymous 
author addresses his ‘friend in God’, advising, for example, ‘Reconcile yourself to 
wait in this darkness as long as is necessary, but still go on longing after him whom 
you love. For if you are to feel him or to see him in this life, it must always be in this 
cloud, in this darkness.’16 Similarly, the influential 16th century Spanish Carmelite 
John of the Cross writes in the Ascent to Mount Carmel that ‘To reach this essential 
 
13 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 108. 
14 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 109. 
15 C. E. Wolters (ed.), The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Works (London: Penguin, 1978), 20. 
16 Wolters, Cloud, 62. 
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union of love of God, a person must be careful not to lean upon imaginative visions, 
forms, figures, or particular ideas, since they cannot serve as a proportionate and 
proximate means for such an effect; they would be a hindrance instead.’17 The 
Church did not always embrace such attitudes though, and was often hostile to 
claims of unmediated, imageless communion with God, which might make it 
redundant or lead people astray.18 
The term ‘mysticism’ did not, however, exist in the early decades of the 18th 
century. The prevailing category was ‘mystic theology’, which was a way of life 
involving prayer, contemplation and self-denial. The term mysticism was first used 
in the mid-18th century as a criticism of enthusiasm and carried connotations of 
misplaced sexuality. Mystics themselves were associated with sects, such that the 
1797 entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica defined mystics as ‘a kind of religious 
sect, distinguished by their professing pure, sublime, and perfect devotion’, citing 
Quietists, Quakers and Methodists as examples.19 Sixty years later, however, 
‘mysticism’ had become the defining category. Furthermore, the texts of the major 
spiritual traditions were beginning to be translated, and the definition of mysticism 
had a universalist tone. In the 1858 edition of the Britannica, the characteristics of 
mysticism were held to be the same, ‘whether they find expression in the Bagvat-
Gita of the Hindu, or in the writings of Emmanuel Swedenborg’.20 The following 
years saw the formation of various subspecies of mysticism, such as Oriental 
mysticism, Neo-Platonic mysticism, etc. Jones, for example, published a review of a 
book entitled ‘Jewish Mysticism’.21 
By the time Jones wrote Social Law, definitions of mysticism had proliferated. Inge 
lists and critiques 26 definitions in the appendix of his 1899 Christian Mysticism, 
 
17 Quoted in D. Chowning, ‘Free to love: negation in the doctrine of John of the Cross’, in Carmelite 
Studies VI: John of the Cross, ed. S. Payne (Washington DC: ICS Publications, 1992), 44. 
18 See, for example, D. MacCulloch, Silence (London: Penguin, 2013), 157. 
19 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 280. 
20 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 282. 
21 R. M. Jones, ‘Jewish Mysticism’, Harvard Theological Review 36 (1943): 155–163.  
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while acknowledging that the list could be made much longer. Mysticism according 
to Goethe, for example, is ‘the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings’.22 
The decades that followed did nothing to bring clarity, and the ambivalent heritage 
of the term is apparent in Jones’ complaint as late as 1937 that ‘In most modern 
scientific laboratories the word mysticism is even now used to connote “spurious 
knowledge,” occult lore, or abnormal phenomena. The student is given the 
impression that the word stands for claptrap and mental rubbish.’23 
8.1.2 How mysticism captured the public imagination  
Diverse definitions notwithstanding, mysticism captured the public imagination to 
the extent that a writer in the Church Quarterly Review in 1906 declared that the 
United States was a country in which ‘mysticism’ and a ‘craving for spiritual 
experiences’ had ‘run mad’.24 Within Quakerism, this interest is apparent in a 
program of talks given at Germantown monthly meeting in 1928 (Figure 8.1). The 
talks are on the theme of the search for God in a variety of religions, with mysticism 
being an explicit or implicit component in a number of cases.25 This interest is also 
apparent in a letter to Jones from one of his colleagues, Douglas Steere. Writing 
from a Methodist conference, Steere reported that the delegates were ‘remarkably 
appreciative’ and ‘intensely interested’ in a talk he had given on the subject. His 
letter also reveals the mistrust of lay mysticism by ecclesiastical authority though, 
as he goes on to complain that in public these same delegates ‘spout broadsides 
against mysticism without any clear notion of what they are attacking except a kind 
of vacuous vagueness of feeling that some of their parishioners have substituted for 
religion’.26  
 
22 W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen, 1899), 338. 
23 Jones, Testimony, 200. 
24 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 284. 
25 Retrieved from Ancestry.com: Swarthmore College; Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Minutes, 1924-
1935; Collection: Quaker Meeting Records; Call Number: MR Ph 190. 




Figure 8.1. Program of talks at Germantown Monthly Meeting in 1928.27  
Something clearly happened in the 19th century to shift mysticism from an 
association with sects to a field of academic study and lay fascination. The emerging 
translations of religious texts from non-Christian religions were an important factor, 
but Schmidt argues that the decisive event was the publication of Robert Alfred 
Vaughan’s seminal two-volume work Hours with the Mystics.28 The book was 
immensely popular, and in fact the 1858 article in the Britannica referred to above 
was a summary of its main points. Hours presents a somewhat meandering history 
of mysticism in the form of a conversation among three friends (Gower, Atherton 
 
27 Retrieved from ancestry.com: Swarthmore College; Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Minutes, 1924-
1935; Collection: Quaker Meeting Records; Call Number: MR Ph 190. 
28 R. Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, 2 vols (London: John Parker, 1856). 
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and Willoughby) as they settle down to enjoy wine and walnuts on a November 
evening as the fire ‘crackled and sparkled, and the wind without moaned about the 
corners of the house’.29 The three men explore, with occasional digressions as they 
move to the drawing room, or enjoy summer picnics, how mysticism found 
expression among different nations and in different periods. Thus chapter titles 
include topics such as ‘Characteristics of Hindoo Mysticism’ and ‘The Mysticism of 
Bernard’.  Vaughan’s prevailing attitude, as captured by a reviewer at the time, is ‘a 
certain want of sympathy with the mystical aspect of religion’, which the reviewer 
identified as its ‘contemplative and experimental side’. 30 Rather, he says, Vaughan’s 
sympathies are with mysticism’s ‘common-sense, robust, world-shouldering, 
militant manifestations’. St Theresa, for example, is, in Vaughan’s view, ‘vision-
craving’ and ‘sentimental’.31  
The book certainly captivated the young Jones, who, as noted in Chapter 2, read 
and re-read it as a student at Haverford.32 Jones is in agreement with a number of 
Vaughan’s views: he too was suspicious of anything abnormal, preferring an active, 
everyday form of mysticism. They also both criticized the ‘negative way’ of Pseudo-
Dionysius. In Hours, Vaughan has ‘Gower’ waxing lyrical, explaining how Pseudo-
Dionysius’ theology is akin to his entering a wood, where he ‘extinguishes the many 
twinkling lights the sunshine hung wavering in the foliage, silences all sounds of 
singing, and fills the darkened aisles and domes with a coldly-descending mist, 
whose silence is extolled as above the power of utterance’.33 ‘Willoughby’ is equally 
adamant, if less poetic, in his condemnation: ‘I cannot get that wretched 
abstraction out of my head which the Neo-Platonists call deity. How such a notion 
must have dislocated all their ethics from head to foot!’34 Likewise, Jones concluded 
 
29 R. Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, 3rd edn, Vol. 1 (London: Gibbings & Co., 1893), 3. 
30 ‘Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics’, London Quarterly Review, Oct.1862-Jan.1932, 57(113) (1881): 199. 
31 R. Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, Vol. 2 (London: John Parker, 1856), 161. 
32 Jones, Life in College, 133. 
33 Vaughan, Hours, Vol. 1, 118. 
34 Vaughan, Hours, Vol. 1, 120. 
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that the ideas of pseudo-Dionysius were ‘Neoplatonic philosophy slightly sprinkled 
with baptismal water from a Christian font’.35 He disliked the speculation about the 
roles of angels, the portrayal of the spiritual journey as a solitary undertaking, the 
goal of gazing on God that ignored the world, and the inherent pantheism. He did 
acknowledge, however, that pseudo-Dionysius ‘kindled in multitudes of souls a pure 
passion for God’.36  
A number of factors helped to fuel the fascination in mysticism aroused by Hours. In 
America, the Transcendentalists played a vital role. Under their influence, mysticism 
loosened its ties with Christianity and became, in Schmidt’s words, ‘loosely spiritual, 
intuitive, emancipatory, and universal’.37 William James gave the mystic cause a 
significant boost in Varieties, conferring scientific credibility on religious experience 
and, in line with the Transcendentalists, claiming that religious feelings are the 
same for ‘Stoic, Christian, and Buddhist saints’.38 Furthermore, religious liberals 
recognized that mysticism offered a refuge from an increasingly scientific and 
materialistic worldview. As early as 1878 an article in the Methodist Quarterly 
Review warned that mysticism was needed more than ever because the general 
drift of thought was antagonistic to the spiritual and the eternal.39 Finally, simple 
curiosity about other religions seems to have played a role. William Inge expressed 
the prevailing attitude in a letter to Jones in 1947, writing that, ‘Like [Aldous] Huxley 
and many others I have been captivated by Indian thought ... Just when we are 
losing India we are finding out just how much we might have learned from them.’40  
In summary, the negative mystical theology as formulated by pseudo-Dionysius 
found its way into the Christian mystical tradition, and Vaughan captured academic 
and public imagination in mysticism as a phenomenon that occurred in all religions 
 
35 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 110. 
36 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 111. 
37 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 286. 
38 James, Varieties, 504. 
39 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 289. 
40 W.R. Inge, 12 June 1947, HC Box 46. 
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through Hours with the Mystics. Jones was captivated by Hours and echoed 
Vaughan’s dislike of abnormal manifestations. In the early decades of the 20th 
century, interest was fuelled by the influence of the Transcendentalists, the liberal 
agenda, James’ psychological approach and the availability of non-Christian 
religious texts. The term itself, though, eluded a concise and universally accepted 
definition and often carried esoteric connotations 
 
8.2 Jones and contemporary scholars of mysticism 
This enthusiasm for mysticism spawned a host of publications. Around the time of 
Social Law, books published on the topic included Christian Mysticism (William Inge, 
1899), Varieties (William James, 1902), Personal Idealism and Mysticism (Inge, 
1907), The Mystical Element in Religion (Friedrich von Hügel, 1908), Mysticism 
(Evelyn Underhill 1911) and The Idea of the Holy (Rudolph Otto, 1917). Jones 
participated enthusiastically in this surge of academic interest, publishing numerous 
books and articles and forging trans-Atlantic friendships with the above writers. 41 
This section first gives a brief overview of some of the mystical works of Jones’ 
corpus and then introduces some of his contemporaries in the field. 
8.2.1 Jones’ mystical corpus 
Social Law contains the first detailed explanation of Jones’ view of mysticism, but it 
was a topic he would return to again and again throughout his life. To take just 
three examples, Studies in Mystical Religion (1909) was designed to be an 
introduction the Rowntree history series. This lengthy book (500+ pages) focuses on 
the mystics that Jones believed were the forerunners of Quakerism: there are 
chapters on Plato, Plotinus, the Church Fathers, St Francis and the Anabaptists, 
among others. Aspects of mysticism that resonated with Jones’ perception of 
 
41 Jones, ‘Jewish mysticism’, 155. 
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Quakerism (the importance of practical service, inner experience) are extolled, 
whereas asceticism and abnormal experiences are denigrated.42  New Studies in 
Mysticism was published in 1927 and contains chapters on mystical religion as it 
related to the abnormal, asceticism, religious education and organization. Here 
again, there is a clear antipathy to anything not involved in ordinary, day-to-day life: 
‘If mysticism were nothing but a series of trances or ecstatic states’, Jones declares, 
‘it would surely be a doubtful asset for religion, and we should be hanging our 
spiritual hopes on a flimsy cable.’43 As a final example, The Luminous Trail (1947) 
was written when Jones was in his eighties. It describes a somewhat eclectic 
selection of saints, ‘whether canonized or not’, whom Jones deemed to have been 
‘open-windowed to God’.44 Thus, while there are stalwarts such as Paul, John, 
Francis of Assisi, the final chapter considers his son Lowell, who had died at age 11 
over 40 years previously. Jones was of the opinion that ‘his life was so full of 
promise, the attitude of direction was so marked, that I am convinced he belongs in 
my list here’.45 The choice likely says as much about Jones’ egalitarian view of 
mysticism and his paternal pride and grief than it does about the Lowell’s nascent 
saintliness. 
8.2.2 Underhill, Inge, von Hügel and Peabody 
In order to identify Jones’ distinctive contribution to the study of mysticism, I offer 
here a few very broad comments on the views of Evelyn Underhill, Friedrich von 
Hügel, William Inge (also referred to as Dean Inge, in respect of his position from 
1911 until 1935 as Dean of St Paul's Cathedral) and Francis Peabody, in particular as 
they relate to Quakerism.46  
 
42 For a review, see Vining, Friend of Life, 125–127. 
43 Jones, New Studies, 49. 
44 Jones, Luminous Trail, 1. 
45 Jones, Luminous Trail, 153. 
46 Further details and a comparison of the first three writers can be found in Brown’s PhD thesis 
(Brown, The Doctrine of God). 
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Baron Friedrich von Hügel (1852–1925) was born in Florence but settled in England, 
where he became a prominent Catholic layman. He argued that there are three 
elements in religion that correspond to the three great forces of the soul: (1) the 
sensory and memory force corresponds to the external element of religion, 
described as historical, traditional and institutional; (2) reasoning is related to the 
speculative, theological element; and (3) intuition and feeling are related to the 
mystical element.47 Whereas it is probably fair to say that Jones emphasized the 
third element (although he by no means ignored the other two), von Hügel insisted 
that there should be balance among the three. In practice this means that, for 
example, silent prayer is legitimate but it must be accompanied by vocal prayer, 
church attendance and sacramental acts to keep it ‘safe and wholesome’.48  
Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941) is perhaps best known for her book Mysticism, first 
published in 1911 and in numerous subsequent editions.49 Her thoughts on 
mysticism developed over her life, in part because of von Hügel, who as her spiritual 
director encouraged her to become involved in social work and to embrace a more 
Christocentric position.50 She was a respected retreat leader and later in life a 
prominent member of the Anglo-Catholic community.  
Underhill believed there were five stages in the mystical life (the awakening of the 
self, purgation, illumination, the Dark night of the soul, and union), and endorsed 
specific techniques for prayer.51 Jones, as we will see, felt that neither a prescribed 
path nor techniques were necessary and was more concerned with the practical 
outcomes of mystic experience. James Pratt summed up the difference nicely in a 
letter to Jones:  
 
47 For a summary of von Hügel’s thought, see Brown, The Doctrine of God, 16–46. 
48 Brown, The Doctrine of God, 36. 
49 E. Underhill, Mysticism, 12th edn (New York: Meridian, 1930). 
50 For a summary of Underhill’s thought, see Brown, The Doctrine of God, 47–96. 
51 See, for example, the advice she gives to one of her correspondents in C. Williams (ed.) The Letters 




Your position seems to me not only strong but extremely important. If 
mysticism is to be a vital & really influential thing in our day it must be 
divorced from the particular and provincial formulations of the Middle Ages – 
such as the Stages of the “Mystic Way”. Too bad that one who has done so 
much to increase contemporary interest in mysticism as Evelyn Underhill 
should also have done so much to rivet its ancient chains.52  
Jones and Underhill also disagreed about the value of abnormal phenomena. In 
Mysticism, Underhill takes issue with Jones’ complaint that the stigmata of St 
Francis were the marks of emotional and physical abnormality, declaring that ‘it 
may well be doubted whether that flame of living love which could, for new dazzling 
instant, weld body and soul one, was really a point of weakness in a saint.’53 
Intriguingly, though, Underhill must at some point have veered towards some 
aspects of Quakerism, as von Hügel evidently took her to task her about what she 
referred to as her ‘Quakerish leanings’. She recounts in a letter that he felt that such 
an interior religion worked well in one’s exalted moments, but failed in ordinary 
daily life: on the whole, ‘a steady-going parish priest like a dear nice eiderdown(!)’ 
was more suitable than any prophet. Underhill admitted that she found this a ‘hard 
and dreary doctrine’ but could not disagree.54 Jones himself seemed frustrated by 
Underhill’s failure to grasp Quaker spirituality, however, complaining in a letter to 
Violet Holdsworth that ‘she is quite unable to appreciate or even to understand the 
full meaning of Quaker worship without sacraments’.55 So perhaps von Hügel’s 
warning had its desired effect. 
Inge’s views have certain similarities to Jones’. In fact, on more than one occasion 
he wrote to Jones of his affinity to Quakerism.56 In 1925 he admitted that ‘I read all 
 
52 James Pratt, 26 April 1915, HC Box 14. 
53 Underhill, Mysticism, 267. 
54 Williams, Letters, 144. 
55 Quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 257. 
56 It might be thought strange that such an eminent churchman should harbour Quaker leanings, but 
Inge disliked the services at St Paul’s. In his diary, he describes them as a ‘criminal waste of time’, 
complaining that ‘I have held different views at different times about the character and nature of the 
Creator of the Universe; but never at any time have I thought it at all probable that he is the type of 
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your books, and find myself in ever growing sympathy with the type of Christianity 
professed by the Society of Friends’.57 By 1947 (at which point Inge was 87), this 
sympathy had evidently increased to the point where he could write, ‘I often think 
of our delightful visit to Haverford and of your kindness to us. Bernard Shaw told 
me that I am a Quaker, and I believe I am.’58 In Mysticism in Religion (written one 
year later, in 1948), he quotes with approval Jones’ claim that Christianity is a 
religion of first-hand experience.59 He was cautious about identifying the 
subconscious with the ‘inmost sanctuary of the soul’, however, warning that ‘There 
is nothing respectable about the subconscious as such. It is not as foul as Freud 
makes out, but it is not the seat of what is best in us.’60 Jones had recognized similar 
problems with the subconscious by this time too, but as noted in the last chapter 
had not reformulated his concept of the Inner Light. Inge’s comments about being a 
Quaker thus raise questions, which are beyond the scope of this thesis, about to 
what extent he was aware of Jones’ 1904 formulation and how closely he 
associated it with Quakerism.  
We met Francis Peabody in Chapter 2, and his relevance here is that Social Gospel 
Protestants insisted that mysticism and political activism could not be separated.61 
Peabody gave an address to students at Bryn Mawr, the Quaker college associated 
with Haverford, in which he identified two links between mysticism and action. The 
first is that it is the experience of communion with God that gives the mystic that 
‘rare endowment of power’ that enables him to serve the world.62 The second is the 
recognition of the ‘worth and dignity of the individual soul’, which means that the 
 
person who enjoys being serenaded!’ Soon after his installation he took to reading a book in his stall 
during services, a practice that seems to have been both acknowledged and tolerated by others. (A. 
Fox, Dean Inge (London: John Murray, 1960), 115.) 
57 W. R. Inge, 1925 (no date), HC Box 24. 
58 W. R. Inge, 12 June 1947, HC Box 46. 
59 W. R. Inge, Mysticism in Religion (London: Hutchison, undated edition [1948]), 23. 
60 Inge, Mysticism in Religion, 161–162. 
61 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”’, 293. 
62 F. G. Peabody, ‘Mysticism and modern life’, Harvard Theological Review 7 (1914): 467. 
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sins and wrongs of society become the ‘natural object of attack’.63 In other words, 
social action is enabled by power from God and motivated by a theologically 
inspired view of humans as possessing an inherent worth. As noted in Chapter 7, 
this latter association between human worth and an ethical imperative was made 
by many liberal/modernist Quakers. 
Jones admired all the above scholars, although it was only Peabody, whom he had 
come to know in 1900/01 at Harvard, that he knew at the time of Social Law. He 
met von Hügel while in England in 1923, recounting that ‘The old philosopher and 
mystic stood up in front of me, half a head taller than I was’, and, raising his hands 
as high as they could reach, insisted that ‘a saint must be radiant’.64 Indeed, Jones 
dedicated New Studies ‘to the beautiful memory of my friend Baron Friedrich von 
Hügel, who strikingly illustrated the meaning of radiance in religion’. Inge and his 
wife enjoyed a visit with the Joneses in Haverford in the early 1920s, during which 
Jones and Inge gave lectures at the Bellevue-Stratford hotel in Philadelphia. Rufus 
Jones folklore holds that Jones secretly cleaned the shoes that Inge left outside his 
door every night during his stay, but Jones denied it. He did reveal, however, that 
they wondered around the maze of corridors in the Bellevue for some time 
searching for their hats and coats before Inge smiled and drily suggested, ‘Don’t you 
think we had better get a non-mystical person to guide us?’65 Finally, in spite of 
being frustrated by Underhill’s lack of appreciation for Quakerism, he referred to 
her as a ‘great soul’.66 
There are a number of extant letters from Underhill (often effusive, in scrawling 
hand-writing) and Inge (quite formal, in neat and precise penmanship) to Jones in 
the Haverford archives. The one from Underhill reproduced in Appendix C worries 
that she might have offended Jones by her comments in Mysticism about their 
 
63 Peabody, ‘Mysticism and modern life’, 470. 
64 Vining, Friend of Life, 205. 
65 Vining, Friend of Life, 207. 
66 Vining, Friend of Life, 257. 
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disagreement over St Francis’ stigmata. 
In summary, Jones was one of a group of Christian scholars who wrote on 
mysticism. Naturally, there were differences of opinion, and Jones recognized that 
he, Underhill and von Hügel represented ‘three different types of religious 
thought’.67 It is clear, however, that he held his fellow writers in affectionate regard. 
 
8.3 Jones’ understanding of mysticism 
As noted above, mysticism is a notoriously woolly term: Jones once commented 
that at the end of any lecture on the subject someone would be sure to rise and ask 
‘Will the speaker kindly tell us in two or three plain words what mysticism really 
is?’68 Added to this general vagueness, Punshon concludes that it is a mistake to 
look for a precise definition of mysticism from Jones, because his understanding 
‘was alive and growing and not really the sort of subject suitable for abstract 
formulae’.69 While this is true, it is also the case that Jones’ discussion of mysticism 
pervades his corpus, so there is plenty of material to draw on to ascertain his views. 
In lieu of a definition, this section first presents some characteristics of Jones’ 
understanding of mysticism, and then considers what I take to be his distinctive 
contributions: his use of the terms affirmation and negation mysticism, and his 
insistence that mysticism flourishes best in a group. 
8.3.1 Ten characteristics of mysticism 
The following ten characteristics of mysticism are apparent in Social Law, but I refer 
to Jones’ wider corpus to clarify and expand them. It will emerge that the way he 
characterizes and describes mysticism across his corpus is fairly constant, with the 
 
67 Jones, ‘Jewish mysticism’, 155. 
68 Vining, Friend of Life, 251. 
69 Punshon, Portrait in Grey, 227. 
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exception of his views on to what extent mysticism is universal. 
(1) Mysticism is an experience of God. In Social Law, a mystic is someone who 
‘feels his relationship to the Infinite’.70 This aspect of Jones’ treatment of mysticism 
never wavers. In Studies in Mystical Religion, mysticism is ‘the type of religion which 
puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and 
intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence’.71 In ‘Jewish Mysticism’, the 
‘fundamental fact of first-hand mystical experience’ is ‘the direct encounter with 
the living revealing God in the depths of the soul’.72 
(2) Mystical experience is one of personal relationship. In Social Law, a mystic is 
someone who has ‘found the living God’.73 This living God is deeply personal, as we 
saw in Chapter 4. In Testimony, Jones is surely drawing on his own experience when 
he says that God is ‘a warm and intimate Person whose reality makes our hearts 
tingle’.74 We have an inner witness, he says, that ‘recognizes the divine guest and 
answers back with the joyous cry of Abba’.75 In New Studies, this relationship is put 
in the context of prayer, during which sometimes ‘there comes a remarkable sense 
of answer and response’.76  It is illustrated in Spiritual Reformers by a quotation 
from the early Quaker Isaac Pennington: ‘This is He, this is He. There is no other: 
This is He whom I have waited for and sought after from my childhood.’77 And in 
The Beginnings of Quakerism, mystical religion is described as the type of religion 
‘through which the soul finds itself in a love-relation with the Living God’.78 
Occasionally Jones does use less personal language. In The Inner Life, he describes 
the central aspect of mystical experience as ‘the fusion of the self into a larger 
undifferentiated whole’ such that the ‘usual dualistic character of consciousness is 
 
70 Jones, Social Law, 142. 
71 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xv. 
72 Jones, ‘Jewish mysticism, 156. 
73 Jones, Social Law, 155. 
74 Jones, Testimony, 122. 
75 Jones, Testimony, 159. 
76 Jones, New Studies, 44. 
77 Jones, Spiritual Reformers, xix. 
78 Jones, Introduction to The Beginnings of Quakerism, in Quakerism, A Spiritual Movement, 128. 
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transcended’.79 It is possible that expressions such as this resulted in 
misunderstandings. Wilmot Metcalf seems to have questioned Jones on this point 
in a letter referring to one of Jones’ talks he had attended. Jones’ reply attempts to 
set the record straight: 
The one point that I made which seemed a mistake to you was in reference to what 
was in my mind in moments of worship. As I had been pointing out all through my 
talk, I feel that there are states of life when one stops thinking and in those highest 
moments of worship I never have a content of thought and I only meant to say that 
in such moments I did not think of God as personal, I simply felt the covering of a 
great Presence that surrounded and invaded me, and no thought beyond that was 
present. But the moment I interpret my religious life and my religious experience I 
always interpret it in terms of a personal God.80  
 
There seems to be little doubt, then, that, in spite of Jones’ occasional reference to 
shifts in consciousness, he viewed the relationship with God as a personal one. It 
should also be noted that Jones’ wider emphasis on divine guidance and 
transformation make most sense if they are understood in terms of a personal 
relationship with God.81  
(3) Mystical experiences are universal.   As we have seen, the fact that the 
‘shekinah of the soul’ is in the subconscious suggests that mystical experience 
should be universal. Jones seems to want to claim this universality, but, as noted in 
the last chapter, he wavers at times. In Testimony, universality is implicitly implied: 
‘mutual fellowship with God is as truly a normal trait of human life as breathing is’. 
And in Studies in Mystical Religion, mystical experiences are ‘not foreign to our true 
nature as men’.82 At other times, he acknowledges that mystical experiences are 
dependent on ‘the peculiar psychic structure of [the] inner self’.83 As also noted in 
the last chapter, Jones does offer some explanations in passing for this lack of 
 
79 Jones, Inner Life, 185. 
80 To Wilmot Metcalf, 24 February 1931, HC Box 56. 
81 Although see Rowlands (ed.) God, Words and Us, Chapter 3, for discussions about how today’s 
non-theist Quakers maintain faith in the Quaker business method when there is no ‘God’ to guide.  
82 Jones, Testimony, 21; Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xxv. 
83 Jones, Spiritual Reformers, xxiii. 
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universality. A further explanation concerns differing expectations over what 
experiences count as ‘mystical’, as discussed in the next point. 
(4) Mystical experiences can vary in intensity. In Social Law, Jones acknowledges 
that the intensity of mystical experiences varies among individuals, writing that 
mystical experience is probably present to ‘some degree’ in everyone.84 In Spiritual 
Energies, the reader is assured that ‘the calmer, more meditative, less emotional, 
less ecstatic experiences of God are not less convincing and possess greater 
constructive value for life and character than do ecstatic experiences’.85 Indeed, the 
experience may be so ordinary that an individual does not recognize it as mystical: 
in New Studies, Jones writes of ‘the powerful testimony of inward peace which 
many a soul knows, even though no special claim of mystical experience is made’.86 
It is possible that Jones had William Littleboy in mind here, who, recall from the last 
chapter, experienced a sense of peace but claimed not to have had a mystical 
experience. 
(5) Mystical experiences are associated with transformation. Jones is absolutely 
clear that mystical experiences should be associated with the transformation of the 
individual. In Social Law, he stresses that progress towards union with God ‘is to be 
known by the increased enrichment of all the powers of our personality’.87 Likewise, 
in Testimony, ‘The highest traits of character we know in God are love, gentleness, 
tenderness and self-giving grace. Where the meeting of the soul with God brings 
forth such fruits in the life of a person as those, we may well believe the 
evidence.’88 Furthermore, mystical experiences can lead to the transformation of 
society: the ‘great mystics come back from their high moments with an imperative 
 
84 Jones, Social Law, 141. 
85 R.M. Jones, Spiritual Energies in Daily Life (Memphis: General Books, [1922] 2012), 15. 
86 Jones, New Studies, 46. 
87 Jones, Social Law, 155. 
88 Jones, Testimony, 160. 
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sense of mission in the world’, and even ordinary people who practice the presence 
of God find that ‘visions of service open before them’.89  
(6) Mystical experiences are ordinary. This association of mysticism with societal 
transformation suggests that mystical experiences will often be decidedly ordinary. 
In Social Law, Jones emphasizes that the mystic is contributing his human powers to 
the ‘divine Spirit’ in ‘normal daily life’,90 and thus mystics ‘have quiet strength 
supplied for tasks that ought to be done’.91 He identifies two problems in identifying 
mysticism with abnormal experiences such as visions, auditions and ecstasy. The 
first is that the mystics who had these experiences had a ‘peculiar psychical frame 
and disposition’.92 In fact, in some cases abnormal experiences are cultivated 
through ascetic practices that produce ‘abnormal persons’ and ‘hysterical 
constitutions’.93 The second is that mysticism’s association with ‘occult lore or 
abnormal phenomena’ brings the term into disrepute.94 He regrets that some saint 
of ‘quiet order’ did not invent ‘a winged word to name this co-relationship of the 
soul with God’.95  
(7) Mysticism requires care and attention to flourish but no special techniques. 
In Social Law, Jones suggests that social action makes an awareness of God (i.e. a 
mystical experience) more likely: ‘The simplest act of duty is good because it makes 
the Infinite God more real’.96 He does not, however, discuss how spiritual practices 
might foster this awareness, other than in relation to a Quaker meeting (see the 
next point).  In New Studies, Jones says that the mystic is ‘a person who has 
cultivated, with more strenuous care and discipline than others have done, the 
native homing passion of the soul for the Beyond’,97 but cautioned that ‘routine cut-
 
89 Jones, Testimony, 25; Jones, New Studies, 45. 
90  Jones, Social Law, 154. 
91 Jones, New Studies, 45. 
92 Jones, Spiritual Energies, 15. 
93 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xxviii. 
94 Jones, Testimony, 200. 
95 Jones, Testimony, 210. 
96 Jones, Social Law, 154. 
97 Jones, New Studies, 15. 
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and-dried’ systems of discipline of the type that forge a mystic like St John of the 
Cross are ‘too remote from life to be satisfactory ways into the heart of divine 
reality’.98 What is important are ‘times of hush and meditation’ and ‘appreciation of 
beauty, learning how to sound the deeps of love, formation of purity, gentleness, 
tenderness of heart’.99 In addition, it is essential to have the ‘fellowship and 
influence of spiritually contagious persons who, beholding as in a mirror the glory of 
the Lord, unconsciously transmit that Life’.100 I return to this point in Chapter 10. 
(8) Mysticism flourishes best in a group. In Social Law, Jones discusses the 
importance of the corporate aspect of mysticism in some detail – this emphasis 
reflects Jones’ distinctively Quaker contribution to the conversation and will be 
discussed further in Section 8.3.3 below. He surmised that ‘There is some subtle 
telepathy that comes into play in the living silence of a congregation which makes 
every earnest seeker more quick to feel the presence of God, more acute of inner 
ear, more tender of heart to feel the bubbling of the springs of life than any one of 
them would be in isolation.’101 Furthermore, because religion and morality are ‘the 
consummate gains of the travail of the ages’, nobody ‘can cut loose from the 
spiritual group-life in which he is rooted without entailing serious loss’.102 In other 
words, the group is necessary both to facilitate experience of God and to provide a 
moral and spiritual framework for that experience.  
(9) Mystical experiences are culturally mediated. The fact that God can be 
experienced in all religions suggests for Jones that these experiences of God will be 
culturally mediated.103 He does not say this specifically in Social Law, but it is 
congruent with his comments about conscience (Chapter 5), which has a cultural 
component in addition to a divine ‘depth’. It is also congruent with his definition of 
 
98 Jones, Testimony, 29. 
99 Jones, Testimony, 22 and 29. 
100 Jones, Testimony, 30. 
101 Jones, Inner Life, 104. 
102 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xxxiv–xxxv. 
103 See Marshall, Mystical Encounters, 179 
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the Inner Light as being divine and human, in that we might expect the divine 
element to be expressed in a way that is particular to each individual. He is more 
explicit about this point in Studies in Mystical Religion, claiming that ‘the symbolism 
through which these inward experiences are expressed … all bear the mark and 
colour of their particular age’.104 
(10) Mystical insights need to be tested: Jones recognizes that in practice it 
cannot be assumed that what comes from the subconscious is divinely given. In 
Social Law, he devotes a chapter to how divine guidance can be tested within a 
Quaker meeting (discussed in Section 8.3.3). In Spiritual Reformers, he expresses 
this need to test intuitions in terms of the other elements of religion, namely reason 
and history: the mystical element may keep religion alive and vital, but its insights 
need to be supplemented with ‘the steady and unwavering testimony of Reason, 
and no less with the immense objective illumination of History’.105 
To summarize, Jones viewed mysticism as a conscious experience of communion 
with a personal God. This experience could vary in intensity but only rarely involved 
ecstasy or trances, these often being the result of ascetic practices. The individual 
mystic is transformed, coming to reflect the character of God, and is inspired and 
strengthened to do good and transform their community. Mysticism requires care 
and attention to flourish, but no special techniques (contra Underhill), and its 
intuitions need to be tested by reason and historical revelation (as per von Hügel). 
For Jones, it was exemplified by John Woolman (who would not himself have used 
mystical terminology): ‘Here was a mysticism – and it was the type to which I 
dedicated my life – which sought no ecstasies, no miracles of levitation, no startling 
phenomena, no private raptures, but whose over-mastering passion was to turn all 
he possessed, including his own life, “into the channel of universal love”.’106 
 
104 Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xxxiii–xxxiv. 
105 Jones, Spiritual Reformers, xxix. 
106 Jones, Middle Years, 201. 
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One of Jones’ contributions to the study of mysticism was to differentiate between 
negation mystics, who aimed at an experience of ecstasy, and affirmation mystics, 
who aimed to transform the world based on an encounter with God, and it is to 
these characterizations that we now turn. 
8.3.2 Negation and affirmation mysticism 
Mysticism for Jones, as we have seen, involves an experience of God, but this 
experience can be characterized by two distinct goals and attitudes.107 A negation 
mystic is, according to Jones, someone whose goal is to become absorbed in God. 
This type of mystic holds that God cannot be found in objects, or events in history, 
or states of consciousness, because these are all finite. They thus aim to transcend 
the finite, even their own ‘self’. As an example, Jones cites Eckhart, whose goal was 
to experience states of consciousness that approach a blank.108 
Jones has two objections to this type of mysticism. The first is Eckhart’s mistaken 
belief that whatever comes from beyond consciousness must necessarily come 
from God.109 The second is that it encourages individuals to live for a rare moment 
of ecstasy and ‘to sacrifice the chance of winning spiritual victory for the hope of 
receiving an ineffable illumination which would quench all further search or 
desire’.110 In other words, Jones seemed to view this approach as selfish and self-
indulgent because its goal is an overwhelming personal experience rather than 
spiritual victory, which, we can deduce from Jones’ comments elsewhere, would 
involve overcoming sin and serving others by doing good deeds. In that sense, 
negation mysticism did not reflect his view of God as love, nor his conviction that 
humans are part of a social group.   
 
107 Jones, Social Law, 148. 
108 Jones, Social Law, 151. 
109 Jones, Social Law, 151. This criticism is of interest because it could also be made of Jones’ own 
views. As suggested in Chapter 5, Jones viewed God as underlying consciousness and does not really 
have a satisfactory theoretical explanation of how consciousness can coexist with what is 'not of 
God' in an individual, although he acknowledges the discrepancy in practice. 
110 Jones, Social Law, 152. 
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Affirmation mystics also seek an immediate, first-hand sense of God, but, in 
contrast to negation mystics, as a prelude to action and not as an end in itself: 
‘More important than vision is obedience to the vision.’111 It is a mysticism of 
everyday life in the sense that God is found not by negating the finite but in the 
finite.112 In fact, all human tasks can become ‘glorious’ because God is in them.113 
The goal is ‘to become one with God in a conscious union’.114 The implication here is 
that this is not a passive union, but rather one that involves transformation of will 
and character such that ‘Instead of losing our will we approach that true freedom 
where we will to do His will.’115 Note that this aim is an expression of one of Jones’ 
recurring themes, namely the concept of Clement’s ‘harmonized man’.  
The key point, then, is that, in line with Jones’ universalism, both negation and 
affirmation mysticism involve an experience of God. His distinction between 
affirmation and negation mysticism rests on attitude and practice, namely what the 
mystic does based on their experience. In this sense, his terminology is subtly 
different from that of pseudo-Dionysius, because for Jones everyone can have an 
experiential relationship with God, not just those who follow the via negativa.  
Furthermore, the boundaries between negation mysticism (or the via negativa) and 
affirmation mysticism are blurred in practice: ‘The great mystics have always saved 
themselves by neglecting to be consistent with this rigorous negation and 
abstraction. In their practice they have cut through their theory and gone on living 
the rich concrete life.’116 Jones’ letter to Wilmot Metcalf quoted in Section 8.3.1 
exemplifies this blurred boundary, in that Jones’ experience of the absence of 
thinking corresponds most closely to one associated with via negativa, although he 
undoubtedly classed himself as an affirmation mystic. One possible resolution to 
 
111 Jones, Social Law, 153. 
112 Jones, Social Law, 154. 
113 Jones, Social Law, 154. 
114 Jones, Social Law, 155. 
115 Jones, Social Law, 155. 
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this paradox may lie in the fact that Jones does not appear to consider that 
practices aimed at enabling communion with God beyond words or knowledge (for 
example silent prayer), and therefore associated with negation mysticism, could in 
and of themselves produce transformation such that a practitioner became more 
compassionate and as a result lived the ‘rich concrete life’ associated with 
affirmation mysticism. I consider this issue further in Chapter 10. The fact that 
Jones’ categories of affirmation and negation mysticism are in practice not distinct 
may be one reason why these terms do not seem to have been taken up by other 
scholars of mysticism.117  
Note that Jones’ obvious preference for affirmation mysticism is in line with the 
Social Gospel movement and the traditional Quaker emphasis on social action. 
These calls to action that may come through an experience of God need, however, 
to be tested. And this is an area where the importance of the group becomes 
apparent. 
8.3.3 Group mysticism and guidance 
Quaker practice has always revolved around times of silence, in which the 
communal aspect is paramount and, among other things, contributes to the 
discernment process. As John Punshon puts it in Quaker Faith & Practice, ‘People 
who regard Friends’ meetings as opportunities for meditation have failed to 
appreciate this corporate aspect. The waiting and listening are activities in which 
everybody is engaged and produce spoken ministry which helps to articulate the 
common guidance which the Holy Spirit is believed to give the group as a whole.’118  
Meetings in which the group as a whole is particularly aware of God’s presence and 
in which God seems to be speaking clearly are said to be ‘gathered’. The exposition 
 
117 Rock, for example, points out that Jones’ affirmation mysticism is ignored outside Quakerism, 
although he suggests that this is because Jones’ mysticism is so different from the traditional 
understanding (Rock, ‘Rufus Jones never did establish’, 52). 
118 Quaker Faith & Practice, 2.37 
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par excellence of this phenomenon, and one which brings the mystical dimension to 
the fore, is given by Thomas Kelly, a friend and colleague of Jones at Haverford. In a 
short essay entitled ‘The Gathered Meeting’, he writes that ‘In the practice of group 
worship on the basis of silence come special times when the electric hush and 
solemnity and depth of power steals over the worshipers ...  we stand together on 
holy ground.’119 The meeting may be silent, or may be characterized by several 
individuals speaking, drawing out a theme, but in such a way that vocal 
contributions enhance the spiritual atmosphere rather than merely breaking the 
silence: the silence and words are of ‘one texture, one piece’.120 Kelly describes 
these occasions using James’ four characteristics of mystic states: they are ineffable 
(they need to be experienced and cannot be described), noetic (they appear to give 
insights beyond the intellect), transient (they rarely last longer than half an hour) 
and passive (although a mystical experience may be facilitated by focusing the 
attention, for example, once in the mystic state an individual will feel ‘as if his own 
will were in abeyance’).121   
As we saw in point (8) in Section 8.3.1, Jones believed that communal worship 
helped each individual to experience God. He also believed that the group had an 
essential role in relation to the clarity it brought regarding guidance. Just as an 
‘ordinary painter’ needs to exhibit his work so that others can discern whether or 
not it is great, he explains, an ‘ordinary man’ must test his leading by the spiritual 
life in other men.122 Thus, I suggest, a gathered Quaker meeting can be seen as a 
corporate expression of affirmation mysticism in that it involves an experience of 
God that leads to action. 
But just how do Quakers discern if the guidance that seems to come from God is 
genuinely of divine origin? Jones does not set out his views systematically, but 
 
119 T. Kelly, The Eternal Promise (Richmond, IN: Friends United Press, 2006), 43. 
120 Kelly, The Eternal Promise, 53. 
121 James, Varieties, 380–381. 
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interestingly the criteria he proposes in passing are all found in Davis’ The Evidential 
Force of Religious Experience, the book considered in the previous chapter, in a 
section that discusses criteria for distinguishing ‘genuine’ mystical experiences from 
‘delusive’ ones in relation to an individual.123 First, for example, Davis refers to 
external consistency, such that experiences are proved real to their possessor 
because, unlike dreams, they remain with a person ‘when brought into contact with 
the objective realities of life’.124 For Jones, group mystical intuitions insofar as they 
relate to guidance are necessarily bound up with everyday life, so meet this 
requirement. Second, Davis’ requirement for consistency with orthodox doctrine is 
also met: Jones states that while individuals test their ideas by the revelation of the 
group, the group, in turn, tests their faith and spirit ‘by the larger revelation which 
has come through prophets and apostles and saints and martyrs’.125 Ultimately, 
however, guidance is to be judged, third, by the fruits criterion. This criterion is cited 
by mystics in all traditions, and involves the mystic developing a life marked by 
virtues such as ‘wisdom, humility and goodness’.126  Jones again applies this at the 
group level, asking ‘Will obedience to this prompting construct not only a better 
person, but a better social group, a truer and a diviner fellowship?’127 Finally, Davis 
points to the importance of an evaluation of the subject's psychological and mental 
condition; for example, St Teresa warned that subjects who are ‘melancholy’ or 
‘have feeble imaginations’ cannot be relied on.128 Jones applies this requirement 
too at the group level, observing that ‘If the meeting is rent by faction or is 
disturbed by stubborn and self-guided members the spiritual method fails to work 
perfectly.’129 
 
123 Davis, Evidential Force, 71–72. 
124 Davis, Evidential Force, 72. 
125 Davis, Evidential Force, 72; Jones, Social Law, 197. 
126 Davis, Evidential Force, 72 (cf. Gal 5). 
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In summary, one unique aspect of Jones’ view of mysticism is its corporate context: 
Quaker meetings have the potential to be a group expression of affirmation 
mysticism, in that they can be a communal experience of God that results in 
guidance for action, with this guidance being tested by criteria that are more usually 
applied to individuals. 
 
Conclusion 
Jones was convinced that Quakerism, which had at its heart an experience of God, 
was a mystical religion. He promoted this aspect of the Society, and by the 1930s 
mysticism was an element in the formation of many of the new meetings that 
emerged where he was read or heard.130 This mystical emphasis reflected the 
widespread public fascination with mysticism – a fascination that originated with 
Vaughan’s Hours with the Mystics, was fuelled by the Transcendentalists and given 
credence by James. Jones wrote prolifically on the subject throughout his life and 
engaged with the most prominent scholars of the time, many of whom he 
considered good friends.  
Social Law provides one of the earliest accounts of Jones’ views on mysticism. 
Neither here nor elsewhere, however, does he offer a formal definition of 
mysticism or set out his views systematically. With reference to the ideas in Social 
Law that are echoed in his wider corpus, I have argued that, at root, he understood 
it as a felt, decidedly ‘normal’ and ‘everyday’, experience of a personal God that is 
available to all. I have suggested that Jones made two distinctive contributions to 
the field. First, he differentiated between negation and affirmation mystics, with 
the former seeking God for the joy of the experience itself and the latter as a 
springboard for action. Second, he insisted that mysticism flourished best in a 
group: Quaker meetings enabled individuals to be aware of God’s presence more 
 
130 Appelbaum, ‘Protestant mysticism’, 14. 
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easily than they would alone, and allowed the guidance that emerged from this 
encounter with God to be tested. Quaker meetings at their best, then, are for Jones 
an example of group affirmation mysticism. 
This group affirmation mysticism is, I suggest, a historically contingent grand 
synthesis of many of the themes encountered in previous chapters. In Chapter 2 we 
saw that Jones took it for granted from childhood onwards that God could be 
experienced in everyday life. This conviction is at the heart of his view of mysticism. 
In Chapter 3 we saw that he was convinced of the importance of making faith 
consistent with modern thought. He thus defended his conviction that God could be 
experienced on the basis of the psychology of James and the idealism of Royce. In 
Chapter 4 we saw that he was convinced that God is characterized by love and is 
working through humans to build a better society. It is thus to be expected that God 
will guide individuals and groups in this endeavour, and this expectation is 
manifested in affirmation mysticism. In Chapter 5 we saw that Jones believed that 
conscience prompts individuals to respond to their particular social and cultural 
circumstances and that they are transformed to become more like God by 
habitually doing good deeds. We also saw that he viewed humans as social beings 
whose ideals and conscience are formed by society. Again, both of these beliefs are 
integral to affirmation mysticism: individuals transform their particular communities 
as a result of God’s guidance and in so doing are themselves transformed; and 
participation in a spiritual community is essential both for enhancing awareness of 
God and for testing spiritual intuitions that come from this awareness. In Chapter 6 
we saw that the ideals that inspire individuals and groups are those of Christ, whom 
Jones believed to be the ultimate revelation of the God who is guiding individuals 
and groups. Thus, the particular form of the action arising from affirmation 
mysticism is shaped by the example of Christ. Finally, in Chapter 7 we saw how 
these aforementioned convictions came together in Jones’ formulation of the Inner 
Light. This formulation has practical implications for how life should be lived, and 
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these implications ultimately find expression through the practice of affirmation 
mysticism. 
Note also that Jones’ affirmation mysticism incorporates the Quaker emphasis on 
the importance of the group as an aid to a conscious encounter with God and the 
traditional emphasis on social action. It also incorporates liberal Christianity’s 
emphasis on experience and the Social Gospel, and the academic and lay interest in 
mysticism. In other words, affirmation mysticism is an ingenious blend of Jones’ 
own experience and aspects of modern thought, Quakerism and liberal Christianity. 
It is thus clear that Jones’ views on mysticism cannot be considered in isolation from 
his wider thought, the historical context, and his own disposition and immersion 
within a form of Quakerism that expected to ‘have converse’ with a personal God. 
The consequences of failing to acknowledge this will become apparent in the next 









Reactions to the ideas in Social Law 
 
Our message must be a clear utterance and an evident practice of the great verities 
of personal contact with the Truth, of an indwelling divinity, and of that inward life, 
not as a foreign or external or supernatural thing, but as an inherent and elemental 
part of our being.1 [George Newman, 1907] 
Jones created an “inner light mysticism” in which the soul was its own authority, an 
elevated humanism which severed the inward light from Christ.2 [Carole Spencer, 
2007] 
 
Given that Social Law was the first expression of Jones’ highly influential views on 
the Inner Light and mysticism, the history of the reception of the book and its ideas 
is an important part of the history of Quakerism. The story is an intriguing one: 
Jones’ views, I will suggest, were initially criticized by evangelical Quakers and 
uncritically accepted by liberals; later, they were occasionally extended or 
interpreted in ways he might not have agreed with, and arguably laid the 
groundwork for a form of Quakerism that could self-identify as pluralistic. As far as I 
am aware, however, it is a story that has not been told in detail. 
It begins with an initial flurry of reviews in newspapers and Quaker journals, with 
personal letters to and from Jones, and with two early attempts (in an article and a 
book) to show how Jones’ thought related to key Christian doctrines. In the decades 
that followed, Jones, as we have seen, repeatedly returned to the theme of the 
Inner Light, and more recent engagement with his novel formulation thus extends 
 
1 Newman, ‘Divine immanence and Quakerism’, 157. 
2 Spencer, Holiness, 204. 
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beyond the presentation in Social Law. In the main, this engagement consists of 
passing comments in articles and books that criticize Jones and his brand of 
Quakerism for fostering humanism or making humans divine. Of particular interest 
here is a more sustained treatment by Hugh Rock on Jones’ mysticism. Rock’s 
interpretation of Jones’ mysticism as a logical appreciation of ethical principles that 
retains language about God as a gloss stands in opposition to the reading of Jones 
presented in the last chapter. 
This chapter will flesh out some of the main details of the story, roughly 
chronologically.  Section 9.1 surveys the wide range of reactions that were apparent 
immediately following publication, as expressed in reviews in newspapers and 
journal articles. Section 9.2 considers letters to Jones, from Quakers and academics, 
again revealing a wide range of reactions. Section 9.3 then considers how two 
Quakers, James Bean and Edward Grubb, related Jones’ ideas on the Inner Light to 
the Holy Spirit and the atonement shortly after the publication of Social Law.  
Section 9.4 considers more recent reaction to his ideas, in particular as they relate 
to attributions of humanism and to complaints that Jones made humans in some 
sense divine. The final section is a rebuttal of Hugh Rock’s 2016 interpretation of 
Jones’ mysticism. 
 
9.1 Initial reception 
As noted in Chapter 1, the publisher’s advertisement for Social Law sees the 
purpose of the book as demonstrating that to be a person means being bound up in 
organic relationship with many others, and that this social relationship stretches 
from earth to heaven, such that ‘God and man are also bound together in organic 
relationship’. 3 The book, the advert promises, ‘is full of optimism and good cheer’. 
Most of the Quaker reviews and letters written to Jones likewise recognized that 
 
3 Friends’ Intelligencer, 61 (3 December 1904), 49. 
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the most important point in the book was indeed this ‘organic relationship’ with 
God. Some, however, saw in this a cause not for ‘good cheer’ but for grave concern.  
9.1.1 Newspaper and journal reviews 
Jones’ biographer Elizabeth Vining devotes a chapter of her book to Social Law and 
includes an overview of its reception.4 Outside Quakerism, Vining reports, the book 
was reviewed across the country. The Boston Transcript concluded that ‘Philosophic 
insight and restraint combined with a rare gift of expression renders this book an 
interesting and valuable addition to the science of religion’. The Los Angeles Times 
was less enthusiastic, complaining that ‘The book lacks the clear conviction that was 
Drummond’s’. In London, The Nation had reservations about the ‘dashing’ American 
style, but concluded that ‘The beautiful and winning description of the way to God 
by one who has trodden that way may be of untold value to many an inquirer.’  
The Quaker reaction was wide-ranging. Conservative Quakers in Philadelphia 
opposed the book to the extent that it was banned from their library.5 The notable 
lack of a review of it in their journal, The Friend,6 means that their objections remain 
unknown, but it seems likely that they would have objected to Jones’ theorizing and 
to his emphasis on the human aspect of the Inner Light: Jones recalled being 
reprimanded by one Conservative Quaker, who told him, ‘Rufus, thee thinks too 
much!’7 The ‘liberal’ Hicksite journal The Friends’ Intelligencer, by contrast, 
published a fairly lengthy review by Henry Haviland. The review was mostly a 
summary with no critical analysis, but it praised Social Law as a ‘logical, limpid and 
convincing book’.8 Haviland recognized the centrality of the formulation of the Inner 
Light, rounding off his review with the observation that the book’s whole message 
 
4 Vining, Friend of Life, 110.  
5 Vining, Friend of Life, 109. 
6 Vining, Friend of Life, 108; see also Appendix A. 
7 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 26. 
8 H.M. Haviland, Social Law in the Spiritual World’, Friends’ Intelligencer, 61 (1904): 786. 
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can be summed up in the final phrase ‘God living through men, and men living in 
God’.9  
In Britain, The [London] Friend started off its review by proclaiming that Jones had 
‘struck oil’ in the title, but went on to deliver a cutting assessment that recognized 
the importance of the subject matter but criticized its analysis: ‘His exposition of 
this aspect of modern thought is worthy of most careful elaboration. The world 
awaits a competent expounder of the theme.’10 The reviewer recognized the 
potential controversy in Jones’ understanding of the Inner Light, pointing out that 
‘In discussing “The Inner Light” on pages 174–5 Rufus Jones throws himself open to 
question’, but offered neither a critique of the new view nor a defence of the 
traditional one.  
A few years post-publication, in 1907, George Newman wrote an article in the 
Friends Quarterly Examiner about Jones’ view of the Inner Light. 11 It left no room 
for ambiguity about Jones’ views: ‘Early Friends’, Newman wrote, ‘thought of the 
Inward Light as “a principle of God’s nature but not of man’s nature” as Isaac 
Pennington put it. Now it seems to us that Rufus Jones … made clear, once and for 
all, the conception that “the Inner Light, the true seed, is no foreign substance 
added to an undivine human life”.’12 This, for Newman, had implications for 
theology and for everyday life: he enthused that Jones’ emphasis on divine 
immanence was in line with the ‘new theology’, and reminded Quakers that the 
inward life could only be revealed in service for others.13 Acknowledging the 
difference between British and American Quakers, he expressed the hope that, 
 
9 Haviland, ‘Social Law’, 787. 
10 The Friend (London), ‘Social Law in the Spiritual Word’ (16th December 1904): 829. 
11 Newman, ‘Divine immanence and Quakerism’, 155. The article Newman refers to is Jones, ‘The 
divine presence in human life’. 
12 Newman, ‘Divine immanence and Quakerism’, 155.  
13 Newman, ‘Divine immanence and Quakerism’, 157. 
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whatever the effect on American Quakers, Jones’ reformulation would stimulate 
British Quakers and rouse them to their calling.14  
Jones was clearly disappointed by the initial sluggish and negative response to 
Social Law. He wrote to John Wilhelm Rowntree in December 1904 that ‘I am 
considerably tried over the awkward notice of my book in The London Friend. It 
could hardly have been worse. I should have welcomed a criticism that showed 
insight. But to praise the title and to say that it is a good subject for somebody else 
to work up is pretty bad!’15 Newman’s 1907 article elicited a more upbeat response 
though: in a letter that revealed his earlier disappointment, Jones admitted that ‘I 
was beginning to wonder whether there was any use trying to bring any larger 
points of view to the notice of Friends. All my attempts seemed to fall so flat that I 
questioned whether I was not wasting my time and ink!’ 16 He continues that his 
1907 article ‘Divine presence’ (see Chapter 7) was receiving ‘a slender, nagging sort 
of comment’ which quite depressed him but that he was pleased that Newman had 
recognized the importance and far-reaching implications of this new formulation of 
the Inner Light: ‘Thy study of it was the first word I had had which indicated an 
appreciation of its significance.’ 
In summary, these initial reviews (or conspicuous lack thereof in the case of The 
Friend) provide an informative first glimpse of how the reception of Jones’ view of 
the Inner Light would unfold. Regarding its novel formulation, pre-existing fractures 
within Quakerism meant that it received mixed reactions. The more ‘liberal’ 
American Hicksites and British Quakers embraced it, whereas Conservative Quakers 
rejected it. Regarding scope, the Inner Light was seen to relate to ‘new theology’ 
and to action in everyday life. Regarding its exposition, some saw it as ‘logical’ and 
‘convincing’, whereas for others it ‘lacked conviction’ or required a more competent 
 
14 Newman, ‘Divine immanence and Quakerism’, 156. 
15 To John Wilhelm Rowntree, 5 December 1904, HC Box 48 [see Appendix B]. 
16 Vining, Friend of Life, 109–110. 
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analysis. Clearly, then, much was at stake regarding a far-reaching, controversial 
idea that was set out in Social Law with questionable clarity. These factors perhaps 
make it all the more surprising that, as we will now see, there was not more critical 
engagement with its ideas. 
9.1.2 The process of acceptance 
In his reflection on Jones’ legacy, Cooper makes the observation that Jones’ views 
on Quaker mysticism were to be accepted rather than argued about.17 This attitude 
is certainly apparent in Newman’s article above, which seems to be advocating an 
uncritical response to Jones’ view of the Inner Light: for Newman it is more 
important to live out the implications of Jones’ views than to engage in debate 
about them.  
A number of reasons for this uncritical acceptance can be proposed. First, perhaps 
the general Quaker tendency to focus on praxis rather than theology meant that 
there were simply no other Quakers who were either willing or capable of offering a 
sustained critique or an alternative ‘liberal’ formulation. Second, the high regard in 
which William James was held may well have conferred authority on Jones’ view. 
Finally, in later years Jones himself had achieved considerable stature within 
Quakerism. Cooper recalls that his criticisms of Jones in a 1963 conference to mark 
the centenary of his birth caused a stir, with most Friends feeling that ‘any critical 
considerations were out of order’.18  
A few comments in letters to Jones suggest that his views gained ground almost by 
osmosis. Rowntree, for example, wrote to encourage Jones, assuring him that ‘Your 
book has taken great hold’,19 and Gertrude Ellis, who had attended lectures by 
Jones at Woodbrooke on material that would form the basis of Social Law, wrote to 
 
17 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 28. 
18 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 35. 
19 John Wilhelm Rowntree, 15 February 1905, quoted in Vining, Friend of Life, 109. 
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Jones that the ‘gift’ he had given was ‘a growing possession to the receivers’.20 
George Newman offers some explanation for why this acceptance was a slow 
process in a letter to Jones. It was, he thought, partly because readers did not 
understand the message and partly because they did not dare to trust it. ‘The 
dualism is still strong in English Christianity’, he continues, ‘but it is going!’21 The 
gradual shift away from dualism would undoubtedly make Jones’ views more 
acceptable, but the phrase about not daring to trust perhaps hints that emotional 
as well as intellectual factors were at play. In spite of the broadly positive view of 
human nature held by Quakers, for example, readers may have worried that seeing 
themselves as inherently related to God was a step too far.  
This broad variety of opinions is reflected in the letters Jones received. 
 
9.2 Personal letters 
Jones received letters about Social Law from a variety of correspondents, including 
Quakers, followers of ‘New Thought’ and psychologists. As we will see, their letters 
are on the whole positive, with the ones from psychologists offering more in the 
way of a brief critical engagement with Jones’ use of psychology. 
9.2.1 Letters from Quakers 
The letters from Quakers illustrate the different attitudes to modern thought and 
certain elements of Christian doctrine within the Society. The British liberal Quaker 
Joan Fry (1905), for example, was delighted with Jones’ engagement with modern 
thought, enthusing that he had put the Quaker views ‘quite plainly in the direct line 
of what one may call philosophical development’ and expressing her gratitude that 
he showed how ‘much that was merely instinctive, is really verified by the slower 
 
20 Gertrude Ellis, 19 December 1903, HC Box 7. 
21 George Newman, 15 July 1907, HC Box 10 [Note that the word I have interpreted as ‘dualism’ is 
difficult to read, so this point should be treated with caution; see Appendix C]. 
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methods of science’. She also praised Jones for making Quaker thought more widely 
known, reflecting that ‘We are often so imbued with an almost false humility, that 
we are afraid to set forth our views in the high place which we ourselves feel 
convinced that they hold.’22  
As noted in Chapter 5, however, Henry Newman, a prominent British Quaker who 
supported modernism, questioned Jones’ implicit assumption that all souls would 
be saved, pointing out that this contradicted Scriptural teaching that ‘immortality is 
only in God, only in Christ’.23 
We see here then that the strength and weakness of Jones’ approach as judged by 
these two Quakers are two sides of the same coin. For Fry, Jones’ strength was that 
his new formulation of the Inner Light was in line with the latest developments in 
philosophy and psychology. For Newman, although he might not have recognized 
the root cause, Jones’ use of psychology meant that the human–divine relationship 
was inevitably universal and therefore contradicted evangelical understandings of 
‘Scriptural teaching’. Newman’s mind would certainly not have been put at rest if he 
had read the next two letters considered, from men perhaps best described as 
being on the fringes of the core of conviction. 
9.2.2 Letters from ‘the fringes’  
As noted in Chapter 3, the ‘New Thought’ movement was popular in New England 
at the turn of the 19th century. Proponents emphasized the immanence of God, the 
availability of God’s power and the divine nature of humans. David Scull was a 
Quaker,24 but his letter reveals that he also clearly supported New Thought and was 
proud of his acquaintance with two of the movement’s founders, Henry Wood and 
 
22 Joan Fry, 13 February 1905, HC Box 9. 
23 As discussed by Dandelion, Introduction to Quakerism, 182, some Quakers were both modernists 
and evangelical. 




Horatio Dresser.25 He declares that Jones’ exposition of the relation of the individual 
ego to the Over Soul (Emerson’s expression that had so captivated Jones as a 
student; see Chapter 2) was ‘essentially one’ with the main features of New 
Thought, and notes with evident enthusiasm that Social Law was ‘permeated with 
the idea of the essential divinity of man’.26 So enthusiastic was he, in fact, that he 
offered to send Wood and Dresser copies of Social Law at his own expense. When 
James addresses New Thought in Varieties, however, he concludes that, although 
Wood and Dresser use Christian terminology, their view diverges from that of 
‘ordinary Christians’ and their idea of man’s higher nature is ‘decidedly 
pantheistic’.27 Given that Jones wanted to avoid pantheism, Scull’s endorsement 
may have given him pause for thought.  
Along similar lines to Scull, George Hohnan wrote to Jones on paper headed with 
the affiliation ‘New Church Evidence Society’, a society dedicated to spreading the 
teaching of Emanuel Swedenborg.28 Swedenberg (1688–1772) was a Swedish 
scientist and engineer who began to experience dreams and visions in his fifties in 
which he conversed with angels and spirits and took tours of heaven and hell; he 
saw heaven as open to all who loved God and acted benevolently and was 
resolutely anti-Calvinistic. ‘After reading your interesting book Social Law in the 
Spiritual World, I venture to ask whether you are at all acquainted with the works of 
Emanuel Swedenborg’, Hohnan starts, before surmising that Swedenborg’s thought 
on ‘the structure of the human mind, the organic communion of all humanity and 
the immanence of God in creation’ could not fail to appeal to Jones, and offering to 
send him a copy of ‘Swedenborg’s Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and 
Wisdom’.  
 
25 For a series of articles on New Thought, see H.W. Dresser (ed.), The Spirit of the New Thought 
(London: George G. Harrap, 1917). 
26 David Scull, 24 December 1904, HC Box 8.  
27 James, Varieties, 100. 
28 George Hohnan, 29 August 1907, HC Box 10. 
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Swedenborg was held in high esteem by Henry James, who passed some of his 
enthusiasm on to his son William, and by Emerson, who described him as the 
‘largest of all modern souls’.29 Given Jones’ dependence on Emerson and James, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Hohnan saw these points of similarity. Again, however, 
although Swedenborg had a Christian framework for his thought – Emerson in fact 
criticized him for remaining subservient to the Bible and Christian symbolism – his 
views were hardly mainstream.30 Although he was initially classed as a ‘mystic’ in 
the Encyclopedia Britannica he was soon reassigned as a ‘Spiritualist’.31 We have in 
these two letters, then, an early indication that readers were entirely capable of 
taking Jones’ thought in directions that he might not have anticipated or intended. 
9.2.3 Letters from academics 
Francis Peabody, the Harvard exponent of the Social Gospel, also saw the wider 
implications of Social Law. He wrote to Jones that ‘The main thesis for which you 
contend, of the “conjuncture” of the lesser life and the larger, and the “implications 
involved in normal consciousness”, seems to me to state the foundation of any 
national religion or social hope.’32 Peabody is thus marginalizing the Christian aspect 
of the Inner Light by associating it with religion in general, and emphasizing its 
social implications. His comments are thus consistent with a pluralistic and 
potentially humanistic understanding of Quakerism. 
Two other academics offered critical considerations. Thomas Harvey Haines was a 
psychiatrist and psychologist at Ohio State University, and sceptical about psychic 
phenomena (see Chapter 3). He advised Jones that ‘Personally, I should have been 
more cautious in my use of telepathy, or reference to it than thee on p. 189. It is a 
pity that the psychic researchers are in such ill repute. Thee handles the sub-
 
29 Schmidt, Restless Souls, 45. 
30 Schmidt, Restless Souls, 46. 
31 Schmidt, ‘Making of modern “mysticism”', 283. 
32 Francis Peabody, 12 December 1904, HC Box 8. 
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conscious very well, in leaving that subject as much in isolation as it is. It is a 
question whether it is an intricately valuable part of the work.’33 Haines’ comment 
about leaving ‘that subject’ alone is slightly ambiguous, but presumably he means 
‘telepathy’ rather than ‘the subconscious’. This reading would mean that Jones’ 
formulation of the Inner Light based on the subconscious as the shekinah of the 
soul would still hold for Haines, which would not be the case if he was referring to 
the subconscious, and it is in line with my assessment in Chapter 5 that Jones 
included more examples of unusual phenomena than were necessary when 
discussing the subconscious.  
Finally, there is the letter from George Coe considered in Chapter 5. Coe taught the 
psychology of religion at Northwestern University, Illinois, and, as noted, was 
troubled by the authority Jones gave to the subconscious, worrying that ‘At one 
point you seem to hold that there may be a shekinah of divine revelation within the 
subconscious; at another you seem to test this subconscious revelation by the fully 
conscious experience.’34 Coe is thus a rare example of someone who criticized 
Jones’ views from a psychological rather than a Scriptural standpoint, although even 
he seems to be questioning a point of detail rather than Jones’ fundamental 
assumption that God is found in the subconscious.  
In summary, the initial flurry of letters regarding Social Law suggests that the 
formulation of the Inner Light therein was open to multiple interpretations and 
evoked a variety of reactions. Some readers enthusiastically embraced an 
interpretation that suggested that humans could be considered divine, some 
rejected such an audacious idea, and some were cautious, wanting clarification on 
some points, or, perhaps, simply time to adjust. Furthermore, Jones’ new 
formulation was based on psychology, and it is notable first that there seems to 
have been no criticism of this as a strategy and second that engagement with the 
 
33 Thomas Harvey Haines, 6 January 1905, HC Box 9. 
34 George Coe, 7 April 1905, HC Box 9. 
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details came from academic psychologists:  Haines cautioned Jones about his 
treatment of telepathy, and Coe questioned the logic of Jones’ view that revelation 
came from the subconscious but needed to be tested.  
Of particular interest here is that the letters from Scull, Hohnan and Peabody 
suggest that Jones’ ideas were compatible with a religion that was not necessarily in 
line with the core of conviction. The next section thus explores efforts to relate 
Jones’ views to Christianity.   
 
9.3 Quaker engagement with the Inner Light in relation to Christian 
doctrine 
Edward Grubb and James Bean endeavoured to tie Jones’ formulation of the Inner 
Light to the specifically Christian concepts of the atonement and the Holy Spirit. 
Here I first consider Grubb’s book Authority and the Light Within, which was 
referred to briefly in Chapter 7. I then consider Bean’s short review of Social Law in 
Friends’ Intelligencer.  
9.3.1 Edward Grubb 
Edward Grubb (1854–1939) was an English school teacher, editor of the British 
Friend, and a friend of Jones. Grubb’s study of philosophy had led him to lose his 
evangelical faith – he recalls sitting in a back seat in the Yearly Meeting of 1880 in 
tears, feeling himself to be utterly alone and unable to believe one word of the 
ministry that was being offered – and he subsequently became committed to the 
liberal agenda.35 His book Authority and the Light Within (1908) acknowledges Jones 
and Social Law as providing the first steps towards a reformulation of the message 
of the early Quakers in regard to the Inner Light. It is likewise aimed at the general 
public rather than academics, but it extends and clarifies Jones’ thought in a logical 
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and lucid manner.36 The first part has chapters that criticize traditional Christian 
sources of authority (the Church, Bible, Christ); the second part expounds the 
Quaker understanding of the Inner Light (historical and the then present-day); and 
the final part deals with the relationship of the Light Within (Grubb’s nomenclature 
for Jones’ Inner Light) to reason, conscience, atonement and the Holy Spirit. Grubb 
is in agreement with Jones’ assessment of Barclay. The discovery of the early 
Quakers, he explains, was ‘that there is something of God in every person – a little 
piece, as it were, of the Infinite’.37 However, Quakers failed to express the idea 
adequately because of the weaknesses of Barclay’s Apology, which was cast in 
terms of 17th century dualism and took for granted the Fall and that man was 
absolutely lost and ruined.38  
Grubb’s chapter ‘The Light Within and atonement’ acknowledges at the outset that 
‘One of the oldest objections to the teaching of the Light Within is that it seems to 
make the Atonement needless.’39 He refers to Jones’ Double Search to counter this 
objection. Drawing on Jones’ assertion that God is reaching across the chasm 
through Christ, Grubb concludes that, far from there being any conflict between the 
Light Within and the atonement, they are complementary: ‘It is as we are reconciled 
to God, as He takes possession of us, that our spiritual eyes are opened to behold 
clearly that of which before we were but dimly conscious.’40 He goes on to illustrate 
this process from John’s prologue, explaining that the Logos has always been with 
man as ‘the Light that lighteth every man’, but that when the Word became flesh, 
those who have been ‘truly “hearing and learning” from the Father come gladly to 
this clearer Light’.41 In other words, the Light Within, which exists in every 
individual, enables an individual to recognize the clearer Light that is Christ. Thus, 
 
36 E. Grubb, Authority and the Light Within (London: James Clarke, 1908). 
37 Grubb, Authority, 76 (italics as in original). 
38 Grubb, Authority, 80. 
39 Grubb, Authority, 112. 
40 Grubb, Authority, 116 (italics as in original). 
41 Grubb, Authority, 116, 117. 
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the atonement is interpreted from an exemplarist point of view, but it is the Light 
Within that helps us to respond to and follow the example of the ‘clearer Light’ of 
Christ.  
Not surprisingly, given that Grubb draws so heavily on Jones, this interpretation is 
consistent with the key aspects of Jones’ understanding of the incarnation and 
atonement: God has always been present in creation; humans can follow ideals and 
the best ideals are exemplified by Christ; it is only because we know God that we 
can find God (because only like can know like). One might doubt, however, whether 
Grubb would reassure those who complained that the Inner Light made the 
atonement unnecessary: there is still some ambiguity (see my Chapter 6) in the fact 
that the Inner Light, albeit dim, still provides some illumination. 
Regarding the Holy Spirit, Jones, as noted in Chapter 6, has virtually nothing to say 
on the subject, the exception being his statement that the Holy Spirit is ‘the self-
communication of God, manifested in persons and producing a Divine–human 
life’.42 As previously noted, Quakers were ambivalent about the Trinity, and there is 
a certain amount of disagreement among scholars about whether or not the term 
Inner Light can be used interchangeably with the Holy Spirit.43  
Grubb addresses this relationship in his chapter ‘The Light Within and the Holy 
Spirit’, asking the key question in the opening sentence: ‘Is the Light Within identical 
with the Holy Spirit?’44 Before considering Grubb’s conclusion on identity, however, 
we first need to ascertain how he conceived of the Holy Spirit. In his analysis of 
Grubb’s view, Davie concludes that Grubb is in conflict with both the ‘core of 
conviction’ and the Quaker tradition. This is because Grubb is reluctant to use the 
term ‘person’ to describe the members of the Trinity, as to do so would mean 
seeing them as ‘conscious selves’, which would lead to an unacceptable tritheism. 
 
42 Jones, Social Law, 261. 
43 Cooper, A Living Faith, 24. 
44 Grubb, Authority, 120. 
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The core of conviction uses the term ‘persons’ in the Nicene creed, however, and 
the Quaker tradition, while sharing Grubb’s misgivings about the term ‘persons’, 
still insisted that God actually is Father, Son and Holy Ghost while being one God.45 
Davie’s assessment of Grubb’s position is borne out in Authority and the Light 
Within. Grubb writes that when Jn 7:39 says that the ‘Spirit was not yet’, the fourth 
Evangelist ‘cannot really mean that the resurrection of the Lord made a change in 
the Divine nature’. 46 Rather, Grubb says, the words represent ‘a strong and startling 
assertion of the new apprehension of God and of His presence that was now 
possible for men’. For Grubb, the Holy Spirit is ‘the source of Christian experience’ 
not a ‘metaphysical entity’.47 The Holy Spirit is associated with transformation, but 
is not a ‘Power’ that is added to men. This process of transformation reveals the 
true nature; that is, ‘The “I” which was “crucified with Christ” was a false and 
usurping self; the true self is the “I” which lives because “Christ liveth in me” (Gal 
ii.20).’48 This means, he says, that ‘the Holy Spirit is not only God but is also the 
immanent life of man’.49  Thus, it appears that for Grubb the Holy Spirit is identical 
to the Light Within, because the Light is likewise both divine and human (although 
he does not make this identification explicitly). Crucially, however, Grubb’s 
understanding of the Holy Spirit is not Trinitarian. Furthermore, although there is 
not much evidence to go on, Grubb’s view seems to be consistent with Jones’ 
statement on the Holy Spirit above. 
In summary, in Authority and the Light Within Grubb was attempting inter alia to 
show how Jones’ understanding of the Inner Light was related to the atonement 
and the Holy Spirit. He related the Inner Light to Christ by seeing it as that within 
human nature that recognized the true Light of Christ. And he identified the Inner 
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Light with the Holy Spirit, although his understanding of the Holy Spirit would be 
unrecognizable to most Christians.  
9.3.2 James Bean 
The relationship between the Inner Light and the Holy Spirit was also of interest to 
James Bean in his review of Social Law for Friends’ Intelligencer.50 Bean felt that 
Jones’ book was not so much a contradiction of Barclay’s view as an analysis of how 
the Holy Spirit performed its work. To make his point, he drew an analogy between 
spiritual growth and the growth of an acorn into an oak tree: ‘As the life of the 
acorn is quickened by first being still and passive in the ground, to be acted upon, 
and yielding to that which quickens it grows into a tree; so we are quickened by 
stillness and communion and yielding to the light which lighteth every man.’51 He 
went on to observe that the ‘life that quickens’ and the ‘life that is quickened’ 
cannot be the same, although they are united in development and growth, in the 
same way as ‘the sap and air and sunlight are united in the life of the tree and 
become one with the tree’. He then placed the analogy in an explicitly Christian 
framework, making a series of identifications: ‘The Holy Spirit is the present Christ; 
the present Christ is the Inner Light; the Inner Light is the life that quickens (Jn 
1:4).’52 Thus Bean’s identification between the Holy Spirit and the Inner Light, which 
explicitly mentions Christ and treats the Holy Spirit as an entity resembles a 
Trinitarian understanding. Furthermore, Bean’s perception of Jones’ work is not so 
much that humans are intrinsically divine but that they have the capacity to receive 
from and be transformed by God in a natural and organic way. This is less 
contentious than an assertion of divinity of essence, and more in line with early 
Quaker thought (cf. Barclay’s explanation of being ‘leavened’).  
 
50 J. Bean, ‘The “Inner Light”’, Friends' Intelligencer 62 (1905): 189–190.  
51 Bean, ‘Inner Light’, 190. 
52 Bean, ‘Inner Light’, 190. 
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The fact that Bean felt it necessary to deliver a Christian interpretation by 
identifying the Inner Light with the present Christ and the Holy Spirit, and to present 
this as his own interpretation (i.e. in opposition to readings that saw Social Law as a 
refutation of Barclay) perhaps suggests that he did not think that these 
identifications were clear enough in Social Law itself.  
Bean and Grubb thus represent different interpretations of Jones’ formulation of 
the Inner Light in relation to the Holy Spirit and Christ, arising in part out of their 
different interpretations of the Holy Spirit. Diverse interpretations, as we will now 
see, continued over the coming decades. 
 
9.4 Later reception of Jones’ view of the divinity of human nature 
Later commentators had material other than Social Law to draw on when critiquing 
Jones’ views. Here I consider three such later criticisms, by Martin Davie, Carole 
Spencer and Richard Ullmann. 
In his analysis of Jones’ Dynamic Faith in British Quaker Theology, Davie concludes 
that ‘Jones sees the possibility of direct personal experience of God as based on the 
nature and psychology of Man, whereas the Quaker tradition sees it as based on the 
supernatural activity of God.’53 As noted regarding the extract from Dynamic Faith 
discussed at the start of Section 7.3.1 in Chapter 7, it is certainly true that for Jones 
humans do know God by an inherent ability, and that this ability is explicable by 
psychology. But this is only because God is self-revealing. Jones never separated the 
activity of God from the receptivity of humans, as Davie seems to imply. I suggest 
that Davie’s criticism arises from the fact that he does not consider that Jones 
viewed the universe as fundamentally spiritual. For Jones, there is no difference 
between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’. (To quote the passage from ‘Why I enroll’ 
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294 
 
again, he was seeking to avoid the ‘defeative dualism of a two-world theory’.54 ) 
Davie’s reference to the ‘supernatural activity of God’, then, refers to a category of 
action that would not be recognized as discrete by Jones. 
In her book Holiness, Carole Spencer objects to Jones’ understanding of the soul. 
She ends her brief analysis of Jones and the Inner Light by quoting the final passage 
from New Studies about the soul being the light of man (referred to in Chapter 7, 
Section 7.3.1): ‘When the sun is set, and the moon is set, and the fire is gone out, 
THE SOUL IS THE LIGHT OF MAN.’55 She concludes that ‘Jones created an “inner light 
mysticism” in which the soul was its own authority, an elevated humanism which 
severed the inward light from Christ. Consequently, liberal Quakerism developed a 
humanistic confidence in the soul as supreme.’ There are two issues that need to be 
addressed regarding Spencer’s statement. The first is whether Spencer’s analysis of 
Jones’ thought is correct. The second is whether she is correct in pinning the 
direction taken by liberal Quakerism on Jones’ thought. 
Regarding the first point, it is certainly understandable why Spencer should point to 
the severance of the inward light and Christ from the passage she quotes. However, 
the passage needs to be seen in the context of its preceding paragraph, which, as 
noted in Chapter 7, links knowledge of God to a relationship with God. 
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 6, Jones believed that the God who dwells within 
us is the God that was most fully revealed in the historical Christ. In other words, by 
quoting this passage in isolation Spencer misses those connections that Jones does 
see between the Inner Light and Christ. Regarding the second point, she is broadly 
correct, given the consensus of scholarly opinion on the influence of Jones within 
Quakerism, the psychological turn (and its implications) that can be traced to him, 
and the interpretations of the divinity of humans that are apparent right from the 
publication of Social Law.  
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Indeed, the influence of Jones regarding psychology is apparent in Richard 
Ullmann’s slim volume Friends and Truth (1955). Ullman does not refer to Jones 
specifically, but his name is surely behind the observation that ‘For a long time it 
has been fashionable amongst us to decry the lack of psychological insight of our 
founding fathers because they had held that the Inner Light was not part of human 
nature but something given in addition to it.’56 Ullmann continues by criticizing this 
psychological turn, complaining that contemporary psychology has pushed our 
thinking in the direction of identifying ‘that of God’ with ‘something of man’. This, 
he continues, means that God is turned into an image within man’s unconscious 
mind, and religion necessarily becomes ‘a relationship between different levels of 
the human soul itself’.57 Ullmann insists, though, that ‘“that of God” is of God, not 
of man; religious experience is not a soliloquy of man with himself, but a 
confrontation of man with that which is infinitely greater than man at his 
greatest.’58  
Again, Ullmann’s criticism is understandable. William James might well have 
concurred in fact, given that, as we saw in Chapter 3, he had suggested that the 
‘more’ could be ‘a larger and more godlike self’.59 But once again I suggest that this 
is a criticism that does not reflect Jones’ thought. Consider, for example, the letter 
Jones wrote to Ellen Carr referred to in Chapter 4. Her conceptual difficulty of 
praying to a God who was within mirrors Ullmann’s complaint, but Jones, recall, 
likened prayer to sunlight coming through a window: ‘There can be a point of light 
from God break [sic] into our human souls, but there is infinitely more of Him 
beyond us.’60 In other words, prayer is far from a soliloquy. What Ullmann has done 
is to focus on the immanence of God, which is undoubtedly an emphasis found in 
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Jones, but to neglect the transcendence that is also apparent, at least in later works 
(see Chapter 4). 
This analysis of three commentators suggests that Jones might have avoided 
confusion if he had been more consistent and deliberate in linking the two sides of 
his various ‘mutual and reciprocal correspondence’ formulations regarding God and 
humans. He viewed the universe as fundamentally spiritual and as revealing a God 
who was both immanent and transcendent, but this is not always apparent. In other 
words, he might have avoided criticism if had expressed himself more carefully in a 
way that reduced the risk of his words being taken out of context. There is, in fact, 
one extant letter in which Jones recognizes this need for his writing to be 
considered as a whole. Violet Holdsworth, a close friend of the Jones family, must 
have taken him to task about an ambiguous statement that could be 
misinterpreted, and Jones responds as follows: 
Thou art quite right in criticizing my statement on p. 135 of ‘The Radiant Life’ 
that the ‘spiritual universe has man’s soul for the center’. It is a very loose 
statement and if it were taken out of its setting in the book it would give a 
wholly wrong impression. The entire book is evidence that I do not hold for a 
minute the Naturalistic-humanistic view. What I was meaning was that for our 
world of experience one must begin from within man’s spirit and not from 
without. But the way it is put and too loose and ambiguous and must be 
changed as soon as possible.61 
This need to take Jones’ work as a whole is worth bearing in mind as we consider 
our next commentator, Hugh Rock. 
 
9.5 A critique of Hugh Rock’s interpretation of Jones’ mysticism 
Rock argues that Jones on the one hand established the mystical origins of 
Quakerism and on the other rejected the mystical tradition. Jones, he says, 
managed this by effecting a theological conjuring trick in that the heart of his 
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religion was ‘a religious humanism comprising a rational ethics allied to a powerful 
social gospel’ that he termed affirmation mysticism.62 This meant that Jones 
‘aborted mysticism as the basis of Quakerism by keeping the name without the 
substance’.63 The claim is an important one regarding Quakerism’s purported 
identity as a mystical religion, especially for today’s non-theist Quakers, and in this 
respect it is notable that Rock has served on the steering group for the Non-theist 
Friends Network.64  
I will critique Rock’s paper first according to his main argument about mysticism, 
and second in relation to subsidiary themes, for example concerning his comments 
on Jones’ motivation, view of God, and view of Christ. In brief, I agree that Rock has 
grounds for concern: Jones did, as we saw in the last chapter, reject negation 
mysticism but keep the term mysticism. The main problem I see with Rock’s 
analysis, however, is that the definition of mysticism he adopts as standard does 
not mention God. This means that when he compares Jones’ view with this 
proposed definition much of what Jones believed and valued about God is lost. It 
also means that when Rock says that Jones did not adopt his (Rock’s) proposed 
definition, and therefore did not establish Quakerism as a mystical religion, all he is 
really saying is that Jones did not establish Quakerism as a mystical religion if Rock’s 
definition of mysticism is adopted.  With this methodology, it would be possible to 
adopt numerous definitions of mysticism and show that Jones did not establish 
Quakerism as a mystical religion in relation to them.  
9.5.1 Rock’s main argument 
Rock defines mysticism as ‘direct experience of fifth dimension dualism’65 and notes 
that here are three components to this definition: the fifth dimension (John Hick’s 
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term) refers to a dimension of reality beyond human senses; dualism refers to the 
ethicization of that dimension (in Plato, the fifth dimension is a source of moral 
good); and direct experience refers to the fact that although the fifth dimension is 
unknowable by human senses it can occasionally be entered or experienced. He 
then proceeds to characterize Jones’ mysticism in relation to this proposed 
definition. (Note that Rock renames Jones’ affirmation mysticism as ‘redirected 
mysticism’, as he, with good reason, contends that Jones’ terminology implies a 
‘speculative’ list of God’s attributes such as omniscience that Jones does not in fact 
provide.66) 
Rock views Jones’ (so-called) redirected mysticism as relying on logic rather than 
experience, in the sense that the fifth dimension is ‘no longer necessarily the source 
of ethical commands which seem to be actually felt in the sensual experience’.67 
Rather, the source of ethics is the dynamics of human relationships. Thus Rock’s 
view of Jones’ mysticism is a ‘logical’ appreciation of ethics.68 This, he says, is a 
formulation which no sensual mystic would credit as mystical experience, which 
means that Jones keeps the term mysticism but without any substance.69 This move 
enabled Jones to harness ‘a rational religion and social gospel under the seeming 
bridle of mysticism’.70 
I suggest, however, that Rock has misrepresented Jones’ view of mysticism, in part 
because his starting point is a definition of mysticism that has no mention of God. 
This approach is in direct contrast to the methodology I used in the last chapter, 
where my starting point was Jones’ own discussion of mysticism throughout his 
corpus. Thus, my methodology reveals Jones’ mysticism (and therefore his 
understanding of a mystical religion) on his own terms. As illustrated from the cited 
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quotations from throughout his corpus, Jones’ mysticism has as its central tenet an 
experiential relationship with a personal God.  
In addition to his questionable methodology for defining Jones’ mysticism, I suggest 
that Rock emphasizes the human, rational element in Jones’ discussions of 
mysticism, which is certainly present, but ignores Jones’ references to a relationship 
with God.  This unbalanced representation occurs because he bases his analysis on a 
few isolated quotations from Jones, citing material only from Spiritual Reformers, 
Studies in Mystical Religion and Social Law. This means that he does not give a full 
picture of Jones’ mysticism – notably, Jones’ everyday experiences of God are 
neglected. Furthermore, Rock fails to tie Jones’ mysticism to his views about the 
Inner Light, which means that he does not account for Jones’ view of the divine 
component in human nature. To illustrate the implications of these omissions, I now 
turn to look at some subsidiary themes in Rock’s paper, including his interpretation 
of Jones’ views of God, consciousness, the mystical tradition, Christ, and the Inner 
Light. 
9.5.2 Subsidiary themes 
God: Rock represents Jones’ picture of God as a fusion of the ‘Nature God’ of Plato 
and the ‘Community God’ that derives from ‘Jahweh, the God of the fortunes of the 
tribe’.71 Rock does not give any evidence from Jones’ work to support this assertion, 
but merely states that ‘Christianity is composed of two different Gods’.72 In Chapter 
4, I argued similarly that Jones’ views were a fusion of two concepts of God, but by 
using quotations from Jones and considering the historical context I identified these 
with the personal ‘Father’ of Christianity and the God of idealism as expressed in 
Royce.  Jones’ view of Christianity has certainly been questioned, but his 
appreciation of the personal nature of God is, I suggest, so fundamental that his 
thought cannot be understood without it. Rock’s neglect of the personal nature of 
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God in Jones’ thought therefore calls much of his analysis into question. 
Consciousness: According to Rock, Jones saw consciousness as ‘a product of human 
relationships in our moral and social environment’, and held that is was here that 
God was revealed.73 This makes him, in Rock’s term, a ‘social theist’. This is only half 
the story, however. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, although Jones believed that self-
consciousness developed within society, he also believed that the ultimate source 
of consciousness was God. To view consciousness only in human terms is to exclude 
God from the picture, which is not true to Jones’ thought and overlooks an essential 
part of his argument about how God and humans are related. 
Opinion of the mystical tradition: Rock states that Jones did not like the mystical 
tradition. This is misleading. As noted in the previous chapter, it is more accurate to 
say that he did not like what he termed ‘negation mysticism’. Affirmation mysticism 
as exemplified by Woolman, as an experience of God that resulted in action, was 
the very essence of life for Jones.  
Motivation to adopt the mystical tradition:  Rock implies that, although Jones 
disliked mysticism, he embraced it to resist the pressure exerted by Evangelicals to 
adopt a doctrinal creed, a situation brought to a head by the Richmond Declaration 
of Faith. Thus for Rock, Jones’ union of Quakerism and mysticism had the air of an 
arranged marriage to a foreign national: ‘Jones was attracted to the benefits of 
citizenship but he did not like the girl’.74 This rather cynical view does not reflect 
Jones’ self-assessment though. He says, ‘I began my studies of mysticism actuated 
at first by my interest in it as a historical phenomenon, but I soon discovered that it 
was the heart and essence of any religion for which I supremely cared.’75 In other 
words, Jones’ interest was first academic and then, once he had understood and 
associated mysticism with Quakerism, it became a passionate personal interest 
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fuelled by experience. Furthermore, although there were certainly tensions 
between evangelical and more ‘mystical’ interpretations of Quakerism, Rock’s 
reference to the Richmond Declaration is not clearly relevant, as this was finalized 
in 1887. Any outside factors that strengthened (rather than initially motivated) 
Jones’ popularization of mysticism arose, I suggest, from the wider interest in 
mysticism and Jones’ own experiential basis.  
The importance of mysticism: Rock discusses Jones’ definition of spiritual religion as 
set out in Spiritual Reformers. He asserts that for Jones ‘Spiritual Religion is 
composed of three parts: the mystical tendency, humanistic or rational tendency, 
and faith tendency.’76 He then goes on to point out that ‘Having formulated this 
new humanist, incarnation mysticism in which mysticism is supplemented and 
tempered by reason into a “wider synthesis” an unexpected feature emerges in 
Jones’ proposition. Mysticism is relegated to the status of an ornament…. It is “only 
one element in a vastly richer complex, and it must not be given undue 
emphasis”.’77  
As we saw in the last chapter, Jones did recognize that there were three elements in 
religion, in agreement with von Hügel. And he did recognize that mystical intuitions 
needed to be tested. But this is a long way from relegating mysticism to an 
‘ornament’. A page after Rock’s quotation in Spiritual Reformers we find Jones 
stating that these reformers ‘shared with enthusiasm the rediscovery of those 
treasures which human Reason had produced … in one way or another they all 
proclaimed that deep in the central nature of man – an unalienable part of Reason – 
there was a Light, a Word, an Image of God, something permanent, reliable, 
universal, and unsundered from God himself.’78 So by selecting a quotation in 
isolation what Rock has done is to overemphasize the role of reason and neglect the 
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associated relationship with God, the ‘mystical’ element. 
Definition of mystical experience: Rock refers to a particularly vivid religious 
experience Jones had as a young man when he was walking alone in Dieu-le-Fit and 
considering his plans for the future. It is an experience that is described by Jones in 
‘Why I enroll’ and Trail in College and that is recounted by Vining in her biography. 
Jones tells it in ‘Why I enroll’ as follows:  
I felt the walls between the visible and the invisible suddenly grow thin, and 
the Eternal seemed to break through into the world where I was. I saw no 
flood of light, I heard no voice, but I felt as though I were face to face with a 
higher order of reality than that of trees or mountains … I felt that I was being 
called to a well-defined task in life.79  
Rock refers to Vining’s account, which draws on the slightly different version in Trail 
in College. Commenting on it, he asserts that ‘This mystical experience does not 
qualify as mystical in Jones’ own terms of reference … he distrusted “audition of 
voices” as evidence of direct experience of God.’80 Note first that, although Jones 
did indeed mistrust auditions, this is irrelevant here, as this experience did not 
involve voices. The main point is that while this experience may not be mystical 
according to Rock, it is by my interpretation of Jones’ mysticism (because it is a felt 
experience of God). Crucially, in ‘Why I enroll’, Jones offers the incident as ‘a type of 
mystic experience which does not reach the stage of ecstasy and which seems 
affirmative rather than negative’.81 In other words, Jones himself viewed it as 
mystical. 
The Inner Light: Rock does not mention the Inner Light. I suggested in the last 
chapter, however, that Jones’ formulation of this concept as a fusion of human and 
divine elements is a crucial component of his understanding of mysticism. To omit it 
in discussion leads to a partial picture of mysticism because it leads to a neglect of 
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the divine element that Jones saw as part of human nature.  
Christ: Rock asserts that the word Christ operates as a shorthand for a set of ethical 
principles that includes concern for the sick and poor, inclusion of outcasts, and 
indifference to material wealth. As explored in Chapter 6, Jones’ Christology is 
certainly ambiguous, and his vision of Christianity undoubtedly has a strong ethical 
component. Christ was for Jones more than merely a set of principles, however: he 
was the ultimate revelation of God’s character. To divorce Christ from God, as Rock 
does, is erroneously to reduce Jones’ Christology to a purely secular concept. 
Mysticism and action: Rock suggests that the ethical call to action arose from 
human society. This is true in the sense that Jones insisted that conscience was 
culturally informed (Chapter 5) and that affirmation mystics were moved by their 
experience to transform the society in which they were embedded (Chapter 8). It is 
again only half the story though, in that Jones is clear that those ethical commands 
arose from God. Indeed, he was of the opinion that philanthropic activity 
untouched by God was liable to be ‘thin and weak’.82  
In essence, then, Rock offers a characterization of Jones’ mysticism that has no 
reference to a personal God. Jones’ mysticism is, in Rock’s interpretation, a logical 
appropriation of ethics rather than the experiential aspect of a loving relationship 
with God that leads to social action. Consequently, there is no sense that God 
transforms or empowers the individual, no indication that God might be 
encountered in a group, and no mention of how humans and God are in mutual and 
reciprocal correspondence. All these themes are leitmotifs in Social Law and indeed 
throughout Jones’ corpus and need to be accounted for. Rock has come to his 
conclusion by concentrating on a very small part of Jones’ writings, and by 
interpreting even this out of context. Rock accuses Jones of effecting a theological 
conjuring trick regarding mysticism by ‘keeping the name without the substance’. 
 
82 Jones, Quakerism, A Spiritual Movement, 136-137. 
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My analysis here suggests that it is actually Rock himself who has effected the trick, 
by proposing a characterization of Jones’ mysticism that cuts out its central thesis of 
an ethically concerned, personal God. 
 
Conclusion 
When Wilmer Cooper reflected on the legacy of Rufus Jones to Quakerism, he 
concluded that it could be summed up in Jones’ use of George Fox’s well-known 
phrase, ‘that of God in everyone’.83 As noted previously, the phrase encapsulates 
how humans and God are related and is closely related to the term the Inner Light. 
It is the main theme of Social Law and a topic that Jones returned to time and again 
throughout his life. The reception of Social Law itself and of the ideas it contains is, 
then, an important part of the history of Quakerism. This chapter has considered 
the reaction to (and extension of) Jones’ novel formulation of the human–divine 
relationship both immediately following the publication of Social Law and in the 
century afterwards. 
Clearly, Jones views were more popular with liberal than with evangelical Quakers, 
and this meant that, broadly speaking, they were more popular in England than in 
America, and more popular among the young and educated than among the old.84 
Evangelical Quakers criticized departures from traditional doctrine, whereas liberal 
acceptance seems to have occurred via a gradual but largely uncritical process of 
assimilation such that, as Davie points out, Jones’ view that the Inner Light was part 
of human nature simply became axiomatic.85  
A number of points can be made regarding how Jones’ thought was interpreted. 
First, it is essential to recognize that Jones refused to separate God from humans, 
 
83 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 31. 
84 Vining, Friend of Life, 122. 
85 Davie, ‘Reflections on an ecumenical pilgrimage’, 194. 
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the sacred from the secular, the inner life from social action.  As he put it in The 
Inner Life in relation to dichotomies such as these, ‘In place of the either–or 
formulations that force a choice between the halves of great spiritual realities I 
should put the living and undivided whole. Instead of selecting either–or, I prefer to 
take both.’86 This preference for ‘both’ means that his thought needs to be 
considered as a whole. His informal style, however, means that it is easy to quote 
one side of the ‘either–or’ pair out of context. Thus it is possible to find passages 
that seem to divinize humanity because they do not recognize the relationship of 
humans to a God who is self-revealing. And it is possible to find passages that seem 
to promote humanism because they emphasize the need for human effort but 
neglect God’s part in inspiring and facilitating that effort.  
Second, and related to the point above, readers who endorsed Jones’ view seem to 
have interpreted him in a way that reinforced their previous beliefs. Thus, Grubb 
and Bean interpreted the Inner Light in terms of their existing, but differing, views 
on the Holy Spirit. Scull and Hohnan, who were proponents of New Thought and 
Swedenborgianism, respectively, interpreted Jones as saying that humans were 
divine. And the non-theist Quaker Rock sees him as embracing an almost non-
theistic version of mysticism and humanism. There is a sense, then, in which Jones is 
‘all things to all men’. 
Third, there seems to have been little explicit recognition initially of the implications 
of Jones’ use of psychology for the relationship between Quakerism and 
Christianity, for example regarding how a psychological approach to the human–
divine relationship meant a divergence from the core of conviction in relation to 
universalism or Christology. By 1955, however, Ullmann’s objection in Section 9.4 
above links the use of psychology with a form of Quakerism that seemed to 
dispense with traditional Christian ideas about God. It was also at about this time 
 
86 Jones, Inner Life, 84. 
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that some Quaker ‘radicals’ were questioning whether Quakerism should be 
explicitly Christian.87 An exploration of the relationship between Jones’ 
psychological approach and the arguments of these radicals, which would require 
an analysis of liberal Quaker writings in the 1950s, is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, given that I have suggested that Jones’ psychologically informed 
view of Quakerism is potentially pluralistic, it seems reasonable to assume that a 
relationship of some sort does exist.  
Regarding how Jones’ thought is interpreted today, Wilmer Cooper makes two 
general points about Jones’ legacy in the United States in 2005 in relation to the 
phrase ‘that of God in everyone’. The first is that the phrase as used by most 
Quakers stresses the immanence of God and there is often little sense of the 
transcendence of God, which leads to ‘a kind of humanism’.88 This stress on God’s 
immanence can likewise be seen in many of the comments in letters and published 
works noted in this chapter. The second is that because Quakers today make little 
reference to Christ, the phrase ‘that of God’ can seem as if God is somehow 
‘parcelled out’ to everyone: God is conceived of like a puzzle, in that if you put 
together the piece in every individual you would have God. Again, this is an 
understandable reaction to Jones’ writings that is in line with the comments above.  
The fuller analysis of Jones’ thought presented in this thesis, however, suggests that 
neither of Cooper’s observations is an accurate representation of Jones’ ideas about 
God or the Inner Light. That is, although it can be seen how these interpretations 
could emerge from Jones’ writings, they do not represent the fullness of his thought 
but rather are unbalanced representations resulting in part from his informal style 
and theological naivety. Jones recognized that God was not only immanent but also 
transcendent, he insisted that he was not a humanist, and he saw Christ to be the 
fullest revelation of God breaking into the Universe. But he did not express these 
 
87 Davie, British Quaker Theology, 145ff. 
88 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 32. 
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convictions clearly and consistently. Aiken in fact makes a similar point in relation to 
Jones’ Christology, when he suggests that if Jones had explicitly referred his theistic 
humanism to its ultimate fulfilment in Jesus he might have kept liberal Quakerism 
rooted in its Christian heritage.89 
In essence then, while Chapter 7 argued that Jones’ arguments regarding the 
human–divine nature of the Inner Light were too superficial to be convincing, this 
chapter has identified a further complication, namely that his thought has often 
been interpreted or extended in ways that he did not intend, and, furthermore, that 
these interpretations have contributed to a form of Quakerism that is consciously 
pluralistic. Some possible solutions to the first of these remarks and some 
reflections on the second are given in the next, and final, chapter. 
 









Conclusion: Does Rufus Jones [still] 
speak to our time? 
 
I am convinced, however, that when the writer of a book succeeds in making God 
actually real to his readers his work immediately takes its place among the most 
constructive contributions that are made to the assets of the race.1 
 
There is little doubt that Rufus Jones left Quakerism a controversial legacy. While 
his engagement with ‘modern thought’ made faith credible for many Quakers, 
especially those who were young and well educated, others objected that his 
reformulation of the Inner Light brought into question the need for Christ and 
promoted humanism. Thus, while he has been commended for spiritually 
revitalizing significant parts of the Society, he has also been criticized for making 
Quakerism Christless. Furthermore, I have suggested that his engagement with 
idealism and psychology was one factor in the journey towards today’s pluralistic 
British Quakerism: while this journey has been welcomed by some, it is a cause for 
concern for others, and it certainly requires that many traditional Quaker practices 
need to be reframed within this new paradigm. 
In spite of the fact that Jones’ ideas, especially those on the Inner Light and 
mysticism, were sweepingly influential within Quakerism, and indeed had an impact 
on American spirituality generally, they have received little critical analysis. Initially, 
evangelical Quakers criticized him for departing from their biblically based beliefs, 
 
1 Jones, Pathways, viii. 
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but Liberal Quakers do not seem to have engaged in any great depth with what he 
replaced these beliefs with, nor questioned his attribution of authority to 
psychology: letters to Jones from Rowntree, Newman and Ellis give the impression 
that Jones’ ideas took hold gradually rather than being the subject of debate among 
liberals. In the decades that followed, some voices questioned his use of psychology 
(e.g. H. G. Wood) and his emphasis on mysticism (e.g. William Littleboy), but Davie 
and Cooper suggest that on the whole Jones’ views simply became axiomatic for 
Liberal Quakers. More recent studies of Jones have criticized his theory of the origin 
of Quakerism in continental mysticism, but have neither considered the evidence he 
provides for his formulation of the Inner Light nor analysed this formulation in 
relation to his thought as a whole in its historical context.  
My thesis has thus attempted to provide a systematic and critical treatment of 
Jones’ thought (which he himself often presents in a somewhat piecemeal manner 
and conveys in an informal, conversational style), to identify the influences on that 
thought from wider movements in philosophy, psychology and liberal theology, and 
to assess how he has been interpreted. My focus was on Social Law in the Spiritual 
World, which was Jones’ first explicit attempt to make Christianity (as he 
understood it) and Quakerism consistent with modern thought. His subsequent 
books encompass the spiritual life, mysticism, Quaker history and children’s stories, 
but to a greater or lesser extent they all revisit the themes set forth in Social Law 
from different angles. This book, then, provides a tractable distillation of his key 
ideas.  
My approach was first to identify the Quaker-informed spiritual, intellectual and 
experiential factors that contributed to Jones’ developing concept of God. I then 
discussed those elements of ‘modern thought’ that he sought to synthesize with his 
Quaker beliefs. These included, in particular, the liberal theology, psychology and 
idealism that Jones encountered at Harvard or through James. With this background 
in place, I analysed Jones’ attempted synthesis in relation to his views on God, 
311 
 
human nature and Christ. I then suggested that this synthesis found its way to the 
heart of Quakerism because Jones used it to reformulate the traditional dualistic 
interpretation of the Inner Light, and that this interpretation gained traction 
because Jones associated it with mysticism, a subject of widespread lay and 
academic fascination in early 20th century America. Finally, I considered the 
reaction and interpretation of his readers both immediately following publication of 
Social Law and more recently, referring to archival letters and published articles and 
books.  
I identified five factors that contributed to the controversy apparent in Jones’ legacy 
and to the diverse interpretations of his thought. 
(1) Although Jones is best described as a Christian theist, the theism he actually 
presents is multivalent. This is because he draws on the idealism of Royce, which 
can be interpreted as pantheistic, and the ‘more’ of James, which can be 
interpreted as an individual’s ‘higher self’. 
(2) Jones used James’ psychology to argue that humans and God are inherently 
related through the subconscious. This reliance on psychology meant that the need 
for and the uniqueness of Christ were brought into question. Furthermore, not only 
is his use of psychology selective and problematic, but the supporting evidence he 
provides for this psychologically informed view is too superficial to be convincing: 
the biblical evidence amounts to ‘proof texts’; the philosophical evidence would 
become outdated within Jones’ lifetime; and the universal experience of God 
implied by this view was not borne out in practice. 
(3) Jones had an experiential approach to Christianity, meaning that at times 
what he seems to be defending is not so much Christian doctrine as his own 
experience of God as present in everyday life. In this sense, he exemplifies James’ 
theory that people chose an explanation of the universe that reflects their 
temperament. I suggested that this is one reason why he minimized any sense of 
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separation from God and the impact of sin, both of which are important strands of 
evangelical Christianity. 
(4) Jones deliberately avoided theological concepts, which meant that he did 
not have the tools to address important theological issues, in particular those 
related to the differentiation between humans, Christ and God.  
(5) Finally, the fact that Jones was attempting to synthesize complex ideas and 
present them informally for lay people meant that he was vulnerable to being 
misinterpreted. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that he preferred to take a 
‘both/and’ rather than an ‘either/or’ approach to spiritual dichotomies. In 
particular, attributions of humanism arise because commentators fail to consider 
his work as a whole and/or fail to acknowledge that he viewed the universe as 
fundamentally spiritual. 
In this final chapter I summarise the main line of argument of the thesis in Section 
10.1. In Section 10.2, I consider how, a century and a half after his birth, Jones’ 
ideas are still relevant to a number of issues being discussed in the areas of 
spirituality and the relationship between science and religion. Finally, I offer a few 
closing reflections. 
 
10.1 God, the Inner Light and mysticism in Social Law 
I started in Chapter 2 by examining Jones’ childhood in a rural and spiritually vibrant 
Quaker community, noting that his ideas of God were shaped by the Bible and by 
experience – both his own and that of others. For Jones, God was characterized by 
love and was actively involved in guiding individuals to do good works, and he 
professed to have always been aware of God’s presence and to have taken it for 
granted that God communicated with his relatives and local Quakers. As a teenager 
at Haverford College, Jones’ reading of Emerson was a watershed event that 
convinced him that Quakerism was a mystical religion characterized by an 
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experiential relationship with God, and he developed an abiding interest in 
mysticism. He was deeply attracted to the idea of his teacher Pliny Chase in relation 
to the Inner Light, namely that an individual’s inner life formed a living junction with 
‘Eternal Reality’, and he interpreted Clement of Alexandria in a way that was in line 
with this interpretation of the human–divine relationship, using Clements’ phrases 
‘mutual and reciprocal correspondence’ and ‘harmonized man’ throughout his 
corpus. Furthermore, Drummond’s Natural Law convinced him that science could 
provide insights into God and the spiritual world. I concluded that a personal 
experience of God was integral to Jones’ theology and termed this his experiential 
basis. 
In Chapter 3 I provided some background on the aspects of ‘modern thought’ that 
Jones encountered after his student days. The Manchester Conference of 1895 
brought the liberal/modernist strand of Quakerism to prominence in England, and 
Jones spear-headed this agenda in America.  Liberal/modernist Quakers embraced 
science, and of particular interest to Jones was the new science of psychology, 
especially as propounded by William James, with whom he corresponded. James’ 
fascination with psychic phenomena contributed to his theory of the subconscious, 
and this, combined with his interest in Transcendentalism, led him to talk of a 
‘more’ in which we live and move. Many Liberal Quakers enthusiastically 
championed James and his work, while skirting over the issue of whether the ‘more’ 
was compatible with the Christian God. I suggested that the impetus for writing 
Social Law arose from Jones’ year at Harvard, where he encountered Josiah Royce 
and his theory of ‘the Absolute’, and Francis Peabody with his interest in the Social 
Gospel. I concluded that, although James’ theory of the subconscious and Royce’s 
idealism fitted with Jones’ experience of contact with a deeper reality, neither 
James nor Royce saw this deeper reality as necessarily personal or triune. The rest 
of the thesis investigated how Jones attempted to synthesize ideas from Royce and 
James with ideas about the personal Christian God. 
314 
 
I thus started in Chapter 4 by considering Jones’ view of God against the 
background of the personalism of Bowne and the impersonal language favoured by 
many prominent scholars of mysticism. I showed how Jones sought to synthesize 
the personal Christian God with the potentially impersonal God or ultimate 
consciousness of idealism using insights from James’ psychology. For example, 
Jones draws on James to argue that one aspect of consciousness is the ability to 
work for desired ends, and, by assuming that these ends are good, he implicitly 
assumes that God is characterized by love. What is clear from his treatment is that 
the biblical idea of the character of God and his own experience are primary, in the 
sense that psychology and idealism are made to fit the idea of a personal God who 
is implicitly assumed to be characterized by love. This means that although Jones 
assumes a Christian character of God, his theism is in fact multivalent. 
One of the key assumptions of Jones’ analysis of God is that God is the ultimate 
consciousness and that human consciousness is a finite expression of this ultimate 
consciousness. In Chapter 5 I therefore focused on the implications of this 
assumption for Jones’ views on human nature. Specifically, I looked at how Jones 
understood consciousness, the subconscious, sin, salvation, habit and conscience in 
relation to God and in relation to society. I concluded that for Jones humans are 
socio-spiritual beings. Thus, for example, consciousness originates with God but 
develops within society; and individuals can be transformed through habitually 
listening to and obeying the divine sense of ‘ought’ in a conscience formed and 
informed by society. I pointed out that Jones’ emphasis on the role of human effort 
resulted in attributions of humanism, but suggested that his deeply theistic 
perspective of human nature and belief in a spiritual universe mean that any label 
of humanism needs at the very least a qualifier such as ‘theistic’.  
Jones’ view of humans as socio-spiritual beings raises questions about the role of 
Christ. If humans are related to God by consciousness, what need is there for 
Christ? Chapter 6, explores this issue. My strategy was to compare Social Law with 
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Practical Christianity, published a few years before Social Law, and with The Double 
Search, published a few years after. I found that Jones’ Christology developed over 
this time period, as he came to attribute more authority to psychology and to use 
fewer doctrinal-sounding formulae. I concluded that in all three books he is clear 
that Christ is the supreme reflection of God’s character, that Christ draws people to 
God, and that the incarnation is an inevitable occurrence in a universe with a 
personal God at its centre. In other areas he is less consistent, especially in relation 
to terminology and psychology. In Social Law, he argues that some Christological 
doctrines are consistent with psychology. Specifically, the fact that Christ is both 
human and divine is an expression of the psychologically informed insight that (in 
Jones’ view) all humans are conjunct with God, and the atonement is an expression 
of the psychologically inspired insight that individuals follow ideals. Thus, Christ is 
not the second person of the Trinity but is related to God in the same way as 
humans generally, and it is not so much union with the historical Christ that a 
Christian experiences as inner strength and inspiration through the spirit that was 
supremely revealed in Christ. 
At the end of this chapter, I provided an interim summary of Jones’ view of 
Christianity, pointing out that Jones believed in a personal, loving God in 
relationship with humans through the subconscious and revealed primarily but not 
exclusively in the historical Christ. Furthermore, his understanding was not 
Trinitarian and was opposed to Calvinism, but has points of contact with aspects of 
Clement and recent work by the Orthodox theologian Christopher Knight. It was 
biblically informed, but took experience, idealism and psychology as more 
authoritative than Scripture. 
Having treated Jones’ view of Christianity in some detail, the groundwork was 
established to look at Jones’ distinctly Quaker contribution, namely his 




In Chapter 7, I discussed how Jones expressed the relationship between God and 
human nature in terms of the Inner Light. Having given some background on how 
the Inner Light has been understood through Quaker history, I critiqued the 
evidence that Jones gives for his proposal that the Inner Light was an inherent part 
of human nature rather than something ‘foreign’ injected into the soul. I concluded 
that the biblical, psychological and philosophical evidence that Jones provides is too 
superficial to be convincing. Furthermore, the universal experience of God that 
would seem to be suggested by Jones’ formulation does not actually occur in 
practice, and although Jones does address this problem in passing, he does not 
treat it in the detail that its importance warrants. A brief review of books written 
after Social Law revealed that Jones maintained this view of the Inner Light as both 
divine and human, even in the face of problems arising from the theories of Freud 
and Jung. Furthermore, he expressed it in different ways at different times, 
depending on the type of book he was writing. While Jones’ relatively 
unsophisticated arguments are appropriate for his deliberately informal style, the 
result is that a central tenet of Liberal Quakerism has somewhat shaky intellectual 
foundations.   
I then suggested that Jones’ ideas about the Inner Light gained traction within 
Quakerism because he linked them with mysticism. Mysticism, or more precisely a 
fascination with mysticism, was au courant in the first few decades of the 20th 
century, and provided a natural framework within which to express religious 
experience and the relationship between humans and God, or the Inner Light. In 
Chapter 8 I started by giving some historical context, tracing how mysticism evolved 
from being disreputable to a respectable field of research at the turn of the 20th 
century. I then introduced some of Jones’ contemporaries, namely Evelyn Underhill, 
William Inge, Friedrich von Hügel and Francis Peabody, briefly pointing out where 
their views differed from Jones’. I suggested that Jones viewed mysticism as a felt 
experience of God that led to action, and identified his unique contributions as the 
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terms affirmation and negation mysticism and his emphasis on the importance of 
the group. I argued that his view of mysticism can be seen as grand synthesis of his 
views on Quakerism, religious experience, Christianity and modern thought.  
Finally, Chapter 9 focused on how Jones’ ideas about the Inner Light have been 
received, extended and interpreted. I started by analysing reviews and archival 
letters in relation to Social Law, noting that right from the start his formulation was 
open to a variety of interpretations, some of which were in line with the view of 
human nature held by movements (such as New Thought) on the fringes of 
Christianity. I then looked at two attempts, by Edward Grubb and James Bean, to 
relate Jones’ ideas on the Inner Light to the atonement and the Holy Spirit. Next, I 
considered how Jones was interpreted in the decades after Social Law, noting that 
later commentators accused Jones of making humans divine, with Ullmann and 
Davie recognizing that this occurred because of his use of psychology. Finally, I 
critiqued an article by Hugh Rock that offers an interpretation of Jones’ mysticism 
that veers towards seeing God as a set of ethical principles rather than the loving 
father of Christianity. I suggested that these diverse interpretations occur because 
commentators sometimes fail to see Jones’ work as a whole and to acknowledge 
that, as he put it, he preferred to take ‘both’ rather than ‘either-or’ in relation to 
many spiritual dichotomies. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that Jones’ attempted synthesis drew together many 
diverse strands of thought – Christianity, idealism, psychology, mysticism, social 
action, personal experience and Quaker concepts – making it rich, wide-ranging and 
complex. Today, however, Jones’ ‘modern thought’ is no longer modern: idealism is 
no longer the prevailing philosophy, theories of the subconscious have revealed 
‘hissing serpents’, and liberal optimism suffered in the light of two world wars. The 





10.2 Does Rufus Jones [still] speak to our time? 
In 1951, Harry Fosdick, the American liberal pastor and radio broadcaster, lamented 
that his generation desperately needed to hear Jones’ message but that many of his 
books were out of print and Jones himself had ‘fallen on sleep’.2 His solution was to 
publish an anthology of Jones’ writings entitled Rufus Jones Speaks to our Time. 
Given Jones’ influence on Quakerism, we might well ask whether, more than half a 
century after Fosdick’s lament, Jones still speaks – to our own time.  
I suggest that he does, on three main topics. The first is the area of theological 
anthropology, in that Jones’ views of humans as socio-spiritual beings resonate with 
many current understandings of what it means to be human in relation to God. The 
second is the area of religious experience, in that underneath Jones’ somewhat 
dated mystical terminology he has a very broad picture of what religious experience 
entails. The third is the perennial question of how prayer and contemplation should 
be related to social action, in that Jones’ affirmative mysticism emphasizes that the 
two are mutually enriching. The following three sections are offered more in the 
spirit of a smorgasbord of topics for further research than as a comprehensive 
analysis. 
10.2.1 The Inner Light and theological anthropology 
I have suggested throughout my thesis that Jones’ evidence for his theory of the 
Inner Light was generally fairly superficial and easy to criticize. Had he been alive 
today, he might well have drawn on a number of developments in theological 
anthropology to defend his views. These developments might offer starting points 
for a more rigorous theological treatment of the Inner Light. 
Jones’ view of the Inner Light assumes that humans are socio-spiritual beings, a 
conception that is discussed from a number of angles in a volume of essays entitled 
 
2 Fosdick, Rufus Jones Speaks to our Time, v. 
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Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human 
Nature.3 Joel Green, for example, considers how biblical authors have considered 
both of these aspects of human nature. 4  He concludes that ‘It is axiomatic in Old 
Testament scholarship today that human beings must be understood in their fully 
integrated, embodied existence. Humans do not possess a body and soul, but are 
human only as body and soul.’5 Furthermore, the Old Testament insists that ‘human 
beings cannot be understood in their individuality’.6 Thus although Jones did not 
make use of the Old Testament, there are possible resonances with his view that 
humans are not dualistic and are socially embedded that could be usefully 
researched. Doing so might go some way to making Jones’ view of the Inner Light 
more acceptable to evangelical Quakers. 
Another area of current interest relates to Jones’ conviction that consciousness 
arises in God. Today this view falls under the remit of the ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’, namely the means by which a physical brain can give rise to 
conscious experience. Jones’ views would suffer in the hands of those such as 
Daniel Dennett, who have proposed naturalistic explanations for consciousness and 
deny that consciousness exists apart from the brain.7 He might, however, have 
found common ground with some propositions from Buddhism.8 The Mahayana 
Buddhist tradition, for example, holds that the psyche (the whole array of conscious 
and unconscious experiences that arise from birth to death) emerges from the 
substrate consciousness, which is characterized by bliss and non-conceptuality and 
 
3 W.S. Brown, N. Murphy & H. N. Malony (eds), Whatever Happened to the Soul? (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1998). 
4 J. B. Green, 'Bodies - that is, human lives': a re-examination of human nature in the Bible, in Whatever 
Happened to the Soul?  eds W.S. Brown et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998): 149–173. 
5 Green, ‘Bodies’, 158. 
6 Green, ‘Bodies’, 158. 
7 For a discussion of some of the issues regarding God and consciousness, see e.g. K. Birkett, 
‘Conscious objections: God and the consciousness debates’, Zygon 41 (2006): 249–266.  
8 See e.g. B. A. Wallace, ‘Buddhism and science’, in The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion, ed. 
P. Clayton (Online publication, 2009). 
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precedes this life and continues after death. This substrate consciousness in turn 
arises from primordial consciousness, which transcends individuality.  
Of course, Jones would have the same problems in reconciling his Christian view of 
a God characterized by compassion with a primordial consciousness as he did in 
reconciling it with the God of idealism. One possible way of effecting this 
reconciliation could be through research that has shown that long-term Buddhist 
meditators have physical changes in the brain that are associated with increased 
compassion.9 That is, it might be possible to link ideas about a primordial 
consciousness with a God characterized by compassion in a similar way to how 
Jones attempted to link the God of idealism and the Christian God through ideas 
about consciousness involving the ability to choose ends that are good, but now 
focusing on the compassion-related changes that occur in the brain through 
purported contact with God through meditation. As far as I know, however, the 
possible theoretical links between Buddhist thought and Jones’ ideas have not been 
explored in relation to a theory of mind. Given that Quakers have developed 
working partnerships with some Buddhist groups and that some Quakers self-
identify as Buddhist Quakers, however, this area might be worth exploring further.10 
Finally, recall that Jones’ understanding of mysticism is that religious experiences all 
involve an experience of God but are expressed according to cultural and personal 
expectations. Given that for Jones God was ultimate consciousness, we might thus 
expect that neurologically his views would be manifested in different individuals 
through similar brain activity that is interpreted in different ways. This, in fact, is 
precisely what was found by the neuroscientist Andrew Newberg: he conducted 
brain scans of Christian nuns engaging in centring prayer and Buddhists practising 
 
9 See e.g. C. Vieton, T. Amorok & M. Schlitz, ‘I to we: the role of consciousness transformation in 
compassion and altruism’, Zygon 41 (2006): 915–931 
10 For example there are links between the Woodbrooke Quaker Study Centre and Thich Nant Hanh’s 
community in France. See also S. B. King, ‘Religion as practice: a Zen–Quaker internal dialogue’, 
Buddhist-Christian Studies 14 (1994): 157–162.  
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meditation and found that the same neurological changes were occurring in both 
groups, although they interpreted the experience according to their beliefs.11 
Furthermore, Jones surmised, recall, that the lack of such experiences in an 
individual may be down to their ‘psychic disposition’. This hypothesis is in line with 
research by neurophysiologist Shanida Nataraja, who links the ability to have a 
religious experience with increased lability in the temporal nodes.12  
In summary, Jones’ conception of the Inner Light might gain credence through 
associating it with Hebrew conceptions of humans as spirited bodies, with Buddhist 
thought on the origin of consciousness, and with research into neurological activity 
and religious experience.  
If Jones is to be brought into dialogue with present-day researchers, however, it 
might be helpful to look beyond his mystical terminology, which was historically 
contingent. The following subsection suggests that in fact his understanding of 
mysticism maps readily onto present-day terminology regarding religious 
experience. 
10.2.2 Moving beyond mystical terminology 
Christianity holds that God communicates with people, whether this is seen in 
terms of the inner assurance of the Holy Spirit, or Christ within, or answered prayer, 
so Jones’ use of the term mysticism to describe an experience of God might be 
thought to be unnecessary. Is he not just describing the Christian life? Furthermore, 
Quakers now tend to use the term ‘spirituality’ rather than mysticism, potentially 
making Jones seem outdated.13 Here I return to Caroline Davis’ book The Evidential 
Force of Religious Experience (referred to in Chapters 7 and 8) to compare Jones’ 
descriptions of mystical experience with the six categories of religious experience 
 
11 A. Newberg and M. R. Waldman, How God Changes your Brain (New York: Ballantine, 2010), 48–
49. 
12 S. Nataraja, The Blissful Brain (London: Octopus, 2008), 79. 
13 Cooper, ‘Reflections’, 31. 
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she identifies.14 The comparison serves to show that Jones’ definition of ‘mystical’ 
experience is in fact very wide. 
(1) Interpretive experience: Davies defines this as an experience that is viewed as 
religious not because of any unusual features of the experience itself but because it 
is viewed in the light of a prior religious interpretive framework, for example taking 
an event to be the answer to prayer.15 For Jones, all life is potentially an interpretive 
religious experience, because God is intrinsically bound up with the world. In Social 
Law, for example, he says that the life of an affirmative mystic ‘is always like the 
palimpsest which bears in underlying writing a sacred text ... The slenderest human 
task becomes glorious because God is in it.’16 In other words, there is no line 
between the secular and the sacred, so all experiences can be interpreted as 
religious.  
(2) Quasi-sensory experience: Davis defines this as a religious experience in which 
the primary element is a physical sensation or that involves a ‘quasi-sensory’ event, 
such as a vision, dream or voice.17 Jones was generally distrustful of experiences of 
this type. As noted in Chapter 5, he appreciated that many curious phenomena 
could be explained by the operations of the subconscious, and in Finding the Trail 
he admits that although he was interested in dreams and visions and openings, he 
had learned to trust them ‘only so far as they can be tested and verified’.18   
(3) Revelatory experience: Davis defines this as an experience that includes a sudden 
conviction, inspiration or enlightenment.19 Jones embraces these. For him they are 
a natural experience akin to the way any ‘genius’ experiences a moment of 
intuition: as he puts it in Social Law, in the highest creative moments of a genius 
 
14 Davis, Evidential Force.  
15 Davis, Evidential Force, 33. 
16 Jones, Social Law, 154. 
17 Davis, Evidential Force, 35. 
18 Jones, Finding the Trail, 68. 
19 Davis, Evidential Force, 39. 
323 
 
there are ‘uprushes from below, invasions from regions beyond the ordinary self’.20 
He links these specifically to God in his discussion of the subconscious, which 
‘borders upon the infinite Life, rises out of it, and may receive “incursions” from 
it’.21 
(4) Regenerative experiences: Davis claims that these are the most frequent type of 
religious experience among ordinary people, whereby they experience new hope, 
strength, comfort and peace. These experiences can be mild or overwhelming, daily 
occurrences or extraordinary one-off events.22 Jones embraced both kinds, the non-
dramatic everyday experience and the extraordinary: as seen in Chapter 8, the great 
mystics may gain vision and strength to transform society but ordinary people can 
experience peace in everyday life.  
(5) Numinous experience: Initially defined by Rudolph Otto in Das Heilige, a 
numinous experience involves a sense of awe and ‘otherness’ but also a fascination 
and attraction to the numen.23 Das Heilige was published in 1917, more than a 
decade after Social Law, so not surprisingly the ‘numinous’ terminology is not used 
therein. Jones certainly appreciated Otto’s work, commenting that ‘Rudolf Otto has 
put all contemporary religious students into his debt through his extremely 
important book, Das Heilige’,24 perhaps suggesting that he recognized the 
experience Otto was describing. Perhaps he felt that Otto went someway to 
addressing his complaint in Social Law that there was no language to express 
religious experiences.25  
(6) Mystical experience: According to Davis, these experiences include an 
apprehension of ultimate reality, a sense of freedom from the limitations of time, 
 
20 Jones, Social Law, 124. 
21 Jones, Social Law, 111. 
22 Davis, Evidential Force, 44-45. 
23 Davis, Evidential Force, 48. 
24 Jones, Testimony, 55. 
25 Jones, Social Law, 145–146.  
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space and individual ego, or a sense of ‘oneness’ and bliss or serenity.26 In Social 
Law, Jones attributes this type of experience to a mystic: ‘In his highest moments he 
enters an eternal now, in which are past and future, near and far, the visible and the 
unseen – all one in a living unity of which he himself is an undivided, but a no less 
real part and parcel’.27  
It is apparent, then, that what Jones categorizes as mystical experience spans Davis’ 
six categories of religious experience, of which she defines only one as specifically 
‘mystical’. With the exception of the numinous, all are described in Social Law. This 
realization may open up discussion among Quakers and academics about Jones’ 
thought by casting it in more up to date and academically acceptable terminology. 
What is significant and typical of Jones regarding all the experiences described 
above though is that they provided inner strength for action. This leads us to the 
next topic, namely how religious experience is related to action. 
10.2.3 The relationship between spiritual practices and social action 
The relationship between social action and spiritual practices is one of timeless 
concern. It is expressed in the biblical story of Jesus’ visit to Martha and Mary (Lk 
10), and crops up regularly in books on the Christian life and contemplative prayer. 
Rowan Williams, in his recent short book Being Disciples, for example, defines 
discipleship as a ‘contemplative mode of life’, which involves growing into ‘a mature 
stillness, a poise and an openness to others and the world’ so that we can develop 
‘a transformative mode of living in which the act of God can come through, so as to 
change ourselves, our immediate environment, our world’.28 Jones likewise viewed 
these two components as inseparable, but his thought again has to be inferred from 
scattered comments. The following questions are useful to tease out his some of his 
insights.  
 
26 Davis, Evidential Force, 54. 
27 Jones, Social Law, 147. 
28 R. Williams, Being Disciples (London: SPCK, 2016), 17. 
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10.2.3.1 What actually are spiritual practices? 
As Vining points out, ‘there are no handbooks of mystical training to be found 
among Rufus Jones’s fifty-four book titles’.29 Jones certainly had a range of spiritual 
practices though. As we saw in Chapter 2, his childhood mornings started with ‘a 
long period of family silent worship’; he had a weekly rhythm of attending Quaker 
meetings; and he was deeply familiar with the Bible. These practices of prayer and 
Bible study continued long past childhood, as evidenced by a rare glimpse into 
Jones’ personal devotional life revealed in a letter that was sent to ‘all young 
friends’ in 1928 on behalf of the Extension Committee of Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting. The closing paragraph gives the following advice: ‘Should we not 
remember and practice Christs’ [sic] habit of prayer, and recognise the importance 
He attached to His message? We want to pass on to you the concern expressed 
recently by our friend Rufus M. Jones that Friends should more actively cultivate the 
individual devotional life by daily prayer and study of the Scriptures. Let us give God 
a chance.’30 Given that in Quaker parlance a ‘concern’ expresses a deep conviction, 
it seems likely that Jones would have practised what he preached and had what is 
often termed a daily ‘quiet time’. Furthermore, a comment in Life in College reveals 
that self-reflection was an integral part of his life: ‘by the end of my third decade I 
had learned the secret of withdrawal from the rush and turmoil of the world into 
the quiet cell of my inner self ... It had become a joy to reflect, to meditate, to be a 
silent spectator of the drama going on behind the “footlights of consciousness”.’31  
In later years, he appreciated that spiritual practices did not have to be exclusively 
Christian, writing in a letter to Edward Brown that in the future ‘The East will 
impress the West with its techniques of meditation’.32 Perhaps recognizing that 
 
29 Vining, Friend of Life, 260. 
30 Letter to All ‘Young Friends’ from The Extension Committee, Philadelphia, 21 March 1928. 
Available from Ancestry.com, US Quaker Meeting Records, 1681-1935 (Haverford College Minutes 
1927-1928; collection: Philadelphia Yearly Meeting). 
31 Jones, Life in College, 200. 
32 To Edward Brown, 6 March 1945, HC Box 59. 
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spiritual practices for him had at their heart a relationship with a personal God, 
however, he warned that meditation came with no guarantee that ‘at the end of its 
long hard road there will be the desired meeting place – the Bethel of the soul’.33 
Indeed, Jones was dubious about techniques and discipline in and of themselves, 
suggesting that ‘routine cut-and-dried’ systems of discipline of the type that forge a 
mystic like St John of the Cross were ‘too remote from life to be satisfactory ways 
into the heart of divine reality’.34 There is some tension here with the above 
comments about Jones’ daily practices, which undoubtedly required some 
discipline, but it is perhaps resolved if we understand Jones’ focus to be on a 
relationship with God fostered in silence rather than on, for example, breathing or 
sitting in a certain way.35  
In summary, perhaps Jones never wrote a ‘handbook on mystical training’ because 
it was not so much techniques that were important (although routine and discipline 
had roles to play) but an attitude to life that included times of reflection and saw 
and sought God and the means to transformation potentially everywhere.36 
10.2.3.2 How are spiritual practices related to transformation? 
It is clear that Jones envisaged that the Christian life would be transformational in 
regard to character – earlier chapters have discussed Clement’s concept of the 
harmonized man and Jones’ complaint that Barclay’s dualistic interpretation of the 
Inner Light left man ‘forever unspiritualized’. But how does this transformation 
occur?  
Jones’ comments in Social Law about negative and affirmation mysticism provide 
 
33 Jones, Testimony, 29. 
34 Jones, Testimony, 29. 
35 Martin Laird helpfully describes this difference in terms of gardening, in that gardening and the 
skill of coming to inner stillness both create the space for something to happen rather than being 
ends in themselves (M. Laird, Into the Silent Land (London: DLT, 2006), 53–54).  
36 This seeking of God in the everyday was part of the ‘presence mysticism’ associated with Jones 
(Appelbaum, ‘Protestant mysticism’). 
327 
 
some clues as to where he saw the vector of transformation lying. Both types of 
mystic, recall, search for God more assiduously than most, and this search, we can 
reasonably assume, involved various spiritual practices. However, only the 
affirmation mystic translates the resulting experience of God into action and thus 
wins ‘spiritual victory’, which, again it seems reasonable to assume, involves 
spiritual transformation (for example the ability to withstand temptation or to 
develop the ‘fruits of the spirit’).37 In other words, Jones seems to be implying that 
spiritual practice in and of itself is not transformative; rather, transformation occurs 
when the insights received as the result of this practice are obeyed. This, recall from 
Chapter 5, is consistent with what Jones’ view of the transformative effect of habit, 
in that actions that were once strained become second nature.  
Today, however, it is known that meditative practices themselves are 
transformative, in that they lead, for example, to increased compassion, decreased 
anxiety and improved health, with these shifts reflected in changes in the physical 
structure of the brain and in levels of certain chemicals and hormones.38 I suspect 
that Jones, in spite of his preference for the transformative effect of action, would 
have interpreted these discoveries in terms of his theory of the Inner Light, perhaps 
arguing that they pointed to the inherent relationship between God and humans 
being mediated by the brain and body, and to the spiritual nature of the universe. 
He might also have seen them as resolving the paradox he saw in Quietism, namely 
that although he regretted the lack of action associated with this tradition, he 
acknowledged that many Quietist Quakers, who spent much time in silent waiting, 
had radiant lives.39 
Finally, Jones’ comments on the transformation of society make it clear that he 
 
37 Jones, Social Law, 152. 
38 See e.g. J. Kabat-Zinn, Full Catastrophe Living, revised edn (London: Piatkus, 2013); C. Vieton, T. 
Amorok & M. Schlitz, ‘I to we: the role of consciousness transformation in compassion and altruism’, 
Zygon 41 (2006): 915–931. 
39 Pryce, ‘Negative to a marked degree’. 
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recognized that social action and spiritual practices needed to come together 
insofar as the former needed to have a tangible divine ‘feel’ to it. He contrasted 
divinely inspired and enabled service with religious activity that was ‘busy and 
nervous and “creaturely”, but without the depth and serenity which come from 
contact with the central Source of Life’,40 and pointed out that ‘Mere social 
propaganda and bare philanthropic activity untouched by a vision of the 
penetrating, co-operating presence of God as the resident power of all permanent 
advance are thin and weak.’41 It is this observation that is particularly relevant to 
today’s British Quakerism. 
10.2.3.3. What is Jones’ message to today’s Quakers? 
Today, transformation is still a key concept within Quakerism: Ben Dandelion’s 2014 
Swarthmore Lecture ‘Open for transformation’, for example, starts with the 
affirmation that ‘We, Quakers in Britain, are in the business of seeking personal, 
collective and global change rooted in our spiritual experience … The Quaker way is 
the way of transformation.’42 Note that Dandelion links transformation with 
spiritual experience. And it is certainly the case that many Quakers of all 
persuasions, theist and non-theist, embrace a range of spiritual practices from a 
variety of traditions, including but not limited to Christianity. This is apparent in the 
many courses offered at Woodbrooke (the Quaker study centre in Birmingham) 
within the category of ‘Spirituality and personal growth’, in the ‘Experiment with 
Light’ project devised by Rex Ambler, and in the writings of Jennifer Kavanagh and 
Curt Gardner, for example.43  
 
40 Jones, Testimony, 27. 
41 Jones, Quakerism, A Spiritual Movement, 136. 
42 B.P. Dandelion, Open for Transformation, (London: Quaker Books, 2014), loc. 44, Kindle 
43 For Woodbrooke course listings and a description of Experiment with Light, see 
https://www.woodbrooke.org.uk/. Examples of books on Quaker spirituality include C. Gardner, God 




There is perhaps a danger, though, that if a theologically pluralistic Quakerism 
becomes increasingly united by ‘what we do’ rather than ‘what we believe’ then 
this link could be lost. Indeed, Dandelion notes that Quakers are in danger of 
becoming a pressure group rather than a group of people led to transform the word 
out of, and through, experience of transformation. 44 Jones’ message to today’s 
Quakers, then, might well be to emphasize that, even if beliefs differ, Quaker socio-




Dorrien noted that Jones could be quoted either way on the question whether 
Quakerism should be Christian,45 and this thesis has gone some way to explaining 
why Jones’ position is so difficult to call: he diverged from the core of conviction 
and from evangelical Quakerism, so the question itself is ambiguous, and he 
expressed himself differently at different times, so his answer is too. Furthermore, 
although Jones himself associated the divine component of the Inner Light with the 
Christian God, others could legitimately associate it with the ‘Absolute’ of Royce or 
the ‘larger and more godlike self’ of James.46  
It is perhaps a fool’s errand to speculate on what Jones would have thought about 
the pluralism of today’s Liberal Quakerism – both individuals and the worldviews 
that form them change with time. I suspect, though, that he would have wanted to 
keep Quakerism grounded in the belief in a personal God, to find ways to make 
Christ’s example known, and to encourage daily spiritual practices, whichever 
religion they came from, as the ground of personal and societal transformation. 
 
44 Dandelion, Open for Transformation, loc. 827, Kindle. 
45 Dorrien, American Liberal Theology 1900–1950, 370. 
46 James, Varieties, 525. 
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Speculation aside, it is certainly the case that Jones’ main ideas, namely that 
humans are not dualistic, that action and contemplation are linked, and that 
Quakerism is the ‘way of transformation’, are scientifically credible and pertinent to 
ongoing discussions within both today’s Quakerism and theological anthropology. In 
spite of his influence and the continuing relevance of his ideas, however, his 
thought is relatively little known outside Quaker circles. My hope is that this thesis, 
by considering Jones’ thought in detail, in historical context, and as a whole, has 
gone some way to illuminating the spiritually inspired, psychologically informed and 
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Schisms in American Quakerism 
Figure A.1 Schematic of the schisms occurring within Quakerism, with very broad 
indications of the authority of the Inner Light. Based on Dandelion, A Very Short 














Major external influences EARLY QUAKERS 




GURNEYITES (US + Britain) 
Joseph John Gurney (‘the charmed banker’) 
Scripture > Light Evangelical; substitutionary atonement;  
no ‘hedge’; theology in 1887 Richmond Declaration.  
Friends Review (est. 1848) Two US strands apparent from 1860s  
ORTHODOX (US) 
Scripture ≥ Light Urban elite.  
The Friend Further split in 1840/50s 
 
HICKSITES (US) 
Elias Hicks (‘the mystical farmer’) Light > Scripture 
Rural. Later viewed themselves as modernists and then religious 
liberals. Friends’ Intelligencer 
CONSERVATIVE QUAKERS 
Christ/Light authoritative ~1500 
worldwide. Conserve Quaker 
traditions. Most in US 
LIBERAL QUAKERS 
Experience authoritative ~55,000 
worldwide. Includes non-Christian, non-
theist Quakers; most British Quakers 
 
EVANGELICAL QUAKERS 
Scripture > Light ~280,000 worldwide. 
Popular in Kenya, US. Known as 
‘Friends’ Churches. Pastors and singing 
WILBURITES (US) 
John Wilbur (‘the glum schoolteacher’) 
Scripture + Light Opposed Gurney; ‘hedge’; 






Rufus Jones  
Light > Scripture Post-millennial; 
wanted modern Quakerism.  
[American Friend (1894), FR+CW] 
REVIVAL/HOLINESS (US) 
David Updegraff   
Scripture > Light Pre-
millennial; revival meetings. 




17C: Contended origins of 
Quakerism (mystical? Puritan?) 
18C: Continental Quietism? 
LIBERAL/MODERNIST (Britain) 
Rufus Jones, John Wilhelm Rowntree, Edward Grubb 
Light > Scripture. Philosophical idealists; God as 
immanent; Social Gospel; stress on experiential 
knowledge. The Friend [London], Friends Quarterly 
Examiner 
QUIETIST QUAKERS 
Light > reason 







Significant dates and events in the life of 
Rufus Jones 
Page references are from E. Vining, Friend of Life (Forgotten Books, [1958] 2012). 
Publication years of books are from the list in Vining, 331–333. 
Year Page Rufus Jones Books by Rufus Jones Other events 
1863 17 Born 25 January in South China, 
Maine 
  
1873 27 Couch-bound for 9 months with 
injured foot/blood poisoning  
  
1878 30 Quaker boarding school (Oak Grove 




32 Scholarship for Providence Friends 
School (PA). Science with Thomas 
Battey 
  
1880 33 Death of his mother, Mary Jones   
1882-
1885  
35 Haverford College. Influenced by 
Pliny Earle Chase. Read poetry and 
Emerson in the library. Editor-in-
chief of the Haverfordian 
• Graduation thesis 




1885 44 Teaches Greek, Latin, German, 
surveying, astronomy, zoology at 
Oakwood Seminary (NY) 
  
1886 51 Travels in Europe, meeting Friends 
and going to lectures. Religious 
experience at Dieu-le-fit which 
convinced him to make the study 
of mystical religion his life’s work. 
  
1887 57 Teaches at Providence Friends 
School 
Visits John Greenleaf Whittier 
 Richmond 
Declaration of 
Faith drawn up in 
Indiana (Uncle Eli 
and others visit 
Jones on their 





1888 58 Marries Sallie Coutant   
1889-
93 
60 Principal of Oak Grove Seminary  
Reads Royce’s Spirit of Modern 
Philosophy and James’ Psychology 
• Eli and Sybil Jones: 






1892 61 Birth of Lowell (named after the 
poet) 
  
1893 63 Managing Editor of The Friends 
Review (Gurneyite) 
Takes up a teaching post at 
Haverford, where he remains until 
1934 
  
1894 67 Merges The Friends Review with 
The Christian Worker to form The 
American Friend. Edits the journal 
until 1912. 
  
1895 69   Manchester 
Conference – 
ideas carried 
forward by Jones 
1897 72 Attends (and is impressed by) 
London Yearly Meeting and then 
travels in Italy and Switzerland. 
Meets John Rowntree and agrees 
to write history of Quakerism, with 
Jones concentrating on mysticism. 
Returns to find Sallie ill with TB  
 First summer 
school held in 
England 
1899 75 Sallie dies • Practical Christianity 
(editorials from The 
American Friend) 




1900 80 Jones and James Wood finalise a 
document known as ‘Uniform 
Discipline’ in an effort to unite 
American Quakers 
Jones becomes engaged to 
Wood’s daughter Ellen, but she 
dies of typhoid a few months later 
 
 First American 
summer school 






85 MA at Harvard, studying under 
Thayer, Palmer and Munsterberg, 
auditing courses by Royce and 
Santayana, and forging a 
friendship with Peabody  












1901 89 Takes up Chair of Philosophy at 
Haverford, created especially for 
him 
Speaks at Scarborough Summer 
School 







Marries Elizabeth Bartram 
(Cadbury family) 
Offered but turns down the post 
of principal at Woodbrooke 
• A Boy’s Religion 
from Memory 
 
1903 99 Son Lowell dies while Jones is en 
route to lecturing at the opening 
of Woodbrooke. Religious 
experience on boat  
• (ed.) Autobiography 









John Wilhelm Rowntree dies soon 
after arriving to see Jones. 
Jones travels to England to discuss 
the History with Joseph Rowntree. 
Funding provided by Rowntree 
Trust  
  
1906   • The Double Search 
• Quakerism and the 
Simple Life 
 
1907 123 Time in England studying at 
Oxford. Hears W. James giving 
Hibbert Lecture 
Gives the first Swarthmore Lecture 
 Dean Inge: 
Personal Idealism 
and Mysticism 
1908   • The Abundant Life 
Quakerism: A 





1909 125  • Studies in Mystical 
Religion 
 
1910   • Selections from the 
Writings of Clement 
of Alexandria 
Death of William 
James 
1911 134 Studies in Europe researching 
mystics. Becomes friends with 
Rudolf Otto in Marburg 
• The Quakers in the 
American Colonies 









Editor of new journal Present Day 
Papers (PDP) 
Appointed to Board of Preachers 
at Harvard  
• Spiritual Reformers 
in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries 
 
1915? 147 Chairman of the Social Service 
Commission of the Interchurch 
Federation of Philadelphia 
(concerned with wages, housing, 
immigration) 
  
1915 152 Concussion, followed by a nervous 
breakdown 
  
1916 184 Elected chairman of the board at 
Bryn Mawr College 
• The Inner Life 
(editorials from PDP) 
 
1917 159 Instrumental in setting up AFSC. 
Becomes Chairman and remains 
deeply involved for 30 years 
• St Paul the Hero  
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1918 165 Visits France to help with AFSC 
work 
• The World Within  
1919   • Religion as Reality, 
Life and Power 





Gives his second Swarthmore 
lecture 
Conference in London on Quaker 
response to war and peace 
AFSC involved in feeding Germans 





• The Remnant 
A Service of Love in 
War Time 
 
1921 192  • The Later Periods of 
Quakerism (2 vols) 
 
1922 200 Knocked over by automobile, 
followed by quiet, prolonged 
mystical experience 
• The Boy Jesus and 
his Companions 
Spiritual Energies in 




Sabbatical travels in Greece and 
Holy Land 
Meets von Hügel in England 
  
1924 206 Dean and Mrs Inge stay with the 
Joneses in Haverford 
• The Church’s Debt to 
Heretics 





Visit to Asia (Japan, China, India) 
giving numerous lectures 
Meets Gandhi – incorporates 
some Indian thought from hereon 
(p. 223) 
• Finding the Trail of 
Life 
• Religion and Life 
Read Whitehead’s 




  • The Faith and 
Practice of the 
Quakers 
• New Studies in 
Mystical Rel Religion 
 
1928 224 Retires from board of AFSC but 
made honorary chairman 
• The New Quest  
1929   • The Trail of Life in 
College 
 
1930 236 Involved in the establishment of 
Pendle Hill (Quaker graduate 
school for religious and social 
studies) 
• George Fox, Seeker 
and Friend 
• Some Exponents of 
Mystical Religion 
 
1931 235  • Pathways to the 
Reality of God 
 
1932 233 Takes part in International 
Missionary Council Conference in 
Canton. Deliberations published as 
the controversial Re-thinking 
Missions 
• Mysticism and 






• A Preface to 
Christian Faith in a 
New Age  




1934 237 Retires from Haverford. Lectures 
at various venues in Europe 
• The Trail of Life in 
the Middle Years 
 
1935 263 Chairman of AFSC 





1936 268 Jones’ idea of a Wider Quaker 
Fellowship finally comes to fruition 
• The Testimony of 
the Soul (Ayer 
Lectures) 
 
1937 269 Presides over Quaker World 
Conference 
• Some Problems of 




Visited Quakers and politicians in 
South Africa to talk about race 
Talks with the Gestapo in Germany 
• The Eternal Gospel  
1939   • The Flowering of 
Mysticism 
 
1941   • The Shepherd who 
missed the Manger 
• A Small-town Boy 
• Spirit in Man 




1942 297 Awarded the Theodore Roosevelt 
Distinguished Service Medal 
  
1943   • New Eyes for 
Invisibles 
 
1944 295 Resigns as chairman of AFSC • The Radiant Life  
1947 306 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to 
AFSC 
• The Luminous Trail  













Selected extracts and transcripts of 
letters 
The following letters, from the Rufus Jones Special Collection at Haverford, have 
been selected because of their relevance to a variety of issues surrounding Social 
Law. I have generally included only a page of the original letter, thus saving on 
space while giving something of the flavour of the style and tone of the letter and 
therefore, perhaps, an echo of the author’s personality. In most cases, I have 
included my transcripts of the whole letter. 
The letter from Jones to John Wilhelm Rowntree was chosen because it gives Jones’ 
response to the reception of Social Law. That from Henry Newman (1895) is 
included because it describes the importance of the Manchester Conference. The 
letters from Newlin, Pritchard and Douglas give some insights into the fracture lines 
between evangelical and liberal Quakerism in the US pre-Social Law. The letters 
from Peabody, Henry Newman (1904) and his son George reflect the various 
responses to Social Law soon after its publication. That from Harris is included 
because of its warning about a Christless Quakerism. The brief notes from Gandhi 
and James are included because of their status as historically important figures. 
Finally, the letters from Underhill and Inge relate to Jones’ views on mysticism. 
Letters 
From Rufus Jones to John Wilhelm Rowntree (26 December 1904). On the review of 
Social Law in The London Friend. 
From Henry Newman (1895). On the Manchester Conference. 
From Thomas Newlin (5 July 1896). On being called an infidel for embracing higher 
criticism. 
From Esther Tuttle Pritchard (23 February 1900). The relationship between science 
and religion. 
From J.W. Douglas (13 February 1903). Complaints about Jones’ theology.  
From Francis Peabody (12 December 1904). Comments on Social Law. 
From Henry Newman (22 December 1904). The salvation of souls in Social Law. 
From William James (20 November 1906). Arranging a meeting. 
From George Newman (15 July 1907). The reaction to Social Law in Britain. 
From Rendel Harris (12 May 1908). Warnings of a Christless Quakerism. 
From Gandhi (28 May 1926). Invitation to visit. 
From Evelyn Underhill (9 January 1928). On differing views of mystics. 
From William Inge (12 June 1947.) On being a Quaker. 
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Jones’ letter to John Wilhelm Rowntree (26 December 1904). On the reaction to 
Social Law in The London Friend. 
My dear John 
The blessed season has brought me at last a few days of rest and I feel like a free man. I did 
not at all realize when I saw Ernest Grace’s death reported that he was so bound up with 
thy own family. I knew that it was a severe loss for the Society but I did not know it touched 
thee and Connie so closely. Poor fellow, thee has assuredly been called to face many hard 
experiences this autumn, and I am sure thee has known how to be a comfort to Connie’s 
sister in her dreadful bereavement. I wish I could in some way help such sufferers to find 
help and peace, for I know so well what it means to be staggered by an unexpected loss. 
There would be no use talking if there were not a heart’s certainty of ‘a more’ than our 
temporal span [?] 
…….. 
I am considerably tried over the awkward notice of my book in The London Friend [p.829 16 
Dec. 1904]. It could hardly have been worse. I should have welcomed a criticism which 
showed insight. But to praise the title and to say that it is a good subject for someone else 
to work up is pretty bad! The two pages which he questions are the cardinal pages of the 
book. If my criticism there is not sound the entire argument of the book falls through. It is 
just here that the critic ought to meet me and show either that I have performed a service 
or that I have attacked the sacred citadel. If the Barclay idea of the ‘seed’ is correct 
Quakerism has no message for modern thinkers. It rests in the last resort on something 
supernatural in the same way as the Bible does for the old time evangelical teacher. I had 
hoped that my book might at least set Friends thinking, but I expect that is too much to 
hope. 
Fortunately, it is welcomed outside the fold. The first edition is practically exhausted in six 
weeks and I have splendid letters from such men as Peabody, and [?] Hyde who are 






From Henry Newman (25 November 1895). On the Manchester Conference. 
Dear Friend 
The Manchester Conference will mark an era in the history of our Society in England. We 
have found for some years past that whilst our Home Mission work was laying hold of 
demands of the strong Anglo Saxon working men of our country and many of them were 
being converted & not a few being received into membership that our Church was losing 
grasp of the highly educated & intelligent young men and women belonging to our best old 
Quaker families who were receiving first class curriculums at College & then drifting 
theologically. 
If our Society was thus to lose its best, a few years might settle our fate. Every Christian 
church must face modern criticism & modern scientific thought. It is not the slightest use 
ignoring it by burying our heads in the sand. This conference is the effort for the first time 
in our Society to face this emergency & I want thee to quietly make the best & fullest use 
thou can of the double number of the ‘Friend’ (Conference Number) that we sent thee by 
Saturday’s mail. President Mills & others in your land have spoken to me about the future 
problems that confront us, which many good friends your side the stream do not yet dream 
of. But our church will have to face them to grow and to grow strong. The addresses by 
Rendel Harris & Thomas Hodgkin are golden. Thou wilt see my own remarks on page 771. A 
recent leader in the ‘Friend’ on Modern Criticism’ also gives my views in another 
department of the subject, but it may be rather strong for some in America. Use thy own 
discretion & may God guide thee. 




From Thomas Newlin (5 July 1896). On being called an infidel for embracing higher 
criticism. 
My Dear Friend: 
I never can tell you how much good your letter did me, which came to me yesterday. I 
sometimes get discouraged, but then I think of Christ’s brave[?] words ‘But for this cause 
came I unto this hour’ and take courage. I have some strong friends and they are in a 
majority in this meeting. I have been called ‘infidel’, ‘skeptic’, ‘unitarian’, and all such. It has 
been very hard for me not to grow vindictive and bitter among all this, but I am thankful to 
say that I have been victorious. Our young people are a unit with me so far as I know. I have 
been very careful in my teaching. The whole trouble has been on account of Dr. Ladd’s 
book ‘What is the Bible?’ Some think this is a dangerous question to ask. I wish the church 
could be made to see how cutting free from the old traditions makes the Bible a real book 
of life. I am not anchored to Moses, to Daniel or to Jonah, but to Jesus Christ. It would be 
amusing, if it were not so serious, to see what a ghost some people see in the term ‘higher 
criticism’, and at the same time have not the least conception what the term means. It is 
provoking to see a premium placed on ignorance as is often done in our church. But our 
faces are toward the light. We cannot go backward. I had a flattering offer to leave here, 
but I found no liberty except to hold the fort. The truth has made me free. 
I have in some degree realized the difficult position in which you are placed in editing our 
church paper, and I think you are succeeding admirably. It will not do to cast pearls before 
swine. The truth must often be given in small doses. I think it is important that our colleges 
be on progressive spiritual lines. Here is our hope, and I am willing to labor on giving our 
young people larger views and broader fields. ‘God wastes no history’ is a helpful thought 
to me. Thanking you again for your kind words and with full assurance of best wishes for 
you & your work. 




From Esther Tuttle Pritchard (23 February 1900). The relationship between science 
and religion. 
My dear friend, Rufus M. Jones 
Thy kind letter of the 21st came by the morning post. I am glad to know I did not oppress 
thee with my ‘much speaking’. I scarcely know what to say about thy request to be allowed 
to make extracts. I would sooner trust[?] the body of the letter beginning where I say I 
should be glad if those who speak of ‘doctrines’ & ‘pet-theories’ would be more explicit, & 
ending just before the concluding paragraph begins. However if thee prefers a different 
course, go ahead, only please let me see the extracts before thee publishes them, as 
selections may not convey the whole thought & I should be sorry to have to explain. I hope 
I am not quite like the [?] school children for there is respectable authority to which I can 
refer and I believe that God will yet vindicate His own book & save it from the scissors of 
the scientists. Of course I desire to be preserved from the [?] that once said the earth is flat 
& it does not revolve, the revelation of science notwithstanding. But I am very slow to 
receive  a theory that wipes out the record of creation & of man’s first disobedience & of 
the promised seed, & makes Gen I-III children’s legends. Besides, if the theory of evolution 
is accepted, I cannot see any place for an immortal nature in man unless one admits that 
the brute creation are immortal also. My own belief is that the creation seems passed like a 
panorama before the vision of the ? just as the future often used to unroll before the old 
prophets & the fact that the same order of creation is given in the Genesis account as has 
been discovered by science is also of might, as being hardly a happy guess. The story of 
Eden like that of the deluge may easily have passed down by tradition so that something 
like the Bible record and can be found in Chaldian inscriptions. However, whatever view we 
take, the situation is one of great gravity when we are told that the truths which God has 
owned for 19 centuries & attested by the ‘everlasting sign’ of our hearts are now making 
infidels and that we must teach differently if we would save the faith of the present-
generation to Christianity. If the scientists would be content to stay on their own ground & 
not invade the domain of theology with their generalizations the case would be different. In 
place of that, the [?] who have had [?] conquests in the realm of grace & have [?] the most 
trophies from the field & who have as much demonstrated the truth of the word as the 
scientist has demonstrated his theories, are asked to [?] & let science leap into the saddle*. 
I think it is a common experience that controversy develops bad blood & a wrong spirit & I 
deprecate it on either side, & I have been pained to see the feeling that is being [?] by some 
of our evolutionists toward those who against the [?] movement with shame. It does not 
impress me as the spirit of the Master, and I trust we who deplore it shall not be betrayed 
into even a semblance of it ourselves. And yet I believe the church of Christ is entering an 
era of conflict in which he who has no sound hath need to ‘sell his garment & buy one’. To 
be silent or to be neutral is to be disloyal to Christ & his truth. 
For thyself in thy responsible position, I do sincerely & affectionately ? the wisdom and the 
grace that the cause demands. Certainly no Quaker editor has held the [?] for sixty years in 
times so perilous. And never has there been more need, it seems to me, for our people to 
be[?] for the anointing that [?], in their study of the word & the emphasis of this [?] the 
Friend will surely be [?] I trust the saints of God of the past and the present may often be 
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heard speaking through the columns of the Friend, witnessing, to what has been 
experimentally wrought in their hearts. 
Thee says be ‘good’ to thee. Dear brother, am I not? It is in my heart to be so, & I say once 
more, the Lord bless thee according to the stress of present need and hold thy right hand & 
comfort thy heart. 
Have I ever told thee I am keeping a MS memoir of my dear husband to leave as a legacy to 
the founders? I am now midway in the last chapter & faithfully ask knowledge the gracious 
enabling of my faithful Lord in a task that has been testing to both heart and brain. 
Thine in Him 
Esther Tuttle Pritchard 
Margin note: Is it not as bad for science to fight Christianity as it is for Christianity to fight 










From J.W. Douglas (13 February 1903). Complaints about Jones’ theology.  
My Dear Friend R. M. Jones 
I cannot understand why thou should encourage the reading of the Books suggested in thy 
editorial of recent date, if they were all labelled Poison, and to be read as samples of 
unsound and dangerous teachings I could understand the object. It seems very remarkable 
that every Book recommended strikes at the very foundation of the orthodox faith. The 
fruit of the teaching has been destructive to the faith of large numbers. The drift seems to 
be away from our childhood faith, and from the tender conscientious teaching of our 
sainted mothers. What a minister is to gain by the teachings of these Books that will enable 
him to better save and build up the believer in the true faith I cannot see. If we receive the 
teachings we shall teach evolution ‘Drummond’ we shall teach that there was no Garden of 
Eden & no personal Devil ‘Fiske’ & by the same author that the incarnation & atonement 
are among the outworn beliefs & that the long life of Voltaire? as worthily ended amid 
words and deeds of affectionate homage Washington Gluddin ends as? Fiske 
These books ae recommended without the least hint of their fundamental errors. Can it be 
possible that thou would have us go with these teachers in calling in question the History of 
the creation of Man, the temptation and fall, the personality of Satan, the inspiration of the 
Scriptures, the Deity of Jesus Christ, and the Atonement. 
It has been with great pain that I have read these authors, but greater much greater pain 
because our paper should so boldly recommend them. I encourage boldness & courage in 
leaving the teachings of our mothers [?]. My Dear Mother was a educated cultural woman 
& a teacher for many years, a woman full of faith and the Holy Ghost & wisdom. She taught 
me faithfully from the Holy Bible, taught me to pray and prayed over me in my cradle & 
under God was my spiritual mother as well as natural mother, now after reaching more 
than three score and ten I am immovably settled in my childhood faith, which I have lived 
and preached for more than 50 years. 
These are stormy times, a new era dawns upon us, a new faith, a new theology is thrust 
upon us & will have its day, history is repeating itself, in fact new ethics, a [?] of worldliness 
is now very common in the churches which is in keeping with the lax faith, card playing, 
dancing, theatre going. Secret societies for both men and women. Clubs for women [Etc.?] 
All not only tolerated in the church but in many places encouraged & buildings filled up in 
connection with Church buildings to accommodate the world the flesh & the devil. 
I am sure that a crop of immorality will result sooner or later from this laxity in faith. It is 
appearing in some places even now. I am thankful to believe that as of old more than 7000 
have not bowed their knee nor kissed these idols. I have been quite sick for a month & 
suffered much, but am out again & hope to be in the [world?] soon again. I had been 
feeling quite comfortable about The American Friend of late & had so expressed myself to 
not a few, but I confess I was wonderfully shocked by the editorial I have alluded to. I am 
now clear what to look for next I cannot forsee, that our beloved [?] is drifting faster and 
faster from her ancient anchorage is true rejoicing many, & causing many great sorrow of 








From Francis Peabody (12 December 1904). Comments on Social Law. 
My dear Professor Jones: 
Your kind letter and your book reached me this morning, and though I have not yet read 
your book straight through I have at once given myself the luxury of a half-hour with it, and 
with unusual appreciation and happiness. The main thesis for which you contend, of the 
‘conjuncture’ of the lesser life and the larger, and the ‘implications involved in normal 
consciousness’, seems to me to state the foundation of any national religion or social hope. 
It gives me renewed courage in my own task to find how nearly your movement of thought 
coincides with my own. I must admit, that though the evidence of mysticism for many years 
seemed to me the most impressive, I have of late turned more confidently to the 
interpretation of moral life, and have found the implications of this consciousness involving 
a renewal of religious faith. There are many ways of approach to the great theme of which 
you write, and different minds must follow different paths, but of the general law which 
you reach and define there can be no question, either in validation or significance. I thank 
you truly for giving me an early opportunity to see what you have written and to express 
some sympathetic interest in it. It is a happiness to feel that you are in some sort one of our 
Harvard men. With kindest greetings, 
Cordially yours, 





From Henry Newman (22 December 1904). The salvation of souls in Social Law. 
Dear Friend 
I felt a great attraction in the title of thy new book, although in reading it, much of it 
reflected the addresses we listened to with such delight & sympathy, at Woodbooke. There 
is a side current running through it that puzzled me in receiving it, & that was a line of 
thought that seemed to run up to the conclusion that somehow all souls are going 
ultimately to be saved. It seems manifest that many die in their sins not having partaken of 
the essential new birth. Is there some process in the next state of being by which after a 
period of suffering these receive the new life through Christ? Is this thy view? Is it that no 
soul of man is ultimately lost. Is it true that every soul has inherent immortality? 
I do not mean that I think thou states this in thy book, but thou appears to leave the ‘way 
open’ for scholars to draw this possible conclusion. I think the teaching of Scripture is that 
immortality is only in God, only in Christ. Therefore if men die without having entered on 
the new life & higher life, the being ‘born again’, can they in the next state, receive life? 
There is a good deal in Scripture that (while recognising illimitable progress) seems to point 
to the direction the soul takes for death or for life, being determined here on earth & that 
the soul of the good grow better, & the souls of the evil grow worse in the future state of 
being. I avoided dealing with this point in my review because I thought it was better to let 
the main theme rest in the minds of the readers. 
With much love and New Years greetings, Thine as ever 












From George Newman (15 July 1907). The reaction to Social Law in Britain. 
My Dear Friend 
Thy more than kind letter was a great pleasure to receive. I got it just before Y.M. & ought 
to have acknowledged it long ago, but have been very busy over many things. 
The Social Law book has been very widely read in England & is having a wholesome effect, 
of that I am sure: though people have been slow to speak about it, partly because they did 
not understand it [the message], & partly because they did not dare to trust it. The 
dualism[?] is still strong in English Christianity – but it is going! 
I tried to get it out again at Y.M., & as the Friend did not fully report it I am printing it in the 
Frds Quarterly Examiner. Edmund Harvey & I had the writing of the [?] – I wonder what thy 
view of that is. It was a bit of an experiment but has been well received. O yes, we Quakers 
have been given something of a vision; if only, if only, we would proclaim it we might make 
the world just a bit nearer to a larger & truer thought of God. Now John Wilhelm has left us, 
some of us must buck up & do, even though it be only a little, something. The F.Q.E. does 
not quite give me the chance to keep hammering in – a quarterly is too infrequent, people 
forget the [?]! But my official work prevents me undertaking much more than the F.Q.E. 
Arnold Rowntree in his usual short cut says ‘then drop the official work’! O, these cocoa 
makers the three families cd. run creation. Well, I must not waste thy time. This is just the 
friendly greeting of an affectionate disciple –  





From Rendel Harris (12 May 1908). The dangers of a Christless Quakerism. 
Dear man, 
We shall probably meet at Y.M. so I will not go into matters further at present. Thy book 
will be of great service: but the quotations must be verified & certain dangerous tendencies 
warned against. Thee will see it for thyself in going about. A Christless Quakerism will 
neither save itself nor the people. 

















From Evelyn Underhill (9 January 1928). On differing views of mystics. 
My dear Rufus Jones 
It was a real joy to have your letter and greetings; for I feel it is a special happiness to have 
your friendship, & value keeping in touch. I am so glad you were not displeased at anything 
I said about ‘New Studies’. We do seem to see the saints from different angles – but they 
remain the same Saints; which after all is the main thing isn’t it? Duttons are publishing my 
new book ‘Man & the Supernatural’ in America shortly & I shall be telling them to send you 
a copy. Though I don’t think you will agree with my philosophy, I hope you will find things in 
it that you like. It like yours is dedicated to Baron von Hügel’s memory & really owes to his 
teaching any value it might possess.  
I wonder whether you have yet seen Bremond’s ‘Priere et Poisie’. If not, do please get it. I 
think you will like it vy much. Algar Thorold has just brought out an English translation. It’s a 
vy deep and subtle little book. 
With all good wishes for your work & happiness in the New Year. 
Always your friend 





From William Inge (12 June 1947). On being a Quaker. 
My dear Mr Jones 
Many thanks for your letter. But your kind gift of ‘the Luminous Trail’ has not arrived. I 
should like to see it very much. 
I have in the press a book on ‘Mysticism in Religion’ – philosophical and not a study of 
psychopathology. Like Huxley and many others I have been captivated by Indian thought as 
expounded by Radhadkrishnan and others. Just when we are losing India we are finding out 
how much we might have learned from them. My book is terribly senile – I have just 
entered my 88th year – but it takes my mind off public affairs, which as far as we are 
concerned are almost desperate. Lord Beaverbrook said to me, ‘We shall soon be very sorry 
that we went into this war’. I said ‘I am very sorry now’ 
I often think of our delightful visit to Haverford and of your kindness to us. Bernard Shaw 
told me that I am a Quaker, and I believe I am. 
Yours very sincerely    W.R. Inge 
 
 
 
 
 
